Equivocation, "As Such" versus Accident, and Being Simply or in a Certain Respect

Orientation #

The recording opens mid-sentence, already inside the example of the simply/qualified distinction; it is the end of the treatment of the kinds of mistake. He says “we’re going to philosophy of Nature next time,” hands out about eight copies of a text (not named on the recording), and asks the class to read the first page and look at the second. The previous episode treated the fourth dialectical tool and dialectical places (a fortiori, Phaedo).

The class, in order #

1. Being simply vs. being in a qualified way (“if you leave this room, you’re going to cease to be”) #

Point: accidental being is being “in a what limited and qualified way”; the fundamental distinctions of being are distinctions of this kind.

• Example: “If you leave this room, you’re going to cease to be” sounds like a threat; in court “Mr. Berquist” explains he only meant cease to be in the room — nobody hears it that way. Contrast: walking into the room this afternoon he did not “come to be” without qualification (he came to be when conceived); at death he will cease to be (soul goes on, “I won’t be around until the resurrection”); leaving the room he only ceases to be in the room.
• Same for the other distinction, act vs. ability: a pile of lumber is a wooden house “in ability,” a pile of bricks a brick wall in ability, but you would not say either is so “simply or without qualification.”
• Conclusion: substance/accident and act/ability are both distinctions of the simply/qualified kind. Understanding the distinction tells you what kind of mistake is being made; seeing the danger of the mistake makes you aware of the distinction’s importance, and it is “no kids’ play to avoid” — “people are making that mistake all day long.”

2. Knowing your mother (“do you know who’s knocking at the door?”) #

Point: a fallacy that “proves” you don’t know your mother, and the observation that more than one distinction can be at work in one case.

• Someone knocks at an opaque door; the student says “I don’t know” who it is; it is his mother; so “you don’t even know your mother.” Student’s diagnosis, accepted: he doesn’t know her as the one knocking at the door — in a qualified way she is unknown; he knows her “period.”
• Added: the same example has “something of the accidental too,” since knocking at the door is something that happens to his mother right now.
• Further: substance and accident are also two meanings of “being,” and act and ability two meanings of “to be” — so one can have more than one distinction and more than one fallacy “almost in the same matter.”

3. Two senses of “to be in” (“whatever comes out of matter is already in matter”) #

Point: some Greek philosophers confuse being in matter with being in place.

• What is in place is actually there; what is in matter is there only in ability. The Pietà is in the rough slab of marble (in ability, before Michelangelo shapes it); the table is in the room in a different way.
• “I’ve got you in my power” — another sense of being in. He says there are eight senses of being in and people often confuse them; only these three are named on the recording.
• The same Greek error can also be described as confusing being simply with being in some way (thinking things are actually in matter when they are only there in ability) — again, more than one kind of mistake and distinction in one matter.

4. Naming the fallacy (“simpliciter and secundum quid”) #

Point: the student asks what the fallacy is called; he gives the Latin and Greek.

• Student suggests “equivocation of the accident”; the name is simpliciter and secundum quid, in Greek haplōs.
• This is “a little bit hard” to get hold of at first — you need many examples to get a sense of the distinction. It is made “all over philosophy,” and the mistake can be made all over the place “by the unwary.”
• It belongs to the mistakes “in the things themselves, not in language.”

5. Choosing the bad because in some way it is good (“is abortion something good or bad?”) #

Point: moral choice of evil is always under the aspect of a diminished good, not of the bad as such.

• Abortion takes the life of an innocent human being, so bad; but it lets someone continue a career or finish college uninterrupted, so “in some very diminished sense” good. Murder: “you annoy me,” getting rid of an annoyance is good. Robbing a bank: money is good. Not studying: studying is uncomfortable, makes one restless.
• Student’s addition: some things are bad as such but appear good. He agrees: one chooses the bad either because in some way it is good or because it has an appearance of good — never “as bad.”
• Wife’s Italian relative, self-proclaimed mushroom expert; the feast ended with stomachs pumped: they did not desire poisonous mushrooms but good ones; the bad was desired because it appeared good.
• “People sin so they can go to hell”? No — you sin “because of some paltry good.”

6. The three mistakes to emphasize (“I’d like to emphasize those three kinds of mistake”) #

Point: recap of the three most important mistakes and why.

1. Mixing up the senses of a word (“most of all”);
2. mixing up the as such and the accidental;
3. mixing up what is so simply and what is so in an imperfect, limited, diminished sense. Reasons: how common and how dangerous they are, and because they correspond to three distinctions fundamental to philosophy.

7. Next time: philosophy of nature (“read the first page and maybe look at the second”) #

Point: the text for next time and how to study it — basic reading first, then “excursions.”

• About eight copies handed out; Michael will be joining; read the first page, maybe the second; “that’s as far as we’ll get at the most.”
• A doctoral thesis was written “just on these words”; he read it and did not think it did them justice — so the class can take time on them.
• His own history: studied these words with his teacher Kasurik at the College of St. Thomas, read Thomas’s commentary many times, thought “if there’s anything I know, it’s this”; at Laval (from 1958) De Koninck’s first-year lectures gave “a much deeper understanding”; then three years teaching philosophy of nature every semester at St. Mary’s (called by his brother Mark), and back at Laval he saw still more. De Koninck, teaching these since the 1930s, still saw something new each time; in class he would read a bit of the Contra Gentiles, stop, and explain how a modern philosopher misunderstood it.
• De Koninck coming down the hall, “a little child,” saying “Isn’t this wonderful?” — more wonder than anyone in the class, though wonder is supposed to come from what is new to you.
• Method: first a basic reading of the text, then go off the text on an excursion showing its universal importance; people measure what you’ve seen by how many words you’ve read, but “this little is a seed of so many things.”

His words #

• being simply / without qualification vs. being in a qualified, limited, diminished way — the distinction of this whole segment; simpliciter / secundum quid; Greek haplōs [ed.: usually paired with pē, “in a way”; he gives only haplōs]
• ability — the state of the lumber, the bricks, the Pietà in marble [ed.: potency]
• act — being there actually, as the table is in the room
• to be in — in place, in matter, “in my power”; eight senses claimed
• as such vs. accidental — the second of the three mistakes
• “mistakes in the things themselves, not in language” — where simpliciter/secundum quid belongs

Texts #

Read in class: none (the recording begins mid-discussion; the philosophy-of-nature text is handed out but not read). Mentioned: Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles (De Koninck reading it in class); “Thomas’s commentary” on the words to be studied next time (locus not stated).

His questions #

• When I walked into this room this afternoon, did I come to be? Only in a qualified way; I came to be when conceived.
• When you have a pile of lumber, do you have a wooden house? In ability, not simply.
• What’s the fallacy in “you don’t even know your mother”? He knows his mother, but not as the one knocking at the door.
• Is that in a way overlooking the distinction or not? Yes, the simply/qualified distinction — and something accidental too.
• What are the Greek philosophers confusing in “whatever comes out of matter is already in matter”? Being in place (actually) with being in matter (in ability); also being simply with being in some way.
• Is abortion something good or bad? Bad as taking an innocent life; good only in a very diminished sense, which is why it is chosen.
• Did they desire poisonous mushrooms? No, they desired the good ones; the bad was desired as appearing good.
• People sin so they can go to hell? No; because of some paltry good.