The Moral Precepts and the Decalogue: Natural Law, Every Virtue, and Numbering the Ten Commandments (Summa I-II Q.100 aa.1–4)

Orientation #

He begins the “proemium” to the kinds of precepts — moral first, then ceremonial, then judicial — and reads Thomas’s list of twelve questions before taking articles 1–4. At the end he stops because the next article “is very, very long,” expecting it to give several opinions about the division. The neighbouring classes continue the same commentary on the precepts of the Old Law.

The class, in order #

1. The proemium and the order of the three kinds (“first about the what moral precepts”) #

Moral, then ceremonial, then judicial — the order is clear because the moral precepts are even natural, the ceremonial are in reference to God, the judicial more in reference to other men.

2. Running through the twelve questions of q.100 (“I didn’t know that there were twelve things asked”) #

He is struck that Thomas asks twelve, where usually two or three. He reads them off and comments:

• a.1 (all moral precepts of the law of nature) is “a good place to begin.”
• a.3 (reduction to ten) he compares to Aristotle’s categories: everything reduced to ten highest genera.
• a.4 (distinction of the precepts): he bets the division will be into twos and threes, as Aristotle’s ten categories are always divided by two or three — “that’s what’s wrong with the metric system. First division is ten.”
• On the order a.4 distinction → a.5 number → order: “That’s a beautiful order there. Distinction and then five about the number. A number rises from distinction.” “What a man who knows how to look before and after… marvelous guy, Thomas.”
• He lists the rest: way of treating; dispensability (“a lot of people would say yes”); whether the mode of virtue falls under precept; whether the mode of charity does — “Can you love God too much?”; distinction of other moral precepts; whether the moral precepts justify.

Aristotle aside (attached to a.1): there is no mean of what is already an extreme — you cannot commit adultery too much or too little; likewise murder and theft. Aristotle takes these as obvious, so he treats the commandments as something natural. A student adds: no mean of seven, any amount of seven is equally seven.

Asides: jokes about marriage (“we regard marriage as a dead end — no way out”), annulment, and the old farmer who told the new preacher “I don’t feed them everything at once.”

3. Article 1, objections (“not all the what moral precepts pertain to the law of nature”) #

1. Ecclesiasticus 17: God “will add to them discipline and the law of life” — but disciplina is divided against the law of nature, which is not learned but had from a natural instinct. (He fixes the reference: it must be Ecclesiasticus, since Ecclesiastes ends at twelve chapters.)
2. Divine law is more perfect than human; human law adds things to good morals beyond the law of nature, since the natural law is the same before all while these are diverse for diverse peoples — the age at which one may marry or smoke, varying with southern and northern climates.
3. Faith too induces to good morals (Galatians 5, faith works through love), but faith is not under the law of nature, being above natural reason. Sed contra: Romans 2 — the nations that do not have the law do naturally the things of the law.

Asides: Pope Francis at the UN was emphatic that the law of nature must be recognized as a moral law binding on everybody. And: Aristotle’s testimony to Plato as the first man to show by word and example that the moral life is a happy life; Albert and Thomas both say Plato and Aristotle are the chief philosophers, and Albert says one must know both to be a complete philosopher.

4. Article 1, the body: three degrees of the natural law (“not in the same way”) #

Point: all moral precepts pertain to the law of nature, but not in the same way.

1. Human mores are said in order to reason, the proper beginning of human acts; good morals are those agreeing with reason, bad those discordant (Dionysius: for man, to be good is to be according to reason).
2. Just as every judgment of speculative reason proceeds from naturally known first beginnings (the axioms, “the worthies”), so every judgment of practical reason proceeds from naturally known beginnings.
3. Hence three grades:

• what any man’s natural reason judges at once with little consideration — honour father and mother, do not kill, do not steal; these are absolutely of the law of nature. (Plato: the son is always in debt to his father. “I said to my mother one time, ‘I wouldn’t even be here without you, mother.’”) He also gives abortion as a thing seen at once.
• what the wise judge by a more subtle consideration, in which the lesser must be instructed by the wiser — “rise up before the hoary head” and honour the person of the old man. (He puzzles over a blot in his text at cano and gets a student to explain hoary; Shakespeare, “which graybeards call divine.”)
• what human reason needs divine instruction for: not to make a graven image, not to take God’s name in vain. This answers all three objections.

5. Article 2, objections: only justice? (“I don’t have to be courageous or temperate, right? But I’ve got to pay my debts”) #

1. The observations of the Old Law are called justificationes (Psalm 118), and justification is a carrying out of justice.
2. What falls under precept has the notion of a debt, and debt belongs only to justice, whose act is to render each his due. (He jokes: “I sometimes think I owe myself a steak” — but nobody is before or after himself. If the law commands me to be brave as a soldier, I owe that to my country; but to whom do I owe temperance?)
3. Every law is laid down for the common good (Isidore), and only justice regards the common good (Ethics V). Sed contra: Ambrose — sin is transgression of the divine law and disobedience of the heavenly commands; but sins are contrary to the acts of all virtues.

6. Article 2, the body: human law vs. divine law (“the community to which the divine law orders is of men to God”) #

1. Precepts are ordered to the common good, so they are diversified according to the diverse kinds of community — the Politics: other laws in a city ruled by a king, others where the people or the powerful rule.
2. Human law is ordered to the civil community, men to each other through outward acts; this communication belongs to justice; so human law commands only acts of justice, and commands other virtues only so far as they take on the notion of justice.

• Test case: is there a law against getting drunk at home? No — but get into the car and it falls under justice, because I might hit somebody or damage property. A student presses the boundary: drunk driving around a racetrack on your own land. A student’s story: a man drunk crashed into a tree and sued the municipality; the judge wrote the decision in iambic pentameter.

3. The divine law orders men to community with God, in this life or the future; man is joined to God by reason, in which is the image of God; so divine law gives precepts about everything by which man’s reason is well ordered — and that is by the acts of all the virtues: the intellectual virtues (Ethics VI) order the acts of reason in themselves, the moral virtues (Ethics II–V) order reason about the interior passions and exterior operations.
4. Distinction: what cannot be omitted without losing the order of virtue falls under the obligation of precept; what pertains to the well-being of perfect virtue comes under the admonition of counsel — as Paul says, not a command, but better so.

Replies: (1) fulfilling any command has the notion of justification insofar as it is just that man obey God, and just that all that is in man be subject to reason. (2) Justice properly said is one man’s debt to another (Ethics V); in the other virtues there is the debt of the lower powers to reason, and for this Aristotle assigns a metaphorical justice. (3) Clear from what was said of the diversity of communities.

Examples of the lower powers owing reason: anger should obey reason — his drive to Quebec to see Warren Murray, the “crazy French driver” whose wheels threw a stone at his new car: “but I’m a philosopher.” Likewise thirst and hunger: “I’ve had enough — put the bottle away.”

7. Article 3, objections and sed contra (“as is clear to one running through them”) #

1. The first and principal precepts are love of God and neighbour (Matthew 22), not contained in the Decalogue.
2. Moral precepts are not reduced to ceremonial ones, yet the Sabbath precept in the Decalogue is ceremonial.
3. Moral precepts are about the acts of all virtues, but the Decalogue lays down only precepts of justice. Sed contra: the gloss on Matthew 5 — Moses, having proposed the ten precepts, afterwards explains them in parts. Aside: discurrere in the looser sense, “run through them” — as in “let’s run through this once more” when planning the Pope’s security.

8. Article 3, the body: promulgated by God himself (“the knowledge of which man has to himself from God”) #

The Decalogue differs from the other precepts in being promulgated by God to the people directly; the others God proposes through Moses. To the Decalogue belong those precepts whose knowledge man has from God himself — those knowable at once from the first common beginnings modica consideratione, and those known from infused faith. Not numbered among them are precepts of two other kinds: (a) the first and most common, which have no publication but their being written in natural reason as per se known (e.g. do no harm to anyone); (b) those found in agreement with reason by the diligent inquiry of the wise, which come from God to the people through the teaching of the wise. Both are nevertheless contained in the Decalogue, but diversely: the first and common as principles in proximate conclusions, those known by the wise conversely as conclusions in their principles.

Replies:

1. The two precepts of love are the first and common precepts of the natural law, known per se to human reason by nature or by faith; the Decalogue refers to them as conclusions to common beginnings — the first three tied to love of God, the last seven to love of neighbour.
2. The Sabbath precept is secundum aliquid morale: as commanding that man give some time to divine things (Psalm 45: “take a vacation and see that I am God”) it is moral and belongs in the Decalogue; as to the determination of the time it is ceremonial. So Thomas admits something ceremonial in the third commandment.
3. The notion of debt is more hidden in the other virtues than in justice; so acts of justice especially come under the Decalogue, the first elements of law. He runs the list: honour father and mother (obvious debt, seen even by Aristotle and Cicero), do not kill, adultery, theft, then false witness and coveting — “a lot of them are more hidden.” (Coveting a neighbour’s wine cellar.)

Student exchange on the Sabbath: Saturday-evening Mass fulfils Sunday; the Jews began the day at evening, and the liturgy still does (“from Genesis, evening”). A student of the Eastern rite notes that first and second vespers are a Western canonical creation — “every day begins in the evening. So we never have second vespers… we used to, because we were Latinized.”

9. Article 4, objections (“unsuitably are the precepts of the Decalogue distinguished”) #

1. Latria is one virtue, faith another, and precepts are given about acts of virtues; “you shall have no alien gods” pertains to faith, “you shall not make a graven image” to latria — so two precepts, not one as Augustine says. (He points out the major: precepts are given about acts of virtues, and here there seem two virtues.)
2. Affirmative precepts are distinguished from negative (honour your parents vs. thou shalt not kill); “I am the Lord your God” is affirmative, “you shall not have alien gods” negative — so two.
3. Romans: “I would not have known concupiscence unless the law said, thou shalt not covet” — so it is one precept, not two. Sed contra: Augustine in the gloss on Exodus — three precepts to God, seven to neighbour.

10. Article 4, the body: three divisions weighed (“at hope, melius est” — and this is better) #

• Hesychius (on Leviticus 26, the ten women baking bread): the Sabbath precept is not one of the ten, since not observed according to the letter at all times. He gives four to God — I am the Lord your God; you shall have no alien gods (Jerome also distinguishes these two); you shall not make a graven image; you shall not take God’s name in vain — and six to neighbour: honour parents, not kill, not commit adultery, not steal, not bear false witness, not covet. Objection to it: it seems unsuitable to place the Sabbath among the ten if it in no way belongs there (“that’s an easy enough objection, you and I can see that”); and “no one can serve two masters” (Matthew 6) shows “I am the Lord your God” and “you shall have no false gods” fall under the same precept.
• Origen: joins those two as one; then graven image; then the name in vain; then the Sabbath — four to God, the other six as Hesychius. (“Of course Origen is a heretic anyway.”) Objection: making a likeness is prohibited only because one is not to worship them as gods — for in the tabernacle God commanded images (Exodus 25).
• Augustine: puts “you shall have no alien gods” and “you shall not make a graven image” under one precept; and distinguishes coveting a neighbour’s wife (concupiscence of the flesh) from coveting his goods (concupiscence of the eyes) as two precepts. Thus three to God and seven to neighbour — melius est. He adds: “It’s the same number as the categories of Aristotle too… therefore it’s even more harmonious.”

He notes with pleasure Thomas’s method here: many opinions, criticism of each, then the final one — “make your doctoral thesis on this fourth article.”

11. Article 4, replies (“the same knowledge of opposites”) #

1. Latria is a kind of protestation of faith; so no separate precepts for latria and for faith — and these are given rather about latria than about faith, because the precept of faith, like the precept of love, is presupposed to the Decalogue. Just as the first common precepts of the natural law are per se known to one having natural reason and need no promulgation, so to believe in God is first and per se known to one who has faith (Hebrews 11: he who approaches God must believe that He is); it needs no promulgation but the infusion of faith.
2. Affirmative and negative are distinguished into separate precepts only when one is not contained in the other — honouring parents does not include not killing, nor the reverse. But where the affirmative is included in the negative and conversely, no separate precept: none is given about restoring or conserving another’s property besides “thou shalt not steal.” So likewise believing in God and not disbelieving fall together — “the same knowledge of opposites, as Aristotle and Plato say.”
3. All coveting comes together in one common notion, so the Apostle speaks of the command singularly; but because in special the reasons for desiring differ, Augustine distinguishes two precepts, for the species of concupiscence differ according to the diversity of actions or things desired (Ethics X).

Student exchange: were the others also counting ten? Yes — they combined the last two, both being concupiscence, and divided the first into four instead of three, arriving at ten.

12. Breaking off (“this next one is very, very long”) #

He asks whether there is time for one more article and decides against it, expecting it to give multiple opinions about the division.

His words #

• “proemium” — the preface Thomas makes before descending to the kinds of precepts.
• “the worthies” [ed.: axioms, dignitates] — the naturally known first beginnings of speculative reason.
• disciplina — what is learned, divided against the law of nature, which is had from natural instinct.
• modica consideratione — “with a little consideration”; the mark of what any man knows at once.
• “the lessers/minors instructed by the wiser” — the second grade of natural-law precepts.
• discurrere in the looser sense — “run through them.”
• “metaphorical justice” — Aristotle’s name (Ethics V) for the debt of the lower powers to reason.
• justificationes — the observances of the Old Law; a carrying out of justice.
• “latria” — “what you do when you worship God.”
• secundum aliquid morale — the Sabbath precept as partly moral, partly ceremonial.
• a converso — conversely; conclusions contained in their principles.
• melius est — “and this is better,” of Augustine’s three-and-seven.

Texts #

Read in class

• Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 100, prologue (list of twelve questions) and articles 1, 2, 3, 4 — objections, sed contra, body, replies.

Mentioned (as cited within those articles or by him)

• Aristotle, Ethics V (justice, common good, metaphorical justice), VI (intellectual virtues), II–V (moral virtues), X (species of concupiscence); no mean of an extreme (adultery, murder, theft)
• Aristotle, Politics — different laws for different regimes; Aristotle’s Categories, ten highest genera
• Dionysius — for man, to be good is to be according to reason
• Ecclesiasticus 17; Psalm 118; Psalm 45; Matthew 5, 6, 22; Romans 2, and Romans on concupiscence (inferred: 7:7); Galatians 5; Hebrews 11; Exodus 25; Leviticus 26
• Isidore (law for the common good); Ambrose (sin as transgression of divine law); Augustine (gloss on Exodus); Jerome (on Hosea, super illud — locus garbled in recording); Hesychius; Origen
• Plato (son always in debt to his father); Cicero; Albert the Great; Shakespeare (“which graybeards call divine”); Pope Francis at the UN

His questions #

• Why does Thomas take the moral precepts first, then ceremonial, then judicial? — Because the moral are even natural, the ceremonial refer to God, the judicial to other men.
• Are all the moral precepts of the Old Law of the law of nature? — Yes, but in three ways: known at once by anyone, known by the wise on subtler consideration, known only through divine instruction.
• Can you love God too much? — Raised in reading a.10 of the list; left open (not treated in this class).
• Are the moral precepts only about acts of justice? — No: human law commands only justice, but the divine law orders man to God through reason, so it commands the acts of all the virtues.
• Is there a law against getting drunk at home? — No; it falls under law only when it touches another, as in driving.
• To whom do I owe temperance? — To reason: it is just that my thirst and hunger obey reason — Aristotle’s metaphorical justice.
• Are all moral precepts reduced to the ten of the Decalogue? — Yes: the first common principles are in them as principles in proximate conclusions, and the precepts found by the wise as conclusions in their principles.
• How can a ceremonial precept (the Sabbath) stand among the moral Decalogue? — It is moral as commanding that some time be given to God, ceremonial only as to the determination of the time.
• Which division of the Decalogue is right — Hesychius’, Origen’s, or Augustine’s? — Augustine’s three to God and seven to neighbour; melius est.
• Were the other authors also counting ten? — Yes: they joined the two precepts on coveting and split the first into four.