Power and Glory in Psalm 62; the Senses of 'To Have' and the Ten Categories

Orientation #

He is looking “back here upon this now”: the first objection of the article (“it seems that habitus is not a quality”), and closes by saying Thomas will not go through all the senses of “have” but only those relevant to seeing that habit is not, e.g., the category of position. He does not name last time or next time explicitly. The previous class opened q.49 a.1 (whether habit is a quality) and promised to revisit it; the next continues a.1 and a.2.

The class, in order #

1. Psalm 62: “to see your power and your glory” (“For you, my flesh pines”) #

Point: a new reading of the Psalm’s “power and glory” as answering to “flesh” and “soul” in the same order.

1. The Psalm says “my flesh pines; my soul thirsts” — body and soul both named, flesh first.
2. Christ tells the Sadducees (the seven-husbands story) planasthe, “you err”, “knowing neither the scriptures nor the power of God” — the resurrection is what the Greeks found ridiculous, and it is tied to the power of God.
3. So take “power” as answering to the flesh (resurrection, mortal body taking on immortality) and “glory” to the soul (the beatific vision).

• His older reading — “power and glory” = the kingdom of God — is “correct too”; the new one respects the order flesh/soul, power/glory.
• Supporting texts: the last quatrain of Thomas’s Adoro te devote (“Jesu quem velatum nunc aspicio, oro fiat illud quod tam sitio”) uses the same word “thirst” (sitio) as the Psalm, ending in glory; the other psalm “the Lord is King in splendor robed … girded about with strength” gives the same two things, splendor (light, which can refer to the second Person) and power — “something for your body, something for your soul in the kingdom.”
• Aside: “robed” is metaphor; Thomas notes some thought the second Person took on flesh as we take on clothing, and some scripture speaks that way, but only metaphorically. Shakespeare’s “shuffle off this mortal coil” = this body and its troubles.

2. The word “have” turned around from the word “in” (“as many meanings as the word in”) #

Point: Aristotle (fifth book of Wisdom [ed.: Metaphysics V]) lists senses of “to have” and says it has as many senses as “in”; each sense of “in” can be reversed into a sense of “have”.

• wine in the bottle → the bottle has wine (contained/container)
• part in whole → the whole has the part
• genus in species → the species has the genus; likewise the differences are in the species and the species has them
• species in genus → the genus has species (a word “singular or plural”)
• Why do the first two come first? Student: because the species is actually in the genus? No: if dog were actually an animal we’d say animal is a dog; the species is in the genus in ability. Likewise form is originally in matter in ability — Michelangelo’s “the statue is already in the marble”: yes, in ability, not in act. Act is more known than ability. Whole-in-parts is “a bit like” form in matter (second book of the Physics).
• in the power of the agent (a different, active ability): “I have you now.”
• love in the thing loved: “I left my heart in San Francisco”; “where your treasure is, there your heart” — treasure in the local bank, heart in the local bank. Reversed: if someone loves me, I have their love, their heart.
• Aristotle gives eight senses of “in” in the fourth book of Natural Hearing [ed.: Physics] without ordering them; Thomas orders them imitating Metaphysics V (“the only guy who can do it”). Aristotle omits “in time”; Thomas reduces it to “in place” — not the same sense, but time like place is an extrinsic measure. Difference-in-species reduces likewise. So: nine senses of “have” answering to the eight of “in” — to see “how equivocal by reason” the word “have” is.
• Thomas will not go through all these; he is concerned with the senses that name categories, or species of a category.
• Aside: C. S. Lewis is right to criticise “I’ve got some time” — you don’t have time, time has you, commanding you to your next place.

3. Genus and species; is there a genus that is not a species? (“both a genus and a species”) #

Point: quality is one of the ten highest genera, so first: how do we know there is any highest genus?

• Porphyry: the same thing can be genus and species, but not with respect to the same thing — odd number is a species of number and a genus of three, five, seven; I am father and son, but not to the same person; cause and effect likewise.
• But is every genus a species (as: is every man a son — Adam is father but not son; is every cause an effect — no)? Also asked, then set aside: is there a species that is not a genus?
• Number shows series can go on forever: 4 is double of 2 and half of 8; there is a half that is double of nothing (1, or 3), but nothing that is double and not half. So “how do you know there’s a genus which is not a species?” — “hard to know without the Bible” (joke), then the student’s guess and his argument:
  1. If every genus were a species of something higher, you would never come to a most universal word — and you would need infinite thoughts to think anything.
  2. But we do come to a most universal word: “being” or “something” — is there anything that is not something?
  3. So there is a highest genus (or highest genera).

4. Is “being” one genus of everything? (“said with one meaning of many things”) #

Point: the most universal names are not one genus, because they are not said with one meaning; hence more than one highest genus.

• Definition of genus: a name said with one meaning of many things other in kind, signifying what it is. “Many” here is opposed to one, not to few — two suffices. Examples: animal of dog, cat, horse (one meaning: living body having sense; signifies what they are, though not completely or distinctly); quadrilateral (from “my teacher” Euclid) of square, oblong, rhombus, rhomboid, trapezium.
• “Being” is said of many things other in kind and seems to signify what they are — but not with one meaning. “When did I come to be?” — when I learned geometry (in some way), when I got married, when generated by my parents: not univocal.
• Nose and ear are two things as man and dog are two things; nose and the shape of the nose, man and his shape — you hesitate: two things as substance and accident, not as two substances.
• Conclusion: there are most universal names, hence highest genera; they are not of one meaning, hence more than one highest genus.

5. Aristotle’s ten, and why a division into ten needs a clue (“who can understand a division into ten”) #

Point: to Aristotle belongs the glory of finding the many highest genera; Thomas supplies the ordering Aristotle left out.

• Categories and the book on places (badly transliterated “Topics”) give the same ten in the same order.
• The mind cannot see a division into ten (God’s ten commandments had to go on two tablets, three and seven, the seven subdivided). He cannot give a reason there should be ten; Aristotle gives no clue in what has come down to us.
• Thomas takes them up in the Physics when the question arises whether motion is the same as acting upon and undergoing, and in the Metaphysics, where Aristotle calls them “figures of predication”: they are distinguished by the ways something is said of individual substances (you, me, the dog), since in the Categories everything besides individual substances either exists in them or is said of them. That one thing, individual substance, is the clue — and Thomas keeps “the rule of two or three or both.”
• An individual substance neither exists in anything else as in a subject nor is said of anything else: “Duane Berquist does not exist in anything else, nor is said of anybody else.”

6. The threefold division: by what it is, by something in it, by something outside (“by reason of what it is”) #

Point: three ways something is said of an individual substance, the second and third subdivided.

• By reason of what it is: Socrates is a man, animal, living body, body, substance; Phaedo the dog is a dog, quadruped, animal, living body, body, substance. One highest genus, substance — “wisdom is chiefly about substances” (Metaphysics).
• By reason of something in them, not what they are: Socrates is a geometer (doubling the square by the diagonal, Meno; conversation with Theaetetus) by a science in his mind; Socrates is healthy (drinks everyone under the table and goes off to his normal day). Subdivided:
  • absolutely: quantity and quality — Greek concrete poion / poson, Latin qualis / quantus, abstract poiotes / qualitas; Aristotle prefers the concrete because it touches the fact that it is something in the individual substance; the best English is “how you are” and “how much” (no “howness”). Five foot nine (or ten, or eight) is in myself.
  • towards another: fatherhood is in me towards Paul, Maria, Marcus (Sophia “more oblique”); husband towards wife, son towards father, brother, teacher towards you. Greek pros ti, Latin ad aliquid — “be careful with those abstract words” like “relation”.
  • Tally: substance 1, quality 2, quantity 3, towards-another 4.
• By reason of something outside: I am clothed — the clothing is not in me as geometry is in me.

7. The six from something outside (“man’s category”) #

Point: habit against the other five, and the five ordered by measure and by cause-and-effect.

• Echein, to have, habitus: “man’s category” (Charles De Koninck used to give a lecture on it); other animals don’t wear clothing except in man’s service; important especially for women (what to wear to what); “housed,” not houseless. To be clothed is the best example. Don’t say the word “have” here right now — “have” is said in all the categories. Same word as the habitus in the text.
• Thomas: a thing is named from something outside either by a measure or by acting upon / undergoing (poiein / paschein, actio / passio). Acting upon implies reference to another; undergoing: warmed by another. Boundary: to be hot is quality, in myself; to be being heated is undergoing, from another. Kicking and being kicked.
• Extrinsic measures: time → when (“execute me at dawn”; “get me to the church on time”); place → where (we’re in this room).
• Position: order of parts in place (two sitting, one standing — “in this room” doesn’t say which). Thomas: no extra category from time, because time (the number of motion according to before and after) already implies order; the chapter on “before” in the Categories puts before-in-time first.
• Objection: isn’t the shape of my body intrinsic? Yes, shape goes up in quality. But crouching isn’t sitting: to sit I need something outside, a chair (“sit down” — “I can’t”); the man falling from an airplane has a standing shape but isn’t standing, since standing needs parts arranged to the floor.
• Final tally: four above, six below — man’s one, three of measure, two of cause and effect. “A brief introduction to the ten highest genera.”
• Asides: sit right in the chair or you get a bad back. Someone [name unclear in recording] puts towards-another among the last six — “a real problem to get to the Trinity.”

8. Back to the text: why the senses of “have” matter here (“not easily moved”) #

Point: Thomas won’t go through all this, but “habit” comes from “to have”, so he must separate its sense from the others; and when he quotes Aristotle’s definition of habit as a disposition not easily moved, “position” is in the word, and there is a category called position — habit is not that. So he takes the senses especially relevant to seeing this is not them.

His words #

• power / glory (Psalm 62): power answers to the flesh (resurrection), glory to the soul (vision).
• fifth book of Wisdom: [ed.: Metaphysics V].
• Natural Hearing: [ed.: Physics]; “the so-called Physics.”
• in ability: the way species is in genus, form in matter, statue in marble [ed.: in potency]; “act is more known than ability.”
• active ability: in the power of the agent.
• genus: a name said with one meaning of many things other in kind, signifying what it is.
• many: opposed to one, not to few.
• most universal word: “being” or “something.”
• highest genus: a genus that is not a species.
• figures of predication: Aristotle’s name for the ten, distinguished by how something is said of individual substances.
• towards another: pros ti, ad aliquid [ed.: relation]; he warns against the abstract word.
• how you are / how much: poion / poson, qualis / quantus [ed.: quality / quantity].
• man’s category: echein, to have, habitus (e.g. clothed, housed).
• acting upon / undergoing: poiein / paschein, actio / passio [ed.: action / passion].
• when / where: from the extrinsic measures time and place.
• position: order of parts in place (sitting, standing).
• time: the number of motion according to before and after.

Texts #

Read in class

• Psalm 62 (Vulgate numbering), opening verses (“O God, you are my God whom I seek…”).
• Thomas Aquinas, Adoro te devote, last quatrain.
• Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II q.49 a.1, first objection (“it seems that habitus is not a quality”) — read back at the start of the categories discussion.
• Summa Contra Gentiles IV ch.15 and II ch.11 — matched by verified sources against the audio; the transcript does not name them.

Mentioned

• Matthew, Christ and the Sadducees, “knowing neither the scriptures nor the power of God” (inferred: Mt 22).
• Psalm “the Lord is King in splendor robed” (used daily in the liturgy).
• Shakespeare, “shuffle off this mortal coil.”
• Aristotle, Metaphysics V, on “to have”; Physics IV, eight senses of “in”; Physics II (whole in parts like form in matter); Categories (ten genera; everything in or said of individual substances; chapter on “before”); Topics (same ten, same order); Metaphysics (figures of predication; wisdom chiefly about substances).
• Thomas’s ordering of the senses of “in” (Physics commentary, inferred) and his treatment of the ten in the Physics (motion vs action/passion).
• Porphyry on genus and species (Isagoge, inferred).
• Euclid (“my teacher”), quadrilaterals.
• Plato, Meno (doubling the square); Socrates and Theaetetus.
• C. S. Lewis on “I’ve got some time.”
• Charles De Koninck’s lecture on man’s category.

His questions #

• Why does the Psalm say “to see your power and your glory”? Power answers to the flesh pining for resurrection, glory to the soul thirsting for the vision; the kingdom reading is also correct.
• If someone loves me, could I be said to have their love? Yes — their heart, in a way; so “have” has as many senses as “in”.
• Why do the senses part-in-whole and species-in-genus come first? Not because actual: species is in genus in ability, and act is more known than ability.
• Was Michelangelo right that the statue is already in the marble? In ability, not in act.
• Is every genus a species? How do you know there is a genus that is not a species? If every genus were a species you would never reach a most universal word; but “being”/“something” is one; so there is a highest genus.
• Is “being,” the most universal name, one genus of everything? No: it is not said with one meaning (“when did I come to be?”); so more than one highest genus.
• Are my nose and the shape of my nose two things as my nose and my ear are? No: substance and accident, not two substances.
• How did Aristotle divide into ten, when the mind can’t see ten? By how things are said of individual substances: by what it is / something in it / something outside — two or three at each step.
• Am I sitting if I crouch like this? Is the man falling from the plane standing? No: sitting and standing need something outside (chair, floor) to which the parts are ordered — position, not shape.