Trinity, Question 39, Article 3: Why the Three Persons Are One God, Not Three Gods (Nouns vs. Adjectives, 'Thing', Theology as Defense of the Faith)

Orientation #

He opens by recalling “where we are” in the seventeen questions of the treatise on the Trinity and that the first article of q. 39 was “the fundamental article” (prev. lecture: persons and essence really the same); he ends “go on to the next article here now” (a. 4). The previous class treated q. 39 aa. 1-2 (persons the same as essence, “of one essence”), the next treats a. 4 on whether “God” can stand for a person.

The class, in order #

1. Where we are in the seventeen questions (“what has today got in common with the treatise on the Trinity”) #

Point: the divine persons are distinguished by relations of origin, so the treatise’s structure follows origin and then compares the persons to everything relevant.

• Division from Thomas’s proemium: 1 question on the proceedings (going forward) in God, 1 on the relations founded on them, 15 on the persons. The 15: 10 on the persons absolutely, 5 comparative. The 5: 3 comparing the persons to something other (in thought at least) than the persons — to God/the divine nature, to the relations, to the notional acts (generation, breathing) — and 2 comparing persons to each other (equality/likeness; missions, “whatever that means. We’ll find out”).
• Augustine’s name for the origin of one from another: ordo naturae. Father generates the Son; Father and Son breathe the Holy Spirit.
• Example of the same completeness “for a beginner”: Porphyry’s Isagoge (read at Laval in Albert the Great’s paraphrase), which after treating genus, difference, species, property, accident, compares each to the others — 4+3+2+1 = ten comparisons.
• Aside: “Thank God Aristotle didn’t do the categories” — ten compared to nine “would have exhausted the human mind”.

2. From articles 1-2 to article 3: predication (“the idea of predication, which is the Latin for being said of”) #

Point: a. 1 showed Father and God, Son and God, Spirit and God are really the same, differing only in our thought; a. 2, how the three are “of one nature”; a. 3 asks how God is said of the three.

• Objection sketched before reading: since “God” is said of Father, Son, Spirit as “man” is said of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle (three men, not one), there must be three gods — which is why the “Mohammedans” think we are polytheists. “This is not the way God is said of” the three.
• His anticipation: you can say the three persons are one God, and also that God is three persons; both orthodox, “but let’s get it from the master.”

3. The four objections and the sed contra (“Here, Israel, the Lord your God is one God”) #

Point: the objections all press an analogy with creaturely predication.

1. As “man” signifies one having humanity, “God” signifies one having deity; three persons are three having the divine nature; so three gods.
2. Genesis 1:1: the “Hebraic truth” has Elohim, plural (“gods, or judges”), said because of the plurality of persons.
3. “Thing,” said absolutely, pertains to substance; yet Augustine (De Doctrina Christiana) says the things to be enjoyed are three — Father, Son, Spirit; so other essential names too are said in the plural. (“Augustine is the greatest doctor of the church on the Trinity, so if he says three things, there are three things.”)
4. As “God” signifies one having the divine nature, “person” signifies one subsisting in an understanding nature; we say three persons, so three gods.

• Sed contra: Deuteronomy 6:4. He notes the order: the last thing shown in the treatise on God’s substance was that God is one, “so however you understand the Trinity, you can’t go against there being one God.” In the Summa Contra Gentiles the last attribute is infinity, followed at once by the understanding of God — recalling Anaxagoras, for whom the first thing said of mind is that it is infinite.
• Aside (student exchange): the Pope’s doctoral thesis on Augustine, the later one on Bonaventure, and that the rough treatment of the first shaped how he later ran the CDF.

4. The body: substantive vs. adjectival essential names (“some signify the essence in a substantial way”) #

Point: names signifying the essence substantively (nouns, e.g. “God”) are said of the three only singularly; names signifying adjectivally are said in the plural. “You have to know grammar” — one of the liberal arts; the terms come from speculative grammar. Argument for the distinction:

1. A substantive name signifies by way of substance; an adjective by way of accident, i.e. what inheres in a subject.
2. A substance has being by itself, so has unity or multiplicity by itself; hence the number of a substantive name is taken from the form signified.
3. Accidents have being in a subject, so receive unity or multitude from the subject; hence the number of an adjective is taken from the individual subjects (suppositum).
   • Examples: the shape of this chair is in this wood, the shape of the next chair in that wood — multiplied by that in which they are, even if the shape is the same; the knowledge of the Pythagorean theorem is not one knowledge in the room but multiplied, in my head and in yours.
4. In creatures one form is not found in many subjects except a unity of order (form of an ordered multitude, “the order of the army”); so substantive names for such a form are said in the singular of many (many men are a college, an army, a people), the adjective in the plural (many men are collegial).
5. In God the divine essence is signified as a form “simple and most one” (which is why Thomas groups simplicity and unity, and infinity with perfection, if you reduce his five attributes to three). Conclusion: Socrates, Plato, Cicero are three men because three human natures in three subjects; Father, Son, Spirit are not three gods but one God because one divine nature. Adjectivally, “three existing, three wise, three eternals, three uncreated, three immense [immeasurable, infinite] ones”; substantively, “one uncreated, one immense, one eternal” — hence the neuter, “as Athanasius says” (Athanasian Creed).

• Student cases: “three wise ones” — yes, adjectivally; the angels’ “holy, holy, holy” taken as referring to the Trinity — holy is adjectival, so “three holies” is fine, but you would not say “God, God, God” unless naming the Trinity.

5. Reply to the first: “having deity” is an adjective (“God signifies substantively”) #

Point: though “God” does signify one having deity, the way of signifying differs — “God” is a noun, “having the divine nature” adjectival — so three having deity does not give three gods. “See how very important that distinction.”

• On error: “mixed up” is almost a synonym for “mistaken” but brings out that a mistake comes from not possessing a distinction; the objection proceeds from ignorance of the substantive/adjective distinction. Plato describes mistake as reaching for one thing and getting the wrong one — because you don’t distinguish them.
• Aristotle, the book on dialectic (Topics): third tool, difference — the closer things are, the more the mind is exercised in seeing their difference (dog vs. chair: little; dog vs. cat: more; kinds of cat: more still; labelled puppies in a mall pet shop while his wife shopped). Fourth tool, likeness — the reverse: a likeness of ratios between far-apart things exercises the mind more than a likeness of genus or species.
• Wine vs. beer is easier than wine vs. wine: Ron McCarthy (former president of Thomas Aquinas College) served the faculty a different wine in a labelled bottle; all were deceived except Brother Mark (“This is not that”). Socrates: we claim to know what we don’t.
• Student: uneducated people make cruder distinctions? His answer: it depends — if your livelihood depends on it you make them fast; concentrating on one narrow thing lets you see differences others miss (student adds the disputed “twenty Eskimo words for snow”). Thomas helps us notice distinctions we would not notice.

6. Reply to the second: diverse tongues (“diverse tongues have a diverse way of speaking”) #

Point: as the Greeks say three hypostases because of the plurality of subjects, so Hebrew says Elohim in the plural; but we (Latins) say neither “gods” nor “substances” in the plural, lest the plurality be referred to the nature. Thomas likewise sometimes notes that a passage of Aristotle “is more according to the Greek idiom.”

• Student: Ricciotti [ASR “Richiadi”; likely Ricciotti’s history of Israel, inferred] says all peoples of that region used that word for God.

7. Reply to the third: “thing” is a transcendental (“this name thing is among the transcendentals”) #

Point: “thing” is said of every category, but not in the same sense; as pertaining to relation it is said in the plural in God, as pertaining to substance in the singular.

• The transcendentals explained: names said of all ten categories, the most universal names — being, thing/something, one, true, good. Nothing is besides being but what is not; besides something, nothing. So “in some way we know everything” (we know what is said of everything, though most indistinctly; “you can’t get something from nothing”). Fourth book of wisdom (Metaphysics): one = undivided being, as universal as being — every being is simple or composed; the composed is one by being put together, a fortiori the simple. True and good convertible with being: “book two, but more so the ninth book” — “I can’t show that right now.” Being said of all ten but primarily of substance (Metaphysics IV).
• Because said of everything, these names are equivocal — Aristotle’s discovery: equivocal by reason, not by chance; Thomas opens De Veritate q. 1 with Avicenna on this.
• Application: to be a man is something; to be five foot ten, a geometer, a father or teacher, are each something, not in the same sense. In God there are four relations but three persons (a distinction to be compared in a later question); a real distinction only where relations are opposed — generator/generated, breather/breath; being generator and breather does not make the Father two.
• Augustine, in one and the same sentence: the Trinity is one highest, greatest thing, and the things to be enjoyed are three. His usual question: are Father, Son, Spirit one thing or three things? Answer: one if “thing” means the substance, three (not four) if it means the opposed relations, i.e. the persons. “A little learning is a dangerous thing.”

8. Reply to the fourth: person vs. God (“the form signified by this name person is not the essence”) #

Point: “God” signifies the nature; “person” signifies the personality, i.e. the personal property; since there are three personal properties, “person” is said in the plural, “God” only in the singular. “If you said three gods, you’d have three divine natures.” “That wasn’t too hard, was it?”

9. Digression: heresy and the two definitions of theology (“heresy is necessary for the development of theology”) #

Point: thinking about what one believes is natural to reason, and theology has grown chiefly by defending the faith against heretics.

• Vatican II text (paraphrased): to cast light on the mysteries so far as possible, penetrate them and see their connection, take Thomas as teacher. Against “Thomas is prying into God”: he is prying into how we speak of God.
• Augustine’s definition of believing (defended by Thomas in the Secunda Secundae): to think with assent / assent while thinking — unlike philosophy, where thinking precedes assent. Even human belief in a teacher naturally leads to thinking about what is believed; grace does not go against nature. Yet one should not be too ready, since mistake is easy.
• Heretics = “choosers” (Greek); they give reasons from philosophy, scripture or a Father, gain followers, and force a Father to defend the article: Pelagius forced Augustine on grace (“the mind of Augustine on grace is the mind of the church”; Thomas: Augustine spoke better on grace later). Arius and the first four councils, venerated by a pope “as much as the four gospels” — tradition alongside the written word.
• Two definitions of theology: (a) “fides quaerens intellectum,” attributed to Anselm but substantially Augustine — belief seeking understanding, in between belief and the beatific vision (faith in Hebrews: the substance, i.e. foundation, of things hoped for; conviction of what is not seen); a consolation, showing harmony of belief and reason. (b) Augustine’s definition at the start of the Summa: a science by which belief is engendered (in others), nourished, strengthened, defended — the “contra, contra, contra” books.
• Philosophical parallel: if someone disagrees with you it is good — either you find your mistake, or you come to understand the truth better through its reasons.

10. Student question: Islam, reason and the Greek inheritance (“is there any sort of common ground”) #

Point: reason’s development has come through contact with the Greeks; the Arabs had it and lost it.

• Regensburg address mentioned. Avicenna, Averroes, Alfarabi reached that God is “I am who am,” being as his nature; Thomas often quotes Avicenna approvingly (God alone truly liberal, getting nothing in return), while correcting his mistakes; Albert the Great shows the same debt.
• Schrödinger, Nature and the Greeks: science is the Greek way of looking at things; no one has had science without contact with the Greeks — likewise philosophy. Arabs met the Greek texts before the medievals, developed medicine, then decayed; “is anybody reading Avicenna over there?”
• A grammarian’s story: the Greeks worked out their grammar; the Romans copied it, hence the mistaken order of Latin cases (Greek: nominative underlying the sentence; genitive before the verb’s action, “I hit you with a tool”; dative with it; accusative after; Latin’s ablative tacked on last, dative misplaced); English grammarians copied the Romans. Roman comedy imitates Greek; Shakespeare’s Comedy of Errors imitates Latin comedy. Euclid’s Elements (c. 300 BC, Alexandria) still the standard book; Einstein on Euclid and youthful enthusiasm; Heisenberg: still answering the Greeks’ questions. Grammar, geometry, arithmetic, philosophy are Greek words: “the nations are not equal in their contributions to the life of the mind.”
• What the West may be proud of: Baroque music up to Mozart (Ratzinger’s half hour of Mozart, per Fr. Neuhaus); “I suspect Mozart would have found nuclear rather easy.”
• Aside: in modern elections people support candidates opposed to their own issues without knowing it — reason yielding to emotion even in the West.

His words #

• proceeding / “going forward” in God — his rendering of processio [ed.: procession].
• ordo naturae — Augustine’s name for the origin of one person from another.
• notional acts — generation and breathing (spiration).
• predication — “the Latin for being said of.”
• substantial / substantive name vs. adjective name — signifying by way of substance vs. by way of accident; his gloss: noun vs. adjective, from speculative grammar.
• suppositum — individual subject.
• unity of order — the only way one form is in many creatures (army, college, people).
• immense — immeasurable, infinite.
• “mixed up” — mistake as failure to possess a distinction.
• tool of difference / tool of likeness — Aristotle’s third and fourth dialectical tools.
• transcendentals — names said of all ten categories: being, thing/something, one, true, good.
• equivocal by reason, not by chance — Aristotle’s discovery about such names [ed.: analogy].
• opposed relations — the only ground of real distinction in God.
• personality — the personal property signified by “person.”
• heretic — Greek “chooser.”
• fides quaerens intellectum — belief seeking understanding.

Texts #

Read in class

• Thomas, ST I, q. 39, a. 3 (objections, sed contra, body, four replies).
• Deuteronomy 6:4; Genesis 1:1 (Elohim); Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana on the three things to be enjoyed (as quoted in obj. 3 and reply).
• Verified source: Summa Contra Gentiles IV, ch. 15 (matched by text, c. 10 min; he does not name it — probably the theology/faith digression, inferred).

Mentioned

• Thomas, ST I q. 39 proemium and aa. 1-2; treatise on the substance of God (ends with unity); Secunda Secundae on believing; opening of the Summa (definition of theology).
• Summa Contra Gentiles (order: infinity, then understanding of God; Trinity in the last book).
• Porphyry, Isagoge (Albert the Great’s paraphrase); Aristotle, Categories; Topics (tools of difference and likeness); Metaphysics IV, II, IX; Anaxagoras on mind.
• Thomas, De Veritate q. 1 (Avicenna on transcendentals); Athanasian Creed; Hebrews on faith; Vatican II on taking Thomas as teacher; Regensburg address.
• Schrödinger, Nature and the Greeks; Euclid, Elements; Shakespeare, Comedy of Errors.

His questions #

• What has today got in common with the treatise on the Trinity? Seventeen — the seventeen questions (the date, left implicit).
• To what does Thomas compare the persons in the first three comparative questions? To God (the divine nature), to the relations, to the notional acts.
• Is there one knowledge of the Pythagorean theorem in this room? No — it is multiplied by the heads it is in, like an accident by its subject.
• Can we say there are three wise ones? Three holies? Yes, taken adjectivally; but not “God, God, God” unless naming the Trinity.
• Can there be something that isn’t a being? Something that isn’t something? No — besides being there is only what is not; besides something, nothing; so we know everything in some way.
• Are the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit one thing or three things? One thing as “thing” means the divine substance; three as it means the opposed relations, the persons.
• If God and person are both said of the three, why three persons and not three gods? “Person” signifies the personal property, of which there are three; “God” the one nature.
• Is there common ground between Christianity and Islam in using reason? Historically yes (Avicenna, Averroes, Alfarabi, through the Greeks), but “how open they are to reason over there anymore” he doubts — left open.