Grace and Merit I: Worthy Merit of Eternal Life (q.114 a.3) and Charity as the Source of Merit (a.4)

Orientation #

He opens by looking back at “article two that we did last time,” on man’s twofold state and the double need of grace (prev. lecture), then takes up article 3 and the first objection of article 4. He does not say what comes next time. The previous class began q. 114 (aa. 1-2, merit and the need of grace); the next continues aa. 4-6 on charity as root of merit and meriting first grace for oneself or another.

The class, in order #

1. Grace and the sacraments (“an outward sign instituted by Christ to give grace”) #

Point: Thomas does not treat the sacraments in this treatise on grace, but the catechism definition of sacrament already shows the connection, which the Tertia Pars will develop (sacraments as tools of Christ).

• The purpose of a definition is to make things clear; it is one kind of discourse. Shakespeare: reason is the ability for discourse. Albert the Great (his “teacher”) divides logic into the art of defining (coming to know the simple unknown) and the art of reasoning (the complex unknown, the statement); the division exhausts the subject and is “a sign of the truth of what Shakespeare said.”
• Anaxagoras: mind distinguishes things and orders them (the second part of that definition).
• Student question: do the angels have grace? Thomas does not say here explicitly. There are no sacraments for the angels, since they have no bodies; sacraments are proportioned to the Word made flesh and to us, “animals that have reason,” who need something sensible. Angels receive grace some other, more direct way.
• Eucharist is the greatest sacrament because it alone contains the source of grace himself (body, blood, soul, divinity); the power is in the others.
• Thomas’s division of the New Testament: it is about grace; origin of grace (Gospels), nature of grace (Epistles of Paul), effect of grace (Acts, canonical Epistles, Apocalypse): beginning, middle, end.
• Mother Angelica’s saying (not exact words): faith gets you going, hope helps you persist, charity gets you there; he matches it to Thomas: faith makes you know the goal, hope tend to it, charity unites you to it; “I doubt you got it from Thomas,” just common sense.
• Aside: converts on “Journey Home” discovering the sacramental life.

2. Article 3 stated: condignus and congruus (“what’s the English word for dignus”) #

Point: the article asks whether man in grace merits eternal life ex condigno; he first gets the two terms into English.

• dignus vs. congruus: dignus = “worthy” (less elevated than “dignity,” but that is the word): you are really worthy of the reward because of your merits. congruus: the students offer “agreement or harmony”; he prefers “fitting”: it is fitting to God that he give the reward he promised. Boundary case (a student): the workers who came at the end of the day get the same as those who worked all day; in some way it is really owed to them.
• Necessity of grace for merit was settled already; the question now is more particular: by fittingness or by worth.

3. Objection 1 and reply: the sufferings of the saints (“the passions of this time”) #

Point: “the apostle” (Rom 8) says the sufferings of this time are not condign to the future glory; but the sufferings of the saints are the most meritorious works; so no work merits ex condigno.

• Reply: Paul speaks of the sufferings according to their substance, not as informed by grace and the Holy Spirit.
• “The apostle” is antonomasia for Paul (sometimes Peter too). Parallel from Thomas on John: the devil is called “the homicide” by antonomasia; Latin names the criminal where English names only the crime. Aside: abortion as homicide, the devil’s campaign.

4. Objection 2 and reply: “the grace of God, eternal life” (“the first cause of arriving at eternal life”) #

Point: the gloss on Rom 6 says it is not “the wages of justice, eternal life” but “by the grace of God, eternal life,” so that we understand God leads us by mercy, not by our merits; “by my merits, eternal life” sounds Pelagian.

• Gloss is from Augustine (the Enchiridion, per the Marietti footnote); aside on the Marietti edition’s parallel-text references vs. the Leonine.
• Reply: the gloss concerns the first cause of arriving at eternal life, the mercy of God; our merit is a subsequent cause. “Very subtle, that Thomas.” Never forget it all started from him; be thankful. Augustine elsewhere: he who made you without you will not save you without you.
• He connects the text from Jude (building up in faith, hope, charity, then mercy, eleos) as pointing to mercy even where merit is only fitting.

5. Objection 3 and reply: grace equal to glory in power (“equal in virtute”) #

Point: condign merit would equal its reward, but no act of this life equals eternal life, which exceeds our knowledge and desire (“eye has not seen,” entering not even the heart, i.e. the will); it exceeds the charity of the way as it exceeds nature (hence “we shall be like him,” being like him now only inferiorly).

• Reply: the grace of the Holy Spirit, though not equal to glory in act, is equal in virtute (power); as the seed of a tree has the power of the whole tree. Show a child the acorn: “this tree came from one of these”; “I don’t believe that.”
• “The acorn question”: is the acorn an oak tree? He says no; the packet of seeds is not broccoli. Student: same life, first stage of the tree’s life, “a holistic process.” He proposes the analogous distinction: not the tree in act, but equal to it in power, so that destroying the seed is in a way destroying the tree. Applied to the pro-life debate: is the fertilized egg a human being, or more accurately the seed of one? Left as a “tough question.”
• Through grace the Holy Spirit inhabits man, a sufficient cause of eternal life, hence “the pledge of our inheritance” (2 Cor 1:22). “Sufficient cause” seems to say condign. He flags the connection: “that’s something that is important to see”: the Holy Spirit studied in the Prima Pars is now tied to grace. Grace is the gift by which we possess the one whose name is Gift.

6. Sed contra: the crown of justice (“a crown of justice, which the Lord will render”) #

Point: what is rendered according to just judgment is a condign reward (justice strictly is what you are obligated to because you owe it); eternal life is rendered by God the just judge (2 Tim, Paul speaking of himself). “A beautiful sed contra… gold star.”

• Aside: the Jesuits’ founder insisted they follow Thomas, “but they don’t seem to follow all the time.”

7. The respondeo: two ways of considering the meritorious work (“on account of the maximum inequality”) #

Point: the work is considered (a) as proceeding from free will, (b) as proceeding from the grace of the Holy Spirit.

1. As from free will and according to its substance: no condignity, on account of the maximum inequality (“it can’t be more unequal”). His old teacher: “God hates equality”; if we demanded equality we would be lost.
2. Yet a certain congruity, on account of an equality of proportion: it is fitting that man doing what he can according to his power be recompensed by God according to the excellence of God’s own power. Example from the military-history magazine: the officer in the 18th-century “potato war” rewarded by the Empire with lifelong nobility, according to the excellence of the emperor.
3. As from the grace of the Holy Spirit: meritorious ex condigno, because the value of the merit is measured by the power of the Holy Spirit moving us to eternal life (John 4:14, a fountain of water “jumping up” into eternal life) and by the dignity of grace, by which man is made a sharer of the divine nature and adopted son of God, to whom the inheritance is owed by right of adoption (Rom 8, “sons, then heirs”). Illustration: As You Like It, the younger son kept from his inheritance by the older brother. Conclusion: “got all the distinctions down,” when to affirm and when to deny: from free will, fitting only (equality of proportion: you do your thing and Daddy gives something much greater); from the Holy Spirit, condign as a seed, equal in power not in act.

• Digression on misery: he answered himself that misery would be never to see God face to face; Augustine (as Thomas quotes him): miserable the man who knows all things but not God, blessed who knows God even if nothing else. Greek ghost stories: philosophers read ghosts at graves as souls attached to bodily pleasure, frustrated at not getting back into the body; his frustration would be not seeing God.
• Student question: does Islam have any sense of joy in being with Allah? He: they have no idea that you can see God; student and he agree the secular and Islamic worlds both have walls founded on irrationality; our faith would make sense to Aristotle.
• Aside: just read SCG (book 2, ch. 61) refuting Averroes on the possible understanding, then a chapter showing Aristotle does not hold Averroes’s opinion.
• Translation aside: “goes forward” for procedere; “way of proceeding” hides the plain sense; you have almost to put it in English before you understand it.

8. Article 4, objection 1: reward is owed to work (“call the workers, and render them their reward”) #

Point: reward is owed to work (Matt 20:8); every virtue is a beginning of some work (virtue is a habit that does something); so each virtue is equally a beginning of merit, not charity chiefly.

• Reply: charity, having the last end for its object (charity is in the will, whose object is the good, and the end is chiefly the good), moves all the other virtues to their acts; always the habit to which the end pertains commands the habits to which the means pertain. Aristotle at the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics: the art aimed at the last end commands the other arts; the wise man commands others because he aims at the last end.
• MacArthur: in war there is no substitute for victory; the general aims at victory and commands; the soldier aims only at the man coming over the hill.
• Master chef and the potato-peeler: the one aiming at the best French fries commands the shape of the cut. Aside: a famous chef said McDonald’s makes the best French fries.
• Aside (from the ex-Marine’s question): is it good moral theology to say “God have mercy on him”? Yes; the Revolutionary-War minister (“may God have mercy on your soul, because I have none on your body”), Erwin Milton praying for enemies before shooting, Joan of Arc, the bumper stickers “Marines with a sword” / “Pray the rosary for peace.”
• Asides: the Trivium/Cyprian dinners.

9. His objection: is the logician the wise man? (“logic is wisdom then”) #

Point: a test case of “the one who directs the others is the wise man.”

1. Logic considers the common way of going forward in reasoned-out knowledge (Thomas); the logician teaches defining, dividing, demonstrating (Thomas’s “three Ds”); so he directs every science.
2. The one who directs everybody else is the wise man. Ergo logic is wisdom.

• Students: “it’s not the last end”; “depends on what and how he’s directing.” He presses: Aristotle (second book of the Metaphysics [ed.: he says “book of wisdom”]) says you must know the road before acquiring a reasoned-out knowledge, and the road differs in geometry, natural science, ethics; philosophy is a methodos (knowledge over a road); episteme from the Greek for stopping, hence his rendering “reasoned-out knowledge.” Thomas there: as each science has its private road, so logic, the common road, is learned before all; the Laval logic professor used this text to open the course.
• His answer: there are three roads, and the objection leaves out the natural road, from what is more known to us to what is more known by nature (Aristotle at the beginning of the Physics); the wise man sees this and so directs the others even as to the road. His doctoral thesis: Aristotle vs. Descartes on the private, common and natural roads.
• Still, logic is close to wisdom by its universality and immateriality. Dionne: logic prepares for wisdom; Kasurik: no, natural philosophy does (knowing causes, reasoning to the unmoved mover and the immortality of the soul). Both true in different ways: natural philosophy precedes as to existence of immaterial things; logic disposes more as to resolving to the understanding and considering immaterial things.
• Closing: so the basic reason charity is more important than any other virtue: it moves all the others to the end.
• Asides: Kasurik introducing him to Dionne and De Koninck (“compared to Aristotle I’ve got the brain of an Averroes”); Thomas’s respect for Aristotle while refuting Averroes.

His words #

• “ability for discourse”: Shakespeare’s account of reason; discourse divided into defining and reasoning.
• “the simple unknown / the complex unknown”: Albert’s division of logic into defining and reasoning.
• ex condigno / condignus: “worthy”; merit equal in some sense to the reward.
• congruus / congruity: “fitting” (students: agreement, harmony); equality of proportion only.
• antonomasia: “the apostle” for Paul; “the homicide” for the devil.
• causa subsequent: our merit, after mercy the first cause.
• “equal in virtute”: equal in power, not in act (seed and tree).
• “goes forward”: his rendering of procedere [ed.: proceeds].
• “the excellence of his own power”: God recompensing according to his own excellence.
• methodos: knowledge over a road.
• episteme: from stopping; his rendering “reasoned-out knowledge” [ed.: science].
• “three Ds”: defining, dividing, demonstrating.
• private road / common road / natural road: the three ways of going forward in knowledge.

Texts #

Read in class

• Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 114, a. 3 (objections, replies, sed contra, body)
• Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 114, a. 4, obj. 1 and ad 1
• Romans 8 (sufferings not condign; sons and heirs); Romans 6 with the Augustine gloss (Enchiridion, per footnote)
• 2 Corinthians 1:22; 2 Timothy (crown of justice); John 4:14; Matthew 20:8 Mentioned
• Thomas, Tertia Pars (sacraments); Thomas, prologue dividing the New Testament (locus not stated)
• Thomas, Commentary on John (devil the homicide); Summa Contra Gentiles II, ch. 61 (Averroes)
• Augustine (he who made you without you; miserable the man who knows all things but not God)
• Epistle of Jude (faith, hope, charity, mercy)
• Albert the Great, on logic; Anaxagoras (mind); Shakespeare (reason as discourse); As You Like It
• Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I; Metaphysics II (inferred; he says “second book of wisdom”); Physics I
• Mother Angelica (sayings)

His questions #

• Do the angels have grace, and are there sacraments for them? They need grace but have no sacraments (no bodies); they receive it more directly.
• What is the English word for dignus? for congruus? Worthy; fitting (students: agreement, harmony).
• Is the acorn an oak tree? (and so: is the fertilized egg a human being?) He says no, not in act; equal to it in power, as grace to glory; the human case left open.
• How is Thomas going to answer the third objection? Grace is equal to glory in virtute, not in act; the Holy Spirit inhabiting us is a sufficient cause.
• What would misery be? Never to see God face to face.
• Does Islam have any sense of the joy of being with God? No idea that God can be seen; left there.
• If the logician directs all the other sciences, isn’t logic wisdom? No: the objection leaves out the natural road, which the wise man sees; logic only disposes for wisdom.
• Why is charity more important than any other virtue? Having the last end as object, it moves all the others to the end.