Summa I, q.1, a.6–7: Sacred Doctrine as Wisdom and God as Its Subject

Orientation #

He says “the one we saw last time, the fifth article,” showed sacred doctrine is both speculative and practical and excels the other sciences, preparing for its being called wisdom (prev. lecture). He does not announce next time. The neighbouring classes work through the earlier and later articles of ST I q. 1.

The class, in order #

1. Dividing the ten articles (“follow the rule of two or three”) #

The point: a map of q. 1 before entering article 6.

• Article 1 vs. the other nine: the first is about the existence of this teaching, the nine about the teaching itself.
• The nine into three: aa. 2–6 the kind of knowledge it is; a. 7 its subject; aa. 8–10 the way of proceeding (“the road”).
• The first five into two: three ask about it as science (is it a science, one or many, speculative or practical); two about its preeminence over the other sciences. Wisdom “names the highest thing in knowledge,” so a. 5’s conclusion prepares a. 6.

2. Article 6: the objections (“it belongs to the wise man to order”) #

The point: three objections that sacred doctrine is not wisdom.

1. No teaching that supposes its beginnings elsewhere is wisdom, since the wise man orders and is not ordered (proemium to “Wisdom,” i.e. Metaphysics I); this teaching takes its principles from God’s knowledge. “That’s a good objection.”
2. Wisdom proves the beginnings of the other sciences, whence it is “head of the sciences” (Ethics VI, virtues of reason); this teaching does not.
3. This teaching is acquired by study, but wisdom is infused, being among the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit (Isaiah 11).

• Sed contra: Deuteronomy 4:6, “this is your wisdom and understanding before the people.”

3. Body: wise in a genus vs. wise simply (“considers the highest cause of that genus”) #

The point: sacred doctrine is wisdom “most of all among all human wisdoms, not only in some genus but simply.”

1. To the wise belongs to order and judge; judgment about lower things is through a higher cause; so whoever considers the highest cause of a genus is called wise in that genus.
   • Building: the architect (Greek: “chief artist”) who disposes the form of the house is wise relative to the workers of wood and stone (1 Cor 3:10, “as a wise architect I have laid a foundation”).
   • Whole of human life: the prudent man is called wise because he orders human acts to a suitable end (Proverbs 10:23, “prudence is wisdom for a man”).
2. He who considers simply the highest cause of the whole universe, God, is most of all wise; whence wisdom is the knowledge of divine things (Augustine, De Trinitate XII; Aristotle also called wisdom the divine science).
3. Sacred doctrine determines about God as highest cause not only as knowable through creatures, “which the philosophers also do” (Romans 1:19, the text Vatican I used for natural knowledge of God), but as known to God alone and communicated by revelation.

• Aside on altissima causa: Greek and Latin imagine the cause above the effect (the effect “depends,” hangs, like a pendant); English imagines the cause supporting the effect (“underlying,” and the Anglo-Saxon word “ground,” which Shakespeare puns on in Romeo and Juliet).

4. Qualified and simple wisdom in philosophy, and a fortiori here (“first philosophy is wisdom simply”) #

The point: the simply/in-some-way distinction is already used in philosophy, and it makes sacred doctrine wisdom a fortiori.

• Ethics is wisdom about human things (its first cause is happiness, the end); natural philosophy a wisdom about natural things; first philosophy, about all things and the first cause, is wisdom simply (Aristotle sometimes calls it simply philosophy or simply wisdom).
• Sacred doctrine is more about God than first philosophy: in Metaphysics IV the subject of first philosophy is being and one, God only its end; here God is the very subject, and we know by revelation what God alone knows of himself.
• Aside: he has read Aristotle a lot and sees no evidence he knew the Trinity (though he says we use the number three to praise God) or the Incarnation.

5. Replies 1 and 2 (“but only to judge about them”) #

• Reply 1: sacred doctrine does not take its beginnings from a human science (that would make it inferior to it) but from the divine science, the summa sapientia, by which all our knowledge is ordered; being derived from the highest wisdom, it has more the character of wisdom than any other human knowledge, though not more than God’s.
• Reply 2: the beginnings of the other sciences are either known through themselves and unprovable, or proven in another science by natural reason; it is proper to this science to be through revelation, not natural reason, so it does not prove their beginnings but judges them. Whatever in the other sciences is repugnant to its truth is condemned as false (“we saw it already in Vatican I”; 2 Cor 10:4–5, destroying counsels and every altitude against the knowledge of God). It has “jurisdiction” over them; in that sense it has the character of wisdom.

6. Reply 3: two ways of judging, two wisdoms (“the separation of the true from the false”) #

The point: the wisdom that is a gift of the Holy Spirit and the wisdom of this teaching differ by two ways of judging.

• Setup: in the Secunda Secundae Thomas takes the virtues (faith, hope, charity; prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance) with connected virtues and the corresponding gifts; the gift of wisdom is taken up with charity, not faith. “That’s relevant.”
• Definition: judgment is the separation of the true from the false (also good from bad) by some beginning in our knowledge.
  • Euclid’s theorem (equal angles, sides must be equal): cut off from the longer side a line equal to the shorter, draw to the corner; two triangles with equal angle contained by equal sides; the lesser triangle would equal the greater, but the whole is more than the part. Judging by that beginning.
  • Odd number even? Odd is not divisible by two, even is; it cannot both be and not be divisible; so back to the impossibility of being and not being at once in the same way. Whole more than part is itself judged by contradiction (otherwise it would have parts and not have parts). “You judge everything ultimately by the axiom about contradiction.”
• Two ways of judging (Thomas): by inclination, as the man with the habit of virtue rightly judges what should be done by virtue, insofar as he is inclined to it; by knowledge, as one instructed in moral science judges acts of virtue even without having the virtue.
  • Desdemona and the maid near the end of Othello: asked whether she would sleep with another for all the world, Desdemona cannot conceive it; the maid would and deny it next morning. Desdemona, later falsely accused of adultery, judges these things repugnant by the inclination of her virtue: Ethics X, the virtuous man is measure and rule of human acts.
  • Joke: “watch out for these moral theologians, make sure they have sinned before they do it.”
• The first way, judging divine things by inclination of the appetite, is the gift of wisdom (1 Cor 2:15, the spiritual man judges all things; Dionysius, Divine Names ch. 2, Hierotheus not only learning but undergoing, patiens, divine things). Will undergoes more than reason. Father Boulay’s point: the will is more proportioned to God than reason, since reason tries to get the known into the knower (“God into your little mind”), love goes to the thing loved; like jumping into the ocean vs. putting the ocean inside you. Hence wisdom is attached to charity.
• The second way pertains to this teaching as had through study, though its beginnings are from revelation; it judges other things by those beginnings, more like the philosopher’s judgment; the gift’s judgment is like the virtuous man’s.
• Extension: Aristotle in ethics says the starting point is to know that it is bad; without that one never gets the why. Same in fine arts: you must see that Shakespeare is better than Fletcher, that Mozart is excellent, before giving a reason; demanding the reason first is “out of order.” Homosexual marriage is spontaneously rejected by the inclination of virtue, not awaited from a quasi-scientific demonstration. Bad upbringing (vice, beer instead of wine, rock and roll instead of music) corrupts the judgment so these are not spontaneously rejected.
• Story: his brother at a hospital had to tell a girl’s friend she had bled to death after an abortion; the friend’s reply, “well, she just had an abortion,” as if nails clipped. Corrupted inclination.

7. Closing the first part: philosophy and theology (“either God alone is wise”) #

The point: summary of aa. 2–6 and its consequence for the philosopher.

• It is a science, one science, more speculative than practical yet transcending the division, superior to all sciences, most of all wisdom among human sciences.
• So it makes no sense that a Christian philosopher would not study philosophy ultimately for the sake of theology. Aristotle, Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Socrates, Plato: either God alone is wise or God most of all; by their own principles, if God shared his wisdom, that would be more wisdom than what they thought out. Modern philosophers who rejected revealed theology eventually reject the wisdom of first philosophy too, “and it would be inconsistent not to.”

8. Article 7: the objections and a question on “suppose” (“whether God is the subject of this science”) #

• “Whether” is the form of a dialectical problem, argued on both sides; in a quaestio disputata there may be objections on both sides, sometimes answered on both.
• Objection 1: every science must suppose about its subject what it is (Posterior Analytics I; Euclid presupposes what a number is, geometry the definitions of triangle, square, circle); but this science does not, since Damascene says to say of God what he is is impossible (we see God as he is only in the intuitive vision).
• Objection 2: everything determined in a science falls under its subject; Scripture determines about creatures and men’s morals; so God is not the subject.
• Sed contra: the subject is what the science speaks about; this is theologia, sermo de Deo (logia like sermo, theos God).
• Student: how is supponere used, given it also names the individual substance (suppositum)? He: literally “to place under”; the principles and the subject are placed under the science, like “ground”; Greek hypokeimenon, placed under. English “presuppose” carries the image of being before (second-semester Latin presupposes first); both images hold: you must know the subject before the science, and the subject underlies it.

9. Body: everything under the ratio of God (“as an object is to a power or habit”) #

1. The subject is to a science as an object to a power or habit; in the three books on the soul, powers are distinguished by acts and acts by objects (eye by colour, ear by sound; digestive power by food).
2. The proper object is that under whose ratio all things are referred to the power: man and stone are referred to sight as coloured, so coloured is sight’s proper object.
3. All things are treated in sacred doctrine under the ratio of God: as God himself, or as ordered to God as beginning and end. This threefold division was touched in the earlier article on one science. It is clearer in Summa Contra Gentiles I–III (God himself, God as beginning, God as end) than in the Summa Theologiae, where the part on the end is expanded in the second and third parts.

• Parallels: Metaphysics IV, the subject of first philosophy is being, an equivocal word, but all refer back to substance (quantity its size, quality its disposition, generation its coming to be); chief subject, substance. Political philosophy: named from polis; government governs the city, laws are what government rules by, revolution is a change of government (Politics III–IV forms of government, V revolution, VI institution of governments); all refer back, nearer or further, to the polis.
• Natural theology is the end of first philosophy (sermo de ente, God only its end); this theology has more right to the name, being sermo de Deo with God as subject. Dominican saying: speak only about God or to God.
• On principium: Thomas, following Aristotle, adapts it to the mover or maker. Physics I opens “in every science of which there are beginnings or causes or elements,” not sharply distinguished there; in Metaphysics V beginning is wider than cause, cause wider than element (element strictly the material cause); by adaptation, element to matter, beginning to mover, cause to end and form. So principium et finis here, though the last meaning of beginning in Metaphysics V is the end, first in intention. Hence the threefold division of sacred doctrine.

10. Second manifestation, and other opinions (“the articles of faith, which is about God”) #

• Second way: the beginnings of the science are the articles of faith, which are about God; seen in the creeds (Nicene-Constantinopolitan, Apostles’), divided by Father, Son, Holy Spirit, other articles attached to each; if the beginnings are all about God, the science is about God.
• “I am the Alpha and the Omega, beginning and end” most explicit in the Apocalypse; the Psalm “know that the Lord is God, he made us, the people of his flock he tends” also carries the threefold: God himself, Maker, Shepherd as man. In SCG III God as end and providence; in II God as Maker and Creator.
• Others, attending to the things treated and not the ratio, assigned as subject things and signs (footnote: the Lombard’s Sentences), or the works of reparation, or the whole Christ, head and members; all treated in the science but in their order to God. “I am the way, the truth, the life”: as God he is truth and life, as man the way; Greek hodos, the road. Thomas opens the third part with Christ who as man is via tendendi ad Deum.

11. Teaching things vs. teaching words; the subject of Scripture (“who teaches teaches either things or words”) #

• Thomas in the commentary on the Psalms: teaching faith, morals, commandments is teaching things; laying out Scripture is teaching words (the words of John, Matthew, Paul are the starting point, unfolded in their order), though each involves the other (the Summa treats words in qq. 12–13). The Summa is a book about things, chiefly one thing, God.
• Pius XII: no one is a Thomist without knowing Thomas’s commentary on John. Dionysius’ Divine Names is in between: it gathers the names said again and again of God in Scripture (good, beautiful) for one somewhat exhaustive consideration, avoiding the repetition exposition of books requires; closer to words than the Summa, but closer to the Summa than Scripture is (the Summa has a treatise on divine goodness by itself).
• What is the chief subject of Scripture? A student: salvation. Vatican II: among the New Testament books the four Gospels are preeminent as chief witness to the words and deeds of the Word made flesh; the Old Testament prepares the way for the Word made flesh. His “amphiboly”: the Word of God (Bible) is about the Word of God, and the Bible is itself “made flesh” in taking on human language, the Word clothing itself in human speech. “A beautiful, beautiful teaching”: the way of speaking fits what is spoken of, as Thomas says the sacraments are tools of Christ and a tool fits the user’s hand; Augustine, the word comes to the element and becomes a sacrament (baptism).
• So one may say the subject of Scripture is the Word of God made flesh, without it being false that Scripture is about God; he would not say the Summa’s subject is the Word made flesh. Sign: the Gospels are divided three against the fourth by relative emphasis on Christ’s human vs. divine nature, not by the Trinity. This indicates Scripture, which teaches words, is more proportionate to us than what teaches things. The class ends there.

His words #

• “rule of two or three”; his method of dividing a text.
• “beginnings”; principles, principia [ed.: principles].
• “Wisdom”; the Metaphysics (also “fourth/fifth book of wisdom”).
• “wise in a genus” vs. “wise simply”; considering the highest cause of a genus vs. of the whole universe.
• altissima causa; the very first cause, above all others.
• summa sapientia; God’s own knowledge, from which sacred doctrine takes its beginnings.
• “judgment”; separation of the true from the false (or good from bad) by some beginning in our knowledge.
• “axiom about being and unbeing” / “axiom about contradiction”; the first beginning by which everything is ultimately judged.
• “judging by inclination” vs. “by way of knowledge”; the virtuous man vs. the man instructed in moral science.
• patiens; “undergoing” divine things (Hierotheus).
• supponere; “to place under”; hypokeimenon; contrasted with “presuppose” (being before).
• ratio Dei; the aspect under which all things are treated in sacred doctrine.
• sermo de Deo vs. sermo de ente; theology vs. first philosophy.
• principium et finis; beginning adapted to mover/maker, against the end.
• hodos; “the road” (I am the way); via tendendi ad Deum.
• “natural hearing”; [ed.: Physics].
• “teaches things or words”; Thomas’s division from the Psalms commentary.
• “amphiboly”; his term for “the Word of God is about the Word of God.”

Texts #

Read in class

• Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 1, a. 6 (objections, sed contra, body, replies)
• Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 1, a. 7 (objections, sed contra, body)
• Deuteronomy 4:6; 1 Corinthians 3:10; Proverbs 10:23; Romans 1:19; 2 Corinthians 10:4–5; 1 Corinthians 2:15 (as quoted within the articles)
• Handout “Contradiction and the Growth of Reason,” p. 4 (verified source; matches the passage on judging by the axiom of contradiction)

Mentioned

• Aristotle, Metaphysics I proemium, IV (being and one), V (beginning, cause, element); Nicomachean Ethics VI, X; Posterior Analytics I; Physics I opening; Politics III–VI
• Augustine, De Trinitate XII; Augustine on the word coming to the element
• Isaiah 11 (gifts of the Spirit); Apocalypse (Alpha and Omega); Psalm “know that the Lord is God”; John “I am the way”
• Dionysius, Divine Names ch. 2 (Hierotheus) and the work as a whole
• Damascene (to say of God what he is is impossible)
• Thomas, Secunda Secundae (virtues and gifts); Summa Contra Gentiles I–III; Tertia Pars opening; Commentary on the Psalms; Commentary on John; ST I qq. 12–13
• Peter Lombard, Sentences (footnote, things and signs)
• Vatican I; Vatican II on Scripture; Pius XII on the John commentary
• Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet (pun on “ground”), Othello (Desdemona and the maid); Fletcher; Mozart
• DHB Vol. III, The School of Aristotle, p. 965 (verified source; not named in the transcript)

His questions #

• Architect in Greek means what? Chief artist.
• The gift of the Holy Spirit called wisdom is taken up with what virtue? With charity, not with faith.
• What is the definition of judgment? The separation of the true from the false (and good from bad) by some beginning in our knowledge.
• Why do I know that a whole is more than a part? A whole has parts; otherwise it would have parts and not have parts, a contradiction.
• Is a man who is a philosopher and a Catholic not to study philosophy for the sake of theology? It makes no sense otherwise; theology has more the character of wisdom.
• What’s the chief subject of political philosophy? The polis; government, laws, revolution all refer back to it.
• Is Dionysius’s Divine Names about things or about words? In between: closer to words than the Summa, closer to the Summa than Scripture.
• What is the chief subject of sacred Scripture, God or what? Student: salvation; Vatican II: the Word of God made flesh, though it is not false to say God.
• Are the four Gospels four books about the Trinity or about the Word of God made flesh? About the Word made flesh; their division (three vs. fourth) is by his humanity and divinity.