Summa I-II Q.67, Article 3: Does Faith Remain in Glory? Knowing, Guessing and the Beatific Vision

Orientation #

He refers back to “last night,” when they talked about whether an odd number can be even (prev. lecture). At the close: “We’ll find out about hope next time.” The previous class worked through the first two articles of q. 67 on whether moral and intellectual virtues remain after death; the next takes up whether hope remains.

The class, in order #

1. The objections and the sed contra (“faith is more noble than science”) #

The point: the three objections argue that faith remains after this life; the sed contra argues it does not.

• Obj. 1: faith is more noble than science; science remains after this life (a. 2); therefore faith remains. He calls it “persuasive.”
• Obj. 2: 1 Cor 3, no one can lay another foundation than Christ Jesus, i.e. the faith of Christ Jesus; faith is called the foundation, the substance (Hebrews: “substance of what is hoped for”). But take away the foundation and what is built on it goes; so if faith did not remain, no other virtue would remain.
• Obj. 3: knowledge of faith and knowledge of glory differ as imperfect and perfect; but imperfect can be together with perfect. Two examples: (a) in the angel, evening knowledge together with morning knowledge — Augustine’s terms: evening = the angel’s natural knowledge; the angels who turned back to God received morning knowledge without losing the natural; (b) a man can have, about the same conclusion, science through a demonstrative syllogism and opinion through a dialectical one. Aside: Thomas expounding Aristotle sometimes says “here Aristotle gives a dialectical argument,” then one with necessity; Aristotle’s dialectic is better because he knows the truth and can find the arguments that approach it with probability; knowing both is part of his excellence. Joshua can say a theorem is so because Euclid says so (probable) and can demonstrate it at the board.
• Sed contra: 2 Cor 5, so long as we are in the body we wander (peregrinamur; English text: “are absent”) from the Lord; we walk by faith and not by species (sight). Those in glory do not wander but are present, face to face. So faith does not remain in glory. Aside: the novel Peregrine Pickle — “a wanderer.”

2. Opposition as the cause of exclusion (“Can odd number be even”) #

The point: Thomas starts from the principle that opposition is the per se and proper cause that one thing is excluded from another, since in all opposites is included the opposition of affirmation and negation.

• Even number: divisible into equal parts; odd: not so divisible — so an even number cannot be odd (immediate contradiction).
• Prime: measured only by one, and one is not strictly a number; composite: measured by some other number — so a prime cannot be composite.
• Acute vs. obtuse: not so immediately a contradiction; obtuse is greater than a right angle, acute less; but what is greater than a right angle cannot be less than it — the affirmation/negation is found inside the definitions.
• Affirmation/negation goes back to the first statement: a thing cannot both be and not be at the same time in the same way. Shakespeare’s “to be or not to be, that is the question” — it is the question because you cannot do both.
• Student: people commonly think a contradiction can exist within a thing (Whitman, “very well, I contradict myself”); when pressed they call logic a “white male tradition” to be transcended, without argument. His reply: yes, fuzzy thinking is prevalent. Anecdote: his teacher Kasurik got a man at a conference into a contradiction and asked what he would do about it; “that’s a contradiction I’ve learned to live with.”

3. Contrary forms, perfect and imperfect, and two kinds of imperfection (“imperfection is sometimes of the very definition”) #

The point: in some things the opposition is of contrary forms (white/black); in others of perfect and imperfect, as in alteration where more and less are taken as contraries (less hot to more hot); so perfection and imperfection cannot be together at the same time according to the same thing.

• Distinction: imperfection that belongs to the very notion and species of a thing vs. imperfection that happens to an individual from something else. Lack of reason belongs to the species of horse or cow; since one and the same thing cannot pass from one species to another, remove that imperfection and you remove the species (a rational cow is no longer a cow; take reason from a man and he is a beast). Contrast: a man impeded from the use of reason by sleep, drink, or a false imagination — remove the impediment and the substance remains; “he’s too tired to think” is temporary.
• Student: this would include many academics whose ways of thinking (deconstructionism etc.) impede knowing anything — “a corrosive thing.” His reply: back to his example, “the whole is more than the part” (see §5).

4. Imperfection is of the very notion of faith (“conviction of things not seen”) #

The point: the imperfection of knowledge is in the definition of faith itself (Hebrews 11: substance of things hoped for, conviction of things not seen; Augustine: to believe what one does not see), so faith cannot become perfect knowledge and remain the same in number — “it’s not the drunk man.”

• Knowing vs. guessing: “Do we know that or just guessing?” Knowing in the strict sense means you are certain; a guess, by definition, is not certain. “I know there are four students here” — can I be guessing it? So a guess cannot be knowledge, nor a belief a seeing.
• When you see God as He is (St John) or face to face (St Paul), you are no longer believing He is three and one; you are knowing. The beatific vision is by definition opposed to faith.
• He notes Thomas will take up Paul’s definition in detail in the Secunda Secundae.

5. Digression: the whole and the part, and the Meno on knowing and guessing (“distinguish between knowing and guessing”) #

The point: an unsolved sophism inclines the mind to doubt even what is evident; logic’s job is to untie it.

• His argument, showing why Aristotle distinguishes the senses of words in the fifth book of Wisdom [ed.: Metaphysics V]: his mother objected to “man is an animal”; “he’s an animal that has reason” — so animal is only part of man; but animal includes dog, cat, horse; so the part includes more than the whole. If you cannot untie this (mixing up senses of a word, “the most common type of fallacy”), you are inclined to think the whole is not always greater than the part.
• Meno, third part: Meno asks whether virtue can be taught; Socrates: we don’t know what virtue is (brother Mark: “he’s got to know this before he knows that”); but Socrates gives probable arguments both ways. Argument for: virtue is knowledge (it directs to the good, as the great men of Athens did), knowledge can be taught. Socrates’s difficulty: aren’t we sometimes directed to the good by guess? Fork in the road to Boston or Providence — the right guess gets you there as much as knowledge.
• MacArthur at Inchon: had a plan, went over it with a lesser officer, then read the Bible — he did not know it would succeed, he guessed right. MacArthur and Patton in WWI moving off a mound before the shells came; Nixon in South America turning off the road where the bomb was. Great generals make right guesses, and sometimes fail.
• So Plato is introducing logic: the distinction between knowing and guessing. Socrates, who rarely claims to know, says he knows there is a difference — because knowing is being sure and guessing is not; and anyone who says “you’re only guessing that” is himself making the distinction. A guess is by definition uncertain, imperfect; it can be reasonable or not; the purpose of logic regarding guessing is to make reasonable guesses — probable in dialectic, likely in rhetoric.
• Application: belief is imperfect by nature, not temporarily like anger or drink. If Euclid demonstrates that the interior angles equal two right angles he knows, not guesses; you believe Euclid before you follow his demonstration, but once you do it, you know.
• Student: people today are certain in following authorities with terrible track records (Lenin, Marx, Hitler, Rousseau) and then accuse believers in God of blind faith. He: “the weakly informed.”

6. Can a guess become knowledge? (“seeing is believing”) #

The point: loose speech says a guess becomes knowledge or suspicion grows into certainty; strictly, a guess is replaced by knowledge, since a guess by definition cannot be knowledge.

• Shrewsbury murder: police guessed the innocent husband; years later DNA from California identified the delivery man. Did their guess become knowledge? A student: it can be knowledge but doesn’t become. He: replaced.
• “Seeing is believing” is questionable: if you tell me on the phone you are sitting, I believe you; I don’t see it. Seeing is knowing; believing cannot be knowing nor become it, though it can be replaced. Student suggests we say such things because of rhyme.

7. Three ways knowledge can be imperfect (“knowledge can be imperfect in three ways”) #

The point: whether imperfect knowledge can be together with perfect depends on which of three sides the imperfection lies: the object, the middle, the subject.

• Object: morning vs. evening knowledge in the angels. Genesis says “evening and morning” — evening came first; Augustine on Genesis reads evening as the angel’s natural knowledge, morning as the vision of those who turned back. Morning knowledge is of things according to the being they have in the Word; evening, according to the being in their own nature, imperfect with respect to the first being, “I am who I am.”
• Middle: demonstrative middle (shows it must be so) vs. probable middle, about some conclusion.
• Subject: opinion, faith (fides), science. Opinion takes one side of a contradiction with fear of the other (election: I think so-and-so will win but fear the other might), so no firm adherence. Thomas, commentary on Ethics VI: opinion and suspicion are not intellectual virtues, since a virtue makes its haver and its activity good, and opinion can be mistaken, suspicion a fortiori; both are conjectura, guess. Science: firm adherence with intellectual vision, certitude flowing from understood beginnings (the whole is more than the part).
• Warning on “science” today: often a guess that has been tested but might fail the next test. Einstein: a scientific theory is a system of guesses. Reason: confirmation is not a syllogism — “if A then B; B; therefore A” (“if Percus dropped dead he’ll be absent; he’s absent; therefore he dropped dead — wishful thinking, not logical thinking”). Many confirmations make it more probable, never necessary. Newtonian physics: so many predictions confirmed that they posited unseen planets from the deviations and found them; still Einstein predicted the same and more from a different hypothesis. Euclid, and the most general parts of natural philosophy, have certitude; further on even Aristotle speaks as if unsure. Thomas uses science in the strict sense.
• Faith (supernatural, not mere belief of a man) is in the middle: exceeds opinion by firm adherence (three persons in God), falls short of science by lacking vision.

8. Which pairs can coexist (“cannot be together according to the same thing”) #

The point: perfect and imperfect cannot be together according to the same, but can when they differ according to something other.

• Imperfect and perfect on the side of the object: never about the same object, but can be in the same middle and subject — through one middle a man knows health and sickness, good and evil; knowing normal blood pressure I know high blood pressure; knowing knowledge I know ignorance, so the teacher knows your ignorance better than you.
• On the side of the middle: not in one middle, but in one object and subject — Joshua demonstrates two right angles and also holds it probable because Euclid says so (a text since about 300 BC; Einstein: if Euclid did not arouse your youthful enthusiasm you were not born to be a scientist).
• On the side of the subject: impossible in the same subject, because faith’s imperfection is on the side of the subject (the believer does not see), and beatitude’s perfection is on the side of the subject (the blessed sees that by which he is made blessed — “beatific vision”). So faith cannot remain with beatitude. He applies it to a guess: once I find the reason in geometry I am no longer guessing.

9. The replies (“faith is more noble than science on the side of its object”) #

• Ad 1: faith’s object is the first truth, God Himself (“I am the way, the truth, and the life”); science has a more perfect way of knowing, which is not repugnant to beatitude’s vision as faith’s mode is. Aristotle, proemium to De Anima: all knowledge is good, but one knowledge is better either because about a better thing or because known better (more certitude). Which wins when they split? Parts of Animals: imperfect knowledge of a better thing is better than perfect knowledge of a lesser — counting the chairs in the room with certitude, “who cares?”; and the manuductio: a glimpse of someone we love is worth more than a leisurely view of others. So faith is simply better than scientia. Aside: his granddaughter Sophia (“wisdom”) smiling over her book, recalling Thomas on wisdom’s joy without tedium at the start of the Contra Gentiles.
• Ad 2: faith is the foundation as regards what it has of knowledge; when knowledge is perfected there is a more perfect foundation — God Himself the form by which we understand God (“in your light we shall see light,” Psalms): both what we see and that by which we see, since no created form could represent God as He is. Digression: SCG on the incarnation — heretics refuted one by one through Scripture, then objections from reason to its possibility answered, then about 24 arguments against its suitability answered; the first argument for suitability goes back to book III: man’s end is to see God as He is, possible only if God is the form of our mind; if God joined man to His very person, a fortiori He can join Himself to our mind as form — “that gives us hope.” ST gives ten arguments, substantially the same. Joke: his favourite work is the Contra Gentiles because his edition has bigger print than the Marietti; one can download the works (Navarre) and set the print size.
• Ad 3: clear from what was said. Joshua on the Pythagorean theorem: first you believe Euclid, Aristotle, Thomas; reading carefully you come to see it must be so, and then you no longer believe but know. So seeing God face to face you no longer believe there are three persons: “you’ll see why it must be so.”

10. Closing aside: what is above and below reason (“poetry is infima doctrina”) #

Beginning of the Summa, on metaphors in Scripture: objection that poetry, the lowest teaching, uses metaphors; reply that both deal with what is beyond reason — Scripture above, poetry below. So an angel has some difficulty understanding why we like wine or chocolate; it is below him. Class stops at four ten; hope next time.

His words #

• peregrinamur; “we wander” from the Lord (English text: “are absent”).
• species; “sight” — “not through species.”
• evening / morning knowledge; Augustine’s terms for the angel’s natural knowledge and the vision of God.
• opposition of affirmation and negation; included in all opposites; the ground of exclusion.
• knowing vs. guessing; knowing is being sure, a guess by definition not sure.
• conjectura; guess — opinion and suspicion both are this.
• “fifth book of Wisdom” [ed.: Metaphysics V].
• fides; faith, in the middle between opinion and science.
• science (strict sense); firm adherence with intellectual vision from understood beginnings — not the modern “system of guesses.”
• beatific vision; the vision that makes you blessed.
• first truth; God Himself, object of faith.
• manuductio; Aristotle’s leading-by-the-hand (the glimpse of the beloved).
• infima doctrina; poetry, the lowest teaching.
• gaudium; joy of wisdom, Contra Gentiles opening.

Texts #

Read in class

• Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 67, a. 3 (objections, sed contra, body, three replies)
• Paul, Hebrews 11 (faith: substance of things hoped for, conviction of things not seen)
• Paul, 1 Corinthians 3 (no other foundation)
• Paul, 2 Corinthians 5 (we wander from the Lord; walk by faith not by sight)

Mentioned

• 1 John 3:2 (we shall see Him as He is)
• Psalms, “in your light we shall see light”
• Augustine, commentary on Genesis (evening and morning knowledge)
• Plato, Meno (third part: virtue, knowing vs. guessing)
• Aristotle, fifth book of Wisdom [ed.: Metaphysics V]; De Anima proemium; Parts of Animals
• Thomas, commentary on Ethics VI (opinion and suspicion not virtues); Secunda Secundae on faith; Summa Contra Gentiles on the incarnation and book III on man’s end; ST beginning on metaphors in Scripture (inferred: I, q. 1)
• Shakespeare, Hamlet (“to be or not to be”); Whitman, “Song of Myself”; Smollett, Peregrine Pickle (inferred)

His questions #

• Can an odd number be even? A prime a composite? An acute angle obtuse? No: affirmation/negation is included inside their definitions.
• Can I know there are four students here and be guessing it? No: knowing means certain, guessing means not certain.
• When you see God face to face, are you believing that He is three and one? No — you’re knowing.
• Is it true that you are directed to the good by knowledge? Sometimes; sometimes by guess (fork to Boston, Inchon).
• Does a guess become knowledge? Not strictly; it is replaced by knowledge.
• Seeing is believing? Seeing is knowing; believing cannot be seeing.
• If one knowledge is about a better thing and another is more certain about a lesser, which is better? The former (Parts of Animals); so faith is simply better than science.
• Can Joshua both believe Euclid and know it is so? Once he sees the demonstration he no longer believes but knows.
• Why did God become man — first reason for suitability? To ground the hope that God can be joined to our mind as the form by which we see Him.