Divine Power (Q. 25, a. 1): Active and Passive Ability in God

Orientation #

He opens by reading the prologue to the question on the divine power, which follows the consideration of divine knowledge and will “and those things which pertain to them, like truth and falsity and life.” He refers back to “the treatise on the simplicity of God” and to the earlier discussion of the divine names (God is good vs. God is goodness). He closes: “We’ll go on to Article Two there. Maybe on Thursday, maybe on Wednesday, maybe another week.” The previous class finished the Book of Life and introduced the treatise on the divine operations; the next continues q. 25 with articles 2-4.

Verified sources place most of the hour in ST I q. 25 a. 1; a handout page (“The First Definition of Reason”, p. 82) and a printed page (DHB Vol III, p. 847) were also matched by the text-matching system but are not named in the transcript.

The class, in order #

1. The six questions of q. 25 (“it remains to be considered about the divine power”) #

He reads the prologue and has students supply the questions: (1) whether there is power in God; (2) whether it is infinite; (3) whether He is omnipotent (“omni means all”); (4) whether He can make past things not to have been; (5) whether He can make what He has made pass away; (6) whether He could have made what He made better. “An interesting question.”

2. Two meanings of dunamis / potentia (“the ability to act upon something”) #

Point: the word in Greek and Latin has an active and a passive meaning, and the second refers back to the first.

• Aristotle, ninth book of “wisdom” [ed.: Metaphysics IX], on ability and act, begins by distinguishing (a) the ability to act upon another, to move or change another; (b) the ability to be acted upon, to undergo. The second refers back to the first: “my ability to kick you is answered by an ability to be kicked by you.”
• The word itself shows the order: dunamis gives “dynamo,” “dynamite” (the active sense), and was then moved to the passive sense; likewise potentia in Latin.
• When one contrasts potentia with actus one is thinking of the second sense, because the first sense is based upon actuality: the teacher can teach because he actually knows; the student is able to know in the second sense.
• The problem: English “power”/“powerful” is stuck in the first meaning and has never moved to the second. “When we learned our philosophy from the Greeks or from the Latins, sometimes the native word was not what moved.”

3. Digression: words that moved in Greek and Latin but not in English (“the very important word phusis”) #

Point: the same translator’s problem arises with nature, and one must decide whether to extend the English word or go back to the Greek/Latin.

• Fifth book of wisdom [ed.: Metaphysics V] on phusis: (1) birth; (2) the source of the baby within the mother; (3) the generalization, the source within of any change, the sense behind “natural philosophy” (natural things have within themselves a cause of their own change); (4) carried over to matter and form, the passive and active sources of change in the living body; (5) the nature of a thing as what it is (nature of God, of government, of the triangle, of the syllogism).
• Which sense characterizes natural science? The first two are proper to natural science but too narrow; the last is too broad; so it is the third, the intrinsic cause of motion and rest, defined more fully in Book Two of Natural Hearing [ed.: Physics II] as “the beginning and cause of motion and of rest, and that of which it is first as such and not by happening.”
• Latin natura likewise has birth as root and moved through the meanings; the English word did not, and English hearers think of nature only in the last sense. English keeps the root only in prenatal, postnatal, nativity, native.
• A case where extending the English word works: hodos / via / road; even Parmenides spoke of a road in the mind, and “a road in our knowledge” is no great stretch in English.
• Shakespeare, Friar Lawrence in Romeo and Juliet: “revolts from true birth, stumbling on abuse,” where “birth” means nature in the sense of what you are; so Shakespeare has moved the word, but whether to extend it is “a little bit of prudence.”

4. His solution: “ability”, with examples (“all the ability is in the what?”) #

Point: English “ability” and “able” already move between both senses, so he adopts “ability”, using “power” only as a sign that the active sense is meant.

• Bricklayer in the ring with Cassius Clay: “all the ability is in Cassius Clay” (first sense); but the bricklayer is “beatable, breakable, bustable,” which is ability in the second sense.
• Paper is burnable: not an ability to act upon the fire but to be acted upon by it.
• Walter Gieseking playing Mozart (an aside about the concert and twelve encores): the ability is the pianist’s, yet the piano is “able to be played,” and this looks back to the pianist’s ability; he could not play the table.
• The cook is able to prepare the meal; the vegetables give way to the knife.
• Aside: a friend wants “potency”; “you can’t move the word; that’s your problem.” He flags: this is important for the first distinction of the article, since God has ability to move others but not the passive one.

5. Article 1: the four objections and the sed contra (“it seems that in God there is no potency”) #

1. As first matter is to ability, so God the first agent is to act; first matter of itself is pure ability without any act (first book of Natural Hearing); so God is pure act without any ability. Aside: Thomas says David of Dinant, who held God to be first matter, “most stupidly taught”; no gratuitous insult, since pure passive ability is the farthest thing from pure act; “he said God was a tree, that would have been closer.” The objection’s mistake is equivocation on “ability.”
2. According to the Philosopher, ninth book of wisdom, the act of any ability is better than the ability (form better than matter, action than the act of ability), since the end of ability is act; but nothing is better than what is in God, since whatever is in God is God; so no ability in God.
3. Ability is the beginning of an operation; God’s operation is His essence (no accident in God); the divine essence has no beginning; so the definition of ability does not fit God. He recalls Aristotle’s definitions: active ability is the beginning of motion in another as other; passive ability is the ability of motion from another; being a beginning is in the idea of ability.
4. God’s knowledge and will have been shown to be the cause of things; cause and beginning are the same; so no need to assign power to God, only knowledge and will. “A very interesting objection.” Sed contra: Psalm 88, “Potens es Domine, you are powerful.”

6. The body of the article (“there is a twofold potency or ability”) #

Point: passive ability is in no way in God; active ability is in God most of all.

1. Each thing is an active beginning according as it is in act and perfect; something undergoes according as it is lacking and imperfect.
2. It was shown above (simplicity of God) that God is pure act and simply and universally perfect, with no imperfection in Him.
3. So to Him most of all (maxime) it belongs to be an active beginning and in no way to undergo.
4. The notion of active beginning belongs to active ability (active ability is the beginning of acting on another; passive, the beginning of undergoing from another, fifth book of wisdom, where he distinguishes the meanings).
5. So in God most of all is active ability.

• On “suffers”: the Greek and Latin word moved from suffering (something bad) to undergoing (even a perfection: in books two and three of About the Soul [ed.: De Anima] sensing and understanding are called suffering/undergoing); English “suffer” is stuck on the bad meaning, so he uses “undergoing,” which keeps a trace of the bad (“under the weather”) but can move (wood undergoes the carpenter and is perfected).
• On simpliciter perfectus: in the chapter on perfect (fifth book of wisdom) Aristotle distinguishes the simply perfect, which is God, “as even Averroes says,” from things perfect secundum quid, in their kind. Homer is the perfect poet, lacking nothing a poet should have (plot, characters, words: Aristotle says Homer taught the other Greek poets to make a plot; Hegel praises his diamond-like, many-faceted characters against the one-dimensional French tragic characters, and his similes, the warrior slowing in the enemy ranks like a rock rolling down a hill), but that is not everything; so Aristotle calls him “the poet” by antonomasia, as the Federalist Papers cite Shakespeare as “the poet.” A perfect woman likewise.
• “I am the Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end” (Revelation): said by antonomasia, since He is not the only beginning but is the beginning most of all.
• Aside: a joke about a radio host’s ten favourite women’s names (Janet, Maxine, Morgan Rose).

7. Reply to the first: active ability founded in act (“the active ability is not divided against act”) #

Point: when we divide ability against act we mean passive ability; active ability is not divided against act but founded in it. “It’s because I have some kind of actuality that’s something to give another”: the fire is actually hot and so can heat the air; each thing acts according as it is in act. So passive ability is excluded from God, not active. He checks: “Is that all clear to everybody?”

8. Reply to the second: act nobler than ability only where they differ (“whenever act is other from ability”) #

Point: wherever act is other than ability, as in things, act must be more noble; but God’s action is not other than His ability, both being the divine essence, as His being is not other than His essence. If His action were other than His essence, His essence would be in passive ability and need perfecting. So no need for something more noble than God’s power.

9. Digression: the De Potentia and the order of faith, hope, charity (“hope is greater than faith”) #

Point: the third reply is treated at length in the Quaestiones disputatae de potentia (about ten questions; Marietti edition, second volume, with De Malo and the question on hope).

• His old question: after “the greatest of these is charity,” which is second, faith or hope? A friend pointed him to the disputed question on hope: hope is greater than faith. Reason he draws from Thomas: by faith we know the end, by hope we tend towards it, by charity we are already in some way joined to it; being joined is best, tending next, knowing least, though one cannot tend without knowing.
• Teresa of Avila: “I don’t know what more I can have in heaven than I have now; our union is already complete,” showing the emphasis on love in the woman, though vision is the whole reward. Charity remains in heaven, hope goes (no more tending), faith is replaced by seeing God as He is. Elizabeth of the Trinity: “heaven is in my soul.” John the Baptist and “the least in the kingdom of heaven is greater”: the least in heaven already sees face to face and so actually loves God more, though John will in the end love more than that person.

10. Reply to the third: power as beginning of the effect, not of the action (“not only a beginning of action but also of some effect”) #

Point: in creatures power is a beginning both of action and of effect; in God the notion of power is saved as beginning of the effect, not of the action (which is the divine essence), “unless perhaps (nisi forte) according to the way of understanding.”

• Secundum modum intelligendi: the divine essence, having beforehand simply whatever perfection is in creatures, can be understood under the notion of action and of power, as it is understood under the notion of supposit having the nature and of nature.
• Parallel with the names: “God has goodness” is said only secundum modum intelligendi. If we say only “God is goodness itself,” goodness signifies that by which something is good, and we would not be saying He is good; if we say “God is good,” we seem to say He has goodness and so to admit composition. So, following Dionysius, every name is inadequate; we must use both, one to emphasize His being good, the other His simplicity. A student asks why it would be wrong to say God is that by which things are good: not wrong, but it does not admit He is good. Student: “it’s kind of hard to say you have yourself.” Reason Thomas gives: we know God from sensible things, where what has the perfection and the perfection are distinct; concrete names name the haver, abstract names the perfection.
• Wise vs. wisdom: my wisdom does not know, I know by it; in God both are said, for different reasons, since whatever God has is God (“is that true of me? my health, my strength, my geometry”). The distinction between the substance of God and the doing of God is in our knowledge, not in God. “We can’t overcome our human way of knowing.”
• Aside on the Incarnation: “the Holy Spirit overshadowed Mary” is said by appropriation (the Incarnation is an effect of the whole Trinity, appropriated to the Spirit who proceeds by way of love, as “Creator” is appropriated to the Father in the creed); “the Word was made flesh” is not appropriation, since the Word became man insofar as really distinct from Father and Spirit. Confusing the two “will get you into serious trouble.”
• The axiom “nothing is a beginning of itself” (like “nothing is before or after itself”): if the divine will were really the beginning of the divine willing, they would be distinct and one would be in trouble; so will is a beginning of willing in God only secundum modum intelligendi, because we start from ourselves, where will and willing differ (“the study of the soul is the doorway”), and Scripture speaks so too (“not my will but thine be done”). Student: if God didn’t have a will could He will? “That’s the way we understand it.” Aside: Photinus in the Contra Gentiles denied the real distinction of Father and Son, the most serious mistake; “the first distinction in reality is the distinction of the Father, Son, Holy Spirit.”
• Summary as he leaves it: divine power vs. divine operation is a distinction of reason; divine power vs. its effect (you and me) is a real distinction. “I really am an effect of God, and I’m not God.”

11. Reply to the fourth: power not distinct from knowledge and will secundum rem (“only secundum rationem”) #

Point: God’s power differs from His knowledge and will only in our thought, insofar as power implies the notion of a beginning carrying out what the will commands and to which knowledge directs; or, the divine knowledge and will, as beginning of an effect, have the notion of power, though as such they do not name this. Hence the consideration of knowledge and will precedes that of power, as cause precedes operation and effect; this justifies the order of the Summa even though they are not different things.

His words #

• dunamis / potentia; “power” (English, stuck in the active sense) vs. “ability” (moves through both senses) [ed.: potency]; “potency” rejected as a transliteration that does not move.
• ability to act upon / ability to undergo or be acted upon [ed.: active / passive potency].
• “ninth book of wisdom”, “fifth book of wisdom” [ed.: Metaphysics IX, V]; “Natural Hearing” [ed.: Physics]; “About the Soul” [ed.: De Anima].
• phusis / nature: birth; source of the baby in the mother; intrinsic source of any change; matter and form; what a thing is.
• hodos / via / road: extended to a road in the mind.
• suffer / undergo: Greek and Latin “suffer” moved to undergoing; he uses “undergoing” [ed.: pati, passio].
• simpliciter perfectus vs. perfect secundum quid: lacking nothing at all vs. lacking nothing of its kind.
• antonomasia: “the poet” for Homer, “the beginning” for God.
• secundum rem / secundum rationem / secundum modum intelligendi: in reality vs. in our thought vs. in our way of understanding.
• nisi forte: “unless perhaps.”
• appropriation vs. what is said of a Person as really distinct.
• axiom: nothing is a beginning of itself.

Texts #

Read in class

• Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 25, prologue and a. 1 (objections, sed contra, body, four replies).
• Psalm 88, “Potens es Domine” (as the sed contra).
• Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Friar Lawrence’s speech (quoted from memory).

Mentioned

• Aristotle, Metaphysics IX (two meanings of dunamis; act better than ability); Metaphysics V (phusis; perfect, with Averroes’ commentary; definitions of ability).
• Aristotle, Physics I (first matter as pure ability) and II (definition of nature).
• Aristotle, De Anima II-III (sensing and understanding as undergoing).
• Aristotle on Homer’s plot; Hegel on Homer’s characters and similes.
• Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae De Potentia; De Veritate; De Malo; the disputed question on hope (Marietti edition).
• Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles on the Trinity and Photinus.
• Revelation, “I am the Alpha and the Omega”; the Creed; John 1, “the Word was made flesh”; Luke 22, “not my will but thine” (inferred); 1 Corinthians 13 (inferred); Teresa of Avila; Elizabeth of the Trinity; the Federalist Papers.
• Handout “The First Definition of Reason”, p. 82, and DHB Vol III, p. 847: matched by the source system, not named in the transcript.

His questions #

• How do you translate dunamis and potentia into English? Sometimes “power,” sometimes “ability”; power is stuck in the active sense, ability moves.
• Has the word “power” been moved to the second sense in English? No; hence the translator’s problem.
• By what kind of ability is the bricklayer beatable, or the paper burnable? The passive ability, to be acted upon.
• Which sense of nature characterizes natural philosophy? The intrinsic source of motion and rest; birth is too narrow, “what a thing is” too broad.
• When we divide ability against act, which ability are we thinking of? The passive; active ability is founded on act.
• Why would it be wrong to say God is that by which things are good? Not wrong, but it does not say that He is good; both ways of naming are needed.
• Is the divine will really the beginning of the divine willing? Not secundum rem, since nothing is a beginning of itself; only in our way of understanding.
• Is “the Holy Spirit overshadowed Mary” said by appropriation? Is “the Word was made flesh”? The first yes; the second no, it is said of the Word as really distinct.
• Why consider God’s knowledge and will before His power? Because power is knowledge and will considered as beginning of an effect, and cause precedes effect.