The Fourteen Books of Wisdom: Naming, Dividing, and 'All Men by Nature Desire to Know'

Orientation #

He says the classes just before this treated the proemium to the Nicomachean Ethics (prev. lecture), and he returns to it here for comparison. This class begins Aristotle’s Metaphysics: its title, its division, and the first sentence of the proemium. The next class continues the opening of Book I from sensation through memory and experience to art and wisdom.

The class, in order #

1. What to call the book (“I like to call it, first of all, the fourteen books of wisdom”) #

The point: the customary title is the worst of the available names.

• In the proemium Aristotle calls this knowledge sophia, Latin sapientia; Thomas explains sapientia as sapida scientia — savory, tasty knowledge.
• Aristotle often calls it first philosophy, because it is first in dignity, in worth; it has most of all the character of wisdom of any part of philosophy.
• “Metaphysics” comes from Andronicus of Rhodes, the editor, who saw that in the order of learning these books come after the books of natural philosophy: Greek meta (after) + ta (article) + physika (from physis, nature). Three words run together into one word that “doesn’t mean anything to us.”
• His objection: the first two names name the book from what it is or what it is about; “metaphysics” names it only from its place in the order of learning. And we have no explicit title from Aristotle himself — but in the proemium he uses sophia, and in the Physics he refers questions forward to “first philosophy,” so the author’s own authority favours those names.
• Aside: America was named after a man who did not discover it but made a map and put his name on it — a fluke of history we are stuck with.
• He notes he uses “the fourteen books of wisdom” in what he posts for the Society of Studies, and takes some flak for it.

2. Custom is a tyrant (“as Shakespeare says, custom is a tyrant”) #

The point: we obey naming customs even when they are unreasonable.

• Examples: “grace” before a meal is really the blessing — the Thanksgiving is the prayer after the meal, and grace means something else; no one can break the habit.
• The birthday song: a poor piece of music sung over and over, unlike the Messiah at Christmas; he asks for Mozart at his own birthday and gets the song anyway.
• Bookstore sections file “metaphysics” with the occult; young scientists sneer at “metaphysics” as whatever lies outside experimental science. Because of this he would sooner say “the fourteen books after the books of natural philosophy” than “metaphysics.”
• Inconsistency of custom: we use a Greek title for the Physics and a Latin one, De Anima, for the three books about the soul — no reason for it.
• Student exchange on clothing: he says we follow customary dress; a student corrects him — “we’re following eight customs” [ed.: habits, i.e. religious habits], and they discuss nuns’ outfits deriving from widows’ weeds (Mother Seton) or from peasant costume.
• Forward references: the end of the second book of wisdom treats the influence of custom on how men think; Thomas at the beginning of the Summa Contra Gentiles treats its influence on what they think. He thinks modern men are more slaves of custom than the Greeks or the medievals.

3. Three senses of “first philosophy” (“is that simply because it’s first in dignity”) #

A student asks whether it is called first from dignity or because it deals with the first thing. Three reasons, all admitted:

1. First = before all the rest in worth. As Aristotle says at the end of the proemium, every other knowledge is more necessary, but none is better.
2. From the word philosophy itself. He denies that Plato or Aristotle use “philosophy” to mean the love of wisdom; the love of wisdom belongs rather to the word philosopher, a lover of wisdom. Philosophy then names the knowledge a lover of wisdom would pursue — “what knowledge would a lover of geometry pursue? Geometry. What would a lover of Mozart listen to? Mozart.” (Groucho Marx’s consolation question: who is buried in Grant’s tomb?) So the knowledge having most of all the character of wisdom is philosophy in the first sense. Ethics and political philosophy are wisdom in a qualified sense about human things, natural philosophy about natural things — not wisdom simply.
3. From its subject. As natural philosophy is about natural things and political philosophy about political things, first philosophy is about first things: most of all the first causes, but also the axioms, which are the first statements, and the first road in our knowledge.

4. “Natural hearing” (“the eight books of natural hearing”) #

The Greek title of the Physics is the eight books of natural hearing, and he gives more than one possible reason: you are hearing about natural things; this is very close to what we naturally know; you are listening to nature as to a teacher. “Physics” transliterates rather than translates the root nature — a translation would say “natural.”

5. Two kinds of division (“the editorial and reference division”) #

The distinction: editorial and reference division vs. logical and understandable division.

• Editorial: Matthew into twenty-eight chapters (from the University of Paris, he says twelfth century); Homer edited at Athens into twenty-four books each; Aristotle’s books subdivided into chapters, or into the lectiones (readings) of the editions with Thomas’s commentary, sometimes down to verses. Necessary — the book will not get published without it — and useful for referring (the Sermon on the Mount is in chapters five, six, seven; chapter nineteen on giving property away). But knowing there are fourteen books, or twenty-eight chapters, teaches the mind nothing.
• Logical: the kind found in Thomas’s commentaries; he calls it logical partly because it follows the rule of two or three he teaches in logic (a rule for the most part), and understandable because it makes the work understood and improves the mind.
• His specimen: Thomas on Matthew. Matthew emphasizes the humanity of Christ, represented by the man; as man he came into this world, proceeded through it, and went out of it — hence three parts: chapters 1–2, coming in; 3–20, progressing through; 21–28, going out through passion, death and resurrection. Subdivision of the middle: he progresses like a teacher, like a preacher, “like a Dominican” — chapters 3–4 his preparation (baptism, i.e. being endowed with grace by the sacraments; then temptation, being tested), chapters 5–20 the teaching itself.

6. Proemium against tractatus (“the proemium… and then the tractatus”) #

The point: Thomas divides most of Aristotle’s works first into two — the proemium and the tractatus, the drawing out of the main work.

• In the Nicomachean Ethics the proemium occupies the first readings of Book I (about three), divided against the rest of Book I and Books II–X. In the fourteen books of wisdom, the proemium at the beginning of Book I is divided against the rest of Book I and Books II–XIV.
• These two are the main proemium to looking [ed.: speculative/theoretical] philosophy and the main proemium to practical philosophy; both, unusually, have an epilogue. There is no good proemium by Aristotle to logic as a whole; the best we have is Thomas’s at the beginning of his commentary on the Posterior Analytics — “a magnificent thing.”
• Analogy: the logical division of Romeo and Juliet is prologue and play; the prologue prepares you for a tragedy, for pity and fear — “whose misadventure, piteous overthrow,” “the fearful passage of their death-marked love.” Compare an overture in music, setting the tone.
• He admires the proemium to Dei Verbum, divided against its chapters: it begins with eternal life, the ultimate goal of the word of God, then comes down to faith, hope and charity as means — faith and hope disappear, charity remains perfected; it ends with Augustine, that by believing we come to hope and by hope to love. Compare the end of John: these things are written that you may believe, and that believing you may have life.
• The most important thing in a proemium in philosophy is what the Greeks call the scopos, the target, the goal you are aiming at; Latin intentio libri says the same more abstractly, the Greek very concretely.
• Aside: Aristotle learned the idea of the proemium from Plato’s Timaeus, where Timaeus gives a proemium before the main work and Socrates sits like a diligent student applauding its excellence.

7. The two parts of this proemium (“what is the nature of the knowledge sought”) #

The editorial division gives three readings; the logical division gives two parts.

1. First part (readings one and two): what wisdom is aiming at — knowing causes, and at last the very first cause or causes of things.
2. Second part (reading three): what kind of knowledge this wisdom is.

• Confirmation from the epilogue at the bottom of page five: Aristotle recalls first “what is the nature of the knowledge sought,” which is the second part just finished, then “what is the goal that the investigation and the whole knowledge over our road must reach,” which is the first. In the Ethics the proemium has three parts and the epilogue likewise recalls third, second, first — the natural way of recalling, like saying what you did yesterday, then the day before, then three days ago. “A confirmation of Thomas’s division of the proemium.”

8. The opening statement and three questions (“All men by nature desire to know”) #

The Greek eidenai comes from the root for seeing, so “all men by nature desire to understand” may be more accurate; “to know” is also acceptable. Three questions to savor it: (1) what does it mean? (2) is it true? (3) why does he begin with it?

9. What it means (“does he mean men as opposed to women?”) #

• “All men”: generic, not men against women or men against boys.
• “By nature”: inborn. Nature and physis both seem to come from the word for birth — Shakespeare never forgets this, as in a natural bond of brothers or sisters, a bond produced by common birth. Medieval Latin: homo natus est to know, he is born to know.
• The force of “by nature” is seen by contrast: he would not say all men by nature wear pants. Some things men do by custom, some by choice — in the fourth book of wisdom the philosopher differs from the sophist by his choice of life: given the choice to be wise without appearing wise, or to appear wise without being wise, the sophist chooses the appearance.
• Two readings of “to know”: in the broad sense, where even the senses are a kind of knowing, the sign taken from the love of the senses illustrates it directly; in the narrow sense, “to understand,” the sign works by analogy — as we love to use our eyes to see, so to use our reason to understand. The explanation does not differ much either way.
• He praises the English “understand”: etymologically to know what stands under a thing; we speak of the cause as standing under the effect, and of the thing named as standing under the name, so to understand a name is to know what stands under it — and the English word for cause is ground, which stands under. “Don’t get too much into the word.” Aside: his mother’s pun, “‘I see,’ said the blind man, but he couldn’t see at all.”

10. Is it true? The signs (“they use their senses… merely to see something”) #

Aristotle’s sign: men love the senses, especially the eyes, and use them not merely to do or make something but sometimes merely to see or hear. Aristotle’s reason as read: sight most of all makes us know and shows many differences — we would know nothing of sun, moon and stars without the eyes.

• Everyday cases: the beautiful sunset, rainbow, mountains, ocean; smelling a flower you are not going to eat; tasting a food out of curiosity in a restaurant.
• What Aristotle does not say is telling: not “a sign of this is that everybody philosophizes,” or does scientific experiments, or does historical research — but that men use the senses merely to sense.
• His own second, more developed sign: all men delight in stories. The child wants to know what happens when Little Red Riding Hood reaches grandmother’s house; people stay up past bedtime over a novel or a movie, not to be more alert at work tomorrow, but because they wonder what will happen. His cousin Donald’s very practical wife picked up his thick Russian spy novel by chance, could not put it down, neglected her gardening and cleaning, and was angry at her husband for leaving it around — even she has an inborn desire to know, against what she is doing. Driving to Quebec [ed.: he also says Indiana — an unresolved slip in the story] every Thanksgiving and Easter, he could not help looking up at the skiers coming down, which does nothing for arriving safely.
• A joke: you want the punchline; the frustration of people who always forget it.
• Third example, sports: if the game is lopsided, ten to one in the ninth, people leave to beat the parking-lot jam; if it is tied, the same people stay, though the practical thing is to leave. They can do nothing about the score, but they wonder who will win.
• Conclusion: not only philosophers, scientists and historians, but all men have this desire.

11. Why begin with it? (“the good is what all want”) #

A student answers first: because seeing this will lead us to a knowledge of what wisdom is. He then draws the argument out:

1. It shows that knowing is something good, since the good is what all want.
2. But caution: sometimes men want what is really good, sometimes what appears good and is not. Being wanted is a sign of being good, but not a necessary sign.
3. What is naturally desired — food, water, sleep — is a very strong sign of something really good, naturally good and not just apparent. So “all men by nature desire to know” is a much stronger sign than “men desire to know.”
4. Further, nature does not go to excess: if nature gives a natural desire, the thing must not only be good but in some way possible. As a natural desire to eat or drink implies it is not impossible to find food and water — though men do die of thirst in the desert — so the natural desire to know implies that knowing is possible for us.

• So the opening statement orients us to the goodness of a knowing that is itself the end, not for the sake of making or doing. Mary hath chosen the better part, which shall not be taken away from her: Martha pursues practical knowledge, good in this life but not lasting and not needed in the next; Mary’s knowledge continues and is perfected in the next world.
• He notes that later, in the third reading, Aristotle says more explicitly that this natural desire — wonder — is the beginning of philosophy; and a beginning is what is first, so “first philosophy” is about the beginning in more than one sense.
• The class breaks off mid-sentence: “Now, what does he start to do in the second…”

His words #

• the fourteen books of wisdom — his preferred title for the Metaphysics, from Aristotle’s own word sophia.
• sapientia / sapida scientia — Thomas’s explanation: savory, tasty knowledge.
• first philosophy — first in dignity; the knowledge a lover of wisdom pursues; the knowledge of first things.
• the eight books of natural hearing [ed.: Physics] — his rendering of the Greek title.
• editorial and reference division — chapters, books, readings; needed for publishing and citing, teaches nothing.
• logical and understandable division — the division found in Thomas’s commentaries; follows the rule of two or three; improves the mind.
• rule of two or three — his logic rule: divide into two or three and subdivide likewise (for the most part).
• proemium / tractatus — preface, and “the drawing out,” the main work.
• looking philosophy [ed.: speculative/theoretical philosophy] — as against practical philosophy.
• scopos — the target, the goal aimed at; Latin intentio libri, more abstract.
• eidenai — the Greek of the opening line, from the root for seeing; “to understand” as well as “to know.”
• by nature = inborn — natura, physis, from the word for birth; homo natus est.

Texts #

Read in class

• Aristotle, Metaphysics I, proemium, first reading — the opening statement and the sign from the senses (“especially the eyes… shows many differences”).
• Aristotle, Metaphysics I, proemium, epilogue (bottom of p. 5 in his text) — “what is the nature of the knowledge sought… what is the goal.”

Mentioned

• Aristotle, Metaphysics II, end — custom and how men think.
• Aristotle, Metaphysics IV — philosopher and sophist differ by choice of life.
• Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I, proemium and its epilogue.
• Aristotle, Physics; De Anima.
• Thomas Aquinas, commentary on Matthew (division of the Gospel); commentary on the Posterior Analytics, proemium; Summa Contra Gentiles, beginning.
• Plato, Timaeus (proemium of Timaeus).
• Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, prologue; “custom is a tyrant.”
• Dei Verbum, proemium (Vatican II), with Augustine quoted at its end.
• John, end of the Gospel — “these things are written that you may believe” (inferred: John 20:31).
• Mary and Martha — “Mary hath chosen the better part” (inferred: Luke 10).

His questions #

• What should these fourteen books be called? The fourteen books of wisdom, or of first philosophy; “metaphysics” names them only from their place after the books of natural philosophy.
• Is “first philosophy” said from dignity or from its subject? Both, and in three ways: first in worth, the knowledge a lover of wisdom pursues, and the knowledge of first things, chiefly the first causes.
• Does knowing that Matthew has twenty-eight chapters help you understand Matthew? No — useful for reference only; Thomas’s threefold division (coming in, progressing through, going out) is what teaches the mind.
• What is the most important thing in a philosophical proemium? The scopos, the target aimed at.
• What does “All men by nature desire to know” mean? “Men” generically, “by nature” as inborn rather than by custom or choice, “to know” broadly, or more accurately “to understand.”
• Is the statement true? Yes — sign: all men sometimes use the senses, especially sight, merely to sense; and all delight in stories and in an undecided game.
• Is the fact that something is wanted a sign that it is good? Yes, but not a necessary sign; what is naturally desired is a strong sign of a real good.
• Why does Aristotle begin with this statement? To show that knowing is good, and possible, and to orient us to a knowledge that is itself the end, not for making or doing.
• What does he start to do in the second reading? Left open — the class breaks off there.