Aquinas on Ignorance as a Cause of Sin (Summa I-II, Q. 76): Is Ignorance a Sin, Does It Excuse, Does It Diminish?

Orientation #

He opens by recalling that “last time” they did the first article of question 76, whether ignorance can be a cause of sin, and he restates its key distinction before moving on. He also asks whether he spoke last time about “I am the Alpha and the Omega” and about the word “point.” The previous class treated sin as cause of sin and ignorance as cause of sin, with the removens prohibens distinction.

The class, in order #

1. Opening prayer and the greater unlikeness (“always the unlikeness is greater”) #

Fourth Lateran Council: no likeness between creature and God without a greater unlikeness. He applies this to himself compared with Aristotle or Thomas — like them “a little bit per quid,” the unlikeness greater. Aside: his teacher Kasarik said that compared to Aristotle he had “the brain of an angleworm.”

2. Review: ignorance as cause, through ignorance of logic (“ignorance of logic is a cause of error”) #

Albert the Great: ignorance of logic caused error in the early Greeks; Aristotle’s treatment of the Eleatics in Physics I shows they did no logic.

• Test case: “Every mother is a woman; no man is a mother; therefore no man is a woman.” Both premises true, conclusion false — so the form is bad. Parallel: “Every dog is an animal; no cat is a dog; therefore no cat is an animal.” The truth that a man is not a woman does not come from this argument.
• Aristotle is called the father of logic; he is surprised modern philosophers ignore the kinds of mistake catalogued in the Sophistical Refutations, whereas Thomas names the kind of mistake being made. Even knowing the kinds you can still commit them — a fortiori if you do not know them.
• In what sense is ignorance a cause? As in the first objection last time: non ens cannot be a cause per se, but can be a cause per accidens as remotio prohibentis, removing what prevents.

3. Article 2, objections: whether ignorance is a sin (“ignorance does not imply some act”) #

Objections read in order:

1. Augustine’s definition: sin is something said, done or desired against the law of God; ignorance implies no act, interior or exterior — it is a negation.
2. Sin is more directly a cause of the lack of grace than of the lack of knowledge [as he reads it]; but lack of grace is not a sin, rather a punishment following sin; so ignorance, a privation of knowledge, is not a sin.
3. If ignorance is a sin, only as voluntary; then the sin lies more in the act of will than in the ignorance. (Student exchange: is ignorance voluntary? — “I choose to be ignorant. Don’t confuse me with the facts.”)
4. Every sin is taken away by penance, and no sin remains in act with guilt removed except original sin; but ignorance remains in act after penance; so ignorance is not a sin except in the way original sin is.
5. If ignorance were a sin, one would sin in act as long as one is ignorant, so ignorance would be the gravest sin — which is false. Sed contra: nothing merits punishment but sin; but ignorance merits punishment — “if anyone is ignorant, he will be ignored” (1 Corinthians). Aside: Kasarik on the teacher’s job — “can’t the teacher confuse the issue.”

4. Article 2, body: ignorance vs. nescience (“nescience says the simple negation of knowledge”) #

The distinction: nescience is simple negation of knowledge — Dionysius lays down nescience even in the good angels, the higher illuminating the lower. Ignorance is a privation: lack of knowledge one is naturally apt and bound to have. What one is bound to know: what is needed to exercise a suitable act — all are held to what belongs to faith (the creed) and the universal precepts of the law; individuals to what pertains to their status or office (e.g. marriage — he doubts instruction is very good). Not bound: theorems of geometry, particular contingents except in some cases. Argument: whoever neglects to have or do what he is obliged to have or do sins by omission; therefore by negligence, ignorance of what one is held to know is a sin. Invincible ignorance — not conquerable by study — is not voluntary, since not in our power to repel it, hence no sin. Boundary cases: invincible ignorance, and ignorance of what one is not bound to know — “who won the game yesterday? Shame on you!” — no sin. Aside: “if you ask me about tree surgery, I’d be stumped.”

5. Article 2, replies (“understand the negations”) #

1. In “said, done or desired” one must also understand the negations, since omission has the note of sin; thus negligence in acquiring due knowledge falls under Augustine’s definition. He remarks that Augustine needs Thomas to explain him, and gives his rule of thumb: “Aristotle means what Thomas says he means.”
2. Lack of grace is not in itself a sin, but by reason of negligence in preparing oneself can have the ratio of sin — yet dissimilar, since science can be acquired by our own acts, grace only as God’s gift.
3. As in transgression the sin is not in the will alone but in the commanded act, so in omission both the act of will and the omission are sin, as somehow voluntary; and thus negligence of knowing, or inconsideration, is a sin. He notes the term used: voluntary inconsideration / voluntary inadvertence.
4. As in other sins of omission, one sins in act only at the time one is bound by an affirmative precept — so the ignorant man does not continually sin in act, but only at the time for acquiring the knowledge he is held to have. (He does not read a separate reply to the fourth here.) Asides gathered here: voters for Obama who failed to know what they should have known, and whether confession is available for them; Kasarik and the man who did not think God would punish him for missing Sunday Mass; Ralph McInerny’s novel — “Father, he didn’t believe in God” / “he does now”; a student’s story of people literally covering their ears during a factual argument — De Koninck’s phrase metaphysical refusal; Kasarik at a convention, told a man he had contradicted himself, and got “that’s a contradiction I’ve learned to live with”; Whitman, “I contradict myself, for I contain multitudes” — “it’s more like you contain legion.”

6. Article 3: does ignorance wholly excuse? (“ignorance causes the involuntary”) #

Objections: (1) every sin is voluntary (Augustine) but ignorance causes the involuntary; (2) what is done outside intention is done by chance, and intention cannot be of the unknown, and chance does not give the species — so nothing done through ignorance is judged sin or virtue; (3) man is subject of virtue and sin as partaking of reason, and ignorance excludes the knowledge perfecting reason. Sed contra: Augustine, On Free Judgment — some things done through ignorance are rightly reproved, and only sins are rightly reproved. Digression on Augustine: one of the four great doctors of the West — with Gregory, Ambrose [and Jerome, “then suddenly they add a fifth”]; the four around Bernini’s chair in St Peter’s; John Paul II’s encyclical on Augustine; count his citations in the Catechism and in Thomas. “Augustine and Thomas are the two greatest minds in the church that we’ve had.”

7. Article 3, body: two ways ignorance fails to excuse wholly (“on the side of the thing itself”) #

Ignorance of itself makes the act it causes involuntary, since the act, had the knowledge been present, would be contrary to the will. If the knowledge would not have prevented the act because of the will’s inclination, the man is not involuntary but not willing (Ethics III) — such ignorance, not causing the act, does not excuse; likewise ignorance merely accompanying the sin. It fails to excuse wholly in two ways:

1. On the side of the thing: one may be ignorant of a circumstance which, if known, would have held him back, while still knowing enough for the ratio of sin. Example: striking a man knowing him a man (enough for sin) but not knowing he is his father (a circumstance constituting a new species) — or not knowing the man would strike back (“that’s most of it”), which does not pertain to the ratio of sin.
2. On the side of the ignorance: it is itself voluntary, directly (studiously refusing to know so as to sin more freely) or indirectly (labour or other occupations make one neglect to learn what would draw him back). Such negligence makes the ignorance voluntary, when of what one is held and able to know. Altogether involuntary ignorance — invincible, or of what one is not bound to know — excuses wholly. Replies: (1) not every ignorance causes the involuntary; (2) so far as something voluntary remains, the ratio of sin remains; (3) ignorance which wholly excludes the use of reason excuses wholly, as in the mad and the mindless, but ignorance causing sin is not always such. Discussion on keeping people ignorant: press coverage that prevented a considered judgment; sealed academic records of candidates presented as brainiacs (“Gore call, instead of just a Gore”); bills in the state house where the public is kept from knowing who voted for what.

8. Digression: “out of your mind,” and the senses of before, in, and beginning (“what sense of ‘in’ is this sense of ‘out’ opposed to?”) #

“Out of your mind”: the meanings of “out” correspond to the meanings of “in” — here, no longer in the power of your mind (“I’ve got you in my power” / “out of my hands”). He counts the senses of “in” as seven here, though below, following Physics IV, he says Aristotle distinguishes eight chief senses of “in” [ed.: the two counts stand as he gave them]. Then: Aristotle distinguishes the senses of before twice — Categories 12 and Metaphysics V (“Wisdom”), which is unusual; he knows no other term so treated. Why not in Physics IV, where place and time are treated, since the first meaning of “before” is in time, just as the first meaning of “in” is place? Answer worked out with a student: because logic is named from reason and wisdom is the highest perfection of reason; Thomas, dividing knowledge by the order reason considers, quotes Aristotle’s description of the wise man — “it belongs to the wise man to order things” — because it is proper to reason to know order. Difference between the two treatments: in Categories 12 he orders the senses of “before” by themselves; in Metaphysics V by the common meaning of beginning given at the start of that book — “the beginning is whence first something is, or comes to be, or is known” — and “before” is then divided according to those three. Application to Apocalypse: “I am the Alpha and the Omega” (early chapter), then “the first and the last” (ch. 22), then all three, “and the beginning and the end.” The figurative Alpha and Omega is opened out by the other two. First and last are defined by before and after; arche and telos are beginning and end. “That’s really kind of amazing to see the harmony between the Apocalypse and Aristotle.” In English it would be “the A and the Z.” Related: Shakespeare’s definition of reason, that it “looks before and after.” “Point” is the beginning of a line in the first sense of beginning, but there are also end points, and “point” is used for the later sense of end, purpose — “life is pointless.” Asides: Alpha and Omega on the tabernacle at St Mary’s; the title on the crucifix in three languages, Latin, Greek and Hebrew.

9. Article 4, objections: does ignorance diminish sin? (“every bad man is ignorant”) #

1. What is common to all sins does not diminish sin; but every bad man is ignorant (Ethics III).
2. Sin added to sin makes a greater sin; ignorance is a sin; so it increases.
3. Ignorance aggravates — ignoring the dignity of God is most grave; aggravating and diminishing do not belong to the same thing.
4. If any ignorance diminished, most of all that which takes away the use of reason; but the drunk man merits a twofold punishment (Ethics III). Sed contra: what is a reason for the remission of sin alleviates it; Paul, 1 Timothy — “I obtained mercy because I persecuted the church [in ignorance].” Aside: the disciples were afraid of Paul at first; he consented at the stoning of Stephen. Asides on double punishment: the Greek law punishing the drunk twice, for the act and for getting drunk; driving badly while drunk punished twice; Augustine on excusing (justifying) your sin — more guilty for justifying it. Digression on Aristotle: in the Eudemian Ethics he speaks of how God originates our thinking and willing — the unmoved mover in spiritual acts as in bodily motion; and in De Anima and Metaphysics he refutes Empedocles, who said God does not know hate because there is no hate in God — ridiculous that we should know something God does not.

10. Article 4, body: ignorance diminishes only as it diminishes the voluntary (“in so far as it diminishes the voluntary”) #

Since every sin is voluntary, ignorance diminishes sin only so far as it diminishes the voluntary.

• Ignorance which wholly excuses does not diminish but takes sin away.
• Ignorance merely accompanying the sin neither diminishes nor increases.
• The ignorance that can diminish is what causes sin without wholly excusing. If it is directly and per se voluntary — one deliberately not knowing so as to sin more freely — it increases the voluntary, since from intensity of will to sin one accepts the damnable state of ignorance for liberty of sinning.
• If indirectly or per accidens voluntary — not wishing to labour at study, or wishing to drink wine immoderately (“that’s me”) and so becoming drunk and lacking discretion — it diminishes the voluntary and so the sin: when something is not known to be a sin, the will cannot be borne to the sin directly and per se, only per accidens; hence less contempt, hence less sin.

11. Article 4, replies (“it makes more sins, not always more sin”) #

1. The ignorance by which every bad man is ignorant is not the cause of sin but something consequent on the passion or habit inclining to sin. Examples: David pursuing Bathsheba — passio making him ignorant at that moment that this was adultery, then it became habitual (and he had to get rid of the husband); Mozart’s Don Giovanni — the habit, loving them all “especially the young beginner,” to whom it did not seem bad; the last act, the descent into hell, and the epilogue where the characters are all a little better. A student adds De Koninck’s point that Don Juan and Faust appear only in Christian times — “you have to be a Christian to be sacrilegious”; pagan drama has no such complete libertine, no such bargain for knowledge and power; a student suggests it is because the pagans, and Islam, had no rational deity; De Koninck on Kierkegaard being closer to us because more a believer.
2. Sin added to sin makes more sins, not always a greater sin; they may not coincide in one sin, and if the first diminishes the second the two together may be less grave than one alone: homicide by a sober man is graver than by a drunk man, though there are two sins. He notes the legal policy is not wholly logical, but they wanted to discourage drunkenness. Illustration of “more”: a child takes four ones over a five-dollar bill; his father’s quarter against three pennies — “who has more money?”
3. Ambrose’s word can be understood of ignorance simply affected, not real; or in the genus of ingratitude, whose highest grade is not recognizing benefits; or of the ignorance of infidelity, which subverts the foundation of the spiritual building. “Guess you need Thomas to explain Ambrose too.”
4. The drunk merits two maledictiones — a student’s edition reads mutationes; he keeps both readings and says maledictio means speaking ill of him, perhaps beatings, “but I’m not sure” — on account of two sins, drunkenness and what follows. Yet drunkenness, by the ignorance joined to it, diminishes the following sin, perhaps more than the gravity of the drunkenness itself. Or the saying follows the ordering of Pittacus the legislator (one of the seven wise men of Greece?), who laid down that drunks who struck people be fully punished, not regarding the ignorance which the drunk ought rather to have, but for utility, because more injury is done drunk than sober (Politics II). Closing asides: the VIP room, free rosé, and a designated driver; Socrates’ story of the wedding band paid to play an extra hour, in which the extra drinking started fights between the two families — “never extend.”

His words #

• per quid — his phrase for a partial likeness to Aristotle or Thomas.
• non ens — a non-being; cannot be a cause per se.
• remotio prohibentis — cause per accidens by removing what prevents.
• nescience — simple negation of knowledge, no privation (angels).
• ignorance — privation: lack of knowledge one is naturally apt and bound to have.
• invincible / unconquerable ignorance — not overcome by study, not voluntary, no sin.
• ratio — “the notion of,” as in ratio of sin.
• voluntary inconsideration / inadvertence — his gloss on negligence of knowing.
• not willing vs. involuntary — the distinction from Ethics III where knowledge would not have prevented the act.
• metaphysical refusal — De Koninck’s phrase for refusing reality for an illusion.
• maledictiones / mutationes — the two manuscript readings for the drunk’s double desert.

Texts #

Read in class

• Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 76, a. 2 (whether ignorance is a sin), objections, body, replies 1–3, 5.
• Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 76, a. 3 (whether ignorance excuses wholly), objections 1–3, sed contra, body, replies.
• Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 76, a. 4 (whether ignorance diminishes sin), objections, sed contra, body, replies 1–4.
• Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III (involuntary vs. not willing; every bad man is ignorant; the drunk’s double desert).

Mentioned

• Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 76, a. 1 (previous class).
• Augustine, definition of sin; On Free Judgment.
• Dionysius, on nescience in the angels.
• Aristotle, Physics I (Eleatics); Physics IV (place, time, eight senses of “in”); Categories 12; Metaphysics V (“Wisdom”); Eudemian Ethics; De Anima; Politics II; Sophistical Refutations.
• 1 Corinthians (“if anyone is ignorant, he will be ignored”); 1 Timothy (“I obtained mercy”); Apocalypse 1 and 22.
• Albert the Great, on ignorance of logic among the early Greeks; Ambrose; Fourth Lateran Council; Catechism of the Catholic Church; John Paul II’s encyclical on Augustine.
• Whitman, Leaves of Grass; Shakespeare on reason (“looks before and after”); Mozart, Don Giovanni; Ralph McInerny’s novel.

His questions #

• “Every mother is a woman; no man is a mother; therefore no man is a woman” — is that a good argument? No: same form as “no cat is an animal,” which is false; the truth of the conclusion has another source.
• In what sense is ignorance a cause of error? Per accidens, as remotio prohibentis.
• How does ignorance differ from nescience? Nescience is simple negation; ignorance is privation of knowledge one is apt and bound to have.
• What is someone held to know? Matters of faith and the universal precepts of law for all; what pertains to one’s status or office for individuals; not geometry’s theorems or particular contingents.
• Does ignorance excuse wholly? Only when altogether involuntary — invincible, or of what one is not bound to know.
• “You’re out of your mind” — what sense of “in” is this “out” opposed to? Being in the power of something: no longer ruled by your mind.
• Why does Aristotle distinguish the senses of “before” in logic and in wisdom rather than in Physics IV, where time is treated? Because logic is named from reason and wisdom is reason’s highest perfection, and it is proper to reason to know order.
• Does ignorance diminish sin? Only as it diminishes the voluntary; directly willed ignorance increases the sin, indirectly voluntary ignorance lessens it.
• Does sin added to sin always make a greater sin? No — more sins, not always more sin: homicide by a sober man is graver than by a drunk.