Summa I-II q.112 a.2–4: Preparing for Grace, Whether Grace Must Follow, and Why Grace Is Unequal

Orientation #

He opens: “We’ve seen that God is the principal cause of grace” (prev. lecture: q. 112, a. 1), and goes on to the second article. He does not announce what comes next. The verified-source list also matches a. 5 for four minutes at the end, but the transcript as given breaks off at the close of a. 4 (“He’s not a Democrat. Okay. Now”). The previous class began q. 112 with article 1 on God alone as efficient cause of grace; the next takes up a. 5 and q. 113.

The class, in order #

1. Article 2, objection 1: merit and the preparation “together with the pouring in of grace” (“the preparation of man for having grace”) #

Point: the preparation that is meritorious is simultaneous with the infusion of grace and merits glory, not the grace already had.

• Objection (Romans 4): to one who works the reward is by debt, not grace; preparation by free will is an operation; so preparation removes the notion of grace.
• Reply as he reads it: (1) the preparation for having grace is together with the pouring in of grace; this operation is meritorious not of the grace already had but of the glory not yet had. (2) There is another, imperfect preparation which sometimes precedes the gift of grace, and is from God moving us — but it does not suffice for merit, because “no merit can be except from grace.”
• A student says he doesn’t understand the first part; his gloss: the man already has grace, so his preparation is preparing the way for glory; there is an element of reward, “not altogether gratuitous,” yet before any grace you could not merit grace.
• Jude v. 20 (the short canonical epistle without chapter divisions): “building yourselves up” — faith, then praying (what hope leads you to do), then charity, then the mercy of God, then eternal life. Shows that even for rewarded good acts done from grace there is mercy rather than bare justice.

2. Objection 2, Paul’s conversion: “subito” vs. “paulatim” (“it makes no difference whether subito”) #

Point: since man can prepare only by God going before and moving him, it is indifferent whether he reaches perfect preparation suddenly or bit by bit.

• Objection: one progressing in sin does not prepare himself, yet Paul got grace while “breathing threats” against the disciples (Acts 9); so no preparation is required. “That’s a nice objection.”
• Reply: Ecclesiasticus (he hesitates between Ecclesiasticus and Ecclesiastes): it is easy in God’s eyes subito to “honestare” the poor (translator’s note he reads: honestare = to honour, adorn, make graceful). Sometimes God moves a man to some good but not a perfect one — a preparation that precedes grace in time; sometimes he moves him perfectly and at once, so that being disposed and receiving grace are simultaneous. John 6: “audivit a Patre et didicit, venit ad me” — the three words hearing, learning, coming as if hama, together. So Paul, in the progress of sin, was perfectly moved in his heart by God in hearing, learning and coming.
• Aside: “subito” is what they chanted when they wanted John Paul II canonised.

3. Objection 3: infinite power needs no disposed matter (“no preparation is needed, which he himself does not make”) #

Point: God needs no disposition presupposed from another cause, but the thing’s condition still requires one — which God himself makes.

• Objection: an agent of infinite power needs no disposition in matter, since it needs no matter at all, as in creation, to which grace is compared (“new creature,” Galatians — aside: funny how “creature” became a bad word; “you come out of confession a nova creatura”). “Sounds pretty convincing to this dumbo over here.”
• Reply, “subtly”: the agent of infinite power needs no matter or disposition presupposed from the action of another cause; nevertheless, according to the condition of the thing, it causes in the thing both the matter and the disposition suited to the form. So God needs no preparation for pouring grace into the soul which he does not himself make — “not the same thing as to say there is no preparation.”
• Digression on the analogous case of the rational soul: does the fertilized egg have it? He thinks the Church has never defined it; pro-life people want to say yes; but the soul is “first act of a natural body composed of tools” [ed.: organs], so perhaps the matter is not yet prepared and the disposition takes time. In Christ, at the Annunciation when Mary said yes, the Word was made flesh, the soul created, the body already disposed — perhaps suddenly, “not by another cause.” Caution: arguing from the Incarnation to all of us is risky. His preferred argument against abortion avoids the question when the soul is there: the golden rule — would you have wanted to be aborted?

4. Sed contra and body: grace as habitual gift vs. grace as God’s moving (“grace is said in two ways”) #

Point: preparation is pre-required for grace as habitual form, not for grace as divine aid moving the soul.

• Sed contra: Amos 4, “prepare to meet your God, Israel”; more clearly 1 Kings 7:3, “prepare your hearts to the Lord.”
• Distinction: grace as habitual gift (a form of the soul) vs. grace as aid of God moving the soul to the good (a movement). He compares it to Aristotle’s third kind of cause: the mover, into which Aristotle “sticks in” the maker; both cause another’s acting, but the mover’s act is a motion, the maker’s act is a form. “Nice distinction … see how philosophy helps you.”
• Argument: (1) grace as habitual gift presupposes some preparation, for the general reason that no form can be except in matter disposed for it (“like the maker”). (2) Grace as moving aid requires no preparation on man’s side going before the divine aid: moving does not require a disposition; God can move us “whenever He wants.” “That’s a very important distinction here.” (3) Rather, whatever preparation there is in man is itself from God moving the soul — the good motion of free will (he notes the odd rendering “free judgment”) by which one is prepared is an act of free will moved by God. So Proverbs 16:1, “it belongs to man to prepare his soul,” but as moved; Proverbs 8, “from God the will of man is prepared … from the Lord the steps of man directed.”
• His summary: for the habit there must be a disposition in the soul; for the moving, “the moving brings with it the disposition.” “Thomas, we’ll let you get away with that.”

5. Article 3, the objections: is grace given of necessity to one who does what is in him? (“God helps those who help themselves”) #

Point: the three objections (the gloss, Anselm, Dionysius) and Thomas’s replies, all turning on where the first cause lies.

• Objection 1: gloss on Romans 5:1, “God receives the one who flees” to him, otherwise there would be iniquity in him. His joke: “home is where they gotta let you in.”
• Reply: the gloss speaks either of one who flees by a meritorious act of free will already informed by grace (not to receive him would be against the justice God himself established), or of the motion of free will before grace, in which case the flight is through a divine movement of the soul, which it is just for God to reward — “if God is moving you towards Himself, then He should reward Himself, so to speak.”
• Objection 2: Anselm, De casu diaboli (“must be an interesting book”): God does not grant grace to the devil because he does not wish to receive it nor is prepared; remove the cause, the effect is removed; so whoever wishes grace must be given it. Joke: “Give me some grace … next week, not this week.”
• Reply: the first cause of the defect of grace is from us; the first cause of its granting is from God. Hosea (“one of my favorite prophets”): “your perdition, Israel, is from you; only from me is your help.” So thank God for the good you’ve done, blame yourself for the bad — sounds unjust to “the modern American man, self-pity man,” who argues: if you hold me responsible for evil, hold me responsible for good. But God cannot be the per se beginning of anything bad, and no good comes except from him who is goodness itself. Story of the angry man: “If I do good it’s from me; if I do bad it’s from me.” Student: Christ was angry at the hardness of their hearts — if responsible for hardness, then for softness? He: “not completely … it’s a probable argument.”
• Objection 3: the good is communicativum sui (Dionysius, Divine Names ch. 4 — how Thomas argues God is good); grace is a better good than nature; a natural form arises of necessity when matter is disposed (heat paper enough, it bursts into flame); so much more grace. He notes Thomas does not answer by saying grace is above nature; he denies the premise.
• Reply: even in natural things the disposition of matter does not of necessity bring the form except through the power of the agent that causes the disposition — the cause disposing the matter is not the one giving the form. He stresses Thomas is not denying the agent might act necessarily: “non ex necessitate consequitur forma” except through the agent’s power. Aristotle: a natural power is determined to one and acts necessarily in the presence of its object (butter in the icebox must get hard); a rational power can act or not (the doctor doesn’t have to cure me; the teacher doesn’t necessarily teach — “get a bigger hammer”).
• Aside: tax forms and the seven-year statute of limitations, from the burning-paper example.

6. Article 3, sed contra and body: necessity of infallibility, not of coercion (“as clay in the hand of the potter”) #

Point: preparation considered from free will has no necessity for grace; considered from God moving, it has the necessity of infallibility.

• Sed contra: Jeremiah 18:6, man is to God as clay to the potter; clay however prepared does not necessarily receive a form (the sculptor needn’t chip the marble); so neither man grace.
• Body: the preparation is from God as from the mover and from free will as from the moved. Two ways: (1) as from free will, no necessity of obtaining grace, because the gift of grace exceeds any preparation of human power; (2) as from God moving, it has necessity toward what God orders it to — “not of coercion, but of infallibility, unfailingness” — because God’s intention cannot fail; Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum: by God’s benefits “certissime liberantur” whoever are freed. Hence if it is from God’s intention that the man whose heart is moved will get grace, infallibly he gets it — John 6:45 again. His gloss: it is not by my being moved that I receive grace but by God’s moving me; “so far as it’s by my free will” no necessity. “That’ll be allowed.”

7. Article 4, objection 1 and the digression on distinction and the bad (“seldom affirm, never deny, always distinguish”) #

Point: God’s care is equal on the side of the divine act, unequal on the side of what is dispensed.

• Objection: grace is from divine love; Wisdom 6:8, he made the little and the great and his care is equally for all; so all receive grace equally. He notes the objection overreaches: equally from him, not the same thing.
• Aside on the Dominican maxim “seldom affirm, never deny, always distinguish” — “some truth to it.” Then a digression on the Summa Contra Gentiles on God knowing the bad: Thomas argues from God’s knowing things distinctly, not just in general. Distinction is a negation (one is not the other); the bad is a negation, a lack of what one could and should have; so whoever knows distinction can know the bad. Tied to Shakespeare’s definition of reason (looking before and after): looking for distinctions is included in it, as the ability for a small discourse is included in that for a large one. A second argument: the good of reason is truth; it is true that the bad is bad; God has all truth, so knows the bad. “It’s beautiful the way he argues.” Aside: SCG is his favourite book after the Bible — the newer Leonine-based edition in bigger print than the Marietti; “because of the bigger print.”
• Reply: divine care in two ways — as regards the divine act, simple and uniform, equally about all, dispensing greater and lesser by one simple act; on the side of the things dispensed, inequality. Student: does God love Thomas Aquinas more than you? He: as to the love itself, no — otherwise there would be two loves (“can the temperature be ninety and thirty?”); as to the mind and memory given, “he kind of shortchanged me.” God is equally careful of the mouse and the cat, but gives the cat better weapons.

8. Objection 2: what is “in summa” takes no more and less (“joins us to the last end”) #

Point: grace cannot be greater by ordering to a greater good, but can by partaking the same good more or less.

• Objection: things at the highest do not take more and less; grace is at the highest because it joins us to the last end, God; so no one’s grace is greater. His illustration: the greatest thing God gave Thomas was himself (the story of Christ’s “what do you want?” — “just you”), and the same for me; music: two hearers of the best music (Mozart) both hear the best, but one has the better ear.
• Reply (he reads it here, ahead of the body): the argument holds for the first way of magnitude; one grace cannot be greater by ordering to a greater good — some thought our end would be to know a separated substance, not God himself — but by more or less partaking the same good; intensity and remission on the side of the subject, both in grace and in final glory. Moon seen with better or worse eyesight; a sensitive wine taster.
• Asides: the Cambridge wine tasting where the “mystery Cabernet” was a dry blueberry wine; the visiting lecturer at Oxford who invented a historic battle (“You fools! I made the whole thing up”); Mondavi at Stanford where nobody drank wine; his California students who grew up drinking wine at table and didn’t just get drunk.

9. Objection 3: grace is the life of the soul (“are all men created equal?”) #

Point: natural life is substantial and takes no more and less; the life of grace is partaken accidentally and so does.

• Objection: grace is the life of the soul; living is not said by more and less; so neither grace.
• Reply: natural life pertains to the substance of man; man partakes the life of grace accidentally — “as opposed to substance, not as opposed to per se.”
• His night-course at Assumption on “all men created equal”: men differ in intelligence, strength (the soldier who trained six months and was beaten again), health (Jimmy the Golden Gloves boxer: “strong but not healthy” — he was stronger, I was healthier), beauty (girls at the mixer; Jimmy, handsome and a great talker, would ask the plain girl: “meant to be a giver, not a taker”). The only equality: all equally men, one not more a man than another, one dog not more a dog — the substantial thing, which is what the Declaration can rest on; in accidents (health, beauty, strength, mind) we are not equal. So the objection argues from the substance of man.

10. Sed contra and body: “God hates equality” (“according to the measure of the giving of Christ”) #

Point: a habit has a twofold magnitude; grace is equal by its object, unequal by the subject, and the first cause of the inequality is God dispensing for the beauty of the Church.

• Sed contra: Ephesians 4, grace given to each according to the measure of Christ’s giving — he measures out more to some. His old teacher Kasurik: “God hates equality” (also: “a poet is a man with his brains kicked out,” which the head of English called “the first definition of poet I agree with”). Task: why does God love inequality? Because he loves diversity.
• Body: a habit has twofold magnitude (“spiritual magnitude,” as he explained the term from SCG): (1) from the end or object — one virtue nobler as ordered to a greater good; (2) from the subject partaking the habit more or less. By the first, grace making us acceptable to God cannot be more or less, since by its very nature it joins man to the highest good, God. By the second it can: one is more perfectly enlightened by the light of grace than another. Reason for the diversity: partly on the side of the one preparing — who prepares more receives fuller grace (why the saints get more out of the Eucharist than we do). But this cannot be the first reason, since preparation is in man only as his free will is prepared by God; so the first cause is on God’s side, dispensing his gifts diversely so that from diverse grades the beauty and perfection of the Church arise, as he instituted diverse grades of things for the perfection of the universe. Ephesians 4 continues: the diverse graces “for the consummation of the saints in the building up of the body of Christ” — like a body where the eye is more interesting than the ear; all eyes would be horrible.
• He adds Thomas’s point that higher creatures perfect lower ones and thereby share a likeness to God: if all were equal none could teach another, a perfection missing in the universe. Fr. Hardon: that is why there are different religious communities. Beauty of the universe is an effect of divine wisdom (the altitude of creatures from power, the beauty from wisdom): beauty is tied to order — composition of a painting, dark and light; a line cut on a furniture edge to catch the light.
• Closing asides: the plain girl at the dance (“she’s got a better heart” — “all’s fair in love and war”); the boy not made for school who is good with his hands; the friend’s son who flunked out of Amherst and was happy with a filling station. “God is not very democratic — no, He’s not a Democrat.”

His words #

• “free judgment” — his rendering of liberum arbitrium, which he finds “funny” beside “free will” [ed.: free choice]
• “the pouring in of grace” — infusion of grace
• “subito” / “paulatim” — suddenly / bit by bit, from a. 2 ad 2
• “honestare” — to make honest/graceful the poor (Ecclesiasticus)
• “hama” — together, at once (Greek), his gloss on hearing-learning-coming in John 6
• “nova creatura” — new creature (Galatians)
• “habitual gift” (habituale donum) — grace as a form of the soul, vs. “aid of God moving the soul to the good”
• “mover” vs. “maker” — Aristotle’s third cause: the mover gives motion, the maker gives a form
• “composed of tools” — his rendering of the definition of soul [ed.: organic body]
• “communicativum sui” — the good is diffusive of itself (Dionysius)
• “non ex necessitate consequitur forma” — the form does not follow of necessity (except through the agent’s power)
• “necessity not of coercion but of infallibility, unfailingness” — a. 3 body
• “certissime liberantur” — most certainly freed (Augustine)
• “in summa” — at the highest, taking no more and less
• “accidentally, as opposed to substance, not as opposed to per se”
• “magnitude” — spiritual magnitude of a habit, twofold: from object, from subject
• “prima causa” — first cause, the order Thomas looks for in the diversity of grace

Texts #

Read in class

• Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 112, a. 2 (objections, replies, sed contra, body)
• Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 112, a. 3 (objections, replies, sed contra, body)
• Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 112, a. 4 (objections, replies, sed contra, body)
• Jude v. 20 (paraphrased)
• John 6:45 (“audivit a Patre et didicit, venit ad me”)
• Hosea, “O Israel, your perdition is from you” (book not named by him; inferred)
• Ephesians 4 (measure of the giving of Christ; building up the body of Christ)

Mentioned

• Romans 4; Acts 9; Ecclesiasticus (subito honestare pauperem); Galatians (nova creatura); Amos 4; 1 Kings 7:3; Proverbs 16:1; Proverbs 8; Romans 5:1 and its gloss; Jeremiah 18:6; Wisdom 6:8
• Anselm, De casu diaboli
• Dionysius, Divine Names, ch. 4
• Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum
• Aristotle on the mover and the maker among the causes; on natural vs. rational powers (works not named)
• Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles: on God’s knowledge of singulars and of the bad; on “magnitude”; on beauty of the universe from divine wisdom (loci not given)
• Shakespeare’s definition of reason (looking before and after)

His questions #

• Whether preparation is required on man’s side for grace? For grace as habitual gift, yes (no form without disposed matter); for grace as God’s moving, no — the moving brings the disposition.
• What did I compare the two senses of grace to in Aristotle’s distinction of causes? The mover (act = motion) vs. the maker (act = form).
• Does the fertilized egg have the rational soul? He thinks the Church has not defined it; perhaps the matter is not yet disposed; left open.
• Is grace given of necessity to one who does what is in him? As from free will, no; as from God moving, yes, with the necessity of infallibility, not coercion.
• Why does Thomas not answer the Dionysius objection by saying grace is above nature? Because he denies the premise: even natural forms follow disposition only through the agent’s power.
• If I’m responsible for the hardness of my heart, am I responsible for its softness? Not completely — no good comes except from God; the first cause of the defect is from us, of the granting from God.
• Does God love Thomas Aquinas more than me? As to the act of love itself, no; as to what is given (mind, memory), yes.
• Is there any truth in “all men are created equal”? All are equally men (substance); in accidents like health, beauty, strength, mind they are not.
• Why does God hate equality? Because from diverse grades the beauty and perfection of the Church and the universe arise, and higher perfecting lower is a likeness to God.