Summa I, q.36, aa.3-4: From the Father Through the Son, and the Father and Son as One Source of the Holy Spirit

Orientation #

He begins directly: “Article three here now,” continuing the reading of q. 36 from the previous class, and ends with “that’s enough for today” after a. 4. He does not say what comes next. The previous class did q. 36 a. 2 (Filioque); the next takes up q. 37 on “Love” as a name of the Holy Spirit.

The class, in order #

1. a. 3, the four objections (“does not go forward from him immediately”) #

The point: reading the objections to “the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son”.

• Obj. 1: what proceeds from one through another does not proceed from the first immediately (“immediately” = negation of a middle), which seems unsuitable.
• Obj. 2: if through the Son, then from the Son only on account of the Father; so, by Aristotle’s principle, more from the Father than from the Son. He stops to expand the principle propter quod unumquodque tale, illud magis, which he restates as: when the same belongs to two things but to one because of the other, it belongs more to the cause. Manifested first in simple things (fire hotter than the air it heats; sugar sweeter than the coffee it sweetens; salt saltier than the fries), then in philosophy (premises more known than the conclusion known through them) and in ethics (health more desirable than the medicine desired for it). The objector applies it: if the Spirit is from the Son only because of the Father, he is more from the Father.
• Obj. 3: the Son has being through generation; so the Father would first generate the Son and afterwards breathe the Spirit, making the procession not eternal, “which is heretical”. Aside: “heretical” comes from the Greek word for choice; joke about the man unsure whether he must leave the church (“you’re already out of it”).
• Obj. 4: “acts through another” converts: the king acts through the bailiff, the bailiff acts through the king; but we never say the Son breathes the Spirit through the Father, so we should not say the Father breathes through the Son. He notes we do say both in human affairs (boss and instrument).

2. Sed contra and respondeo: the senses of “through” (“this preposition per or through designates some cause”) #

The point: Hilary’s prayer supports the formula, and Thomas answers by distinguishing what per can mean. Sed contra (Hilary, De Trinitate): he reads his own rendering, has Maria read hers, then finds and reads his fuller translation (“who is from Thee through Thy only Begotten”). Thomas’s distinction as he lays it out:

1. In every “X acts through Y”, per designates some cause or beginning of the act.
2. When the action passes between doer and done, the cause named may be (A) a cause of the action as it goes forth from the agent, i.e. a cause to the agent that he acts: final (the artist acts through desire for profit), formal (through his art), mover (through the command of another; “your wish is my command”); or (B) a cause of the action as it terminates in the thing made: the artist acts through his hammer.
3. In (B) the hammer is not the cause to the artist that he acts, but the cause to the artifact that it proceed from the artist, and this it has from the artist moving it. His case: Michelangelo made the Pietà through his art (A) vs. through his hammer and chisel (B).
4. Some say per notes authority in recto (the king acts through the bailiff) or in obliquo (the bailiff acts through the king).
5. Application: since the Son has from the Father that the Spirit proceeds from him, it can be said the Father breathes the Spirit through the Son, or equivalently that the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son. His gloss: the Son has the divine nature from the Father, hence the power of breathing. He flags that this is not the hammer sense of per but “the other ones”, and that the formula is only fully understood once the misunderstandings in the objections are cleared.

3. Reply 1: agent and power; Adam, Eve and Abel (“just as Abel proceeds immediately from Adam”) #

The point: “immediately” is true of the power, “through a middle” is true of the persons.

1. In every action consider two things: the individual acting and the power by which he acts (fire heats by heat).
2. As to the power by which they breathe, no middle: the power is one and the same, the divine substance as in Father and Son.
3. As to the two persons breathing, the Spirit is immediately from the Father (who breathes by the power he has) and in a middle way from the Son, who is from the Father. Example (Thomas’s own, which he is pleased to find he has been using): Abel is immediately from Adam as his father, and from Adam through Eve, who came from Adam’s rib. Thomas adds that this example of material procession “seems to be inept” for the immaterial procession; he keeps it because it helps him see the point.

4. Replies 2 and 3: one power in number; co-eternity (“one in the same in number is the power of breathing”) #

• Reply 2 (to the propter quod objection): if the Son had from the Father another power in number, he would be a second, instrumental cause, and the Spirit would be more from the Father. But the power of breathing is numerically one in Father and Son, so the Spirit proceeds equally from both, even though sometimes said “chiefly and properly” from the Father because the Son has the power from him. A student confirms: one nature, numerically one; power and substance the same.
• Reply 3: the Son’s generation is co-eternal with the one generated (the Father was not before he generated the Son); likewise the Spirit’s procession is co-eternal with its beginning, so the Son was not before, in duration, and then the Spirit. Both eternal, no “after a while”. Student joke: “they got to know each other for a while” — “that’s Adam and Eve”, where Eve did come from Adam before Abel; again, the example is “inept”.

5. Reply 4: why no conversion, king/bailiff vs. hammer (“we do not say that the hammer acts through the maker”) #

The point: “acts through” does not always convert, and where it does the two directions name different orders.

1. We do not say the hammer acts through the maker: it does not belong to the hammer to act, only to be acted on, so it is designated only as instrument. The bailiff, lord of his own act, can be said to act through the king.
2. The bailiff acts through the king, though through denotes a middle, because as the suppositum is prior in acting, so its power is more immediate to the effect: the power of the first cause joins the second cause to its effect — “hence the first principles in science are said to be immediate.”
3. So in the order of agents the bailiff is the middle (king acts through bailiff); in the order of powers the bailiff acts through the king, whose power makes the bailiff’s action achieve its effect.
4. Between Father and Son there is order of persons only, not of power; so the Father breathes through the Son and not the reverse, otherwise you would be saying the Son gets a different power from the Father. Student exchange: is it like the senses of “in” (the king’s power is in the bailiff, not reversed)? He answers that the two directions are two senses: king through bailiff is one person acting through another; bailiff through king is effect through cause, the bailiff getting his power. Another student: instrument is a moved mover, so the principal cause is cause of the instrument acting. His example: the chisel makes the statue through being moved by Michelangelo; but “Michelangelo makes the statue through the chisel” names no cause of the action as it proceeds from him, only perhaps as it terminates in the statue, and even that ability is from Michelangelo. “You got to be careful when you say that the Father breathes the Holy Spirit through the Son.”

6. a. 4, the seven objections (“one beginning of the Holy Spirit”) #

The point: reading the objections to “Father and Son are one beginning of the Holy Spirit”.

• Obj. 1: not insofar as one in nature (then the Spirit would proceed from himself), nor one in a property (one property cannot be of two persons, “as it seems”); so as many, so not one beginning.
• Obj. 2: “one” cannot be personal unity (they would be one person), nor unity of a property, else by two properties the Father would be two beginnings of Son and Spirit.
• Obj. 3: the Son does not agree more with the Father than the Spirit does; Father and Spirit are not one beginning of any person; so neither Father and Son. His gloss: the objection assumes Father and Son are “more one” than Father and Spirit.
• Obj. 4: the one beginning is either the one that is the Father (then the Son is the Father) or one that is not the Father (then the Father is not the Father).
• Obj. 5: the converse “the one beginning of the Spirit is the Father and the Son” is false, since “beginning” stands either for the Father or for the Son.
• Obj. 6: one in substance means the same; but “the same beginning” is denied by many.
• Obj. 7: the three are one Creator because one beginning of the creature; but Father and Son are “two breathers, as is said by many”, agreeing with Hilary (De Trinitate II: the Spirit is from Father and Son “as authors”). “No one could ever untie this mess.” Sed contra: Augustine, De Trinitate V, not two beginnings but one — “this guy is troublemaker”, he is behind the question. Aside (after obj. 4): the medieval way of teaching — lectures Mon/Wed/Fri, disputations Tue/Thu/Sat with students giving objections for and against, the master resolving; a request to stage a medieval disputation when he taught at St. Mary’s College, declined; mock versions at Thomas Aquinas and Christendom (Oktoberfest, “the virtues of watching television”); after a public defense you buy everyone a drink; Cajetan carried on shoulders after his defense. “We’re really kind of stuck compared to the medieval people… but at least we’re moving.”

7. Respondeo: “beginning” takes its number from the form signified (“the opposition of relation does not distinguish”) #

The point: Father and Son are one in all things where relative opposition does not distinguish them; being the beginning of the Spirit is such, so they are one beginning. He prefers the rendering “in which the opposition of relation does not distinguish among them”. Then the opinion Thomas rejects: some say “one beginning” is improper because “beginning” taken singularly signifies a property, not a person, and is taken adjectivally; since an adjective is not determined by an adjective, “one beginning” must mean “in one way” — but then the Father would be “two beginnings” of Son and Spirit, “in two ways”. Thomas: “beginning” signifies a property but in a substantive way, like “Father” or “Son” in created things, and so takes its number from the form signified; as Father and Son are one God by unity of the form “God”, so one beginning by unity of the property “beginning”. He admits this is hard to understand as stated and will clear up in the replies.

8. Replies 1-3: the breathing power; one property in two persons; likeness (“in so far as they are one in the breathing power”) #

• Reply 1: as to the virtus spirativa, the Spirit proceeds from Father and Son insofar as they are one in the breathing power, which “in a way signifies the nature with a property”, as will be said later [unclear in recording]. His gloss: the power is the divine nature as in Father and Son, not as in the Spirit, “a mixed thing” in its definition. Nor is it unsuitable that one property be in two persons of one nature — the objection’s weakness. But as to the persons breathing, the Spirit proceeds from them as many, “as the love uniting the two”. He stresses the double answer: two persons breathing, by one ability to breathe.
• Reply 2: “one beginning” designates one property, the form signified by the name; it does not follow that many properties make the Father many beginnings, since that would imply plurality of persons. “Think about it there.”
• Reply 3: according to relative properties there is no likeness or unlikeness in God, only according to the essence; so as the Father is not more like himself than like the Son, the Son is not more like the Father than the Spirit is. His gloss: sharing “breather” with the Father does not make the Son more like him; likeness is by the same nature. Comes out more in the treatise on the comparison of the persons.

9. Reply 4: the alternatives are not contradictories (“To be or not to be, that is the question”) #

The point: “one beginning that is the Father” and “one beginning that is not the Father” are not contradictorily opposed, so neither need be granted.

1. Contradictories cannot both be admitted and cannot both be denied (Hamlet: it is a question because you can’t both be and not be, and must either be or not be).
2. The contradictory of “the Father and Son are one beginning that is the Father” is “they are not one beginning that is the Father”, not “one beginning that is not the Father”.
3. So “one or the other must be given” fails. His example: “you are the man that is doing Berquist” [ed.: “breakfast” in the joke, ASR wavers between the two] vs. “you are the man that is not doing breakfast” — of a third person, neither is true; the true contradictory is “you are not the man that is doing breakfast”. Student example: “either he’s here or he’s there — he’s in both”: not a contradiction, which would be here and not here. “The main thing the sophist wants to do is to get you in a contradiction,” so he makes non-contradictories appear contradictory. Thomas adds: “beginning” here has not a determined supposition but a confused one, for the two persons together, so the argument commits a fallacy from confused to determined supposition — one of Aristotle’s six mistakes from words in the Sophistical Refutations (he does not say its name aloud). “Everything, you know, Aristotle comes in here sooner or later.”

10. Replies 5-7: confused supposition; two breathing, one breather (“stands confusedly and indistinctly for two persons”) #

• Replies 5 and 6: the same solution — “beginning” stands confusedly and indistinctly for the two persons together, so “the same beginning” is true indistinctly. (He runs obj. 5 and obj. 6 together and reads only what he calls “to the sixth”; one reply for the two.)
• Reply 7: some say Father and Son are one beginning but two breathers, by distinction of persons, just as two breathing, since actions refer to supposita; and “Creator” differs because the creature proceeds from the three as one in nature, whereas the Spirit proceeds from Father and Son as two distinct persons. But Thomas says it is better to hold: “breathing” (spirantes) is adjectival, “breather” (spirator) substantive; so two breathing, by plurality of persons, but not two breathers, by the one breathing power — adjectives take number from the supposita, substantives from the form signified. Hilary’s “as authors” is explained as putting the substantive for the adjective. He notes his own rendering wavers (“two breathers… because breather seems to be said absolutely”) before settling on Thomas’s line. “That’s enough for today.”

His words #

• “goes forward” — his rendering of procedit [ed.: proceeds].
• “immediately” — negation of a middle.
• propter quod unumquodque tale, illud magis — his three-statement expansion: what belongs to two things, to one because of the other, belongs more to the cause.
• “heretical” — from the Greek for choice.
• “per / through” — designates some cause or beginning of the act; final, formal, mover (cause to the agent), or instrument (cause as terminating in the thing made).
• in recto / oblique [ed.: in obliquo] — authority noted directly (king through bailiff) or obliquely (bailiff through king).
• “individual” / “suppositum” — the one acting, against the power by which he acts.
• “breathes”, “breathing”, “breather” — his renderings of spirat, spirantes, spirator.
• “beginning” — his rendering of principium [ed.: principle].
• “opposition of relation” — what alone distinguishes Father and Son.
• virtus spirativa — the breathing power; the divine nature as in Father and Son, “nature with a property”.
• “ability to breathe” — his gloss on the breathing power [ed.: potency].
• “confused” vs. “determined” supposition — “beginning” standing for two persons together vs. for one.

Texts #

Read in class

• Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 36, a. 3 (objections, sed contra, respondeo, replies 1-4), translated as he goes.
• Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 36, a. 4 (objections 1-7, sed contra, respondeo, replies), translated as he goes.
• Hilary, De Trinitate, the prayer cited in a. 3 sed contra: read in his own translation, Maria’s translation, and a fuller translation he has on hand.
• Handout “The Matter and Order of Wisdom”, p. 17 (per matched sources; not identified aloud in the transcript).

Mentioned

• Aristotle, principle propter quod unumquodque tale, illud magis (no locus given).
• Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, six kinds of mistakes from words.
• Augustine, De Trinitate bk. V (a. 4 sed contra).
• Hilary, De Trinitate bk. II (a. 4 obj. 7).
• Thomas’s later “treatise on the comparison of the persons” (no locus given).
• Shakespeare, Hamlet, “To be or not to be”.
• DHB Vol. III, The School of Aristotle, p. 466 (per matched sources).

His questions #

• “Immediately means a negation of what?” Of the middle.
• Fire and the air, sugar and the coffee, salt and the fries: which is hotter, sweeter, saltier? The cause — fire, sugar, salt; so premises more known than conclusion, health more desirable than medicine.
• Michelangelo made the Pietà through his art, or through his hammer and chisel — which is which? Art is cause to the agent (formal); hammer and chisel are instrument, cause as the action terminates in the statue.
• Is Adam’s son immediately from Adam? Yes, immediately from Adam as father, and through Eve, who is from Adam.
• Why don’t you say the reverse, that the Son breathes the Holy Spirit through the Father? Because between Father and Son there is order of persons but no order of power; the Son has the numerically same power.
• Is “either here or there, but he’s in both” a contradiction? No; the contradiction is here and not here.
• Either you are the man doing breakfast or the man not doing breakfast — which is this third man? Neither; the two are not contradictories, the contradictory is “not the man doing breakfast”.
• “Whence, in the process, there is the fallacy of the what?” From confused to determined supposition; one of Aristotle’s six mistakes from words (name not spoken).
• Are Father and Son two breathers? Two breathing (adjective, by persons), one breather (substantive, by the one breathing power); Hilary’s “authors” puts substantive for adjective.