Wisdom as the Knowledge of Being as Being: 'Through Itself', the First Cause, and Words Equivocal by Reason

Orientation #

He opens the class proper with “Let me come back here a little bit to this idea of kath’ hauto,” i.e. a return to a term already introduced, and he refers back to earlier treatments of the ten highest genera and of the Ethics proemium (“as I think I mentioned before”). The class then begins the first reading of Book IV (“at the beginning of this reading, Aristotle says there is a reasoned-out knowledge of being as being”), from a handout: “Do you all have a copy of this?” The neighbouring classes treat the aporiai of Metaphysics III and, afterwards, being said in many ways in Metaphysics IV with Aquinas’s commentary.

The class, in order #

1. Prayer and the word kath’ hauto (“through itself in English”) #

Opening prayer (Father, Son, Holy Spirit; guardian angels; St Thomas, angelic doctor). Kath’ hauto (Greek) = per se (Latin) = “through itself” (English). One ordinary meaning is “by yourself”: alone in a room you are kath’ hauto, though in English we would not say you are “through yourself.” In philosophy, “through itself” and “as such” are near-equivalents.

2. The senses of per se in reasoned-out knowledge (“belongs to the triangle through itself”) #

Point: the subject of episteme (reasoned-out knowledge) has parts and properties belonging to it as such. He distinguishes:

1. Per se as pertaining to the definition — triangle is through itself a plane figure, contained by three straight lines; “itself” is a pronoun, so “the triangle, through being a triangle, is a plane figure,” i.e. triangle as triangle. Contrast: a triangle is not green through being a triangle — green is accidental.
2. Per se as an essential part — a man through being a man has a body and a soul. From the Peri Hermeneias: a statement as such is a speech (vocal sound signifying by human agreement, with parts that signify by themselves) signifying the true or the false; and a statement as such has a noun and a verb (or subject, predicate, and the copula is/is not).
3. Per se as a property following on the nature — Euclid I.32, every triangle has interior angles equal to two right angles, proved through the parallel theorem: not a defining part, but something following upon triangle, like an effect. Porphyry’s Isagoge on property vs. accident: both signify something outside what the thing is, but the property follows upon the nature, the accident has no connection with it. Number: multitude belongs to number as such (Euclid: a multitude composed of units; Aristotle: a multitude measured by the unit); that two is half of four or a third of six is a property. Statement: every statement has an opposite statement, and indeed one opposed contradictorily — “President Bush is sitting / is not sitting”: one is true, one false now, whether or not we know which.
4. Per se divisions of the subject — dividing triangles into red, white and blue is accidental; into scalene, isosceles and equilateral is a division as such, since it determines what is intrinsic to having three sides. Geometry says nothing about triangles being green, “we’re not concerned with what happens.” He says a thing belongs to reasoned-out knowledge if it is said of it in “any one of these four senses” — and four are in fact given.

Also here: the first definition of good, “the good is what all want” (Socrates in the Meno, Aristotle at the start of the Nicomachean Ethics), is not the end of our knowledge of good but its starting point; it is kath’ hauto, like a proper effect — “something is not good because you want it, but you want it because it is good.”

3. First paragraph of the reading: what belongs to being as being (“there is a reasoned-out knowledge of being as being”) #

Point: “as being” is this same “as such.” Things belonging to being as such:

• to be good (harder to see): being as such is good, and the bad is a kind of non-being, a lack or privation.
• to be one (more easily seen): by the either-or syllogism in the Summa Theologiae — what is, is either simple or composed; if composed, it is not at all unless its parts are put together (smash up this chair and you have no chair); and a fortiori the simple is one.
• per se divisions of being (especially Book V): being into act and ability, being into substance and accident — different ways of being.
• possibly essential parts: all created being has some act and some ability in it. But being may not have defining parts, since defining goes by genus and difference.

4. Second paragraph: not one of the sciences “said in part” (“cutting off some part of this”) #

Point: nothing is more universal than being — being means simply what is, so whatever is in any way comes under it. Every other reasoned-out knowledge is about something more particular: geometry about continuous quantity (lines, angles, plane and solid figures), arithmetic about numbers, natural philosophy about natural things, logic about syllogism, statement and definition, political philosophy about the city and government. And (Book VI) they treat their subject also in a particular way: arithmetic treats numbers as numbers, not as beings; logic treats syllogisms as syllogisms, “because a being is a syllogism” [ed.: i.e. not every being is].

5. Digression: cause imagined above or below (“the highest beginnings of causes”) #

He explains “highest”: the Greeks imagined the cause above the effect, so the highest cause is the first cause; in Latin we say the effect depends on the cause — an earring is a pendant, hanging from something, the cause holding the thing up in existence from above. In English (more Germanic) we imagine the cause below, holding up: in Comedy of Errors the wife complains of her husband’s wandering eye and calls him “the ground of my defeatures” (her declining beauty) — ground for cause. Also the “underlying cause,” and hypothesis, whose etymology is “placed under,” hence supporting. Strictly the cause is neither above nor below the effect; this is only how we speak, and why he uses the word “highest.”

6. Third paragraph: the universality of the cause and of the subject said of all (“the science about the king talks about the citizen”) #

Aristotle’s text: since we seek the highest beginnings and causes, these are necessarily of some nature through itself; whence we must grasp the first causes of being as being. His unfolding:

1. A science of the king must treat the citizen, since the king’s causality extends to all citizens; a science of the general must treat the soldier, since his causality extends to all soldiers. (Simplifying: every soldier is a citizen, not every citizen a soldier — so “citizen,” said of more, corresponds to the more universal cause.) Political philosophy itself both treats government and treats who is or is not a citizen.
2. Therefore what is cause of more has as its subject what is said of more.
3. The first cause is cause of all; so its science must treat what is said of everything — being as being. Do not confuse “cause of all” with “said of all,” but see that they belong to the same knowledge.

The more profound example: ethics (which, as Thomas says in the commentary, gives the elements of political philosophy) is about happiness — the end desired for its own sake, everything else for its sake (as Socrates points out in the Symposium), hence a cause as end of everything in human life. In the Apology Socrates, the most read work in this crazy country, examines the Athenians on whether to take as much as possible of exterior goods and bodily goods with the minimum of goods of the soul, or the reverse — “I know what side you guys have chosen, but the Athenians have chosen the other.” He is thus touching the division of all human goods into goods of the soul, of the body, and exterior goods, taken up again in Politics VII: everyone knows there are these three kinds (“early to bed, early to rise, makes a man healthy, wealthy and wise”), all agree we need some of each, so the laws refer to all three; but men disagree, and philosophers and most men disagree, about which are better. Why does the division belong to the moral and political philosopher? Because someone must divide all human goods and say which are better — otherwise you spend your life pursuing lesser goods, and “your life is based on a mistake.” Not cooking, whose end is that food be tasty, nor medicine, whose end is health — nobody takes health as his final goal; he wants health so as to do other things. Only the philosopher of happiness, the end of the whole of human life, has a cause universal enough to require the division of all human goods and their order in goodness.

7. Review of the three paragraphs, and the wise man (“he’s got it all together”) #

Paragraph 1: there is an episteme of being as being and what belongs to it as such, and it is none of the particular sciences. Paragraph 2: the others cut off a part. Paragraph 3: this must be the same knowledge that seeks the first cause. Confirmation from the description of the wise man as a know-it-all in the way a man can be: he cannot know all things in particular, but in knowing what an odd number is he knows in a way an infinity of things; so in knowing being as being he knows all things in some way. Compare the practically wise man: “he’s got it all together” — not everything in particular, but a proportionate view of the whole of life.

8. Fourth paragraph and the objection from equivocation (“is being said with one meaning of all beings?”) #

Being is said equivocally, not with one meaning. Objection: a common name does not make one knowledge — there is no one science of baseball bats and the bats that fly, nor one knowledge of honey the bee’s product and honey a man’s wife; so if “being” is like “bat,” there is no one knowledge of being. Supporting review from logic: the same thing can be genus and species (quadrilateral is genus of square and species of rectilineal plane figure; animal is genus of man and dog and species of living body). But is every genus a species? If every genus had a genus above it you would have to know an infinity to know anything; and since a genus is said of more than its species, there would always be a name said of more things than any name — but nothing can be said of more than “thing,” “something,” “being,” since nothing is not a being. So not every genus has a genus above it. There remains the question whether there is one highest genus or many — as one may grant that not every father is a son and still ask whether there is one father of us all, like Adam, or many. Also cited: in the Summa Contra Gentiles, in the chapter on whether any name is said of God and creatures with the same meaning, Thomas argues that every name said univocally is genus, species, difference, property or accident, and eliminates all five — which casts light on Porphyry’s five predicables.

9. Showing in simple ways that “being” and “thing” are not univocal (“to be or not to be, that is the question”) #

Test against the strict definition of genus: a name said with one meaning of many things other in kind, signifying what it is.

• Hamlet’s “to be or not to be” means to live or not to live — not to be a student, or to be in Denmark, or to be married; those would need qualification. So “to be” is not said in one way.
• “If you leave this room you will cease to be” sounds threatening; pleading in court that he only meant “cease to be in the room” would not do — no one would understand it so. Likewise “you came to be when you walked into this room” needs the qualification.
• “Thing”: my nose and my ear are two things; but my nose and the shape of my nose are not two things in that way — the man in the bar would be puzzled. If a man and a dog are in a room and the dog leaves, one thing is left, not two (the man and his shape) or three (adding his health). Conclusion: being and thing, though said of everything, are not said univocally, hence are not genera — and so there is more than one genus; “it took the genius of Aristotle to find out what the many were.”

10. Equivocal by reason, not by chance (“there is an order and connection among the meanings”) #

Point: a name said of many with different meanings can still name the subject of one knowledge when the meanings are connected and one is fundamental.

• Healthy: a healthy body, complexion, diet, food, exercise. The central meaning is the body’s good condition; diet and food are healthy as preserving it, complexion as a sign of it. So the medical art treats all of them — it makes no sense for one science to know what is a sign of the body’s good condition and another to know what that condition is.
• Political philosophy (the Groucho Marx question, “who’s buried in Grant’s tomb”: political philosophy is about political things). Polis means the sovereign city, the first meaning. Government is not a polis, but rules it — second meaning. Law (Plato’s Laws) is neither polis nor government, but that by which the government rules the polis. Revolution (Politics V) is none of the three, but is a change of government — further off, and unintelligible apart from government (Plato in the Republic, and Aristotle, treat what a government changes into: an unruly democracy ending in tyranny). So one episteme treats them all: equivocal by reason, not by chance like “bat.”
• Revealed theology is about God, and about other things only in relation to God. The theological definition of man is imago dei; you cannot speak of the image of God without speaking of God, whereas “animal having reason” need not bring God in. Grace is not God but a partaking of the divine nature; faith, hope and charity are not God, but their object is God. So “divine,” said of God and of grace or the virtues or our soul, is equivocal by reason — “we are not divine, my soul is not divine.” Application: granted that “being” is said equivocally of my nose and the shape of my nose, and of my coming to be (when my parents generated me and God infused my soul) and my coming to be in this room — the question is whether it is equivocal by chance or by reason. There is a connection and a first meaning; so, as with political, there can be one reasoned-out knowledge of being as being. Book V will lay out the meanings clearly.

His words #

• kath’ hauto / per se / “through itself” / “as such” / “to itself” — interchangeable renderings; per se in four senses (definition, essential part, property, division).
• “reasoned-out knowledge,” “reasoned-out understanding” — his rendering of episteme / scientia [ed.: science].
• “ability” — [ed.: potency], in the division of being into act and ability.
• “said in part” — Aristotle’s phrase for the particular sciences.
• “highest beginnings and causes” — his rendering; “highest” only because of how we imagine cause above or below the effect.
• “know-it-all” — his description of the wise man, in the way a man can be one.
• “equivocal by chance” vs. “equivocal by reason” — the latter: an order among the meanings, with one fundamental meaning the others refer back to.
• polis — sovereign city; the first meaning of “political.”
• imago dei — the theological definition of man.

Texts #

Read in class

• Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, opening paragraphs (handout), paragraph by paragraph through the fourth.

Mentioned

• Aristotle: Posterior Analytics (subject of episteme); Peri Hermeneias (statement, noun and verb, opposite statements); Metaphysics V (meanings of being), VI (each science treats its subject in a particular way); Nicomachean Ethics I proemium; Politics VII (three kinds of goods), V (revolution).
• Euclid, Elements I.32; definition of number.
• Porphyry, Isagoge (property vs. accident; the five predicables).
• Plato: Meno; Apology; Symposium; Laws; Republic.
• Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae (whatever is, is one); Summa Contra Gentiles (no name said univocally of God and creatures); commentary on the Ethics.
• Shakespeare: Hamlet; Comedy of Errors (“the ground of my defeatures”).

His questions #

• Is the triangle green through being a triangle? No — green is accidental, outside the four per se senses.
• What belongs to being as such? To be good, to be one; and being is divided per se into act and ability, substance and accident.
• Why is the knowledge of being as being none of the other sciences? Because each of them cuts off some more particular part, and treats it in a particular way (numbers as numbers, not as beings).
• Why must the science that seeks the first cause be the science of being as being? Because the more universal the cause, the more universal what is said of its effects — king/citizen, general/soldier, happiness/all human goods.
• Does the consideration of all the goods of man belong to cooking or medicine? No: their ends (tasty food, health) are not the end of life; it belongs to the moral and political philosopher, whose cause is happiness.
• Does every genus have a genus above it? No — else one would need to know an infinity, and there could be no name said of most, yet “being” and “thing” are said of all.
• Is “being” said with one meaning of all beings? No: “to be or not to be” vs. “to be in Denmark”; my nose and my ear are two things, my nose and its shape are not.
• Is there just one highest genus or many? Many — since being and thing are not univocal, they are not genera; how many, “it took the genius of Aristotle to find out.”
• Is being equivocal by chance or by reason? By reason: there is a connection among the meanings and a first meaning, so one reasoned-out knowledge of being is possible.