Episode 145

Prima Pars · Class 73 · part 2 of 2

Summa I q.42 a.3-4: Order of Origin without Before and After, and the Son's Equality with the Father

Prima Pars · Class 73 · part 2 of 2 Summa I q.42 a.3-4: Order of Origin without Before and After, and the Son's Equality with the Father

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Prima Pars · Class 73 · part 2 of 2 · 2008-06-19 · 47 min

Summa I q.42 a.3-4: Order of Origin without Before and After, and the Son's Equality with the Father

Berquist takes up two articles of Summa I, q.42: whether there is order among the divine persons, and whether the Son is equal to the Father in greatness. He turns to Aristotle's Categories and Physics for the relevant senses of "confusion," "beginning," and relation—distinguishing relatives said secundum dici from those secundum esse—to show how Thomas can speak of origin and order in God without any temporal priority or inequality of nature. He also brings in patristic and conciliar language, from Hilary, Augustine, and Athanasius, to show how the Father's scriptural "greater" status is reconciled with the Son's full equality in the one divine nature.

Orientation #

He begins in the sed contra of q. 42 a. 3 (the class had “already looked at” the reply to the first objection) and refers back to “the previous article” on natural vs. chosen generation (prev. lecture). He stops at the end of a. 4, “we’re going to have to stop here.” The previous class ran through the article on the Son’s co-eternity and into a. 3 on order of nature; the next continues q. 42 with aa. 5-6.

The class, in order #

1. Sed contra: two senses of “confused” (“wherever there is plurality without order, there is confusion”) #

The point: order is required among the persons because plurality without order is confusion, but “confused” here is the bad sense, to be distinguished from Aristotle’s.

  • Joke: the modern university as confusion, “a pluribus confusion”; “just look at any college.”
  • Distinction: confused as mixed up, mistaken vs. confused as indistinct but not false (Aristotle at the start of the eight books of “Natural Hearing” [ed.: Physics]: the confused is before the distinct and more known and certain to us). Descartes’ problem, he suggests, is partly mixing up the two senses, “confused about the word confused.” The first, bad sense is probably the first meaning.
  • Examples: thinking a dog is a cat (mistaken) vs. knowing a dog is an animal (incomplete, not mistaken, though animal does not distinguish dog from cat); calling a Cabernet Sauvignon “Chianti” (mistaken) vs. “a dry red wine” (not distinct, but certain and not mistaken).
  • Etymology: confusion = “poured together”; “mixed up” has not moved to the neutral sense.
  • Parallel: the word passio / undergoing first means being acted on harmfully; later the harm is dropped and only “being acted upon, receiving” kept. Confusion moves the same way. He notes Aristotle does not stop to explain this equivocation.

2. Body: order is said in comparison to a beginning (“order is always said in comparison to some”) #

The point: since “beginning” is said in many ways, so is “order”; in God there is beginning by origin without “before,” hence order by origin without before.

  • Method compared to the fifth book of “wisdom” [ed.: Metaphysics V]: Aristotle first takes up “beginning” (what is first in being, becoming, or knowing), then divides the senses of “before” accordingly; in the Categories he takes “before” by itself, without “beginning.”
  • Senses of beginning Thomas names: according to position (a point, Aristotle’s first meaning); according to understanding (beginning of a demonstration, Aristotle’s fifth meaning); according to cause(s) [garbled: "singular causes"].
  • Objection he raises to Thomas: “order without before” might look like a contradiction, or one might say order-with-before is just one sense of order. But in the Sentences Thomas explains it otherwise: before-and-after is the general meaning of order; differences contract it into kinds of order; we keep one difference and apply it to God. (The De Potentia text, he notes, seems instead to distinguish two kinds of order, “before” vs. “from”; Augustine’s “order of nature” is “not by which one is before the other, but by which one is from the other.”)
  • Example: “I’m before some of you in time, but I’m before my son as father, origin”: keep what is specific to being before one’s son, drop “before,” and say it of God.

3. Replies 1-2: origin in general; before by nature and understanding (“two is before half a four”) #

  • Ad 1 (already seen): order of nature signifies a notion of origin in general, not in particular.
  • Ad 2, the objection: wherever there is order of nature one is before the other, if not in time then by nature and understanding, as two is before half-of-four: they are together, hama / simul, not two first and then gradually half of four; yet it is half of four because it is two, not two because it is half of four.
  • Thomas’s reply as read: in created things, even when what is from the beginning is coeval (same duration) with its beginning, the beginning is before by nature and understanding if one considers that which is the beginning; but if one considers the relations of cause and caused, beginning and begun, relatives are simul by nature and understanding, one being in the definition of the other. He says “come back upon this in a moment” and goes to the Categories.

4. Digression: relation in the Categories, secundum esse vs. secundum dici (“double is nothing in itself”) #

The point: Thomas’s reply rests on Aristotle’s correction of the Platonic definition of relation.

  • Aristotle lists substance, quantity, quality, relation, but treats relation before quality. Why: the Platonic definition (“what is said towards another in any way whatsoever”) does not see a distinction Aristotle sees.
  • Distinction: double and half, shorter and taller (nothing in itself, whole nature is to be towards another; “how much is shorter? could be anything”) vs. knowledge (a quality of the mind, under habit or disposition, with a relation to the thing known following upon it). So Aristotle modifies the definition: a relative is one whose whole being or nature is to be towards another. Terms: relative secundum esse vs. relative secundum dici (“careful about those words”); the secundum-dici sense is the one “at the beginning,” whatever is said to be of another.
  • Applied to “beginning”: axiom, nothing is the beginning of itself, so beginning is always of another; but is it pure relation (like double) or a thing with a relation following (like knowledge)? Answer: like knowledge, secundum dici. Hence: considering only the relation, neither is before, since relatives are understood in reference to each other; considering that which is a beginning but is not the relation, it is before in definition and nature.
  • “That’s a very subtle thing.” In the Trinity the persons are constituted by the relations, so considering only the relation, they are hama, and one is not before the other.
  • Aside: Cajetan is good here; there is no commentary on the Categories by Thomas, but Cajetan reflects Thomas’s understanding of it.

5. Digression: the good student is like the earth (“the good student is compared to the earth”) #

The point: Thomas is Aristotle’s good student, taking a seed from the Categories and developing it.

  • From Thomas’s inaugural lecture (commendation and partition of Sacred Scripture): the earth is (1) lowly, humble: submit your mind to the teacher, read or listen “carefully, frequently, and with reverence”; (2) stable: not everything the teacher says at random, some discrimination; (3) fertile: develop, apply, see consequences no one saw. “That’s the culminating quality of the student.”
  • Example: Planck discovers the quantum; five years later Einstein uses it for the photoelectric effect; thirteen years later Bohr for the stability of the atom.
  • Seminar comes from the word for seed; the teacher plants a seed (a saying he attributes to Empedocles [name unclear in recording]: press it down in your mind and you get many things from it).
  • Back to ad 2: in God the relations themselves are subsisting persons in one nature, so neither on the side of nature nor of the relations can one person be before another, by nature or understanding. “From the Categories to question forty-two, article three, ad two … put that in your pipe and smoke it.”

6. Replies 3-4: natural origin; why “nature” not “essence” (“He didn’t choose to generate him”) #

  • Ad 3: the objection misunderstands; “order of nature” does not mean the nature itself is ordered (that would put distinction in the nature), but that the order among persons is according to a natural origin: the Father naturally generates the Son, does not choose to; Father and Son did not choose to breathe the Holy Spirit, though it is in harmony with their will. Contrast: God chooses to create you and me.
    • Aside: a parish priest, “God loved you before anyone else, before your mother,” and because He chose you He arranged that your parents would meet; “not the way the Father generated the Son.”
  • Ad 4: why not ordo essentiae? Nature implies the notion of a beginning (Aristotle, second book of Natural Hearing: nature is beginning and cause of motion and rest); essence does not. So the order of origin is better named order of nature, as Augustine names it. Thomas is defending Augustine’s way of speaking. Break.

7. Article 4: is the Son equal to the Father in greatness? (“equal to the father in what magnitude”) #

  • Objections read: (1) John 14:28 “the Father is greater than I”; 1 Cor 15, the Son will be subject to Him; (2) fatherhood belongs to the Father’s dignity and not to the Son, so not every dignity of the Father is in the Son; (3) where there is whole and part, more parts are more than fewer (three men more than two or one); relation/notion is a universal whole containing many notions; the Father has three notions, the Son two (“the Holy Spirit is going to come in third, he’s got only one”). Sed contra: Philippians 2:6, He did not think it theft to be equal.
  • Body, as read: greatness of God is nothing but the perfection of His nature; it belongs to the definition of fatherhood and sonship that the son by generation arrives at the perfection of the nature that is in the father. In men generation is a changing over from ability [ed.: potency] to act, so the son is not at once equal but is led to equality by suitable growth, unless there is a defect in the beginning of generation. In God fatherhood and sonship are proper and true; the Father’s power was not defective, nor does the Son arrive at perfection successively; so from eternity He is equal in greatness. Hilary, book on the synods: take away bodily infirmities, beginning of conception, pains, all human necessity, and every son by natural birth is equal to the father because like him in nature.
  • Aside: magnus = great, magnitude = greatness.

8. Ad 1: two solutions, and the strange word “subjection” (“the father is greater because he gave”) #

  • First solution: the texts are said of Christ in His human nature, in which He is less and subject; in His divine nature equal (Athanasian Creed: equal by divinity, less by humanity). He adds: by His humanity He is less than Himself as God too; Thomas stresses the Father because of the text.
  • Second solution, Hilary De Trinitate IX: by the authority of giving the Father is greater, but the Son, to whom one and the same being is given, is not less. He finds this “a little bit difficult… strained”: maior seems to imply minor as double implies half.
  • Book on the synods (a collection of councils, student asks; yes): the subjection of the Son is the piety of birth, recognition of paternal authority (origin); the subjection of others is the infirmity of creation. “Subjection” said of the Son in His divine nature “seems strange… kind of stretching”; you must determine how it is to be understood.
  • Parallel: a priest attributing humility to Christ in His divine nature because He receives it from the Father; but Thomas says God cannot be humble, since no one can subject Himself; Christ as man is humble, putting His human nature under His divine. He does not accuse the priest of falsehood; a synod, even popes, speak so: interpret benignly, do not extend. Student: is the Son in any way under the Father? As man, yes (even under Himself as God); as God, no.
  • Etymology digression: “perfect” comes from “made,” but saying God is perfect is not saying He is made; the etymology of a word is not its meaning, as Thomas often notes. “Philosophy” etymologically is love of wisdom, but Aristotle uses it to name the knowledge the lover of wisdom pursues; “philosopher” means lover of wisdom, “philosophy” means wisdom. Thomas in the commentary (ninth book of the Metaphysics, “I think”) on how a definition is never one word: a more known synonym helps the student but is not a definition; the synonym for philosophy is sapientia, not amor sapientiae. So one could defend “subjection” by its etymology, “but there’s no need to use such a word… we can admire it but shouldn’t imitate it.” Compare Thomas not rejecting entirely Origen’s “always being generated,” and “always breathing” vs. “have always breathed” the Holy Spirit.
  • Asides: Father’s Day at church, grandchildren whose fathers are in Afghanistan; Elijah mocking the prophets of Baal (“maybe he’s taking a nap”).

9. Ad 2: greatness is absolute, not relational (“qualis aut quantus”) #

  • Equality is noted by greatness; greatness signifies perfection of the nature and pertains to the essence; so equality and likeness in God are by the essential attributes, and the distinction of relations cannot yield inequality or unlikeness.
  • Back to the Categories: greatness as quantity, or as excellence of nature, is absolute, not relative. Augustine against Maximinus: origin is “from what,” equality is “qualis aut quantus,” the concrete words for the second and third categories. Thomas divides: something absolute (quantity, quality) vs. towards another; magnitude signifies something absolute.
  • Fatherhood is the Father’s dignity as it is the Father’s essence: the same essence is fatherhood in the Father, sonship in the Son, so the same dignity. “Father has fatherhood, therefore Son has fatherhood” does not follow, because quid is changed into ad aliquid: same essence and dignity, in the Father under the relation of giving, in the Son of receiving.

10. Ad 3: relation in God is not a universal whole (“I am who am”) #

  • Relation, though said of many relations, is not a universal whole; a universal whole is said of things differing in being, but all the relations are one in essence and being: each says “I am who am.” Same reason God is not in a genus or species. Nor is “person” a universal in God. So all the relations are not more than one, nor all the persons more than one only, because the whole perfection of the divine nature is in each. “This is a very subtle thing.”
  • Contrast: an angel is its own nature (one angel per kind); men partake of human nature, so human nature is not identified with me. Joke: “I partake of human nature, I always knew I wasn’t fully human”; Mother Teresa on Hindu shrines with her picture, “they treat me as if I weren’t human.”
  • The persons do not partake of one nature (that would be more than any one); no distinction between Father and divine nature, etc. Father and Son together are not more than the Holy Spirit. Hence the word “communicate”: the nature is common, but not as a universal said of them; it is what each is.
  • Closing question: Scripture nowhere states explicitly “three persons” or “these three are one God” as theology states it; one objection to using the word “person” of God was that it is not in Scripture. “We’re going to have to stop here.”

His words #

  • confused: (1) mixed up, mistaken; (2) indistinct but not false (Aristotle, Physics I)
  • Natural Hearing [ed.: Physics]
  • passio / undergoing: first, being acted on harmfully; then just being acted on, receiving
  • the fifth book of wisdom [ed.: Metaphysics V]
  • beginning: what is first in being, becoming, or knowing; said in many ways (position, understanding, cause)
  • order: general meaning before-and-after, contracted by differences; in God, order by origin without before
  • hama / simul: together, of relatives as such
  • relative secundum esse (whole nature towards another: double, half) vs. secundum dici (has a relation following: knowledge, beginning)
  • ability [ed.: potency]
  • magnus / magnitude: great, greatness = perfection of the divine nature
  • quid / ad aliquid: what vs. towards something; fatherhood is dignity as quid, not as relation
  • qualis aut quantus: Augustine’s concrete words for quality and quantity
  • universal whole: said of things differing secundum esse; not said of the divine relations or persons
  • communicate: the nature is common to the persons but not as a universal

Texts #

Read in class

  • Thomas, ST I q. 42 a. 3: sed contra, body, ad 1-4
  • Thomas, ST I q. 42 a. 4: objections, sed contra, body, ad 1-3
  • Hilary, De Synodis (quoted in a. 4 body and ad 1); Hilary, De Trinitate IX (ad 1)
  • Augustine, Contra Maximinum (in ad 2)
  • John 14:28; 1 Cor 15; Philippians 2:6 (as cited in a. 4)

Mentioned

  • Aristotle, Physics I (confused before distinct); Physics II (definition of nature)
  • Aristotle, Metaphysics V (beginning, before and after); Categories (relation before quality; definition of relative)
  • Thomas, Sentences and De Potentia on order and “before”
  • Thomas, inaugural lecture on Scripture (good student as earth)
  • Thomas, commentary on the Metaphysics, “ninth book, I think” (definition not one word; synonym)
  • Cajetan on the Categories
  • Athanasian Creed; Origen’s “always being generated” (prev. article)

His questions #

  • Does Aristotle mean we are more sure when we are mixed up? No: “confused” as indistinct (dog is an animal) is not the bad sense of mistaken (dog is a cat).
  • Is order without before a contradiction, or just one sense of order? In the Sentences: before-and-after is the general meaning; keep the specific difference (origin), drop “before.”
  • Is “beginning” purely a relation, like double, or something with a relation following, like knowledge? Like knowledge, secundum dici; but in the Trinity the persons are the relations, so none is before.
  • Why does Aristotle treat relation before quality in the Categories? To correct the Platonic definition by distinguishing double/half from knowledge.
  • Why “order of nature” rather than “order of essence”? Nature implies a beginning (cause of motion and rest); essence does not.
  • Should you really use the word “subject” of the Son in His divine nature? It is a stretch; interpret benignly, admire but don’t imitate; as God the Son is not under the Father.
  • Is the etymology of a word its meaning? No: perfect ≠ made; philosophy ≠ love of wisdom but wisdom.
  • Does “the Father has fatherhood, therefore the Son has fatherhood” follow? No; quid is changed into ad aliquid; the same dignity is fatherhood in one, sonship in the other.
  • Are all the persons together more than one of them? No; the whole perfection of the nature is in each; the nature is not a universal whole.
  • Does Scripture say explicitly that God is three persons in one God? Not spelled out as theology states it; that was one objection to the word “person.”

References

The day's text (2)
Aquinas (3)
Aristotle (5)
Scripture (3)
Fathers and councils (5)
  • Augustine, De Potentia mentioned
  • Hilary, De Synodis mentioned
  • Hilary, De Trinitate IX mentioned
  • Athanasius, Creed mentioned
  • Augustine, Contra Maximinum mentioned