Q.85 a.8 Replies and Q.86 a.1: Why the Mind Knows Causes Last, and How It Knows Singular Things

Orientation #

He refers back to “what we argued before” about reason being immaterial and to the earlier argument for the common sense (white vs. sweet), and says the question on what understanding knows in material things (q. 86) “is going to be followed by” what it knows in itself (q. 87) and what is above it (q. 88). The verified sources place this class on ST I q. 85 a. 8 (the replies) and q. 86 a. 1. The previous class worked through q. 85 aa. 7–8 and the next takes up q. 86 aa. 2–3 on the infinite and the contingent.

The class, in order #

1. Reply ad 1: effect before cause, except in mathematics (“Resolve things to their causes”) #

Point: in acquiring a science we usually go from sensible effects to their principles; only in the completed science does knowledge of effects depend on knowledge of principles (“then we think we know scientifically when we can resolve things to their causes”).

• Husband knows the wife is upset before he knows why; once he knows the cause he understands better why she was upset, but that she is upset was simply more known to him.
• Day and night vs. their cause: we agree there is day and night but disagree with the ancients about the cause (sun round the earth vs. earth turning on its axis). Rule drawn: “Men disagree more about the less known.” Same for the French Revolution (agreed fact, disputed causes) and elections (everyone agrees who won, they disagree why).
• Exception: the mathematical sciences, because the matter is very limited and imaginable. Worked example on the board: two intersecting straight lines; a + x = two right angles and b + x = two right angles (earlier theorem: a straight line meeting a straight line makes two right angles or angles equal to them); equals to the same are equal, equals subtracted from equals leave equals, so the vertical angles are equal. Here you go from cause to effect: the intersection causes the angles, but the straightness causes their equality (a bent line would give unequal angles). Likewise the isosceles theorem: two sides equal, therefore the angles equal.
• In natural philosophy what you sense (colour, shape of the cat, the tree getting bigger) is not the main thing; why the cat does this or why the tree grows is hidden. Every question “why” is a sign we know the effect before the cause (eclipse of the sun).
• Sherlock Holmes to Watson: “we reason backwards”—from effect to cause, as far as reality is concerned.

2. Consequence: God last in philosophy, first in theology (“God is the last thing known in philosophy”) #

Argument:

1. We go from effect to cause, and from cause to cause of the cause.
2. God is the first cause.
3. Therefore God is the last thing reached in philosophy (Aristotle treats him in Metaphysics XII, “the last part of the last part”).

• Thomas at the beginning of SCG II: the order of revealed theology (God first) is contrary to the order of philosophy (God last). Reason: in theology we share God’s own knowledge, and God knows everything else by knowing himself; philosophy knows God only through his effects.
• Aside: Gilson’s Introduction to Philosophy tries to proceed philosophically yet begins with God, following the order of SCG—“kind of strange.”

3. The rationalists’ mistake (“the order in our thoughts and the order in things is the same”) #

Point: Descartes, and Spinoza even more, were so impressed with mathematical clarity that they generalised cause-to-effect procedure to all knowledge.

• Spinoza says explicitly that the order in our thoughts and the order in things is the same; Thomas says they are contrary.
• Heisenberg: when we begin a study we never start at the beginning. Water known before hydrogen, hydrogen before proton, though the proton is first in things (hence its name, “from the very first”).
• Hegel: since the mind first knows confusedly and the general before the particular, he takes the most confused first thought, being, and identifies it with the one who said “I am who am”—“terrible mistake”; Thomas has a chapter refuting this in SCG after establishing the truth of “I am who am.”
• Historians call Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, to some extent Hegel “rationalists” as against the English empiricists: two extremes, different problems.
• Weizsäcker (Heisenberg’s student): one goes down from extended body to elementary particles, then turns round to see the reasons for what was known before—periodic table, then quantum theory applied by Bohr to the atom, then the reason why the periodic repetitions occur.
• Aristotle, at the beginning of Wisdom [ed.: Metaphysics], says one should determine the way of proceeding in any science, against those (Pythagoreans: “the soul is a self-moving number”) who want to proceed mathematically everywhere; the same tendency dominates the moderns, because we want mathematical clarity and certitude everywhere and cannot have it.

4. Reply ad 2: point in the definition of line; unit as measure of number (“the unit is the measure of number”) #

Point: the point is not placed in the definition of line taken in general.

• Infinite line and circular line have a point only in ability [ed.: potency]; Euclid defines a finite straight line, so the limit enters the definition of the limited. He does not recall Euclid putting it quite that way: Euclid defines point, then line as “length without breadth,” then says the limits of a line are points.
• Contrast: the unit measures number, the point does not measure a line. You can see how many ones in three, four, five; you cannot count how many points in this line vs. that one, since every line has an infinity of points in ability—no “three-point-long line.”
• So the unit is placed in the definition of number (a multitude measured by one), not in the definition of the divisible—rather the reverse.
• Modern students: “half of three?” “one and a half”; “half of three points?” “one and a half points.” He tries to show them the one is even simpler than the point; if the point cannot be divided, a fortiori the one cannot. The Platonists defined the point as “a one having position,” so they saw the one as simpler and indivisible. The confusion comes from comparing numbers to the continuous (graphs, plus and minus one): “half of one” is half of one line or one something, not the abstract one.

5. Reply ad 3: like known by like, and why we do not know the immaterial first (“otherwise sight would know sound more than color”) #

Objection: like is known by like, and the indivisible (or the immaterial) is more like the understanding, so it should be known first. Reply: the likeness by which we understand is the form of the known in the knower; a thing is not known first because its nature is like the knowing power, but because it fits the power’s object. Otherwise sight would know sound better than colour, since sight has no colour (if the centre of the eye had colour everything would look that colour) but does have a sound [as he puts it].

• Applied: our reason is immaterial, but the likeness it uses is taken from images, which are material; so we know material things by an immaterial power long before we know there are immaterial things.
• Aristotle, Physics IV, on place: the common opinion that whatever exists is somewhere, and what is nowhere does not exist. His students agree. To be somewhere is to be in a place, a property of bodies; so the mind “left to itself” is almost naturally materialistic. Cousin Donald could not get his pious mother to accept that God has no body. “Where will my soul be after I die?"—in the strict sense, nowhere; we are deceived by imagination because we have always been somewhere (books, tea, bed, car).
• Since understanding is a power of the soul, and the soul is the first act of a natural body with tools, its own object is material; the immaterial, if known at all, is known negatively (“im-material,” “in-corporeal”: we think of a body and negate it). That is how the mind knows God in this life—what he is not—unlike the vision of 1 John (ch. 3 v. 2, “I think”): “we shall see him as he is.” Showing God is simple is showing he is not composed.
• Aside: Thomas says Father, Son and Holy Spirit are distinct but not divided, since division in the strict sense is a distinction of parts of a whole, and they are not parts of God.

6. Opening q. 86 a. 1: singular when sensed, universal when understood (“whether our understanding knows singulars”) #

Point: what reason knows directly is the what-it-is of something sensed or imagined, and that is universal; the question is whether it can somehow come back and know the singular.

• Boethius: a thing is singular when sensed, universal when understood. This chair seen is singular; what it is (a chair) is common to all chairs. You seen are a singular man; what you are, “animal with reason,” is universal.
• Preview: since we form statements about singulars (“Socrates is a man,” “George Bush is a man”) reason must somehow know the singular—Aristotle says by coming back upon its origin, not directly.
• The four objections as he reads them: (1) whoever knows a composition knows the extremes, and understanding forms “Socrates is a man”; (2) practical understanding directs action, and actions are about singulars (the dentist fixes my mouth); (3) understanding understands itself, which is singular, since actions belong to singulars; (4) what a lower power can do the higher can, and sense knows the singular.
• Sed contra: Aristotle, Physics I—the universal is known by reason, the singular by sense.

7. The body: directly and first only the universal, indirectly the singular (“directe and primo”) #

Argument:

1. The cause of singularity in material things is individual matter. Example: many identical window panes because there is enough glass; many identical chairs because enough metal or wood—matter as subject to quantity lets you divide into many of the same kind (so too in geometry, because of quantity).
2. Understanding works by abstracting the understandable form from this matter, and what is abstracted from individual matter is universal.
3. Hence directly it knows only universals.
4. But even after abstracting, it cannot actually understand except by turning to images, in which it understands the forms (De Anima III): to understand what a triangle is now, I imagine one and understand the what-it-is of that imagined triangle.
5. Therefore indirectly, “by a certain reflection” (Aristotle’s words), it knows the singulars of which there are images, and so forms “Socrates is a man”—which answers the first objection.

• He stresses the two adverbs, directe and primo, and the words “in material things.”
• Parallel to the argument for the common sense: sight knows only white, taste only sweet, neither nor both together can sense the difference; one power must know both. Likewise the power that forms “this is a chair” or “Duane is a man” must know both terms, one of which is singular—not through its received form but by turning back to its origin, the imagination.
• Illustration: asked “what is Monsignor Dionne like?” or “what is your mother like?”, everything I say is universal, unless I simply point—and then I am back at my senses. Student tries: “he’s a man, white, lost weight, philosopher, thinks a lot, drinks a lot”; a student suggests the name; he replies the name does not tell who Duane is, and everything said is universal. Student: “there’s something unique about each human being”—he grants it but says you cannot express it except in universals.
• Aside: “proposition” originally meant the premise of a syllogism (propositio, placed for something); custom extended it to any statement; he prefers “statement.”

8. Reply ad 2: the practical syllogism needs a singular premise (“the choice of a particular thing to be done”) #

Point: the choice of a particular deed is like the conclusion of a practical syllogism, and from a universal alone you cannot conclude to a singular without a singular premise supplied by the sensitive part (De Anima III).

• “The human body should be fed; this is a human body; therefore it should be fed.” The doctor knows “give the headache man an aspirin,” but knows this man’s fever by sense; “ah, this is feverish”—apply the cold washcloth.
• Consequence for morals: passions are strong because they are closer to the senses, and one may fail to apply the universal (“adultery should be avoided”) to this case, or apply “this is pleasant” instead; the senses, being the direct knowledge of the singular, can dominate.

9. Reply ad 4: the higher power does it more eminently (“in an immaterial way and abstractly”) #

Point: the higher power does what the lower does but more eminently: sense knows materially and concretely, i.e. the singular directly; understanding knows immaterially and abstractly, i.e. the universal.

• Expansion: the eye does not know what colour is, the ear what sound is, but reason does to some extent, so it knows the thing better in that way; yet the singular as such is known directly by sense. Drinking wine: reason knows better what wine (or smell) is; taste and smell know better the singular flavour of this wine.
• Reply ad 3 (understanding knows itself) is not read in this class; the recording ends with ad 4.

His words #

• “reasoned-out knowledge”: his rendering of scientia [ed.: science].
• “beginnings”: his word for principles.
• “ability”: potency (“a point except in ability”) [ed.: potency].
• “Natural Hearing”: Aristotle’s Physics [ed.: Physics].
• “Wisdom”: Aristotle’s Metaphysics [ed.: Metaphysics].
• “understandable form”: species intelligibilis [ed.: intelligible species].
• “directe and primo”: directly and first; the two adverbs he underlines in the body of q. 86 a. 1.
• “reflection”: turning back upon its origin (the images); “Aristotle’s words.”
• “statement”: his preferred term for what is usually called a proposition; “proposition” originally the premise of a syllogism.
• “via negativa”: knowing God by what he is not.
• distinction vs. division: division is a distinction of parts of a whole; the divine persons are distinct, not divided.
• “common sensibles”: what is sensed in the geometrical figure (shape, straightness).

Texts #

Read in class

• Thomas, ST I q. 85 a. 8, replies ad 1, ad 2, ad 3 (translated and commented).
• Thomas, ST I q. 86 a. 1: objections 1–4, sed contra, body, replies ad 1, ad 2, ad 4 (ad 3 not read).
• Euclid, Elements: definitions of point and line, theorem on angles made by a straight line meeting a straight line, vertical angles, isosceles triangle (inferred loci, book I).

Mentioned

• Aristotle, Physics I (universal by reason, singular by sense; sed contra); Physics IV (on place, “whatever exists is somewhere”).
• Aristotle, De Anima III (turning to images; universal reason moves only through particular apprehension).
• Aristotle, Metaphysics XII (God treated last); beginning of the Metaphysics on the way of proceeding in each science.
• Thomas, SCG II, beginning (order of theology contrary to order of philosophy); a chapter of SCG refuting the identification of God with common being.
• Boethius: singular when sensed, universal when understood.
• 1 John 3:2 (as he recalls it): “we shall see him as he is.”
• Gilson, Introduction to Philosophy; Spinoza; Descartes; Leibniz; Hegel; Heisenberg; Weizsäcker; Bohr; Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes.

His questions #

• Which is more known to us, day and night, or the cause of day and night? Day and night; we disagree about the cause, agree about the fact.
• Why is God the last thing known in philosophy? Because he is the first cause, and we go from effect to cause to cause of the cause.
• What’s half of three points? Students say one and a half points; he shows the point, and a fortiori the one, is indivisible.
• Otherwise sight would know what more than what? Sound more than colour—so knowing is by likeness of the object in the power, not likeness of nature.
• Would you agree that whatever exists is somewhere? Students agree; he shows this amounts to holding that everything is a body.
• Where will my soul be after I die? Nowhere, in the strict sense of place; imagination deceives us.
• Why can you have many individuals of the same kind in the material world? Because of matter subject to quantity (enough glass, metal, wood).
• Tell me who this Duane is—can you say anything about an individual that is not universal? No; even the unique in a person can only be expressed in universals, or by pointing.
• Does the eye know what colour is? Does the ear know what sound is? No; reason does to some extent, but sense knows the singular directly.