A Second Definition of Reason: Understanding, Order, and Whether the Decalogue Admits Dispensation (I-II q.100 a.8)

Orientation #

He opens by saying he was thinking of another definition of reason, alongside Shakespeare’s, which he had evidently given before; then he turns to “Article Eight,” which he treats as next in sequence. The previous class treated the order of the precepts of the Decalogue and why some precepts carry an added reason or promise.

The class, in order #

1. A second definition of reason (“the ability to understand, reason and direct itself and others”) #

The point: reason can be defined twice because the definitions harmonise while each brings out something the other does not.

• His definition: the ability to understand, reason, and direct itself and others.
• He raises the difficulty himself: “if it’s so good, how can there be two definitions? Because reason is one thing.”

2. “Understanding” as the great English word (“to know what stands under it”) #

The point: the word understanding covers, by etymology, everything reason does that sense cannot.

• He cites the Laval linguist who called English the greatest invention of the human mind, and Monsignor Dion’s rule: look at the languages, sometimes a word is better in one than another.
• From a text of Thomas asking whether the sinful act is a substance: two senses of substance — (a) substance as opposed to accident (Categories); (b) substance as what a thing is. In the Topics Aristotle says to ti esti (“what it is”) where the Categories says ousia.
• Both senses mark off reason from sense: the eye does not know what colour is, what sound is, what a dog is; and reason alone knows the substance standing under the accidents, of which sense knows only the accidents. So “ability to understand” includes both senses at once.
• To understand a word = to know what stands under it. Latin impositio nominis, “the placing upon the name” — English too says you put a name upon something, a label upon something; so the thing named is as it were under the name.
• Example: Warren Murray saw on television a parrot saying the Hail Mary — “he’s got the sounds down,” but he doesn’t understand what he said. (Aside: you could hire it to wake you saying your prayers.)
• To understand an effect: English speaks of the underlying cause, and of the “ground.” If a friend’s tone sounds sad, you ask what is underlying the sadness.

3. The three acts of reason inside the definition (“the first two acts of reason are kind of understanding”) #

• From the proemium to the logic: the first act, understanding what something is (square, quadrilateral, circle); the second act, understanding the true or false (a square is a quadrilateral, is not a circle). Both are understanding.
• The third act is reasoning — hence “and reason” in the definition.
• “Direct itself and others” covers the practical order: itself, by knowing logic; the other parts of the soul (will, emotions), the exterior actions, and other men (father over children, general over the army).

4. Harmony with Shakespeare’s definition (“you think it out, then you understand it”) #

• Discourse in its strictest sense: coming to know what you do not know from what you do know.
• Student question and his answer: thinking about something is not the same as understanding it — you can think about a thing without understanding it — but they are connected: you think it out, then you understand it. You can think out a definition, a division, a distinction, an order.
• “Looking before and after” is trying to see an order, which matches “directs itself and others,” since it directs by knowing order.
• Conclusion: the definitions harmonise, but one brings out what the other does not, and Shakespeare stresses that reason must think about a thing before it understands it.

5. Reason understands order: two orders among the objects of looking philosophy (“one is called looking philosophy by Berquist”) #

The point: an example of reason understanding an order, namely two criteria by which one knowledge is better than another, which run opposite ways.

• “Looking philosophy” [ed.: speculative/theoretical] has three parts: mathematical philosophy (Euclid “of Athens and Alexandria”), natural philosophy, and first philosophy or wisdom.
• Order of how well we know: I fully know what a square is (equilateral right-angled quadrilateral), better than what a dog is (a four-footed animal that barks and gets irascible — hard to bring out fully), and I know the dog better than I know what God or an angel is (perhaps only negatively — not composed, etc.).
• Order of the worth of the object: it is better to understand God, however imperfectly, than a cat or dog; and better to understand a cat or dog — these are alive — than a square or circle.
• Aristotle, proemium to the books on the soul: one knowledge is better than another either because it is about a better thing or because we know the thing better; he does not there say which criterion counts more. As Thomas often points out, and as is clear in the beginning of the Parts of Animals, Aristotle’s main criterion is that the object is better. So imperfect knowledge of a better thing beats full knowledge of a lesser.
• Aristotle’s image: a mere glimpse of someone we love is better than a long view of a lesser thing. His versions: a brief look at the beautiful tree outside beats staring all day at an ugly ash can; the office worker’s brief glimpse of his girlfriend across the lane beats the long view of the boss all day.
• Asides: the dog Habibi (“my beloved”), who barks the whole time through Mass, telling the neighbourhood to be quiet; and the two dogs in the New York motel breakfast room that could not be shut off.

6. Why will and reason differ in going wrong (“the goodness or badness of the will depends upon its object”) #

The point: a text of Thomas he read that day, comparing will and reason.

1. The goodness or badness of the will depends on its object: desiring what is good is good, desiring what is bad makes the will bad.
2. The goodness or badness of reason does not depend on the object: to know what is good is good, and to know what is bad is also good.
3. Reason, from Aristotle in the sixth book of wisdom: good and bad are in things, truth and falsity primarily in the mind. The will goes out to the thing in itself; the mind’s objects are true and false as they are in the mind. If the mind knows things as they are, that is good; as they are not, bad.

• Thomas adds: reason knows something true because it sees it in the light of the first beginnings which it actually knows; it is mistaken when it follows imagination. He ties this to St. Teresa, whose feast it is, calling imagination “the crazy one.” (Aside on the new Colombian priest, Fr. Gadero, and his good sermon on Teresa.)

7. Order said to stand under things (“Once upon a time”) #

• Question put: is order sometimes said to stand under things? The first sense of order is the temporal (yesterday before today, today before tomorrow), and the childhood phrase “once upon a time” puts things in the order of time while speaking of being upon — parallel to impositio nominis, placing a name upon a thing.
• For a latecomer he repeats the definition and the point about “discourse.”

8. Aside on the seal of confession (“you’ve got to master this before you hear confessions”) #

• The story on the Catholic channel: Hess, the Nazi, raised Catholic, whose confessor reportedly told his father what he had confessed — the occasion of his turning from the Church (he apparently went to confession before execution, after the Nuremberg trials).
• Student’s answer to “is that a mortal sin?”: breaking the seal is automatic excommunication reserved to the Holy See.
• His qualification: pressure is put on priests (he mentions attempts “down south”), but also people exaggerate, speculate about what a priest said, and “the priest told” gets around — which sounds more like an excuse; still, even the imagination of it is traumatic.

9. Article 8, the five objections (“whether the precepts of the Decalogue are dispensable”) #

He translates each objection:

1. The precepts of the Decalogue are of the natural law; but the naturally just fails in some cases and is changeable, as human nature is changeable (Ethics V); and the defect of the law in a particular case is the reason for dispensing. (He notes one must understand what Aristotle is up to there; and that this is not the hardest objection.)
2. As man stands to human law, so God to the divinely given law; man can dispense in the precepts man establishes; therefore God can dispense in the Decalogue.
3. Prelates hold God’s place on earth — “if I give something, I give it in the person of Christ” — therefore prelates too can dispense. (Aside: “these guys are the religious here; Father Albert’s a prelate.”)
4. The Decalogue forbids homicide, yet men seem to dispense in it when by human law malefactors or enemies are killed. (Asides: the colonel who prayed for the enemy before shooting him; Leo Alvarez, Korean War veteran, on whether “God have mercy on you” is good moral theology.)
5. The Sabbath precept was dispensed: 1 Maccabees — whoever comes against us in war on the Sabbath, we will fight him. So a soldier may miss Mass the day the enemy invades.

• “So you’re all convinced now, temporarily?”

10. Sed contra and the body (“precepts of this sort are indispensabilia”) #

• Sed contra, Isaiah 24: some are reprehended because they changed the just and dissipated the eternal covenant — understood most of all of the Decalogue. Hence the phrase “written in stone.”
• Body. Dispensation ought to occur when in some particular case keeping the word of the law would be against the intention of the legislator (he notes this comes up even in Supreme Court cases). The lawgiver’s intention is ordered first and chiefly to the common good, second to the order of justice and virtue by which the common good is conserved and attained (soldiers must be brave to get victory — “there’s no substitute for victory,” MacArthur).
  1. Precepts that themselves contain the preservation of the common good or of the order of justice and virtue contain the lawgiver’s intention — e.g. that no one destroy the republic, or hand over the city to the enemy, or act unjustly and badly. These are indispensabilia.
  2. Other precepts are ordered to these and determine special modes: e.g. a statute that each village keep a guard for the safety of the republic. These can be dispensed when omitting them in some case does not prejudice the first precepts — for a greater usefulness, or if a wall cannot be held and you fall back to another wall.
  3. The precepts of the Decalogue contain the lawgiver’s own intention. The first table orders to God and so contains the order to the common and last good, which is God Himself; the second table contains the order of justice among men — that nothing not owed be given to anyone, and to each be rendered what is owed him.
  4. Therefore the precepts of the Decalogue are omnino — entirely — indispensable.
• Digression on summum bonum: in the Summa Contra Gentiles Thomas treats God’s goodness in five chapters (37-41) (inferred), more completely than in the Summa Theologiae: God is good; God is goodness itself; nothing bad can be in Him; He is the good of every good — the one left out of the Summa Theologiae; He is the highest good. Then, from Aristotle, the good and the end are ultimately the same, so if God is the summum bonum He must be the last end — “he was taught by Aristotle.” Aristotle also holds the common good superior to the private good.

11. Reply to the first objection (“the philosopher does not speak of the naturally just that contains the order itself of justice”) #

“Now he’s got to untie these knots… he won’t get his dinner until he unties these.”

• Reply 1: Aristotle is not speaking of the naturally just that contains the very order of justice — that never fails, that justice be observed — but of determinate ways of observing justice, which do fail in some cases.
• His example of a dispensable determinate mode: not playing “Hail to the Chief” when the president enters, if the band leader is sick.
• The remaining four objections are not answered; the class runs out into a long West Point digression (the tour with the grandchildren; MacArthur beating Ulysses S. Grant’s son for first academically and for cadet colonel; MacArthur’s father a teenage Civil War officer with the Medal of Honor; the crack drill squad, and his own at St. Thomas Military Academy in St. Paul which appeared on the Ed Sullivan show; the graduating classes marching, the parachutists, the West Point marching music for Rosie’s brother).

His words #

• “Reason is the ability to understand, reason and direct itself and others” — his second definition of reason.
• “Understanding” — from etymology, to know what stands under: substance, the meaning under a word, the cause under an effect.
• Impositio nominis — “the placing upon the name”; the thing named stands under the name.
• “Large discourse, looking before and after” — Shakespeare’s definition of reason; discourse strictly = coming to know the unknown from the known.
• “Looking philosophy” — his English rendering [ed.: speculative or theoretical philosophy]; its three parts: mathematical, natural, first philosophy or wisdom.
• “The sixth book of wisdom” [ed.: Metaphysics VI].
• “First beginnings” [ed.: first principles] — in whose light reason sees the true.
• Dispensabilia / indispensabilia — able / not able to be dispensed from.
• Omnino — entirely (the Decalogue is omnino indispensable).
• Summum bonum — highest good; identified with the last end via the sameness of good and end.
• Bonum commune et finis finalis — the common and last good, which is God Himself.

Texts #

Read in class

• Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 100, a. 8 — objections 1-5, sed contra (Isaiah 24), body, and reply to obj. 1.
• Aristotle, De Anima, proemium — two criteria for one knowledge being better than another.
• A text of Thomas on will vs. reason in going wrong (locus not stated).

Mentioned

• Thomas, on whether the sinful act is a substance (locus not stated).
• Aristotle, Categories (ousia) and Topics (to ti esti).
• Thomas, proemium to the logic — the three acts of reason.
• Aristotle, Parts of Animals, beginning — the better object is the main criterion.
• Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics V — the naturally just is changeable (obj. 1).
• Aristotle, Metaphysics VI — good and bad in things, true and false in the mind.
• Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles I, cc. 37-41 (inferred) — five chapters on God’s goodness.
• 1 Maccabees — fighting on the Sabbath (obj. 5).
• Paul, “I give it in the person of Christ” (obj. 3).

His questions #

• How can there be two definitions of reason, since reason is one thing? They harmonise; each brings out what the other does not.
• What is the distinction between thinking about something and understanding it? Not the same — you can think without understanding — but you think it out and then understand it.
• Do I understand what a square is better than what a dog is, or a dog better than God? Yes in both cases, on the criterion of how well we know.
• Is it better to know God imperfectly or the square perfectly? God, because the main criterion is the worth of the object.
• Does the goodness or badness of reason depend on its object as the will’s does? No: to know what is bad is good; truth and falsity are primarily in the mind.
• When is reason mistaken? When it follows imagination — Teresa’s “crazy one.”
• Is breaking the seal of confession a mortal sin? It is automatic excommunication reserved to the Holy See.
• Are the precepts of the Decalogue dispensable? No: they contain the lawgiver’s own intention, so they are omnino indispensable.
• Then what did Aristotle mean by the changeable naturally just? Not the order of justice itself, which never fails, but the determinate modes of observing it.
• How are objections 2-5 answered? Left open (not reached in this class).