Summa I-II Q.60 A.5: Aristotle's Eleven Moral Virtues and the Rule of Dividing into Two or Three

Orientation #

He does not say what was done last time or what comes next. The previous class worked through aa. 2–4 of q. 60 and the next takes up q. 61 on the cardinal virtues.

The class, in order #

1. The objections and their replies (“to the same virtue of justice pertains”) #

Point: three objections argue that moral virtues are not distinguished by the objects of the passions; the replies all turn on relation to reason.

• Obj. 1: operations have objects too, yet one virtue (justice) covers buying and selling a house and a horse; so neither should passions’ objects diversify virtues. Reply (the “interesting point”): all objects of a specifically same operation have the same relation to reason, but not all objects of a specifically same passion, because operations are not repugnant to reason as passions are. His gloss: sexual desire and the desire to drink are not opposed to reason in the same way; “you got to see that from experience” — Aristotle says experience is needed to understand ethics.
• Obj. 2: passions are acts of the sense appetite; more diversity is needed to diversify habits than acts; so objects that do not diversify a passion’s species do not diversify virtue — one virtue about all delightful things. Reply: passions and virtues are diversified “for a different reason” (to be seen in the body).
• Obj. 3: more and less do not diversify species, and delectables differ only by more and less. Reply: more and less do not diversify species except on account of diverse relation to reason.

2. Objection 4 and the sed contra (“the bad does not act except”) #

• Obj. 4: virtue does good and impedes bad; about desires for goods there are diverse virtues (temperance about pleasures of touch, eutrapelia about pleasures of play); so there ought to be diverse virtues about fears of bad things too.
• Reply: the good moves us more strongly than the bad, since the bad acts only in virtue of the good (Dionysius, Divine Names ch. 4). So the bad makes no difficulty for reason requiring a virtue unless it is very excelling: one virtue per genus of passion — about anger only mildness, about audacity only fortitude. Good brings a difficulty even when not excelling, hence diverse virtues about concupiscences.
• Sed contra: chastity about venereal pleasure, abstinence about food, eutrapelia about play.

3. The body: reason vs. sense appetite (“the perfection of virtue depends upon”) #

1. Perfection of virtue depends on reason; perfection of passion on the sense appetite.
2. So virtues are diversified by order to reason, passions by order to the desiring power.
3. The motion of reason and of the sense appetite is not the same.
4. Therefore some difference of objects diversifies passions but not virtues (one virtue about many passions), and some diversifies virtues but not passions (about the one passion pleasure, diverse virtues — as in the sed contra).

• Diverse passions of diverse powers always pertain to diverse virtues: good absolutely vs. good with difficulty.
• Reason rules the lower parts and extends to exterior things, so an object’s relation to reason differs according as it is grasped by sense, imagination, or reason, and as it pertains to soul, body, or exterior things; all this diversifies virtue. “This is a mouthful,” he says.

4. Goods of the sense of touch (“the pleasure I take in the music of Mozart”) #

• Good apprehended by touch and pertaining to the consistency of human life in individual and species (food, venereal matters): temperance.
• Pleasures of the other senses are not vehement, give reason no difficulty, so no virtue is laid down about them; virtue is about the difficult, as Aristotle says. His test case: is there a virtue moderating the pleasure he takes in Mozart? “I don’t think so.”

5. Goods grasped by an interior power: money and honor (“liberality, right? Magnificence”) #

• Money is ordered to the good of the body; honor consists in the apprehension of the soul. Each can be taken absolutely (concupiscible) or with difficulty (irascible) — a distinction with no place in goods of touch, which are lowly (infima) and shared with the brutes. Aside: he used to tell the cats “we’re having steak tonight,” and they’d perk up.
• Money absolutely (object of love, concupiscence, pleasure): liberality; with difficulty (object of hope): magnificence, “large sums.” He notes Aristotle’s order: courage and temperance in book III, then liberality and magnificence at the start of book IV, then the virtues about honor.
• Honor absolutely: philotimia (love of honor); with difficulty: magnanimity. Liberality and philotimia in the concupiscible; magnificence and magnanimity in the irascible.
• Aside: perhaps the highest thing music imitates is magnanimity — Mozart’s 36th (the Linz) and the Jupiter, both in C major.

6. The good of man in order to another (“Villain, son of darkness”) #

• No difficulty here; taken absolutely, as pleasing to another. Two spheres: serious things (actions ordered by reason to a due end) and play (actions ordered to pleasure only), not related to reason the same way.
• In serious things one shows oneself (a) as agreeable, by suitable words and deeds: friendliness, “not the virtue of friendship,” also called affability; (b) as one is, manifesting oneself truly: truth. Example: making you think I am other than I am can be a vice — Iago, who represents himself as Othello’s friend, treachery.
• Manifestation approaches reason more closely than pleasure, and the serious more than the jocular. About the pleasures of play: eutrapelia, “easily turning.” He connects it with Shakespeare’s “one good turn deserves another”: after constant serious things you need a turn, a break to relieve the strain.

7. The count: ten virtues about the passions (“Aristotle didn’t say there were ten”) #

• Thomas’s list: fortitude, temperance, liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, philotimia, mildness, friendliness, truthfulness, eutrapelia — distinguished by diverse matters, passions, or objects. Add justice about operations: eleven. (His count matches Thomas’s.)
• Joke: Aristotle didn’t have ten highest genera because of ten fingers, since here he has eleven; the Ten Commandments — Moses had ten fingers, easier to remember.

8. Digression: the rule of two or three (“you divide by two or three until you get ten”) #

A student asks whether, given the rule of threes, anything involves ten. His answer: tens arise by repeated division into two or three.

• Commandments: two tablets, three and seven; the seven: the fourth against the last six; the six by neighbor — deed, word, desire.
• Aristotle’s ten categories as Thomas divides them, by ways something is said of individual substances: (1) by reason of what we are (substance); (2) by reason of something in us, either absolutely (quantity, quality) or toward another (relation); (3) the last six: the one proper to man (clothed, armed, shod) against five; the five into extrinsic measures (place, time) and cause/effect (acting upon, undergoing). “That’s the only way to follow the rule of two or three.”
• Thomas divides Matthew’s Gospel into three: Christ’s coming into the world, his proceeding in it, his passing out of it.
• Psalms: Augustine and Thomas divide the 150 into three at Psalm 50 (penance, Teresa of Avila’s favorite), 100 (good deeds), 150 (resting in God) — the three stages of the Christian life; lost with the Protestant numbering (joke that the student’s ordination is invalid, “we have to report this to the Holy See”).
• Our Father: after the ascent, seven petitions; divisible into four about the good and three about the bad, but Thomas in the Summa divides into three: two about the end, two about means, three about removing impediments. This corresponds to the Psalms’ division, but in the order of intention while the Psalms are in the order of execution — “really beautiful.”

9. Does the rule hold in nature? (“How do you divide a plant?”) #

A student asks whether the rule reflects nature. He: a plant divides into three (roots, stem, branches). The student adds an aesthetic sense of proportion in trees and art; he agrees.

• He cites a text of John Damascene [ed.: “John Danesina” in recording; likely John Damascene, inferred] read for his feast: most divisions are into two or three, rarely four, never more. The rule holds for the most part; exceptions exist (Aristotle divides quality into four species), so “think twice” before accepting more.
• His own division of Shakespeare’s plays into four (others would do tragedy, comedy, and two kinds of romance in the middle — Greek and medieval). Sign of the four kinds: a man falsely thinking his wife false — Othello (tragedy), the love-and-forgiveness romances (long delay before forgiveness), Much Ado (a villain deceives, discovered by clowns), Merry Wives (comedy).
• Aside: coworker Charlie’s insanely jealous wife — “don’t say hello” — laughable, whereas at times the same thing is tragedy.

10. Why three? (“three is the first number about which we say all”) #

A student asks whether the Trinity or nature grounds the preference for three (people asked for a number pick three). His answer: Aristotle’s sign — three is the first number of which we say “all”: two are “both,” three are “all.” Further signs: the Divine Comedy; trilogies; Mozart needs three movements for a complete piece (Prague Symphony in three, concertos always in three; the only famous two-movement symphony is Schubert’s Unfinished); Sophocles’ third actor sufficed for the greatest Greek plays; a story’s beginning, middle and end; history divided ancient/medieval/modern (McNeil divides differently but still in three); Quebec’s repas complet (appetizer, main course, dessert); sonata form (exposition, development, recapitulation). “It’s a natural thing.” He stops here.

His words #

• “the consistency of human life” — what pleasures of touch pertain to, in individual and species
• “infima things” — the lowly goods of touch shared with brutes
• philotimia — love of honor, the virtue about honor taken absolutely
• magnanimity — honor taken with difficulty, as object of hope
• friendliness / affability — showing oneself agreeable; “not the virtue of friendship”
• truth (truthfulness) — showing oneself as one is
• eutrapelia — “easily turning,” virtue about the pleasures of play; “good turn”
• “rule of two or three” — most divisions are into two or three, rarely four
• order of intention vs. order of carrying it out — Our Father vs. Psalms

Texts #

Read in class

• Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 60, a. 5 (objections, replies, sed contra, body)

Mentioned

• Dionysius, Divine Names, ch. 4 (cited in reply to obj. 4)
• Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III–IV (order of the virtues) (inferred locus)
• Aristotle’s ten categories; Thomas’s division of them
• Thomas on Matthew; Augustine and Thomas on the Psalms; Thomas on the Our Father in the Summa Theologiae
• John Damascene on division (inferred identification)
• Shakespeare: Othello, Much Ado About Nothing, Merry Wives of Windsor
• Dante, Divine Comedy; Mozart symphonies 36 (Linz), Jupiter, Prague; Schubert, Unfinished; McNeil’s world history

His questions #

• Why do objects of the same passion not all relate to reason alike? Because passions are repugnant to reason as operations are not; sexual desire and desire to drink oppose reason differently.
• Why only one virtue about anger, one about audacity? The bad makes a difficulty for reason only when very excelling; the good moves more strongly.
• Is there a virtue that moderates the pleasure I take in the music of Mozart? No; pleasures of the other senses are not vehement.
• What is the good of money taken absolutely, and with difficulty? Liberality; magnificence.
• Is there anything involving ten, given the rule of threes? Ten comes from repeated division by two or three (Commandments, categories).
• How do you divide a plant? Into three: roots, stem, branches.
• Why is three the number about which we say “all”? Two are “both”; only with three do we say “we’re all going.”