Summa I-II Q.77 aa.3–6: Sins of Weakness, Love of Self, the Three Concupiscences, and Whether Passion Lessens Sin

Orientation #

He opens with the prayer and announces “Question seventy-seven,” picking up at article 3 (he notes “so up to Article Three here”). At the end he says: “Now, let’s see if passion will totally excuse from the sin, because that’s what we’re interested in” — i.e. article 7 next. The previous class treated earlier articles of q. 77 on passion moving the will and clouding reason’s particular judgment (prev. lecture).

The class, in order #

1. Opening puzzle: the three befores (“What sense of before does one sense of before come before another”) #

His favourite puzzle from the treatment of time: before-and-after on the road causes before-and-after in the motion over the road, which causes before-and-after in time. In what sense of “before” (of the five in Categories 12) are these prior to one another?

• Student: “in being” — he rejects it, since one could be without the other.
• His answer: it looks like extrinsic form, i.e. a kind of cause. He notes there are three before-and-afters but asks for the order among them; he does not settle it further.

2. What is best in the cosmos: order (“the beauty of the cosmos is in the order”) #

Best thing after God is the cosmos as a whole; the end, God, is outside it. Best thing in the cosmos is its order — clearer in the Greek kosmos, a beautifully ordered whole (aside: he used to tell girls that cosmetics is arranging the face to be more beautiful). Which of the five senses of “before” is in the order of the universe? Students guess the third (order of reason’s knowledge) and the fourth; he says Thomas gives two senses of order, hence two of the five:

1. diverse creatures, one better and more perfect than another — stones, plants, animals, man, angels (he notes the angels are all unequal) — the fourth sense;
2. one part moving another — the fifth sense taken up in the Categories. Not the order of time, of being, or of reason.

3. Digression: we need mediators to the great books (“Aristotle’s up here, and Thomas would bring down Aristotle”) #

Msgr. Dionne’s remark that Cajetan erred in commenting directly on Aristotle instead of on Thomas’s commentary; Thomas brings Aristotle (and Dionysius) down, proportioning them to us; we need De Koninck and Dionne to bring Thomas to us. St. Basil’s four kinds of books: Scripture; the Fathers to explain Scripture; theologians to explain the Fathers; philosophers to teach us about theology. Hence his maxim: “Aristotle means what Thomas says he means, Augustine means what Thomas says he means” — against those who say Thomas is merely excusing Augustine in the objections here.

4. Article 3: is sin from passion “from infirmity”? (“compares the incontinent to the paralytic”) #

Objections: (1) passion is a vehement motion of the sense-desiring power, and vehemence attests fortitude, not infirmity; (2) infirmity is noted where man is most fragile, i.e. the flesh (“Remember that we are flesh,” Ps. 77) — so bodily defect, not a passion of the soul (aside: Falstaff, “I have more flesh than the other man, so I should be excused”); (3) we are not infirm in what is subject to our will, and passion is under the will — Gen. 4, “under you will be your appetite, and you will dominate it.” Sed contra: Cicero, Tusculans IV, calls the passions of the soul sicknesses, and sicknesses are otherwise called infirmities (hence “infirmary”). Body: the proper cause of sin is on the side of the soul, where sin chiefly is. Infirmity of soul is named by likeness to the body: the body is infirm when weakened or impeded in its operation through a disorder of parts, i.e. when humors and members are not subject to the ruling and motive power — an eye that does not see clearly (History of Animals X). So the soul is infirm when impeded in its operation through disorder of its parts, i.e. when concupiscible or irascible is moved by passion outside the order of reason, reason being the power that rules the parts of the soul. Aristotle’s beautiful comparison (Ethics I): the incontinent man is like a paralytic, whose parts move contrary to what he disposes; Shakespeare’s “little war going on inside himself.” Replies: (1) the stronger the bodily motion apart from the order of nature, the greater the infirmity — so the stronger the passion outside the order of reason, the greater the infirmity of soul; (2) sin chiefly consists in the act of the will, which bodily infirmity does not impede (a sick man can have a prompt will), but passion does — though this infirmity of soul is called infirmity of the flesh insofar as passions arise in us from the condition of the flesh, the sense appetite using a bodily organ; (3) it is in the will’s power to assent or not, and so far the appetite is under us, but the assent itself is impeded by passion as shown. Asides: historia means investigation, incomplete by nature — Aristotle even calls the books on the soul historia; our own “history” is always incomplete (Liddell Hart: the French had more and better tanks and did not know how to use them; British planes more maneuverable, better communication). And Fred Fredette’s seizure: a violent motion of the body flipping him backwards is the sign of a serious inner disorder.

5. Article 4: is self-love the beginning of every sin? (“a friend is, as it were, another self”) #

Objections: (1) love of self is in itself good and due — we are commanded to love our neighbor as ourselves (Lev. 19); (2) Rom. 7, sin by the commandment worked in me all concupiscence, and the gloss makes concupiscence the cause of all sin — but concupiscence is a different passion from love; (3) Augustine on Ps. 79: every sin is from love badly inflaming or from fear badly demeaning — so fear too; (4) one also sins from disordered love of neighbor. Sed contra: Augustine, City of God XIV: amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei makes Babylon, amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui makes the city of God; by any sin man belongs to Babylon. (He asks the class: “so, are you a Babylonian?” — “Sometimes.”) Body: the per se cause of sin is on the part of the turning toward the changeable good; every sinful act proceeds from disordered desire of some temporal good; and that proceeds from disordered love of self, since to love someone is to wish good to him — so the disorder in the good I will for myself comes from a disorder in loving myself. Replies: (1) ordered self-love is fitting and natural; the disordered love that goes to contempt of God is the cause of sin; (2) concupiscence, by which one wishes a good for himself, reduces to self-love as to its cause — love is the cause of desire (if I didn’t love wisdom / candy / wine / Mozart / Shakespeare I wouldn’t desire it), so love causes all the passions; (3) the distinction of love of concupiscence (loving wine, money — wanting to receive the good) and love of friendship/benevolence; fear of evil likewise reduces to self-love, so both desire of good and flight from evil come back to loving oneself — the coward loves his own life, but disorderedly, putting himself above country and comrades; (4) a friend is another self — philos estin allos autos (footnote to Ethics IX, one of the two books on friendship; he learned the tag in a college Greek textbook alongside the opening of John’s Gospel) — so disordered love of neighbor comes from disordered love of self. He stresses that “he loves himself” almost always carries a bad connotation, which is a sign that it is hard to have an ordered love of yourself — yet the commandment requires straightening it out first. Also: “you love yourself as much as you know yourself to be what you are” — some think they are a smart monkey and love themselves as a smart monkey (cf. Ethics X). Aside, put as a question left standing: can loving wisdom proceed from a disordered love of self? He recalls persuading fellow students to be philosophers who were not cut out for it and could not support themselves — and jokes that if all were philosophers, who would do the farming? “Of course, you don’t have this danger too much. Most men don’t love themselves that much.” And someone used to argue that love of literature is a substitute for the love of wisdom that cannot go all the way.

6. Article 5: are the three causes of 1 John enough? (“the concupiscence of the flesh, of the eyes, and the pride of life”) #

He says openly that he hopes Thomas defends this division, since it is into three, and three is all — he would be embarrassed to admit a fourth. Objections: (1) cupidity is the root of all evils (St. Paul), and pride of life is not contained in cupidity; (2) concupiscence of the flesh is most excited by sight — Dan. 13, “beauty deceived thee” (the elders and Susanna) — so the two should not be divided; (3) pleasure comes by the other senses too, so there should be concupiscence of hearing, taste, smell; (4) nothing here pertains to flight from evil. Sed contra: 1 John — everything in the world (in the bad sense) is these three; things are “in the world” on account of sin; the whole world is placed in evil. (Aside: the old phrase for a woman choosing marriage over virginity, “going into the world.”) Body: disordered self-love is the cause of every sin, and includes disordered desire of good, since each desires good to the one he loves (parents wish good things for their children). Good is object of the sense appetite in two ways: absolutely, object of the concupiscible (epithymia); as something difficult, object of the irascible (thymos). And concupiscence is twofold:

• natural — what sustains the nature of the body, for the individual (food, drink) or the species (the venereal): disordered desire of these is concupiscence of the flesh;
• animal / more of the soul — things not sustaining or delighting the flesh but delightful according to imagination or some such apprehension, e.g. money, clothes: this is concupiscence of the eyes, taken either as curiosity (Augustine, Confessions X) or as cupidity for things set before the eyes (as others expound). Disordered desire of the bonum arduum is the pride of life, pride being the disordered desire of excellence (to be treated below). Thus all passions causing sin reduce to these three: the concupiscible’s to the first two, the irascible’s to the third — the irascible is not divided in two because all its passions conform to animal concupiscence. (He recalls that the irascible is closer to reason than the concupiscible.) Replies: (1) as cupidity means universally the desire of any good, pride of life is contained in it; how cupidity as the special vice of avarice is root of all sins is treated later; (2) concupiscence of the eyes is not of everything visible — the pleasure sought must not be that of the flesh, which is by touch; going past the bakery is concupiscence of the flesh, not of the eyes; (3) sight is the most excellent sense and extends to most things (the sun, moon and stars would not be known without eyes), so its name is transferred to the other senses and to all interior apprehensions — Hamlet, “I can see my father now”; Augustine, On the Words of the Lord; (4) flight from evil is caused by desire of good, so only the passions inclining to good are laid down. His verdict: “Very good, Thomas. Three is enough.” Examples attached: the advertisement where a beautiful girl drives up in a car — the double trick, first the girl (concupiscence of the eyes), then the car, and people jealous of you; the radio report of a woman filmed walking ten hours through New York to show how aggressive men are, as an instance of concupiscence of the eyes; the rich man’s “knock down my barns and build bigger” and money as pleasant only to imagination; the miser and the lecher dying in the camp, and the cartoon of the heirs told “he took it with him”; and his own wish to beat Warren Murray on the biology exam as an instance of the arduous good — “that’s how we got to be friends.” A student adds Eve’s three in Genesis: good for food, pleasing to the eyes, to be desired for wisdom.

7. Article 6: does passion lessen sin? (“you’ve got to look before and after”) #

Objections: (1) increase of cause increases effect (the hotter dissolves more), so greater passion means greater sin; (2) as good passion increases merit, bad passion aggravates sin; (3) the more intensely one wills the sin the graver it is, and passion makes the will borne more vehemently. Sed contra: concupiscence is called the tempting of the flesh, and the more one is thrown down by greater temptation the less he sins (Augustine). Body: sin essentially consists in the act of free judgment, a faculty of will and reason (his text refers to “the Master,” in the second book of the Sentences; the transcript reads “Ambrose” — likely Peter Lombard). Passion is a motion of the sense appetite, and can stand to free judgment antecedently (drawing and inclining reason and will) or consequently (the vehement motion of the higher powers overflowing into the lower — the will cannot be intensely moved without exciting passion).

• Antecedent passion necessarily diminishes sin, because an act is sin insofar as voluntary and in us, and what is in us is by reason and will; the more reason and will act from themselves and not from passion’s impulse, the more voluntary.
• Consequent passion does not diminish but rather increases, or at least is a sign of the will’s intensity toward the act of sin: the greater the libido with which one sins, the more he sins. He stresses the lesson: “See how Shakespeare is very important for the life of your mind — you’ve got to look before and after. Thomas looked before and after; without that you could not have answered the question correctly.” Student question: what if one wills the passion that precedes the sinful will? His answer: then you are worse off — you cannot get your sin lessened that way. “I want to go to the party to get drunk so I can do something after”; the actress who got drunk to get through a filthy scene. Replies: (1) passion causes sin on the part of the conversion (turning toward the creature), but the gravity of sin is taken more on the side of the aversion (turning from God), which follows praeter intentionem from the conversion; and causes that are per accidens do not augment the effect — only per se causes do. Discussion with students unpacks this: the man pursuing a woman does not intend to offend God, though he ought to have taken it into account; antecedent passion, not being the per se cause (which is the voluntary act of will and reason), lessens sin when increased, while consequent passion, being nearer the per se side, can increase it — “a very important distinction between the per se and the per accidens; comes up all the time.” (Aside: he uses against heavy drinking the argument that losing one’s reason is like telling God, “I don’t want to be your image” — which is rude, though most people think only of the pleasure.) (2) Good passion following the judgment of reason increases merit; if it precedes, so that a man is moved to act well more from passion than from reason’s judgment, it diminishes merit (less voluntary). (3) Though the motion of will is more intense when passion is incited, it is not so proper to the will as when reason alone moves one.

His words #

• cosmos — a beautifully ordered whole; its beauty lies in its order.
• historia — investigation, gathering the facts before knowing why; incomplete by nature.
• infirmity of soul — the soul impeded in its operation by disorder of its parts, i.e. parts not subject to the order of reason.
• passiones animae — the emotions; more on the side of the soul than the body, but involving bodily change (very clear in anger).
• amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei — self-love to the contempt of God, making Babylon.
• love of concupiscence / love of friendship (benevolence) — loving the good one wants for oneself vs. loving the one for whom it is wanted; “a friend is another self,” philos estin allos autos.
• concupiscentia naturalis / animalis — desire for what sustains bodily nature (food, drink, the venereal) vs. desire for what pleases only by imagination (money, clothes).
• bonum arduum — the difficult good, object of the irascible; its disordered desire is the pride of life.
• liberum arbitrium — free judgment, “a faculty of the will and the reason.”
• antecedenter / consequenter — passion before the act of choice vs. passion overflowing from it.
• conversion / aversion — turning toward the changeable good vs. turning from God; gravity measured more by the aversion.
• praeter intentionem, per se / per accidens — outside the intention; only per se causes augment the effect.

Texts #

Read in class

• Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 77, a. 3 (sin from infirmity), a. 4 (self-love the cause of every sin), a. 5 (concupiscence of flesh, of eyes, pride of life), a. 6 (whether passion lessens sin) — objections, sed contra, body and replies throughout.
• Summa Contra Gentiles IV, ch. 15 (inferred — matched in the audio; not named in the transcript).
• Scripture quoted within the articles: Psalm 77; Genesis 4; Leviticus 19; Romans 7 with the gloss; Psalm 79 (Augustine); Daniel 13; 1 John 2:16; Genesis 3 (Eve’s three, raised by a student).

Mentioned

• Aristotle, Categories ch. 12 (five senses of “before”); Nicomachean Ethics I (incontinent as paralytic), IX (friendship), X; History of Animals X (the eye not seeing clearly); the De Anima proemium (emotions involve the body); on the excellence of sight.
• Cicero, Tusculan Disputations IV; Augustine, City of God XIV, Confessions X, On the Words of the Lord; Peter Lombard, Sentences II (the “Master”); Dionysius and Thomas’s commentary on him; Cajetan; De Koninck, Msgr. Dionne; St. Basil’s four kinds of books.
• Shakespeare (the little war within; Hamlet “I can see my father”; Falstaff; “look before and after”); Liddell Hart.

His questions #

• In what sense of “before” is before-and-after on the road prior to before-and-after in the motion and in time? It looks like extrinsic form, a kind of cause; the full order among the three is left open.
• What is the best thing in the cosmos, and which senses of “before” does its order involve? The order itself; the fourth sense (one creature better and more perfect than another) and the fifth (one part moving another).
• Ought sin from passion to be called sin “from infirmity”? Yes — infirmity of soul is disorder of its parts against reason’s rule, as the incontinent is like a paralytic.
• Is disordered love of self the beginning of every sin? Yes — every sin comes from disordered desire of a temporal good, and to love is to wish good to someone, so the disorder is in self-love.
• Can love of wisdom proceed from a disordered love of self? Left open; he only notes that one wants the best for oneself, and for the best part.
• Are the three of 1 John a sufficient division of the causes of sin? Yes — the first two take all concupiscible passions (natural and animal concupiscence), the third all irascible ones.
• Why is the appetite for money “concupiscence of the eyes” and not of the flesh? Because no pleasure of touch is sought in it, only that of the eye, i.e. of any apprehending power such as imagination.
• Does passion lessen sin? Antecedent passion lessens it by lessening the voluntary; consequent passion does not, but shows and increases the will’s intensity.
• What if one wills the preceding passion in order to sin? Then it is worse, not less — like getting drunk in order to do something afterwards.