Act Cannot Be Defined: Induction by Proportion, Descartes and Locke, and the Love of Wisdom

Orientation #

He goes “back to my division” of the name equivocal by reason “as we were saying the other day”, and back to “the connection between wisdom and reason, like we did in the other day” (prev. lecture). He defers the next part of the text (line 6, “legetai energeia ou panta homoios”, the distinction among acts) to “this afternoon’s session”, which “will take the rest of Lectio 5” and “extend into Saturday”. Verified sources indicate his handout “Note on End or Purpose of Man” (pp. 2–4) and “On Dividing Shakespeare’s Plays” (p. 3) are read from in this class. The previous class examined how act is made known by examples and analogy rather than definition; the next works through the definition of motion in the Physics.

The class, in order #

1. Act known by induction from ratios; the fourth tool of dialectic (“induction is for many particulars”) #

Point: act is known without definition, by induction, but the “particulars” here are ratios; this is the culmination of the fourth tool of dialectic, the ability to consider likeness.

• Likeness between dialectic and wisdom: Plato, Aristotle and Thomas “all insist” on it.
• Third tool vs. fourth tool: the mind is exercised in finding a difference where things are close (far apart, the difference is easy); it is exercised in finding a likeness where things are far apart (close, the likeness is easy). So reason is exercised more in seeing a likeness of ratios than a likeness within one species or genus. The likeness of ratios is “the utmost of that ability”, though the tool is not limited to it.
• Usefulness of the fourth tool, per Aristotle: three things — defining, induction, hypothetical syllogisms.

2. Worked case: the purpose of man from a thing’s own act (“the act which that thing either alone can do”) #

Point: the first definition of happiness in Nicomachean Ethics I is reached by a “long induction” whose particulars are ratios, then a hypothetical syllogism.

1. Plato’s definition of a thing’s own act (Republic, “I think in the first book”): the act which that thing either alone can do, or can do better than other things. Examples: seeing is the eye’s own act because only through the eyes can you see; walking is not the hands’ own act, though people on TV walk on their hands, because they cannot do it the way the legs do.
2. Induction from tools: knife’s own act is to cut, and cutting is its purpose; ballpoint pen’s own act is to write. From organs: eye/see, ear/hear. From occupations: cook/cook, teacher/teach (“that’s why we hire a teacher”), pianist/play the piano (“in my restaurant”). Then a further induction from these less universal statements: each thing’s own act is its end or purpose.
3. Apply to man: does he have his own act, or is he “without anything to do” (Aristotle)? He does: the act with reason. The induction works by seeing that seeing is to the eye like cutting is to the knife or playing is to the pianist.
4. Hypothetical syllogism: if seeing is the purpose of the eye, then the act with reason is the purpose of man; everybody knows seeing is the purpose of the eye; therefore the act with reason is the purpose of man.

• “The most interesting inductions are the ones that are made from particulars that are in fact ratios. Those are the subtle ones.” This is how logic arose: someone saw that drama is to tragedy and comedy like habit is to virtue and vice, and so approached genus and species. Dialectic is useful to find the beginnings of episteme; by an induction from analoga you reach the beginning of wisdom, an understanding of act in this universal way.
• Not just falling is to the stone as rolling is to the bowling ball (all motion): you must see that falling is to the stone like understanding is to the mind, or like the form of mercury is to [unclear in recording].

3. Aristotle’s five proportions, the first three vs. the last two (“to oikodomoun pros to oikodomikon”) #

Point: when Aristotle returns “a second time” to proportion he gives five ratios, and the fourth tool lets one see a likeness across ratios that are themselves unlike.

• The five: the one building a house to the house builder; the one awake to the one sleeping; the one seeing to the one with eyes closed who has eyes; what is segregated from matter to the matter; what is worked up or fashioned to the unfashioned.
• First three: some motion or activity compared to what is capable of it (activity to actor). Last two: form to matter (the last two “almost the same thing”, differently phrased).
• Student: so there are different proportions for the different meanings? His reply: “be careful” — he will bring out differences later, but at this point, in seeing act in general, you are seeing a likeness of these ratios: asleep-then-awake is like eyes-closed-then-seeing is like wood-then-table. As the eye closed was able to see and actually sees when opened, so the wood was able to be a chair and actually is one when it receives its form from the carpenter. Student: like ratios across all five? Yes, but the first three are closer together, the last two further apart.

4. Digression: seeing likeness in things far apart, and the first knowings (“either you didn’t add correctly”) #

Point: examples from his own teaching of how a proportion to something far apart manifests a point; and how first words, first statements and first numbers are not known through prior ones — “that’s the way you come to know act”.

• Syllogism vs. adding/subtracting: in both, from two you get one. If the sum is wrong, either you did not add correctly or one number added was wrong (his mother spending the afternoon reconciling the checking account; a wrong decimal point). So if a syllogism’s conclusion is not true, either it did not follow (not really a syllogism) or a premise was defective. Though the syllogism is speech in which, some statements laid down, another falls necessarily, “falls necessarily” does not mean necessarily true. Even with correct adding, ballpark figures give a probable, in fact wrong, number.
• Defining vs. reasoning: as not every premise is a conclusion, not every defining part is itself definable — “a necessary thing to see”.
• First words: a dictionary explains words by other words, but you come into the world knowing no words. The child associates the sound “cookie” with the thing; he is not told “a cookie is a sweet, small…”. Easier to see than the harder parallel: the first statements are not known through other statements.
• First numbers: not got by adding, subtracting, multiplying or dividing (you need two numbers already) but by counting; likewise you need two statements to syllogize, so first statements are not known by syllogism.
• “This is an extremely important way of coming to know, and that’s the way you come to know act.” You must know act before motion, though motion is what we first call act. Of the distinction, one part is act, the other the able (possible).

5. The distinction seen “in virtue of this likeness”; proportions at the beginning of every science (“something to sit on is to chair like animal is to dog”) #

Point: the English translation says “distinguished”, but you do not see act by first making the distinction; you see the distinction in virtue of the likeness — wood before shaping is to the chair (and its form) as my eye closed is to my eye seeing you; one is act, the other ability.

• Logic example: students asked “what’s a dog?” say “an animal”; “a chair?” “something to sit on” — “so’s a bench”. They naturally begin with what the thing is in general, then add differences. Only after seeing that something-to-sit-on is to chair like animal is to dog can you abstract genus (“general” from the same root) and species.
• Moral virtue: Aristotle manifests it by the likeness of extremes and the mean; you see the likeness of ratios before separating things out.
• Euclid: Book V, theory of proportions; Book VI suddenly has “tremendous power” (not just squares on the sides but any regular rectilineal figure) — a witness to the importance of proportions.
• Senior seminar topic: the importance of seeing proportions in philosophy (one student the De Anima, another the Ethics). The De Anima, which he taught this summer: “how many proportions are in there”. Use the phrase sunorama, “to see together”; people can’t see things together.
• Even modern academics test this: a business hiring exam in the Worcester newspaper, and IQ tests (“this is to that as this is to…”), are largely the ability to see a proportion.

6. Extending the syllogism: “seeing well”; proportions in theology and poetry (“seeing well is to the eye as hearing”) #

Point: proportion carries the argument further and dominates parables, metaphor and prayer.

• Purpose of man is not just the act with reason but done well; likewise the eye’s purpose is not just to see but to see well (“otherwise why would they give you eyeglasses”). Does the proportion hold if I add “well” to seeing? No — so add it to both: seeing well is to the eye as hearing well is to the ear (a student checking off “walking” is in trouble; “hearing” alone is also wrong). So if seeing well is the end of the eye, the act with reason done well is the end of man; and not for a day or two but throughout life. “Ain’t got the definition of it done” — the induction shows the importance of proportion.
• Parables of our Lord are all based on proportions: tribute to Caesar — “whose image?” — “give to Caesar what is Caesar’s, to God what is God’s”. The church fathers come back on the proportion: what has Caesar’s image, you give Caesar; what has God’s image — the soul — you give God. You see a proportion, understand one ratio more exactly, then reason to the other.
• Poetics: the best metaphors and similes are based on proportions. Stock example: a father’s only daughter, dead on her wedding day; Shakespeare: “Death lies on her like an untimely frost upon the sweetest flower of all the field” — he challenges classes to find a better line.
• Our Father: “forgive us our trespasses as we forgive” — a proportion, here of three terms (8:4 :: 4:2; 9:6 :: 6:4): God will be to you as you are to your neighbour; the parable of the forgiven servant who throttles the other servant develops the same.
• Student: Aristotle is using these proportions to make act known, but also extending it to power to act? “Yeah, yeah.”

7. Act as a name equivocal by reason, by like ratios to different things (“go back to my division there”) #

Point: “act” is one of the six kinds of name equivocal by reason.

• His division (from the other day): a name becomes equivocal by reason either (i) by being kept by one of the things it is said of while the other is given a new name, or (ii) by being carried over from one thing to another; (ii) divides into (a) losing part of its meaning, generalizing it (e.g. “undergoing”, passio), or (b) by reason of ratios, in three ways: ratio of the second to the first; other ratios to the same thing; like ratios to different (other) things.
• Act is (b), third way: seeing to the eye, hearing to the ear, then more extended, form to matter (or the matter unformed to the matter formed, like the eye before seeing to seeing). So “act” is carried over from motion to form; it is not said of them equally; a common meaning of act is only imperfectly separated from these things, since it does not belong to them exactly the same way.
• Student (Chris): is he explaining all the ways “act” is used, or giving it a new meaning? Answer: in daily life we carry the word over ourselves (“the statue is actually finished”) but not as far; Aristotle is more precise, and sees that act is equivocal by reason.

8. Why no reading on “act” in Book V; the order of Books VIII and IX (“form has not been manifested enough yet”) #

Point: in Metaphysics V Aristotle distinguishes the meanings of being and has a lexis/reading on “ability” but none on “act”; Thomas notices and says form has not yet been manifested enough — after Book VIII, on substance and, starting from natural philosophy, matter and form, the senses of act can be distinguished adequately.

• Here Aristotle tends to use “substance” almost for form, with in mind the greatest example of form being act, substantial form rather than exemplar form. So Book IX appropriately follows VIII, “if nothing else”.
• Aside: at TAC the faculty asked him to teach Book VII (“of all the books… I’ll be learning with you”); VIII is more concrete (matter and form, their composition). In VIII you see matter and form, ability and act, in a more particular way; in IX act and ability in a complete, universal way — as ST I q.117 a.1 says of the teacher leading the student from less universal to more universal. Aristotle’s “order is there… perfect”, though these may be his notes; hence you need Thomas to unfold them.

9. Love of wisdom and love of reason (“can you love wisdom without loving reason”) #

Point: following on the two connections between wisdom and reason seen before (prev. lecture), the love of wisdom and the love of reason are connected.

1. If you love something you love its perfection. Wisdom is the highest or greatest perfection of reason. So loving wisdom, you must love reason. Parallel: can you love the body without loving health, its good? Would you love health if you did not love your body?
2. Reverse: can you love reason without loving wisdom? Student: if you love reason you love its act and want it to act well. He: less obvious, since wisdom is its highest perfection; a student adds one could love reason not for its own sake — “that’s the point”. Augustine, De Trinitate (his favourite): “an immature and perverse love of reason”. One could love reason for food and sleep, lesser things: immature, and perverse if you know what wisdom is. A mature and true love of reason requires loving wisdom; “they go together”. Immature = not yet capable of it, and what you are not capable of is not very lovable.

• Albert the Great, in a passage in Kasurik’s little translation of Thomas’s commentary on Physics I–II: to study lower things for any reason other than to know God, unless forced by necessity (a doctor), is a perverse attitude toward knowing — “Augustine has something of that”.
• Aside: the Prometheus Books catalogue always reminds him of Augustine’s phrase — their “reason” is atheistic, evolutionary-humanist, rejecting faith: an immature and perverse love of reason.

10. Must a Catholic lover of wisdom love theology more than first philosophy? (“knowledge of God in both senses”) #

Point: yes; a Catholic philosopher with no serious interest in theology has a disorder.

1. Student: the least glimpse of the highest things is more desirable than full knowledge of the less. He: go back to the Proemium — the fourth thing said of wisdom is that it is the best and most honourable knowledge because most divine.
2. Two senses of “divine” knowledge: about God, or had by God — as knowledge is “human” either because about human things or because had by humans. Geometry is human only in the second sense; ethics and politics in both; Shakespeare’s definition of reason is knowledge of reason in both senses.
3. Wisdom is knowledge of God in both: about the first cause, which is God; and, on the common opinion of the great Greek philosophers, God alone is wise or most of all wise. So sharing God’s wisdom would be wisdom in a higher sense than natural wisdom, which is only about God.
4. Aristotle did not know God has spoken (before Christ, apparently ignorant of the Hebrews); a Catholic knows. Told that sharing God’s knowledge is offered, Aristotle would have to want it or cease to love wisdom. So one who does not want theology more than first philosophy is not a lover of wisdom — “a lover of his own ability, or something”.

• Medievals all subordinate philosophy to theology, as lovers of wisdom must. Moderns reject theology and end up loving something other than wisdom: Sartre freedom; Hegel, end of history is freedom (or equality — “falls rather flat”); many, power (what experimental science gives); the Scottish philosopher of The Wealth of Nations, wealth.
• So “philosopher” said of them and of the Greeks is equivocal, perhaps more by chance than by reason: is there reason to call a lover of liberty a lover of wisdom? If Berquist loves Mozart (or wine, candy) more than wisdom, call him a lover of Mozart; you call a man a lover of what he loves most of all.
• Student: that’s just playing with words. He: the question is only whether they are philosophers in the original sense, not whether they must or should be. The Greeks would say power and freedom are good if used wisely, extremely harmful if foolishly (terrorists getting power).

11. Closing question: is motion used to define motion? (“the first meaning of act is motion”) #

Student: if act defines motion and the first meaning of act is motion, aren’t you using motion to define motion? “A good question” showing one difficulty of defining motion; what is interesting is that in the eight books of Natural Hearing the first book comes before the third — [recording ends].

His words #

• fourth tool of dialectic: the ability to consider likeness; culminating in seeing a likeness of ratios [ed.: Topics I, the four organa]
• a thing’s own act (Plato): the act which that thing alone can do, or can do better than others
• sunorama: “to see together” [ed.: Gk. synoran]
• analoga / the proportional: particulars that are ratios
• episteme: science, whose beginnings dialectic helps find
• to oikodomoun pros to oikodomikon: the one building a house to the house builder
• apo kekrimenon: what is segregated from matter
• the able / possible: the other part of the act–ability distinction [ed.: potency]
• undergoing / passio: example of a name generalized by losing part of its meaning
• equivocal by reason: his six-fold division (kept by one; carried over: generalized; ratio of second to first; other ratios to the same; like ratios to different things)
• lexis / reading (lectio): Aristotle’s treatment of a word in Book V
• substantial form vs. exemplar form: why “substance” stands almost for form here
• wisdom: the highest or greatest perfection of reason
• immature and perverse love of reason (Augustine)
• knowledge of God in both senses: about God, and had by God
• Natural Hearing [ed.: Physics]

Texts #

Read in class

• Aristotle, Metaphysics IX (Thomas, Lectio 5): the five proportions; next part from line 6, “legetai energeia ou panta homoios”, deferred.
• Handout, “Note on End or Purpose of Man”, pp. 2–4 (verified): the induction and hypothetical syllogism of segments 2 and 6.
• Handout, “On Dividing Shakespeare’s Plays”, p. 3 (verified; probably the “untimely frost” passage).

Mentioned

• Aristotle, Topics, the four tools and their usefulness (inferred locus)
• Plato, Republic I, definition of a thing’s own act
• Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I, first definition of happiness; moral virtue and the mean
• Aristotle, Metaphysics V (reading on “ability”), VII, VIII, Proemium (fourth thing said of wisdom)
• Thomas Aquinas, ST I q.117 a.1, the teacher
• Augustine, De Trinitate, “immature and perverse love of reason”
• Albert the Great, passage in Kasurik’s translation of Thomas on Physics I–II
• Aristotle, Poetics, best metaphors from proportions; De Anima
• Euclid, Elements V and VI
• Shakespeare, “Death lies on her like an untimely frost…” (Romeo and Juliet, inferred)
• Gospel: tribute to Caesar; parable of the unforgiving servant; the Our Father
• Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (“this one Scottish philosopher”); Sartre, Hegel; Prometheus Books
• Aristotle, Physics (Natural Hearing), eight books, I before III

His questions #

• Act is known by induction, but the many particulars are what? Ratios.
• The fourth tool of dialectic is useful for what three things? Defining, induction, hypothetical syllogisms.
• What is to man as seeing is to the eye? The act with reason — and, adding “well” to both, the act with reason done well, throughout life.
• Seeing well is to the eye as what is to the ear: hearing, walking, hearing well? Hearing well.
• Do the first three of Aristotle’s proportions and the last two have like ratios? Yes, across all five, but the first three (activity to actor) are closer, the last two (form to matter) further apart.
• If you add and get the wrong number, what is the cause? Either you did not add correctly or one number was wrong — as with a false conclusion: no true syllogism, or a defective premise.
• How do you get your first numbers — by adding or subtracting? By counting; likewise first words are not learned from other words, first statements not from other statements.
• Why does Aristotle have no reading on “act” in Book V? Thomas: form has not been manifested enough until Book VIII.
• Can you love reason without loving wisdom? Only with an immature or perverse love of reason (Augustine).
• If a Catholic lover of wisdom does not want theology more than first philosophy, is he a lover of wisdom? No — wisdom is the knowledge of God in both senses; the moderns who reject theology love freedom, power or wealth instead, so “philosopher” said of them is equivocal.
• If the first meaning of act is motion, aren’t you using motion to define motion? left open — “a good question”; recording ends.