Metaphysics I, Proemium: Liberal Knowledge, Not a Human Possession, the Knowledge of God

Orientation #

He is working through the second part of the proemium of the Metaphysics, reading from the bottom of page four of the printed text (DHB Vol I, The First Philosophers, pp. 4–5 verified). He treats the second, third and fourth things Aristotle says about this kind of knowledge, having already established (prev. lecture) that wisdom is looking (speculative) knowledge and not practical.

The neighbouring classes also treat this proemium, the previous one on wisdom as universal and of first causes and on wonder rather than utility.

The class, in order #

1. Liberal and servile knowledge by analogy (“liber, meaning free”) #

Why some knowledge is called liberal and some servile: an analogy, not a claim about who has it.

• A free man exists for his own sake; a slave exists for the sake of his master. Everyone in the ancient world (and until very recently) knew this difference.
• By proportional likeness: knowledge for its own sake is called liberal; knowledge for the sake of making or doing something else is called servile or slavish.
• He blocks the misreading: it may well be that slaves in society did servile knowledge and free men liberal, but that’s not the main point — the main point is the analogy.
• Liberal education = knowledge for the good of the mind itself; servile knowledge is for the good of your body, possessions, house, car.
• Whether society should have free men and slaves is a different question — that’s for political philosophy.

2. Wisdom alone is fully liberal (“this alone is for the sake of itself”) #

The point: liberality follows from wisdom’s being speculative, and wisdom alone is liberal without qualification.

• Even within looking philosophy, we study the lower for the sake of the higher. Thomas’s ladder: I study the body so I can study the soul, the soul so I can study the angels, the angels so I can study God — but I do not study God for the sake of knowing anything else. That’s the end.
• Hence knowledge of the highest thing is the only knowledge fully for its own sake, and so fully liberal.
• Text read: “as we call a man free, that is for himself and not for another, while a slave is for the sake of another… so this alone is free among the sciences, for this alone is for the sake of itself.”

3. The objection from the human condition (“the nature of man is enslaved”) #

Aristotle’s third point: it might justly be thought that such a possession is not a human one, since in many ways the nature of man is enslaved.

• The objection in his voice: “It’s not very practical what you’re saying, Mr. Berquist.”
• Primitive economy: a man may spend the whole day hunting or berry-gathering for the necessities of life — some days a feast, some days to bed hungry — never mind the comforts.
• Present-day slaveries, multiplied from that one sentence (he says he once gave a whole talk on it): to the body (feed it, clothe it, a chair, a bed, sleep); to children’s college tuition; to a job for the money; to the car (a flat, the garage); at his age, to the doctor — what’s breaking down now. Something always needs fixing in the house; the same is true of the car.
• Beyond these, men are enslaved to their passions — St. Paul: in sinning you become a slave. Slaves of anger, of drink, of drugs, of envy.
• Shakespeare calls custom a tyrant; men are enslaved to custom, to fashion, to error.
• War: a Greek may have to be a soldier tomorrow and cannot philosophize. So this knowledge is not something man can pursue whenever he wants; it takes unusual circumstances, and most men are taken up with the necessities or amusements of life.

4. Simonides and the envy of the divine (“poets say many false things”) #

Whether God begrudges man this knowledge.

• Simonides: this honor belongs to God, not to man; man is not worthy to seek knowledge for itself. This already anticipates that wisdom is more divine than a human possession.
• Aristotle’s text: if the poets say something and the divine is able to envy, it is likely to happen especially about this, and all who excel in knowledge are unfortunate — but the divine is not able to be envious.
• His two reasons why God cannot envy: (1) envy is a form of sadness, and nothing bad can happen to God in his divine nature; (2) the envious man thinks another’s good diminishes his own, and God could not make that mistake about the good we partake of from Him.
• “According to the proverb, poets say many false things.”
• Aside: envy came into the world through the devil.
• Aside (Sumerian vase, from McNeill, The Rise of the West): three levels — gods, men, beasts. The beasts were made to relieve man of his labors (ox plows, dog keeps the flock, horse carries you town to town); but men are slaves of the gods, bringing food to the temple — so the gods are the ones who live the free life.

5. The fourth point: the two senses of “divine” (“the most divine is most honorable”) #

Point: wisdom is most divine in both senses, and so most honorable.

• Parallel with “human” knowledge: human because about human beings and because had by human beings. History is human in both senses; chemistry is human only in the second (had by humans, not about human things).
• Aristotle’s text: the most divine is said in two ways — the knowledge God most of all would have, and the knowledge of divine things — and this alone has both, since God seems to all to be among the causes and a beginning, and such knowledge God alone or most of all would have.
• First sense, a syllogism: wisdom is about the first cause (shown in the first part of the proemium); the first cause is God (taken as the common opinion of men); therefore wisdom is about God.
• Second sense: God alone or most of all is wise. Aristotle does not syllogize this; he takes it as the common opinion of all the great philosophers before him, and his own.

6. The humility of the Greeks (“God alone is wise”) #

Four witnesses that man is not wise as God is.

• Pythagoras: called wise by his contemporaries for discoveries like the Pythagorean theorem, he answered, “Don’t call me wise, God alone is wise”; if you must call me something, call me a lover of wisdom. So there is a humility in the very origin of the name philosopher.
• Heraclitus, two proportions: as a child is to a man, so is man to God (to a little boy, daddy seems to know everything); and as an ape is to a man, so is man to God.
  • Aside: he asks students the scientific name for man — Homo sapiens. But biologists use Homo for any man-like thing, and sapiens means wise. Compared to the ape man is wise; compared to God he would be the Homo that is not sapiens.
• Socrates in the Apology: Chaerephon asks the Oracle of Delphi whether anyone is wiser than Socrates; the Oracle says no one is. Socrates, thinking himself ignorant, questions those with a reputation for knowing and finds they do not know what they claim. Hence: I know that I don’t know; they don’t know either, and don’t know that they don’t — doubly ignorant. Man’s wisdom consists more in knowing that he doesn’t know than in knowing much.
• Aristotle: either man is not to be called wise at all in the full sense, or he is wise only in some imperfect way — as he knows what is said of all, and all things, only imperfectly.
• Contrast: the moderns lack this humility, thinking themselves wiser than God.

7. “Knowledge of God” in both senses of the phrase (“instead of using a word, I like to use a speech”) #

He prefers to state the fourth point as a speech with two senses rather than a word: the phrase “knowledge of God” can name the object known or the one who has the knowledge, and wisdom is knowledge of God in both.

• Drill cases, with student answers:
  • The definition of reason — Shakespeare’s definition: reason is “the ability for large discourse, looking before and after.” Is it a knowledge of reason? In both senses: it is about what reason is, and it is had by reason, since reason is what defines and knows by definition.
  • The definition of square (“an equilateral right-angled quadrilateral”) — a knowledge of reason in one sense only: had by reason, not about reason.
  • De Anima (Peri Psychēs, “about the soul”) — a student answers: both senses. It is the knowledge our soul has of itself.
  • Geometry — one sense only: had by our soul, not about the soul.
• Conclusion by parallel: so wisdom is the knowledge of God in both senses — about God, and had alone or most of all by God. Since God is the best and most honorable thing, this is the best and most honorable knowledge.

8. “Know thyself” and the modern refusal to think about the soul (“wouldn’t certain wise men put down this dictum at Delphi”) #

The Delphic dictum urges the soul to pursue knowledge of what the soul is.

• In De Anima Book I, after the proemium, Aristotle reviews all his predecessors’ thinking about the soul; they all thought about what the soul is, but none knew. Only at the beginning of Book II does Aristotle succeed in understanding what the soul is — a couple hundred years of Greek thinking before one man knew.
• The modern world does not even think about what the soul is, let alone understand it — and if you don’t think about it you will never understand it.
• Shakespeare was wiser: in Much Ado About Nothing, Beatrice, sure that Hero is innocent, tells Benedick “as I have a soul” — she swears by it as the surest thing. He compares: asked whether George Washington was the first president, he would say he is as sure as that two plus two is four; her phrase was stronger in kind.
• Reason in a strict sense is the only part of us that can know itself; so when reason defines reason, the definition is knowledge of reason in both senses.

9. Equivocation of a speech, from the Sophistical Refutations (“where a speech… has more than one sense”) #

Why this matters logically.

• Aristotle’s list: six kinds of mistakes from words, seven kinds from outside words. The first two from words: a single word with more than one sense, and a speech (like “knowledge of God”) with more than one sense, where someone mixes them up.
• Applications: theology is and is not a knowledge of God; the definition of square is and is not a knowledge of reason. You appear to contradict yourself but do not, because the sense affirmed is not the sense denied.
• Another favorite phrase: “Word of God” — in one sense it is about the Word of God in another sense. From Vatican II it is clear the greatest books of the Bible are the Gospels, everything else preparing for or building on them; the Gospels are about the Word of God made flesh, while the Bible itself is called God’s word, God speaking in a kind of human language.
• An addition from Metaphysics XII, not Aristotle’s point here: the knowledge of God, meaning the knowledge God has, is chiefly a knowledge of God — God knows nothing else except by knowing Himself. Thomas brings this out very much.

10. The two closing syllogisms (“all other kinds of knowledge are more necessary than this, but none is better”) #

• Syllogism A: wisdom is the most divine knowledge; the most divine is the best and most honorable; therefore wisdom is the best and most honorable knowledge.
• Syllogism B (leading up to a premise of A): wisdom is knowledge of the first cause; the first cause is God; therefore wisdom is a knowledge of God. The other half — that wisdom is had most of all by God — he simply takes from the agreement of all the great Greek philosophers.

11. Pride as the mother of error (“God hates pride”) #

Closing digression on why humility matters for philosophy.

• Thomas’s exposition of Matthew on Peter’s fall: Peter fell through pride — “though all the rest abandon him, I won’t” — relying on himself rather than on God and not believing Christ’s word that the flock would be dispersed. Thomas’s statement: God hates pride; He allowed Peter to fall so he would learn humility. Other reasons sometimes given (the head of the Church should be merciful, not overly severe, recognizing his weakness), but humility is Thomas’s reason there.
• In the Summa Contra Gentiles Thomas calls the presumption of pride the mater erroris, the mother of error; Aristotle too treats pride as a cause of error — so error is on the side of the heart.
• Hence the humility of the Greeks is part of why they finally got somewhere, and the pride of the moderns a main cause of their downfall.
• The Meno and the slave boy: the most commonly read Plato in introductions to philosophy is the Apology, often joined by four dialogues — the Meno and Euthyphro leading up, the Crito and Phaedo following. In the Meno Socrates has two conversations with the slave boy: the first showing him he is mistaken about doubling the square, the second actually teaching him to double it (though Socrates denies he teaches). The boy has the humility to admit his mistake and learn; the others are too proud and get angry.
• Our Lord, seeing pride in the apostles, points to the little boy: unless you become like him you will not enter the kingdom of heaven — unless you have the humility of the slave boy you will never become a true philosopher. And a nobody in that society is likelier to admit a mistake than someone with reputation and position.

His words #

• liberal / servile knowledge — for its own sake vs. for the sake of making or doing something else; named by analogy to free man and slave.
• looking knowledge — [ed.: speculative knowledge], as against practical.
• the nature of man is enslaved — Aristotle’s phrase for the objection that wisdom does not fit the human condition.
• the most divine — said in two ways: what God most of all would have, and what is of divine things.
• knowledge of God in both senses — his preferred formulation: about God, and had by God; a speech with two senses rather than a single word.
• a speech — [ed.: a phrase or complex expression], as against a single word, in the Sophistical Refutations’ first two fallacies.
• the ability for large discourse, looking before and after — Shakespeare’s definition of reason, “from my teacher Shakespeare.”
• mater erroris — mother of error, Thomas’s name for the presumption of pride.

Texts #

Read in class

• Aristotle, Metaphysics I, proemium, second part (DHB Vol I, pp. 4–5): the free/slave proportion; “this alone is for the sake of itself”; the enslaved nature of man and Simonides; “the divine is not able to be envious”; “nor must any other knowledge be thought to be more honorable”; “all other kinds of knowledge are more necessary than this, but none is better.”
• Handout, “Know Thyself,” p. 2 (read from for several minutes).

Mentioned

• Aristotle, De Anima I (predecessors on the soul) and II (the definition attained) (inferred).
• Aristotle, Metaphysics XII (God knows all else by knowing Himself).
• Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations (six fallacies from words, seven outside) (inferred).
• Plato, Meno (the slave boy and doubling the square); Apology (Chaerephon and the Oracle); Euthyphro, Crito, Phaedo named as the accompanying dialogues.
• Simonides (quoted by Aristotle); Heraclitus’s two proportions; Pythagoras on the name “philosopher.”
• Thomas Aquinas, Commentary/exposition on Matthew (Peter’s fall); Summa Contra Gentiles (mater erroris).
• Shakespeare, Much Ado About Nothing (Beatrice: “as I have a soul”); Shakespeare on custom as tyrant.
• W. H. McNeill, The Rise of the West (the Sumerian religious vase).
• St. Paul: in sinning you become a slave.
• Vatican II on the Gospels.
• Gospel: unless you become like the little boy.

His questions #

• Why do you call some knowledge liberal and some servile? Because of a proportional likeness to the difference between a free man, who is for his own sake, and a slave, who is for his master’s sake.
• Is wisdom the only fully liberal knowledge? Yes — in looking philosophy the lower is studied for the higher, and God is not studied for the sake of anything else.
• Can the divine be envious, as the poets suggest? No: envy is a kind of sadness, impossible in God, and God could not think our partaking of His good diminishes it.
• In how many ways is knowledge called divine? Two: knowledge God most of all would have, and knowledge of divine things — and wisdom alone has both.
• Is the definition of reason a knowledge of reason, and in what sense? In both senses: it is about reason and had by reason, which is what defines and knows by definition.
• Is the definition of square a knowledge of reason? In one sense only — had by reason, not about reason.
• Are the three books about the soul a knowledge of the soul in both senses or one? Both (student’s answer, accepted): it is the knowledge our soul has of itself; geometry, by contrast, only in one sense.
• What is the scientific name for man, and does it contradict the philosophers? Homo sapiens — wise compared to the ape, but compared to God he would be the Homo that is not sapiens.
• Whether men should be free or slaves in society? Left open — “that’s for political philosophy.”