Summa I q.77 a.1: Is the Soul's Essence Its Power? Act and Ability, Properties, and Augustine's Hard Sayings

Orientation #

He refers back to “how we said last time when I distinguish those” wholes (prev. lecture) and to “what we saw in the De Anima” on the definition of the soul. He anticipates a.5 (“the soul is the subject of some powers, but other powers it has in common with the body”) and a.6 (powers flow from the essence). The previous class treated the soul as whole in the whole body and in each part (q. 76) and previewed q. 77; the next continues q. 77 into a.2.

The class, in order #

1. Proemium: the eight questions of q. 77 (“eight things are asked”) #

He reads Thomas’s prologue: the powers of the soul in general (q. 77), then in particular (from q. 78). The eight: (1) whether the essence of the soul is its power; (2) one power or many; (3) how the powers are distinguished; (4) their order to each other (“distinction always comes before order”); (5) whether the soul is the subject of all its powers (he anticipates: some it shares with the body); (6) whether the powers flow from the essence “like properties, like effects from the nature”; (7) whether one power arises from another; (8) whether all remain after death (“a question about the powers that it shares with the body”).

2. Article 1: the seven objections (“unusual to have that many objections”) #

Point: it seems the essence of the soul is its power.

1. Augustine, De Trinitate IX: mind, knowledge, love are in the soul “substantially” or “essentially” (substantia and essentia “used to mean what a thing is”); De Trin. X: memory, understanding, will are one life, one mind, one nature. He warns Augustine’s way of speaking about the image of the Trinity in us “might be a little misleading” out of context.
2. The soul is nobler than first matter; first matter is its own ability; so much more the soul.
3. Substantial form is simpler than accidental form — sign: it is not made more or less, “consists in something indivisible” (one man not more a man than another, one dog not more a dog, one circle not more a circle); but accidental form is its own power; so much more the substantial form which is the soul.
4. Sense power is that by which we sense, understanding power that by which we understand; but Aristotle, De Anima II, in the demonstration of the definition: the soul is that by which we first sense and understand.
5. Everything not of the essence is an accident; if the power is other than the essence it is an accident; against Augustine, De Trin. IX: these are not in the soul as in a subject like colour or figure in a body, since such things do not exceed their subject, but the mind can know and love other things.
6. Boethius: a simple form cannot be a subject; the soul is simple (not composed of matter and form, shown above); so the power cannot be in the soul as in a subject.
7. An accident is not the principle of a substantial difference; but sensible and rational are substantial differences taken from sense and reason, which are powers. Gloss: man is defined as animal having reason; man is what he is through his soul; so his soul must be his reason.

3. Sed contra and the first argument of the body (“ability and act divide being”) #

Sed contra: Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy ch. 11 — the angels are divided into essence, power (virtutem) and operation; much more the soul. Body: “impossibile est” that the essence of the soul is its power, “although some say this”. Two arguments. First argument:

1. There are two main divisions of being (to be seen “when we study wisdom”): by the figures of predication (substance, quantity, quality, relation…) and into act and ability; the two “crisscross”, since ability and act are found in every genus (he was able to be five foot ten before he was; able to be a logician; able to be a father).
2. Ability and act correspond: the ability to see to seeing, to hear to hearing. So act and ability of one operation are referred to the same genus.
3. The operation of the soul is not in the genus of substance: “my understanding is not what I am”, nor my loving, walking, seeing.
4. Only in God are substance and operation the same — so John can say “God is love”, but not I. Conclusion: the ability for that operation is not in the genus of substance but “in the category of quality, the second species”. Aside on how we know God from creatures: substance and operation are two thoughts in us that we must reunite by negating the creaturely distinction — his circle figure: lines from different points on the circumference end in one and the same centre; approaching from the circumference you have “two thoughts” of one point.

4. Second argument: the soul is an act (“act as such is not an ability”) #

1. By its very definition the soul is an act, “the first act of an actual body composed of tools.”
2. If the essence were the immediate principle of operation, what has a soul would always have the operations of life, as it is always alive.
3. As form, the soul is the last end of generation, not an act ordered to a further act; act as such is related to ability, not to further act.
4. But what has a soul is not always in the act of the operations of life; hence the definition says “act of a body having life in potency” — the operations of life in potency, a potency not excluding the soul. Conclusion: “nothing is in potency according to act insofar as it is an act”; the essence is not its power. He calls this “one of those subtle questions that Aristotle doesn’t investigate.” Student: what does “not always in act” mean? — sleep; the trees outside not now operating yet not dead; “when you and I are asleep, we’re almost like we’re dead” (“Sleep, thou ape of death” — Shakespeare “always comparing sleep to death”). Summary: the ability is “something added”, an accident, in the second species of quality.

5. Reply to obj. 1: soul as object, and the potential whole (“a middle between the universal whole and the integral whole”) #

First way: Augustine speaks of the mind as knowing and loving itself (the image of the Trinity: the Son proceeds as the Word of God understanding himself, the Spirit by way of love). Knowledge and love refer to the soul not as subject but as object, so they are “substantially in the soul” because the very substance of the soul is what is known and loved. Likewise “one life, one mind, one essence.” He compares hard ways of speaking even in Scripture (“firstborn of creatures” said of Christ, who is not a creature). Second way (“as some say”): the potestative or potential whole, which Aristotle does not treat explicitly in the fifth book of Wisdom but “I think he understands.”

• Composed whole (Thomas: integral whole) vs. universal whole: the composed whole is put together from its parts but not said of them (a seat or a back is not a chair); the universal whole is said of each part but not put together from them (a dog by itself is an animal). The universal whole is present to each part according to its whole essence and power; the integral whole is in no part according to its whole nature or its whole power, so is said of none, and if of all together (roof, wall, foundation of the house) only improperly (a student: like metonymy — “yeah, but just in a kind of proper speaking”).
• Potential whole: present to each part according to its whole nature but not its whole power; so said of each part “but not so properly as universal whole.” Thus memory, intelligence, will are “the one essence of the soul.” Application: the soul is in each part of the body in its essence but not all its powers (walking not in the eye, seeing not in the leg), whereas the whole nature and power of animal is in dog and cat.
• Further uses: soul divided into human, animal, plant soul as a potential whole (human has the full power, animal less, plant less); friendship divided into perfect, of pleasure, of utility. “That’s kind of a hard notion… you can see why Aristotle doesn’t bring it up.” Aside: Hilary of Poitiers, De Trinitate — the Father greater than the Son by his dignity as Father, but the Son not less; he finds this “a little strained” though Thomas quotes it.

6. Reply to obj. 2: first matter’s ability is in the genus of substance (“first matter is substance and ability”) #

The act to which first matter is in potency is substantial form, so matter’s potency is not other than its essence — its ability and its act (matter and form) are both in the genus of substance. But the soul’s ability to understand or to will is for an act not in the genus of substance; so, by the body’s principle that act and ability of one genus are paired, the soul cannot be its own ability while matter can.

7. Reply to obj. 3: heat to fire (“as heat is to the substantial form of fire”) #

He re-reads obj. 3: substantially “we’re all created equal” — one man not more a man, though one can be more courageous or taller. Reply: action belongs to the composite, as being does, for it belongs to what exists to act; the composite has being through the substantial form but operates through the power that follows on the substantial form; so the active accidental form stands to the agent’s substantial form as heat to the form of fire “in the old physics.” Student: “would it be the same as light to fire?” — “perhaps, but heat is maybe a better, simpler example.” He adds that this is like reply 2: now the ability and its act are both in the genus of quality.

8. Reply to obj. 4: first vs. proximate principle (“that by which we first sense and understand”) #

The accidental form’s being a principle of action comes from the substantial form (cf. a.6, powers flow from the essence); so the substantial form is the first but not the proximate principle. He notes his text omits “first” from the Aristotle quotation, “but it should be in there.” Do I understand by my reason or by my soul? Both: I have the ability to understand because I have a human soul (not a dog’s or a tree’s), but immediately by reason. Example: I teach geometry both by my reason and, more proximately, by the art of geometry in my reason. Shakespeare: “my understanding soul”; Hamlet on Horatio — “since my dear soul was mistress of her choice… her election hath sealed thee for herself”: he chooses by his soul, but proximately by his will; “the will is not in the body.”

9. Reply to obj. 5: two senses of accident (“nothing can be a middle between substance and accident”) #

Obj. 5 recalled; he notes it resembles Aristotle’s “the soul is in some way all things.” Thomas’s distinction (“this is logic”):

• Accident as divided against substance: divided by affirmation and negation (exists not in another as subject / exists in a subject), so no middle; the power, not being the essence, is an accident, in the second species of quality. The four species of quality from the Categories: habit or disposition (health, virtue); inborn power; sense qualities (red, hot); figure — Thomas explains their order in the Prima Secundae.
• Accident as one of Porphyry’s five universals (genus, species, difference, property, accident): genus, difference, species signify something inside the nature; property and accident outside it; the accident has no connection with the nature (can be present or absent), while the property is connected with it and follows upon it “like an effect”, belonging to one species, every member, always. So property is a middle between essence and accident, and the powers of the soul are between substance and accident “as natural properties of the soul.” Aside: Father Henri de Lac and Father Baumgartner (Laval, logic theses); de Lac despaired that students would ever see the two meanings of accident. Examples:
• Triangle green vs. triangle has interior angles equal to two right angles: green is known only by sensation, never reasoned from the nature; the angle sum is outside the nature but reasoned from it (Euclid: extend a side, draw the parallel, alternate angles equal, or exterior angle equals the two opposite) — a property vs. a predicable accident.
• Two is half of four: two is in quantity, half of four in the fourth category, relation (pros ti, ad aliquid, “towards something”; cf. John’s Gospel, the Word “towards God”). Socrates’ Euthyphro question: is it two because half of four, or half of four because two? — the latter; else why not a third of six, a fourth of eight? What makes two is adding one to one; the relations follow. So the powers are to the soul as half of four to two, not as green to triangle: a quality following on a substance, as a relation follows on a quantity; “what’s another genus can’t signify something inside the nature” but can follow it as effect from cause. Augustine’s proof re-read: knowledge and love compared to the soul as knower are in it as in a subject (and only in it); compared to it as known and loved they are not limited to it, since I can love God, my guardian angel, my neighbour — so the accident would transcend its subject only in that sense.

10. Digression on amphiboly, unfinished (“the wisdom of nature”) #

Point: the same phrase with two related meanings. “Wisdom of nature” (Shakespeare’s name for philosophy of nature, which he prefers): the science, and the wisdom nature shows, due to God’s wisdom — Aristotle in the biological works appreciating the divine mind through the order of what it made, as one admires Shakespeare’s, Mozart’s or Thomas’s mind through their works. “Word of God”: the sophism “the Son of God is the Word of God; the Word of God is the Bible; therefore the Son of God is the Bible” trades on two meanings, yet they connect — the Bible is chiefly about the Son, and (Vatican II’s constitution, “called the Word of God”) as the Word became flesh, the Bible takes on human language. Recording ends mid-sentence. Replies to obj. 6 and 7 are not reached.

His words #

• ability: [ed.: potency] — “ability and act divide being”
• figures of predication: the division of being into substance, quantity, quality, relation, etc. [ed.: categories]
• second species of quality: inborn power; where the powers of the soul fall
• composed whole: put together from its parts, not said of them [ed.: Thomas's integral whole]
• universal whole: said of each part, not put together from them
• potential / potestative whole: present to each part by its whole nature but not whole power; said of parts less properly
• first vs. proximate (immediate) principle: soul vs. its power
• property (proprium): outside the essence but caused by the essential principles of the species; middle between substance and accident in Porphyry’s sense
• predicable accident: outside the nature with no connection to it
• pros ti / ad aliquid: “towards something” [ed.: relation]
• fifth book of Wisdom [ed.: Metaphysics V]

Texts #

Read in class

• Thomas, ST I q. 77 proemium; a. 1 objections 1-7, sed contra, body, replies 1-5
• Augustine, De Trinitate IX and X (as quoted in obj. 1 and 5)
• Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy ch. 11 (sed contra)
• Shakespeare, Hamlet, Hamlet to Horatio (“my dear soul was mistress of her choice”)

Mentioned

• Aristotle, De Anima II (definition of soul; “soul is in some way all things”)
• Aristotle, Metaphysics V (wholes); Categories (species of quality); biological works
• Porphyry, five universals
• Boethius (obj. 6)
• Thomas, ST I on angels (“shown above”); Prima Secundae on order of the species of quality
• Euclid, angle sum of a triangle; Plato, Euthyphro (Socrates’ question)
• Hilary of Poitiers, De Trinitate; John’s Gospel (“God is love”; Word “towards God”); Vatican II constitution on the Word of God; Shakespeare (“sleep, thou ape of death”, “understanding soul”, “wisdom of nature”)

His questions #

• One man is not more a man than another — in what sense? In the genus of substance; in courage or height one can be more or less.
• Is my understanding what I am? No; only in God are substance and operation the same.
• What does it mean that what has a soul is not always in the operations of life? Sleep; the trees outside, not operating but not dead.
• Can you say a seat is a chair? a dog is an animal? No to the first (composed whole), yes to the second (universal whole).
• Would light to fire do as well as heat to fire? Perhaps, but heat is the simpler example.
• Do I understand by my reason or by my soul? Both: by the soul first, by reason proximately.
• Is half a number? No, a relation — another category from two.
• Is it two because it is half of four, or half of four because it is two? Half of four because it is two.
• Are the soul’s powers to the soul like green to triangle or like half of four to two? Like half of four to two: in another genus but following upon the nature.
• What’s wrong with “the Son of God is the Word of God, the Word of God is the Bible, so the Son of God is the Bible”? Two meanings of “Word of God”; left mid-sentence.