Summa Theologiae I-II, Q.114, Articles 6-10: Restoring Grace, and Whether Merit Increases Charity and Perseverance

Orientation #

He refers back to the maxim from a former Dominican’s teacher (“I told you the story there”), to Thomas’s habit of distinguishing in his replies, and to meriting first grace for another (prev. lecture). No next time is announced; he closes: “we’re going to be through with this… a little break now.” The previous class treated q. 114 aa. 4-6 (charity as root of merit, meriting first grace for oneself or another), distinguishing condign and congruous merit.

The class, in order #

1. Opening prayer: thank first, then ask (“Christ, you know, prays first”) #

Point: he defends putting thanks before petition in the opening prayer.

• Thomas approves saying thank you first for what one has already received; in John 11 (raising of Lazarus) Christ thanks the Father before asking.
• Aside: he began putting thanks first only because he kept forgetting to say it afterwards, and was glad to find he was following our Lord’s order.

2. A “little objection to our Lord”: why not distinguish? (“the Father and I are one”) #

Point: he tests the maxim “never affirm, seldom deny, always distinguish” against Christ’s own words.

1. Thomas nearly always begins a reply by distinguishing.
2. Christ says “the Father and I are one” without distinguishing “one God” from “one person”; a Sabellian (Father, Son, Spirit one person named differently for different doings) could take it his way.
3. Thomas would say: one God, not one person; you both affirm and deny they are one. Student replies and his answers:

• “He says ’the Father and I’, so there is some distinction.” Reply: Sabellius could still say one person; like being grandfather and philosopher, two names for one person.
• “Elsewhere he says the Father sent me.” Reply: that brings in another text; here he does not distinguish.
• “He is making a claim of divinity in a particular context.” Reply: it still does not distinguish; and to a Jewish monotheistic hearer, “we’re one but different persons” might sound like polytheism (student’s point, which he accepts).
• John’s opening: “the Word was toward God” (toward implies distinction) “and the Word was God” (unity) does distinguish; he says this “doesn’t satisfy me” as an answer for Christ’s saying. His own suggestion: recall simpliciter vs. secundum quid. “I am” is true without qualification even though “I am not in my car”; substance is being simply, relation something secundum quid. Father and Son are one in the divine nature (substance) and differ by relation, though in God relation is not a different thing from the divine substance. So there may be more reason to say “we are one” than “we are not one.” “Think about that a little bit… I’m struck by that.”
• Aside: “the Father is in me and I in the Father” says almost the same as “we are one”: the Word is the thought of God, and a thought is in the thinker.

3. Article 7: reparation after a lapse (“merit what reparation after a lapse”) #

Point: no one merits his own reparation after a future fall, neither ex condigno nor ex congruo. Obj. 1: what is justly asked of God can be merited; nothing more justly asked than reparation (Augustine; Psalm 70, “when my strength fails do not abandon me”). Reply: the desire and prayer are “just” because they tend to justice, not because based on justice; “you got to distinguish the sense in which it’s said to be just.” Obj. 2: one can merit reparation (and first grace) for another, so much more for oneself. Reply: for another it is ex congruo, and there is no impediment in the one meriting; the lapsed man has the impediment himself. He notes the objection is “not too hard.” Obj. 3: one act of charity merits eternal life; one cannot reach it without reparation; so the lapsed man has merited reparation. He restates it in the first person (“I’ve merited eternal life; I won’t get there without being repaired”); a student: “sounds like the prodigal.” Reply (Thomas rejects the view, footnoted “cf. Bonaventure”, which he warns does not mean Bonaventure holds it, that only the act of final grace merits absolutely, on condition of perseverance): unreasonable, since the last act is sometimes less meritorious (oppression of sickness). Rather each act of charity merits eternal life absolutely, but subsequent sin places an impediment so it does not achieve its effect, as natural causes fail of their effect when impeded (the stone falls unless something stops it; joke: “one thing we know is it’s not going to spin on its axis”). Sed contra: Ezekiel 18:24, the just man who turns to iniquity, “all his justices I will not remember”; “that’s pretty rough.” So prior merits avail nothing for rising again. Body: ex condigno, because merit depends on the motion of divine grace, interrupted by the following sin; later benefits do not fall under the earlier motion. Ex congruo, because even for another it is impeded by sin in the one for whom one merits; here impediments in merit-er and merited-for coincide in one person.

• Asides: “I wonder what Pope Francis would say about this”; the Denzinger note (“the just merits eternal life… if he dies in grace”) he cannot look up.

4. Article 8: growth of grace or charity (“hasn’t lost the source of merit”) #

Point: growth of grace is merited ex condigno; the cases are not parallel with a. 7 since here the source of merit is not lost. Obj. 1: once the reward is received nothing more is owed (“they have received their reward,” Matthew 6). Reply: the reward is the term of merit, but a motion has two terms, the last, and a middle one that is both end of what precedes and beginning of what follows; growth is a middle term, eternal life the last (as for those “constituted in the end,” who receive no further reward). Sed contra: Augustine on the Epistle of John: charity merits to be increased, and increased merits to be perfected. Obj. 2 (“a little more for a philosopher”): nothing acts beyond its form; grace is the source of merit; so no one merits greater grace than he has. Reply: the increase is above the quantity of pre-existing grace but not above its power. Seed and tree: the tree exceeds the seed in quantity, not in the seed’s power; the premises of geometry are much less than the first book in quantity, but in power extend to its conclusions. “That’s kind of an interesting distinction.” Obj. 3: each act informed by charity would then merit growth, and what one merits one infallibly gets (2 Timothy 1, “I know whom I have believed… able to keep what I have committed to him”); but some meritorious acts are not fervent enough. Reply: each act merits increase as it merits eternal life, but as eternal life is given in its time, so grace is increased in its time, when one is sufficiently disposed. Illustrations: confirmation received outside grace takes effect when grace is restored (student); reading the Summa Contra Gentiles twice, the first reading disposes you to see in the second what you missed (also the Latin word order differing from English); De Koninck’s humility when Deanna pointed something out (“how could I have taught this all these years and not seen this?”); a dry soul keeps praying, fervor comes, then perhaps the increase of grace (Teresa of Avila; diabolical torment as sign “a big fish is coming”). Body: what falls under condign merit is what the motion of grace extends to; a mover’s motion extends not only to the last term but to the whole progress; the term is eternal life (“spring up into eternal life,” John), the progress is growth of charity. Proverbs 4:18, the path of the just like a splendid light growing to the perfect day (glory): the sun rising, “not the earth turning on its axis”; Shakespeare’s sonnets on the sun’s golden face. “It’s a marvelous thing.” Meriting eternal life, you merit the stepping stone.

5. Article 9: perseverance (“perseverance of the road”) #

Point: perseverance of glory is merited as term of the motion; perseverance on the road is not, since it depends solely on the divine motion, the beginning of all merit. Obj. 1: what one obtains by asking falls under merit; we ask perseverance in the Lord’s Prayer (“thy kingdom come,” Augustine). Reply: we also ask what we do not merit; God hears sinners asking forgiveness (Augustine on John 9, “God does not hear sinners”; the publican in Luke was heard); “forgive us our trespasses” daily. Student: this justifies “God is more ready to give than we are to ask.” Obj. 2: not being able to sin is greater than not sinning, and impeccability belongs to the definition of merited eternal life; so one can merit not to sin, i.e. persevere. Reply: perseverance in glory is compared to the meritorious motion as its term; perseverance of the road is not. Joke: the deathbed saint, “Ah, I shall sin no more.” Obj. 3: growth of grace is greater than perseverance and is merited. Reply deferred to the body; he does not return to it explicitly. Sed contra: many with meritorious works do not obtain perseverance, and this cannot be from the impediment of sin, since sinning is opposed to perseverance; if merited, God would not permit the fall. Body: free will is flexible to good and bad; perseverance comes two ways: free will determined to good by consummate grace in glory (the will filled, “no room for anything else but God”, fuller than the stomach at Thanksgiving), or the divine motion inclining man to good usque in finem on the road. What is merited is compared to the motion of free will as term, not what is compared to it as beginning; so glory’s perseverance is merited, the road’s is not; God gives the gift gratuitously to whom he gives it (largitur).

• Denzinger citations at the foot: Council of Arausio (Orange), God’s aid to be implored for the reborn that they perdure, the gift only from him who makes the standing stand and the fallen rise; one cannot know one’s perseverance with infallible certitude without special revelation; Trent (Denzinger 826): anathema on whoever says one can persevere without special aid. “A sober thought.” Old editions of Denzinger number differently; Columba Marmion did his table reading in Denzinger.

6. Article 10: temporal goods, objections (“temporal goods come under what merit”) #

Point: the objections and sed contra, with a digression on senses of “true.” Obj. 1: temporal goods promised in the old law as reward (Deuteronomy 28). Reply: Augustine contra Faustum bk. 4, the temporal promises figured future spiritual things; carnal people cleave to present promises. Digression: Thomas in the John commentary gives senses of “true” by opposites: true vs. false, true vs. figure, true as what is so essentially vs. by participation (Christ true Son of God; we sons by participation). Aristotle’s rule in the logic: a word with more than one opposite has more than one meaning; “liberal” vs. conservative, vs. servile, vs. stingy, so three meanings. “A very important rule.” Obj. 2: God repays service with temporal goods: the midwives feared God and he built them houses (Exodus 1; Gregory’s Moralia gloss: benignity of God, temporal recompense for the lie); the king of Babylon served against Tyre and got Egypt (Ezekiel 29). Reply: these repayments are made with respect to the divine motion, not to the malice of the will; the king wished dominion, not to serve God; the midwives had good will for the boys but not for the lie. “An odd reply.” Obj. 3: demerit of sins brings temporal punishments; so goods come under merit. Reply: temporal evils are punishments for the impious (not aided toward eternal life) but medicines for the just. Sed contra: Ecclesiastes 9, all things come equally to just and impious. Reply (4): equal as to substance of the goods, not as to end, since the good are led by the hand (manuductio, Monsignor’s word) to beatitude. Aside: Prima Secundae treats morals in communi, Secunda Secundae in particular.

7. Article 10, body: good simpliciter vs. secundum quid (“that which comes under merit is a reward”) #

Point: temporal goods are merited simpliciter as useful to eternal life, otherwise only secundum quid.

1. A reward has the notion of good; man’s good is twofold: simpliciter (the last end, Psalm 72 “for me to adhere to God is good”, and what leads there) and secundum quid (good for him now, in some respect).
2. Temporal goods as useful to works leading to eternal life fall directly under merit, like growth of grace; God gives the just of temporal goods and evils as is expedient (Paul’s thorn keeping him from swelling at his revelations); Psalm 33 those fearing God lack no good; Psalm 36 “I have not seen a just man…” (“sounds like the guy talking to Job”).
3. Considered as such they are goods secundum quid and merited secundum quid, as reward with respect to the divine motion moving men’s wills to pursue them, even when the intention is not right (“work hard, you get ahead”). Close: “Haec de moralibus in communi dicta sufficienter”: the reward for finishing is common, not particular, knowledge of morality.

His words #

• “seldom affirm, never affirm, seldom deny, always distinguish”: the Dominican maxim he tests against Christ’s speech.
• Sabellian: one who makes Father, Son, Spirit one person under three names.
• simpliciter / secundum quid: being or good without qualification vs. in some respect; applied to “I am” vs. “I am not in my car,” and to substance vs. relation.
• merit of worth / merit of fitting: his renderings of ex condigno / ex congruo.
• reparation after a lapse: restoration after falling into sin.
• impediment: what stops a merit achieving its effect (subsequent sin).
• last term / middle term of motion: end of the whole vs. a term that is also a beginning.
• power vs. quantity of grace: the lesser grace extends in power to the greater it does not equal in size.
• perseverance of glory / of the road: consummate grace filling the will vs. divine motion inclining to good until the end.
• largitur: God bestows perseverance gratuitously.
• true (three senses): vs. false, vs. figure, essentially vs. by participation.
• manuductio: being led by the hand to beatitude.
• in communi / in particulari: the Prima vs. Secunda Secundae’s treatment of morals.

Texts #

Read in class

• Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 114, a. 7 (objections, replies, sed contra, body)
• Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 114, a. 8 (objections, replies, sed contra, body)
• Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 114, a. 9 (objections, replies, sed contra, body); Denzinger notes on Orange and Trent (826)
• Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 114, a. 10 (objections, replies, sed contra, body)
• Ezekiel 18:24; Proverbs 4:18; 2 Timothy 1 (English and Latin compared)

Mentioned

• John 11 (Lazarus); John 1; “the Father and I are one”; “the Father is in me”; John 9; Luke (publican); Psalm 70; Matthew 6; Augustine on the Epistle of John; Augustine on the Lord’s Prayer; Augustine, Contra Faustum bk. 4; Deuteronomy 28; Exodus 1 with Gregory’s Moralia; Ezekiel 29; Ecclesiastes 9; Psalms 72, 33, 36; Thomas’s commentary on John (senses of “true”); Aristotle’s logic (rule of opposites); Summa Contra Gentiles; Shakespeare’s sonnets; Teresa of Avila; Columba Marmion.

His questions #

• Why doesn’t Christ distinguish “one God” from “one person” when he says the Father and I are one? Left open; his suggestion: substance is being simply, relation secundum quid, so there is more reason to affirm oneness.
• Can I, by one act of charity, merit eternal life? Yes, each act merits it absolutely, but subsequent sin impedes the effect.
• What would you think Thomas is going to say about growth of grace; are the two cases parallel? No: the one meriting increase has not lost the source of merit.
• Is the increase of grace beyond the power of the lesser grace? No, beyond its quantity only, as the tree exceeds the seed.
• Am I understanding the Summa Contra Gentiles better this time than last? Not always, but the first reading disposes you to see something in the second.
• Do temporal goods come under merit? Simpliciter as useful toward eternal life; otherwise secundum quid.
• What is the opposite of liberal? Conservative, servile, stingy: three opposites, three meanings.
• What reward do you get for finishing this question? Common, not particular, knowledge of morals.