Prima Pars #

A systematic study of St. Thomas Aquinas’s Prima Pars (First Part of the Summa Theologiae). These lectures examine God’s existence, essence, and attributes—simplicity, perfection, infinity, eternity—the Trinity, divine knowledge and will, and the foundations of theological inquiry according to Thomistic principles.

152 episodes, about 145 hours

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Classes #

Class 1 2005-12-06 #

Part 1 of 2 · Vatican I, Dei Filius: Pius IX’s Prologue and Chapter 1 on God in Himself #

41 min Berquist opens Vatican I’s Dei Filius, tracing Pius IX’s account of rationalism and pantheism, then compares its first chapter on God to the structure of Aquinas’s Summa Contra Gentiles.

Part 2 of 2 · Dei Filius Chapter 1: God Distinct from the World, Creation, Providence and the Canons Against Pantheism #

45 min Berquist works through the first chapter of Vatican I’s Dei Filius on God’s distinction from the world, weighing it against Aquinas’s orderings and the council’s canons against pantheism.

Class 2 2005-12-15 #

Part 1 of 2 · The Necessity of Belief and the Two Roads to God: Vatican I on Revelation #

63 min Berquist argues that belief precedes knowledge in every discipline, then reads Vatican I’s Dei Filius on the two roads—reason and revelation—to knowledge of God.

Part 2 of 2 · Scripture, Tradition and the Nature of Faith: Vatican I, Chapters 2-3 #

40 min Berquist works through Chapters 2 and 3 of Vatican I’s Dei Filius, on Scripture and Tradition as the two sources of revelation, then turns to Aquinas and Hebrews on the nature of faith.

Class 3 2005-12-22 #

Part 1 of 2 · Dei Filius III: The Church as a Sign of Credibility, the Canons on Faith, and the Two Kinds of Knowledge of God #

58 min Berquist works through Vatican I’s Dei Filius on the necessity of faith and the Church, the Church’s own credibility as a motive of belief, and the canons condemning fideism and rationalism, then opens Summa Contra Gentiles IV, ch. 15 on the twofold order of knowledge.

Part 2 of 2 · Dei Filius IV: How Reason Serves the Mysteries of Faith, Why Faith and Reason Cannot Contradict, and Why Theology Judges Philosophy #

56 min Berquist works through Vatican I’s Dei Filius on how reason may aid faith’s mysteries—by analogy, by connecting mysteries to each other, and by establishing the preambles of faith—while never penetrating or contradicting them.

Class 4 2006-01-05 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa Theologiae I, Q.1: Prologue, Overview, and Art. 1–2 (Why Sacred Doctrine Is Necessary; Objections to It Being a Science) #

64 min Berquist opens Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae by asking why sacred doctrine is needed at all beside philosophy (Q.1, a.1), then turns to whether it counts as a science (a.2), sketching the ten articles of Question One along the way.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa Theologiae I, Q.1, Art. 2–5: Sacred Doctrine as a Subalternate Science, One Science, More Speculative, and the Highest Science #

64 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q. 1, aa. 2–5, asking whether sacred doctrine is a genuine science, whether it is one science, and why it outranks the others—with a detour into q. 93 on the image of God.

Class 5 2006-01-12 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, q.1, a.6–7: Sacred Doctrine as Wisdom and God as Its Subject #

61 min Berquist works through Summa I, q.1, aa.6-7, asking whether sacred doctrine is wisdom and whether God himself is its proper subject.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, q.1, a.7–9: Christ as King, Arguing from Authority, and Metaphor in Scripture #

65 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q. 1, aa. 7–9, on theology’s argument from authority and its use of metaphor, opening with Christ as king, prophet, and priest.

Class 6 2006-01-19 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa Theologiae I, Q.1 aa.9–10 and the Prologue to Q.2: Metaphor in Scripture, the Four Senses, and the Plan of the Summa #

65 min Berquist finishes Summa Theologiae I, q.1, a.9 on Scripture’s “lowly” metaphors, then works through a.10 on the fourfold sense of Scripture, closing with a preview of Question 2’s plan for the whole Summa.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa Theologiae I, Q.2 aa.1–2: Is God’s Existence Self-Evident, and Can It Be Demonstrated? #

62 min Berquist opens the Summa Theologiae’s Prima Pars, then works closely through Question 2’s first two articles: is God’s existence self-evident, and can it be demonstrated?

Class 7 2006-01-26 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, q.2, a.3: Objections Against God’s Existence and the First Two Ways (Motion and Efficient Cause) #

60 min Berquist works through Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae I, q.2, a.3, tracing the objections to God’s existence and the first two of the five ways—from motion and from efficient causality.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, q.2, a.3: The Third, Fourth and Fifth Ways, the Most Universals, and Replies on Evil and Enough Causes #

64 min Berquist works through Aquinas’s third, fourth, and fifth ways for God’s existence in Summa I, q.2, a.3, tracing the fourth way’s debt to Aristotle’s Metaphysics II and the fifth way’s roots in the Physics.

Class 8 2006-02-01 #

Part 1 of 2 · God’s simplicity, perfection, infinity, unchangeableness and unity: why the mind looks for one, simple, unlimited, unchanging beginning, and an overview of the question on simplicity #

58 min Berquist opens Question 3 of the Summa Theologiae on divine simplicity, asking why Aquinas moves from simplicity through perfection, infinity, immutability, and unity—and why the mind keeps reaching for something one, simple, and unchanging as a first principle.

Part 2 of 2 · Is God a body, or made of matter and form? Aquinas’s arguments, second-figure syllogisms, scriptural metaphors, and ‘divina substantia forma est’ #

70 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q. 3, articles 1 and 2, asking whether God is a body and whether God is composed of matter and form, tracing Aquinas’s syllogisms step by step.

Class 9 2006-02-16 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa Theologiae I, Q.3, Articles 3–4: God is His own nature and His own existence #

60 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q. 3, aa. 3–4, where Aquinas argues that in God essence and existence are one and the same as the divine nature — unlike in creatures, where matter separates individual from nature, and potency separates nature from existence.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa Theologiae I, Q.3, Articles 5–6: God is in no genus and has no accidents #

64 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q. 3, aa. 5–6, asking whether God falls under a genus and whether any accidents can exist in Him.

Class 10 2006-02-23 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, Q.3, Art.7: Is God Altogether Simple? Five Arguments, Pure Act, and the Mistake About the First Cause #

63 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q. 3, a. 7 — is God altogether simple? — tracing the article’s five arguments from pure act, first cause, and identity with existence itself.

Part 2 of 2 · Q.3, Art.7 Replies and Art.8: Why the Simpler Can Be More Perfect, Why God Is Not Part of Other Things, and Things That Are Other by Themselves #

62 min Berquist finishes Summa Theologiae I, q. 3, a. 8 on whether God enters into composition with other things, refuting the world-soul, universal form, and prime-matter errors, then loops back through articles 7 and the prologue to Question 3.

Class 11 2006-03-02 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, Q.4 aa.1–2: God Is Perfect and Holds Every Perfection, Despite His Simplicity #

70 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q. 4, articles 1 and 2, asking whether God is perfect and whether He holds the perfections of all things—illustrated with geometry, Mozart, and the chicken-and-egg problem.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, Q.4 a.3 and Q.5 Introduction: How Creatures Are Like God, and the Most Universal Things (Being, One, True, Good) #

67 min Berquist finishes Aquinas’s treatment of divine perfection, then works through Summa I, Q.4, a.3 on whether creatures can be like God, before opening onto Aristotle’s and Avicenna’s doctrine of the transcendentals: being, one, true, good.

Class 12 2006-03-16 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, Q.5: Are Good and Being the Same? (Arts. 1–2, first part): Simply vs. in Some Way, and Why Dionysius Names God Good Before Being #

70 min Berquist opens Summa I, Q.5 on the good, previewing its six articles before working through Article 1’s case that good and being are really the same but notionally distinct, and resolving Boethius’s objection from De Hebdomadibus.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, Q.5: Is Good Prior to Being, and Is Every Being Good? (Arts. 2–3): Per Se vs. Per Accidens, Evil as Privation, First Matter and Mathematics #

46 min Berquist works through Summa I, q. 5, aa. 1 and 3, asking whether good really differs from being and whether every being is good, with first matter and mathematics as test cases.

Class 13 2006-03-23 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, Q.5, A.4: Why We Want the Good, and the Good as Final Cause #

44 min Berquist works through Summa I, Q.5, A.4, asking whether goodness has the character of a final cause, and why fire’s heating illustrates how good presupposes efficient and formal causality.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, Q.5, AA.5–6: Mode, Species and Order; the Noble, the Useful and the Pleasant #

69 min Berquist works through Summa I, q. 5, aa. 5–6, asking whether goodness consists in mode, species, and order, and how good divides into the noble, the useful, and the pleasant.

Class 14 2006-03-30 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa Theologiae I, Q.6, aa.1–3: God Is Good, the Highest Good, and Good by His Essence #

64 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, Q.6, aa.1-3, arguing that God is good, is the highest good, and is good by essence rather than participation.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, Q.6 a.4 and Q.7 a.1: All Things Good by the Divine Goodness; the Infinity of God #

45 min Berquist works through Summa I, q. 6, a. 4 and q. 7, a. 1, asking whether all things are good by the divine goodness and whether God is infinite.

Class 15 2006-04-06 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, Q7, Articles 2–3: Can anything besides God be infinite, in essence or in size? (Simply vs. in some way, first matter, and useful fictions in physics) #

66 min Berquist works through Summa I, Q7, a.2–3, asking whether anything but God can be infinite in essence, and whether an actually infinite body could exist — matter, angels, and physical magnitude all get tested against the distinction.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, Q7, Article 4 and Q8, Article 1: No actual infinite multitude, Weizsäcker on a finite universe, and how God is in all things #

43 min Berquist asks whether an actually infinite multitude can exist, then turns to whether God is infinite and present in all things, working through Summa I, q. 7, a. 4 and q. 8, a. 1.

Class 16 2006-04-20 #

Part 1 of 2 · Is God in All Things and Everywhere? (Summa I, q.8, a.1–2) #

56 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q. 8, a. 1–2, asking whether God is in all things and whether God is everywhere, tracing “in” and “place” back to Aristotle’s Physics.

Part 2 of 2 · God Present by Essence, Presence and Power; God Alone Everywhere; the Unchangeable God (q.8 a.3–4, q.9 a.1) #

68 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q. 8, aa. 3–4 and q. 9, a. 1, on how God is present in creatures by essence, power, and presence, why He alone is everywhere, and why God cannot change.

Class 17 2006-04-27 #

Part 1 of 2 · God’s Unchangeableness (Summa I, Q.9): Pure Act, Motion vs. Doing, and How Angels Are in Place #

59 min Berquist works through Summa I, Q.9 on why God, as pure act, cannot change—then asks how angels, having no bodies, can still be said to move or be “in place.”

Part 2 of 2 · The Eternity of God (Summa I, Q.10, aa.1–2): Boethius’ Definition and the Via Negativa #

58 min Berquist works through Summa I, Q.10, aa.1–2, testing Boethius’s definition of eternity—“the whole, simultaneous and perfect possession of unending life”—term by term before asking whether eternity belongs to God alone.

Class 18 2006-05-18 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I q.10 a.3-5: Is Only God Eternal? How Eternity Differs from Time, and the Aevum Introduced #

55 min Berquist works through Summa I, q. 10, aa. 3-5, asking whether God alone is eternal, how eternity differs from time, and introducing the aevum, the middle duration proper to angels.

Part 2 of 2 · Common Doctor, Dividing into Twos and Threes, the Aevum (q.10 a.5-6), and the Philosophy of the Continuous #

70 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q.10, aa.5-6 on the aevum as a duration between time and eternity, opening with why Aquinas is called “the Common Doctor.”

Class 19 2006-05-23 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, Q.11, Arts. 1–2: The One Convertible with Being, and How One and Many Are Opposed #

52 min Berquist works through Summa I, q. 11, aa. 1–2, asking whether “one” adds anything to being and whether one and many are truly opposed.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, Q.11, Arts. 3–4: God Is One and Most of All One; Review of the Treatise on God’s Substance #

44 min Berquist works through Summa I, Q.11, Arts. 3–4, Aquinas’s arguments that God is one and most of all one, then closes the treatise on God’s substance with a look ahead to knowledge and naming.

Class 20 2006-09-14 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I q.12 intro and a.1: we name things as we know them; can a created mind see God’s essence? #

61 min Berquist opens Summa I, q. 12 on how creatures know and name God, then works through Article 1’s argument—via Aristotle’s act/potency distinction, Chrysostom, and Dionysius’s bat-in-sunlight image—for why the God who is supremely knowable in Himself is so hard for us to grasp.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I q.12 a.1 replies and a.2: God infinite and knowable, ratio in two senses, the light of glory and seeing God without a created likeness #

56 min Berquist works through the replies in Summa I, q. 12, a. 1 on comprehending an infinite God, then turns to a. 2 on why the beatific vision requires the light of glory rather than any created likeness.

Class 21 2006-09-28 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I q.12 a.3–4: Can the Bodily Eye See God? The Meanings of ’to See’ and ‘Eye’, and Why No Creature Sees God by Nature #

55 min Berquist works through Summa I, q. 12, a. 3–4: whether bodily eyes could ever see God, and whether any created intellect can see the divine essence by its own natural power.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I q.12 a.4–5: The Knower’s Way of Being, Why Reason Is Immaterial, and the Light of Glory That Makes Us Godlike #

63 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q. 12, articles four and five, asking why no created intellect can see God’s essence by its own power, and why a supernatural “light of glory” is required.

Class 22 2006-10-05 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I q.12 a.6–7: Why Some See God More Perfectly, and Why No Creature Comprehends God #

54 min Berquist works through Summa I, q. 12, articles 6 and 7, on why some souls see God’s essence more perfectly than others and why no creature can comprehend God even while seeing Him wholly.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I q.12 a.8–10: What the Blessed See in God, Seeing Without Likenesses, and Seeing All at Once #

64 min Berquist works through Summa I, q. 12, a. 8–10, asking whether one who sees God’s essence thereby sees all things, and whether that vision is simultaneous rather than successive.

Class 23 2006-11-02 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, Q.12, a.11–12: No Vision of God’s Essence in This Life; Knowing God by Natural Reason #

54 min Berquist works through Summa I, q. 12, aa. 11–12: can anyone see God’s essence in this life, and can natural reason know God at all?

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, Q.12, a.13 and Introduction to Q.13: Knowing God by Grace and the Names of God #

61 min Berquist closes Question 12 of the Summa by asking whether grace gives a fuller knowledge of God than reason alone, then opens Question 13 on the names of God.

Class 24 2006-11-09 #

Part 1 of 2 · Aquinas on the Names of God, Part 1: Can God Be Named, and Do Names Signify His Substance? (Summa I, Q.13, Aa.1–2) #

68 min Berquist opens Question 13 of the Summa, working through Article 1 on whether any name can fit God and into Article 2 on whether such names name his substance, with Dionysius, Augustine, and Maimonides in the background.

Part 2 of 2 · Aquinas on the Names of God, Part 2: Proper and Metaphorical Names, Figures of Speech in Scripture, and the Dangers of Imagination (Q.13, Aa.2–3) #

64 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae Ia, q.13, aa.2-3, asking how names like “good” apply properly to God while names like “rock” apply only metaphorically—then opens a.4 on figurative speech in Scripture.

Class 25 2006-11-16 #

Part 1 of 2 · Hallowed Be Thy Name: Why Dionysius Writes About Names, and Why the Divine Names Are Not Synonyms (ST I q.13 a.4) #

48 min Berquist asks why “good” and “wise” said of God aren’t synonyms, working through Aquinas’s Summa I, q. 13, a. 4 against Pseudo-Dionysius’s Divine Names, with a stop at the Lord’s Prayer’s “hallowed be Thy name.”

Part 2 of 2 · Carrying Names Over to God: Analogy Between Univocal and Equivocal, and Whether Names Apply First to God or to Creatures (ST I q.13 a.5–6) #

59 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q. 13, a. 5–6, asking whether “wise” and “good” apply to God and creatures univocally, equivocally, or analogically—and which side the name belongs to first.

Class 26 · Summa Theologiae I, Q.13, Article 7: Are “Lord” and “Creator” Said of God in Time or from Eternity? #

2006-11-30 · 67 min Berquist works through Article Seven of the Summa’s treatise on divine names, asking whether “Lord” and “Creator” are said of God in time or from eternity.

Class 27 2006-12-07 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, q.13, aa.8–10: What the Name ‘God’ Signifies, Whether It Can Be Shared, and How It Is Said Analogously #

66 min Berquist works through Summa I, q.13, aa.8–10 on whether “God” names the divine nature or operation, whether it can be shared with creatures, and how it is said analogously—by nature, participation, or opinion.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, q.13, aa.10–12: Univocal, Equivocal and Analogous Names; ‘He Who Is’ as God’s Most Proper Name; Affirmative Statements About God #

62 min Berquist finishes Summa I, q.13, a.10 and works through articles 11 and 12, asking why “He Who Is” is God’s most proper name and whether we can truly affirm anything of God.

Class 28 2006-12-14 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, Q.14: The Order of the Question on God’s Knowledge, and Article 1: Is There Knowledge in God? #

66 min Berquist opens Question 14 of the Prima Pars on God’s knowledge, laying out the question’s sixteen articles and arguing, with Article 1, that knowing means immaterially possessing the form of another.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, Q.14, Article 2: Does God Understand Himself? #

45 min Berquist works through Summa I, q. 14, a. 2 on whether God understands Himself, weighing an objection from the Liber de Causis and Aristotle’s De Anima before turning to Thomas’s answer.

Class 29 2006-12-21 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, Q.14, Arts. 3–4: Does God Comprehend Himself, and Is His Understanding His Substance? (with ‘simply’ versus ‘in some way’) #

62 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, Q.14, Articles 3 and 4: does God comprehend Himself, and is His act of understanding identical with His own substance?

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, Q.14, Arts. 5–6: God Knows Other Things in Himself, and Knows Each One Distinctly #

42 min Berquist works through Summa I, Q.14, Articles 5 and 6, asking whether God knows things other than Himself, and whether that knowledge reaches particulars or stops at universals.

Class 30 2007-01-04 #

Part 1 of 2 · Faith, Hope and Charity in Jude; Is God’s Knowledge Discursive? Is It the Cause of Things? (Summa I, q.14, aa.7–8) #

61 min Berquist opens with Jude on faith, hope, and charity before turning to Aquinas on whether God’s knowledge is discursive and whether it causes things (Summa I, q.14, aa.7–8).

Part 2 of 2 · God’s Knowledge of Things That Are Not and of Bad Things; Knowing Our Own Ignorance (Summa I, q.14, aa.9–10) #

62 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q. 14, aa. 9–10: does God know things that do not exist, and does he know evil? The answer turns on act, potency, and privation.

Class 31 2007-01-11 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I q.14 a.11: Whether God Knows Singulars – Practical Knowledge, Fiction and the Likeness of Matter to God #

50 min Berquist works through Summa I, q.14, a.11 on whether God knows singular things, arguing that divine knowledge causes rather than derives from what it knows, reaching down to matter itself.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I q.14 a.12: Whether God Knows Infinite Things – Senses of ‘In’, Potency vs. Act, and Limits in Modern Physics #

61 min Berquist works through Summa I q.14 a.12 on whether God knows infinite things, distinguishing knowledge of vision from knowledge of simple intelligence—then tests the potency/act distinction against quantum theory and relativity.

Class 32 2007-01-18 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, Q.14, a.13: Does God Know Future Contingents? Eternity, Boethius, and the Composed and Divided Senses #

48 min Berquist works through Summa I, q. 14, a. 13 on whether God knows future contingents, using Boethius’s definition of eternity and the composed/divided sense to answer objections that divine foreknowledge destroys contingency.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, Q.14, aa.14–15: God’s Knowledge of Statements and Why It Never Changes; Does Truth Require We Know Things as They Are? #

65 min Berquist works through Summa I, q.14, aa.14–15: how God knows enunciable statements without composing them discursively, and why His knowledge never changes though the things He knows do.

Class 33 2007-01-25 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, Q.14 a.16 and Intro to Q.15: Is God’s Knowledge Looking (Speculative) or Practical? Plato’s Forms and Whether Truth Requires That the Way We Know Be the Way Things Are #

47 min Berquist closes Summa I, Q.14, a.16 on whether God’s knowledge is speculative or practical, then opens Q.15 on the divine ideas with Plato’s theory of Forms.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, Q.15 aa.1-3: Ideas in the Divine Mind (Whether There Are Ideas, Whether Many, and Whether of All Things God Knows) #

60 min Berquist walks through Summa I, q. 15, aa. 1-3, asking whether ideas exist in God, whether they are many, and whether they extend to everything he knows—including matter, genera, and evil.

Class 34 2007-02-08 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I q.16 a.1: Is Truth in the Mind or in Things? (Doctors of the Church, Truth vs. Goodness, the Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth) #

66 min Berquist opens Summa I, q. 16 on truth, asking whether truth is found in the mind or in things, and works through Aquinas’s article 1 answer that truth belongs primarily to the intellect.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I q.16 a.1–3: Same Knowledge of Opposites, Truth in Judgment, and Truth Convertible with Being #

70 min Berquist works through Summa I, q. 16, a. 3, asking why truth belongs to the intellect’s act of judgment rather than to things themselves, unlike goodness.

Class 35 2007-02-22 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I q.16 a.4–5: Is the true before the good? Is God truth? (Simply vs. in some respect; appropriation; ’through itself’) #

53 min Berquist works through Summa I, q.16, articles 4 and 5, asking whether the good is prior to the true and whether truth belongs to God essentially, testing each objection against the text.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I q.16 a.5–6: Privation, opposites and the fallacy of the accident; one truth or many? (Marx on making, teaching, the two Summas) #

64 min Berquist takes up the objection that God, as cause of all truth, must be the cause of sin, resolving it through the distinction between non-being and privation and the fallacy of the accident, then closes with Summa I, q.16, a.6 on whether there is one truth or many.

Class 36 2007-03-01 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa Theologiae I, Q.16 aa.7–8: Is Created Truth Eternal? Is Truth Unchangeable? (with Aristotle’s convertible terms: being, one, true, good) #

68 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, Q.16, articles 7 and 8—whether created truth is eternal, and whether truth is unchangeable—alongside Aristotle’s convertible terms being, one, true, and good.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa Theologiae I, Q.17 aa.1–2: Falsity in Things and in the Senses (fool’s gold, likeness and deception, proper, common and accidental sensibles) #

57 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q. 17, aa. 1–2 on whether falsity exists in things and in the senses, testing the distinctions against fool’s gold, optical illusions, and wine tasting.

Class 37 2007-03-15 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, Q.17, a.3: Whether Falsehood Is in the Understanding; Natural vs. Reasoned-Out Understanding; the Four Kinds of Opposition #

57 min Berquist works through Summa I, Q.17, a.3 on whether falsehood is in the understanding, then maps Aristotle’s four kinds of opposition onto the difference between grasping an essence and composing a judgment.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, Q.17, a.4: True and False as Contraries; Q.18 on the Life of God and the Grades of Life #

59 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q. 17, a. 4, asking whether true and false are contraries or contradictories, then opens q. 18, a. 1 on the life of God.

Class 38 2007-03-22 #

Part 1 of 2 · Aquinas on Life (ST I q.18 a.1–3): Moving Oneself, Life as Being, and the Grades of Life up to God #

66 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q. 18, articles 1–3, asking what it means to call something alive, and argues that life reaches its fullest sense in God, whose act of understanding never ceases.

Part 2 of 2 · Life in God (ST I q.18 a.3–4): Perfect Act, All Things as Life in God, and Moving On to the Divine Will #

54 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q.18, articles 3 and 4, asking how God can be called self-moving and how all things exist as “life” in the divine mind.

Class 39 2007-03-29 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, Q.19, Arts. 1–2: Light and Life in St. John; Whether There Is Will in God and Whether He Wills Other Things #

44 min Berquist opens with John’s Gospel, pairing light and life as John 8 pairs “way, truth, and life,” then turns to Summa Theologiae I, q. 19, working through whether will exists in God and whether God wills things besides Himself.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, Q.19, Arts. 3–4: Absolute vs. Suppositional Necessity in God’s Will; God’s Will as the Cause of Things #

66 min Berquist works through Summa I, Q.19, Arts. 3–4, asking whether God wills everything of necessity and whether His will causes things, distinguishing absolute necessity from necessity by supposition.

Class 40 2007-04-19 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, Q.19, Articles 5–6: Nothing Causes God’s Will, and His Will Is Always Fulfilled (Antecedent vs. Consequent Will) #

61 min Berquist works through Summa I, Q.19, articles 5 and 6: whether anything causes God’s will, and whether that will is always fulfilled, turning on the split between antecedent and consequent willing.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, Q.19, Articles 7–9: God’s Will Does Not Change, Does Not Make Everything Necessary, and Does Not Will Evil #

64 min Berquist works through Summa I, Q.19, Articles 7–9, asking whether God’s will changes, whether it forces necessity on things, and whether God wills evils.

Class 41 2007-04-26 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, Q.19, Arts. 10-12: God’s Free Choice and the Will of the Sign (Command, Counsel, Prohibition, Operation, Permission) #

49 min Berquist works through Summa I, q. 19, aa. 10-11, asking whether God has free judgment and how the “will of the sign” divides into operation, permission, precept, prohibition, and counsel.

Part 2 of 2 · The Eleven Emotions and Summa I, Q.20, Art. 1: Is There Love in God? #

67 min Berquist catalogs Aquinas’s eleven passions—love, hate, desire, joy, hope, fear, anger and their kin—then asks, with Summa Theologiae I, q. 20, a. 1, whether love can rightly be said of God.

Class 42 2007-05-03 #

Part 1 of 2 · Part 1: God’s love for all things, and whether He loves them equally (Q.20, a.2–3) #

42 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q. 20, a. 2–3, asking whether God loves all things and whether He loves them equally—and how a love that causes goodness differs from ours.

Part 2 of 2 · Part 2: Whether God always loves the better more, and the justice of God (Q.20, a.4 – Q.21, a.1) #

62 min Berquist asks whether God loves the better thing more—testing it against Christ and the human race, angels and man, Peter and John—then opens Question 21 on whether justice belongs to God, in Summa Theologiae I, q. 20, a. 4 and q. 21, a. 1.

Class 43 2007-05-10 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, Q.21 (Arts. 2–4): Justice as Truth, God’s Mercy, and Mercy as the Root of Justice #

64 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q. 21, articles 2–4, asking whether God’s justice is truth and whether mercy belongs to God—and how mercy underlies every act of divine justice, including creation.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, Q.21 Art. 4 Replies and Q.22 Art. 1: Mercy in Every Work of God; Providence as God’s Foresight #

56 min Berquist finishes the replies to Summa I, Q.21, Art. 4 on how mercy and justice coexist in every divine work, then opens Q.22, Art. 1 on whether providence belongs to God.

Class 44 2007-05-24 #

Part 1 of 2 · Sweet and Right: A Psalm Commentary on God’s Mercy and Justice, and Whether All Things Fall Under Providence (Summa I, Q.22 a.2) #

65 min Berquist tracks Aquinas’s Psalm commentaries on why Scripture calls God’s mercy “sweet” while naming His justice through rectus and veritas, then turns to the Summa’s question of whether all things fall under providence (I, q.22, a.2).

Part 2 of 2 · Chance, Evil and Free Will Under Divine Providence; God Plans Everything Directly but Acts Through Other Causes (Summa I, Q.22 aa.2–3) #

59 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q. 22, aa. 2–3, answering objections to divine providence drawn from chance, evil, necessity, and free will.

Class 45 2007-05-31 #

Part 1 of 2 · Six Senses of Sleep, Tocqueville’s Doubt, Providence and Contingency, and Whether Men Are Predestined (John 11–12; Summa I, Q.22 a.4 – Q.23 a.1) #

62 min Berquist works through the six senses of “sleep” in the Lazarus story and Christ’s rejection in John 12, then turns to the Summa’s questions on providence, necessity, and predestination (I, Q.22 a.4 – Q.23 a.1).

Part 2 of 2 · Predestination in the Divine Mind, Reprobation, and Divine Choice and Love (Summa I, Q.23 a.2–4) #

56 min Berquist works through Summa I, Q.23, Articles 2–4: whether predestination puts anything in the predestined, whether God reprobates anyone, and whether the predestined are chosen by God.

Class 46 2007-06-07 #

Part 1 of 2 · Aquinas on Predestination (ST I, Q.23, Arts. 5–6): Is It Caused by Foreseen Merits, and Is It Certain? #

52 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, Q.23, Articles 5 and 6, asking whether predestination is caused by foreseen merits and whether it is certain.

Part 2 of 2 · Aquinas on Predestination (ST I, Q.23, Arts. 7–8) and the Book of Life (Q.24, Art. 1): How Many Are Predestined, Whether Prayer Helps, and What the Book of Life Is #

68 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q. 23, a. 7–8 and q. 24, a. 1: is the number of the predestined fixed, can prayer change it, and what is the Book of Life?

Class 47 2007-06-14 #

Part 1 of 2 · Book of Life (Q. 24, a. 2–3), God’s Operations, and Water and Fire as Metaphors for God #

62 min Berquist works through Aquinas on the Book of Life (Summa I, q. 24, aa. 2–3) — whether it names only the predestined and whether anyone can be blotted out of it — then opens the treatise on God’s operations.

Part 2 of 2 · Divine Power (Q. 25, a. 1): Active and Passive Ability in God #

62 min Berquist opens Question 25 of the Summa, asking whether power belongs to God, and grounds the answer in Aristotle’s Metaphysics IX distinction between active and passive dunamis.

Class 48 2007-06-20 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, Q25, Articles 2–4: God’s Infinite Power, Omnipotence, and Whether God Can Undo the Past #

68 min Berquist works through Summa I, Q25, aa. 2–4, on whether God’s power is infinite, what “omnipotent” actually means, and whether God could make the past not to have happened.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, Q25, Articles 5–6 and Q26, Article 1: Could God Make Other or Better Things? God’s Beatitude #

54 min Berquist works through Summa I, Q25, aa. 5-6 on whether God could have made other things, or better things, than He did, then opens Q26, a. 1 on whether happiness belongs to God.

Class 49 2007-06-26 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, Q. 26, a. 2: Is God Blessed by His Understanding? Knowledge, Love and Pleasure #

45 min Berquist reads Summa Theologiae I, q. 26, a. 2, asking why God’s blessedness is properly attributed to His understanding rather than to His will or essence, drawing on Aristotle’s De Anima and Boethius’s Consolation of Philosophy.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, Q. 26, a. 3–4 and the Opening of the Trinity Treatise (Q. 27): God’s Beatitude, True and False Happiness, and Dividing into Two or Three #

54 min Berquist works through Summa I, q. 26, a. 3–4 on whether God alone is the blessed’s beatitude, then opens q. 27’s prooemium on the Trinity treatise, tracing Aquinas’s habit of dividing material into twos and threes.

Class 50 2007-10-18 #

Part 1 of 2 · Order of Teaching About God, and Whether There Is Procession in God (Arius and Sabellius) #

68 min Berquist opens Aquinas’s treatise on the Trinity, Summa Theologiae I, q. 27, tracing the order of teaching from God’s existence to the persons, and begins Article 1 on whether “procession” can be said of God.

Part 2 of 2 · Inward Procession, the Word, and Why the Word’s Procession Is Called Generation (ST I q.27 a.1–2) #

59 min Berquist takes up Summa Theologiae I, q.27, a.1–2 on why the inward “procession” of a word from the intellect is the best creaturely likeness for what happens in God, and why that procession is rightly called generation.

Class 51 2007-10-25 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, q.27, a.3: A Second Procession in God, the Procession of Love, and the Word as ’the Thought’ #

43 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q.27, a.3, asking whether a second procession—love, proceeding as the Holy Spirit—exists in God alongside the generation of the Word, with a detour through Summa Contra Gentiles IV, ch.15 and the Greek behind John’s Logos.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, q.27, a.4-5: Why the Procession of Love Is Not Generation, and Why There Are Only Two Processions #

67 min Berquist works through Summa I, q.27, a.4-5, asking why the Spirit’s procession of love isn’t called “generation” like the Son’s — since love, unlike intellect, doesn’t produce a likeness.

Class 52 2007-11-08 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, Q. 28, Art. 1: Are There Real Relations in God? Relations of Reason and the Sabellian Heresy #

55 min Berquist takes up Summa I, Q. 28, Art. 1—whether there are real relations in God—working through Aristotle’s and Avicenna’s accounts of relation and Boethius’s objections to defend the Trinity against Sabellius.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, Q. 28, Art. 2: Relation and the Divine Essence, Why We Think About God, and Perfection Divided Among Creatures #

70 min Berquist works through Summa I, Q. 28, Art. 2, asking whether relation in God is really identical with the divine essence, against Augustine, Boethius, and Gilbert of Poitiers’s condemned error.

Class 53 2007-11-15 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, Q.28, Art. 3: Why the Divine Relations Are Really Distinct from Each Other (Kinds of Opposition, Names Equivocal by Reason) #

50 min Berquist works through Summa I, Q.28, A.3, asking why paternity and filiation must be really distinct relations in God, even as each remains identical with the divine essence.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, Q.28, Art. 4 and Intro to Q.29: The Four Real Relations in God and the Plan of the Treatise on the Divine Persons #

57 min Berquist works through Article 4 of the Summa’s treatise on the Trinity, asking why God has exactly four real relations, then opens Question 29 on the divine persons.

Class 54 2007-11-29 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, Q.29, Art. 1: Boethius’ Definition of Person as an Individual Substance of a Rational Nature #

62 min Berquist works word by word through Summa Theologiae I, q. 29, a. 1, testing Boethius’s definition of “person” as an individual substance of a rational nature against Aristotle’s Categories, Physics, and Metaphysics.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, Q.29, Art. 2: Person, Hypostasis, Subsistence and Essence, with Asides on Fiction, Shakespeare and Mozart #

54 min Berquist works through Summa I, q. 29, a. 2, asking whether “person” means the same as hypostasis, subsistence, and essence—then digresses into how Shakespeare and Mozart move us toward virtue without moralizing.

Class 55 2008-01-10 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, Q.29 a.3: Should the Name ‘Person’ Be Used of God? (Boethius, Hypostasis, and Where Names Come From) #

49 min Berquist works through Article 3 of Summa Theologiae I, Q.29, asking whether “person” can rightly be said of God, weighing objections from Scripture’s silence, the word’s theatrical origin, and the puzzling term “hypostasis.”

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, Q.29 a.4: ‘Person’ in God Means Relation as Subsisting (Augustine, Boethius, and Univocal vs. Equivocal Names) #

66 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q. 29, a. 4: does “person” in God name a relation or a substance? He traces the answer—relation understood after the manner of substance—through Augustine and Boethius.

Class 56 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, Q. 30, a. 1: Are There Many Persons in God? Subsistent Relations, and Numbering vs. Numbered Number #

61 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, Q. 30, a. 1, arguing from subsistent relations that there are multiple persons in God, and resolves the whole/part objection using Aristotle’s distinction between numbering number and numbered number.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, Q. 30, a. 2: Why Only Three Persons: Opposed Relations, Word and Love, and the Order of Origin #

52 min Berquist works through Summa I, Q. 30, a. 2, where Aquinas answers objections urging four or more divine persons, arguing the three are fixed by relations of origin, not by any count of goodness or operations.

Class 57 2008-01-24 #

Part 1 of 2 · Aquinas on the Trinity (Summa I, q.30 a.3): Numbers in God, the Transcendental ‘Many’ and Two Kinds of ‘One’ #

55 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q. 30, a. 3, asking whether “one” and “three” said of God name something real or merely deny composition, and why divine number is not the number of creatures.

Part 2 of 2 · Aquinas on the Trinity (Summa I, q.30 a.4 and q.31): ‘Person’ Shared by Three, the Word ‘Trinity’ and Saying ’the Father Alone’ #

43 min Berquist works through Article 4 of Summa I, q. 30 — whether “person” can be said in common of Father, Son, and Spirit — then opens q. 31 on the name “Trinity” itself.

Class 58 2008-01-31 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, Q.31, Articles 1–2: Is There a Trinity in God, and Is the Son ‘Other’ (Alius) Than the Father? #

58 min Berquist reads Summa Theologiae I, q. 31, articles 1 and 2, working out whether “Trinity” fittingly names God and whether the Son can be called “other” than the Father.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, Q.31, Article 3: Can ‘Alone’ Be Said of God? Solus, Only, and Exclusive Words #

41 min Berquist works through Summa I, Q.31, A.3 on whether “alone” can be joined to an essential name of God, distinguishing when it rightly excludes creatures but wrongly excludes the other Persons.

Class 59 2008-02-07 #

Part 1 of 2 · Exclusive Words About the Divine Persons (ST I q.31 a.4) and Why Natural Reason Cannot Know the Trinity (q.32 a.1) #

69 min Berquist finishes ST I q.31 a.4 on whether “alone” can be said of one divine person, then opens q.32 a.1 asking whether natural reason can know the Trinity.

Part 2 of 2 · Notions in God: Abstract and Concrete Names for the Divine Persons (ST I q.32 a.2) #

36 min Berquist works through Aquinas on whether “notions” belong in God (ST I, q. 32, a. 2), asking why divine predication needs both abstract and concrete names.

Class 60 2008-02-14 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, Q.32 a.3–4 and Q.33 intro: The Five Notions, When Opinions About Them Become Heresy, and Whether the Father Is ‘Beginning’ Without Being ‘Before’ #

51 min Berquist works through Summa I, Q.32 on the five notions distinguishing the divine persons and how opinions about them can slide into heresy, then opens Q.33 on why the Father is called “beginning” without being “before” the Son.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, Q.33 a.1–3: Beginning vs. Cause, ‘Father’ as the Proper Name of the First Person, and Fatherhood Said of God Before Creatures #

68 min Berquist works through Summa I, Q.33, a.1–3, asking whether “Father” names a beginning in the Trinity, why it’s preferred to “generator,” and whether it applies first to the divine person or to God as Creator.

Class 61 2008-02-28 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, Q. 34, Art. 1: Is ‘Word’ a Personal Name in God? Word as Thought, Imagining vs. Thinking, and Faith Seeking Understanding #

58 min Berquist works through Summa I, Q. 34, Art. 1 to ask whether “Word” names the Son personally or names the divine essence, sorting out sound, image, and concept along the way.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, Q. 34, Arts. 2–3: Word as the Son’s Own Name, and the Word’s Relation to Creatures #

51 min Berquist works through Summa I, Q. 34, Arts. 2-3, asking whether “Word” is the Son’s proper name and whether it implies a relation to creatures, testing the answer against John 1:1 and Augustine.

Class 62 2008-03-14 #

Part 1 of 2 · Thinking, thought and image: is ‘image’ said personally in God? (Summa I, q.35, a.1) #

50 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q. 35, a. 1—whether “image” is said personally or essentially in God—distinguishing image from likeness along the way, with side trips into Summa I, q. 93 and Summa Contra Gentiles IV, ch. 15.

Part 2 of 2 · Why only the Son is the image, and the name ‘Holy Spirit’ (q.35, a.2; q.36, a.1) #

64 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q. 35, a. 2 and q. 36, a. 1, asking why “Image” belongs to the Son alone and why “Holy Spirit” fittingly names the third Person as mutual love.

Class 63 2008-03-27 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, q.36, a.2: Does the Holy Spirit Proceed from the Son? The Filioque, Distinction by Opposed Relations, and the Creeds #

55 min Berquist works through Summa I, q.36, a.2, asking whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son—the Filioque question—and why, for Aquinas, the persons can’t be really distinguished without it.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, q.36, aa.3-4: From the Father Through the Son, and the Father and Son as One Source of the Holy Spirit #

53 min Berquist works through Summa I, q.36, aa.3-4, asking whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, and whether Father and Son are one principle of the Spirit.

Class 64 2008-04-03 #

Part 1 of 2 · Aquinas on Love as the Name of the Holy Spirit (ST I, q.37, aa.1–2) #

69 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q. 37, on whether “Love” names the Holy Spirit properly and whether the Father and Son love each other “by” the Spirit.

Part 2 of 2 · The Holy Spirit as Love and as Gift (ST I, q.37 a.2 replies; q.38) and the Order of the Treatise on the Trinity #

50 min Berquist takes up whether the Father loves by the Holy Spirit and whether “Gift” names the Spirit properly (ST I, q. 37, a. 2 and q. 38), then maps out the whole treatise on the Trinity ahead.

Class 65 2008-04-10 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I q.39: Persons Compared to the Essence – Overview and Article 1 (Is the Essence the Same as the Person?) #

46 min Berquist opens the Summa’s ten questions comparing the divine persons to the essence, working through Article 1 of q.39: is the divine essence the same as the divine person?

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I q.39 a.1 Replies and Article 2: Relations as Opposition, and ‘Three Persons of One Essence’ #

51 min Berquist works through the replies to Summa I q.39 a.1 and into a.2, asking why the divine persons are said to be “of one essence” rather than “of one nature” or “from one substance.”

Class 66 2008-04-17 #

Part 1 of 2 · Trinity, Question 39, Article 3: Why the Three Persons Are One God, Not Three Gods (Nouns vs. Adjectives, ‘Thing’, Theology as Defense of the Faith) #

68 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q. 39, a. 3: why we say “one God” but “three persons,” never “three Gods,” and why that grammar matters.

Part 2 of 2 · Trinity, Question 39, Article 4: Can ‘God’ Stand for a Person? (Meaning vs. Supposition, ‘God from God’, Metaphor and Irony) #

51 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q. 39, a. 4: can “God” stand for a Person rather than just the divine essence, tested against the Creed’s “God from God.”

Class 67 2008-04-24 #

Part 1 of 2 · Meaning vs. Standing-For: Why the Essence Does Not Generate the Essence (Article 5) #

61 min Berquist works through Article 5 of Summa Theologiae I, q. 39, asking why “essence” cannot stand for a divine person the way “God” does — the distinction between meaning and standing-for that undoes Abbot Joachim’s error.

Part 2 of 2 · God Is Three Persons, and Appropriating Essential Attributes to the Persons (Articles 6–7) #

46 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q. 39, articles 6 and 7 — whether personal names can be said of “God,” and how essential attributes like wisdom and power get appropriated to Father, Son, and Spirit.

Class 68 2008-05-08 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, Q.39 a.8 (1): Being Led by the Hand to God, the Order of Appropriations, and Eternity, Beauty and Enjoyment #

63 min Berquist works through Summa I, q.39, a.8, where Aquinas appropriates eternity, beauty, and use to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, tracing the article’s objections from Hilary and Augustine.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, Q.39 a.8 (2): Unity, Equality and Concord; Power, Wisdom and Goodness; ‘From Him, Through Him, In Him’, and the Glory of the Father #

63 min Berquist continues through Summa Theologiae I, q. 39, tracing how power, wisdom, and goodness are appropriated to Father, Son, and Spirit, then closes with Romans 11:33-36 and Thomas’s commentary on it.

Class 69 2008-05-15 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, Q. 40, Art. 1: Is the Relation the Same as the Person? (Divine simplicity, two kinds of identity, and the senses of ‘in’) #

47 min Berquist works through Summa I, Q. 40, Art. 1, asking whether a divine relation is identical with the divine person, and why fatherhood constitutes a person while common spiration does not.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, Q. 40, Arts. 2–3: Relations Distinguish and Make Up the Divine Persons, and What Remains When We Abstract the Relations #

49 min Berquist works through Summa I, q. 40, aa. 2–3, asking what distinguishes the divine persons and what happens if you try to abstract the relations away.

Class 70 2008-05-22 #

Part 1 of 2 · Aquinas on the Trinity: Whether Fatherhood Comes Before Generation, and Why Notional Acts Are Attributed to the Persons #

57 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q. 40, a. 4 and q. 41, a. 1, asking whether fatherhood is prior to generation and why acts like generation and spiration belong to the divine persons themselves.

Part 2 of 2 · Aquinas on the Trinity: Does the Father Generate the Son by Will or by Nature? Nature, Will, and the Senses of ‘Necessary’ #

59 min Berquist works through Summa Theologiae I, q. 41, a. 2 on whether the Father generates the Son by nature or by will, using Aristotle’s Metaphysics IX on necessity to show why nature, not will, is at work.

Class 71 2008-05-29 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I q.41 a.3–4: The Son Begotten from the Father’s Substance, Not from Nothing; Does God Have Power to Generate? #

67 min Berquist works through Summa I q.41 a.3–4, asking whether the Father generates the Son from something or from nothing, and whether “power” applies to God’s generating and spirating.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I q.41 a.4–5: Power as a Beginning, and Whether the Power of Generating Signifies the Divine Essence or the Relation #

55 min Berquist works through Summa I, q. 41, aa. 4–5, asking whether “power” properly names generation and spiration, and whether the power of generating signifies the divine essence or the paternal relation.

Class 72 2008-06-05 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I q.41 a.6: Why There Is Only One Son and One Holy Spirit (Material vs. Formal Distinction, Simply vs. Not Simply) #

40 min Berquist treats Summa I, q. 41, a. 6, asking why generation and spiration terminate in only one Son and one Holy Spirit, not several.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I q.42: Equality and Order among the Divine Persons (Quantity of Virtue, Likeness, Equality as a Relation of Reason) #

61 min Berquist reads Article 1 of Summa I q.42 on whether the divine persons are equal, working out how “quantity,” “order,” and “equality” can apply to God once stripped of their dimensive, creaturely sense.

Class 73 2008-06-19 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I q.42 a.2-3: The Son Co-eternal with the Father, and the Objections to an Order of Nature in God #

43 min Berquist works through Summa I, q. 42, a. 2-3, defending the Son’s co-eternity with the Father against Arius and asking whether an “order of nature” holds among the divine persons, drawing on Augustine, Boethius, and the Athanasian Creed.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I q.42 a.3-4: Order of Origin without Before and After, and the Son’s Equality with the Father #

47 min Berquist works through Summa I, q.42, a.3-4, asking whether order exists among the divine persons and whether the Son equals the Father in greatness, using Aristotle’s Categories and Physics on relation and beginning.

Class 74 2008-06-26 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, Q. 42, Articles 5–6: The Father and Son in each other and equal in power (with a digression on dividing things in two or three) #

50 min Berquist works through Summa I, Q. 42, articles 5 and 6 — whether the Son is in the Father, and whether Son and Father are equal in power — pausing to survey Aristotle’s eight senses of “in” from the Physics.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, Q. 43, Articles 1–2: The mission of the divine persons (with Shakespeare’s ‘dull, unfeeling, barren ignorance’ and the three acts of reason) #

50 min Berquist works through Summa I, Q. 43, on whether a divine person can be “sent” and whether such a mission is eternal, with a detour through Shakespeare’s Richard II on the three acts of reason.

Class 75 2008-07-03 #

Part 1 of 2 · Summa I, Q. 43, Arts. 3–5: Sanctifying Grace, Why the Father Is Not Sent, and the Invisible Sending of the Son #

66 min Berquist works through Summa I, q. 43, arts. 3–5: whether the divine missions happen only through sanctifying grace, why the Father cannot be sent, and how the Son is sent invisibly.

Part 2 of 2 · Summa I, Q. 43, Art. 6 and a Logic Aside: Who Receives the Invisible Sending; How Names Signify Things Through Thoughts #

45 min Berquist works through Article 6 of Aquinas’s treatise on the invisible mission of the divine persons, then turns aside to Aristotle’s logic and Summa Contra Gentiles I on how names signify things through concepts.