Habitual Grace Follows the Union (Q.7, a.13); Mixing Up Word Senses; Introduction to Q.8 on Christ as Head of the Church

Orientation #

He refers back to “the previous article” (a.12, prev. lecture): Christ has this amount of grace because it is ordered to the personal union. He recalls that at the start of q.7 Thomas distinguished three graces (as individual man, as head of the Church, grace of union) and that the grace of union was treated under the Incarnation. He ends: “got to wait till next week” for q.8 a.1. The next class works through q.8 on Christ as head of the Church.

The class, in order #

1. Article 13: the three objections and the sed contra (“the same thing does not follow upon itself”) #

Point: Is Christ’s habitual grace subsequent to the grace of union? The objections say no.

• Obj. 1: nothing follows upon itself; but Augustine (On the Predestination of the Saints) says the grace by which any man becomes a Christian from the beginning of faith is that by which “that man from the beginning was made Christ”, i.e. habitual grace and grace of union are the same. He calls the text “a little obscure” and glosses “made Christ” as anointed, the Word made flesh.
• Obj. 2: disposition precedes perfection in time or at least in understanding; habitual grace is a disposition of human nature for the personal union. He links this to a.12 (prev. lecture): Christ has this amount of grace because ordered to the union.
• Obj. 3: the common is before the private; habitual grace is common to Christ and other men, the grace of union private to Christ (“He alone has the hypostatic union”).
• Sed contra: Isaiah 42, “Behold my servant, I have taken him up,” and after it “I gave my spirit upon him,” which pertains to habitual grace; so the assumption of human nature precedes.

2. The body: precedence in the order of nature and understanding, first reason (“according to the order of the principles of both”) #

Point: the union (= grace of union, already treated under the Incarnation, which is why it gets no separate question) precedes habitual grace, not in the order of time (“there’s no time in which he was incarnate before he had habitual grace”) but in the order of nature and understanding, for three reasons. First reason, from the principles of each:

1. The beginning of the union is the person of the Son assuming human nature; in this respect the Son is said to be sent into the world.
2. The beginning of habitual grace, given with charity, is the Holy Spirit, said to be sent in that he inhabits the mind by charity. Aside: the Spirit does not himself change when he inhabits you; he is said to come to you by reason of the gift of love, by a new effect.
3. The sending of the Son is before the sending of the Spirit in the order of nature, as the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son (Augustine’s ordo naturae); only the persons that proceed from another are said to be sent, not the Father.
4. So the personal union (mission of the Son) is before habitual grace (mission of the Spirit). He calls this “kind of a subtle thing” and “the first one is a little more difficult”. Supporting text he adds: “unless I leave the Holy Spirit won’t come” — Christ’s coming is before the Spirit’s full coming at Pentecost.

3. Second reason: grace and its cause (“light in the air from the presence of the sun”) #

Point: grace is caused in man by the presence of the divinity, as light in the air by the sun (Ezekiel 43: the glory of God entered through the eastern way and the earth shone from his majesty). God’s presence in Christ is understood by the union; so habitual grace follows the union as splendour follows the sun rising. He notes this is “pretty clear”, and connects it to John: because he is the only-begotten of the Father, he is full of grace and truth. Aside on French se coucher, the sun “going to bed”.

4. Third reason: grace is ordered to acting (“actions are of individual substances”) #

1. Grace is ordered to acting well; actions belong to supposita, individuals.
2. So action, and grace ordered to action, presupposes the hypostasis acting.
3. But no human hypostasis is presupposed in Christ’s human nature for the union (“that has to be pushed out of the way”); the person here is by the hypostatic union, which is the grace of union.
4. So the grace of union is understood before the grace disposing one to act. Illustration: Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am” — you must be an individual substance before you can do anything; even if it always acted, there is still an order of nature. Student remark: “They’re convincing me, Thomas.” He: “Difficult, huh?” — “I rest my case. Well, Thomas rests his case.”

5. Aside: fire as a metaphor (“Fire is sometimes a metaphor for the divine nature”) #

Fire for the divine nature: light = divine understanding, heat = divine love or power. Fire for the Trinity: the substance of fire = the Father, from whom proceed light (Son) and heat (Spirit); light is seen as proceeding before heat, fire giving heat through its light. Applied to faith and charity: the sun enlightens the world before it warms it, so God enlightens the mind by faith before warming the heart by charity.

6. Reply to obj. 1: senses of “grace”; digression on mixing up senses (“the most common mistake is the one for mixing up”) #

Point: Augustine names “grace” the gratuitous will of God bestowing benefits without merit; in that sense the grace by which a man becomes Christian and the grace by which Christ is made man are the same, both gratuitous. So the objector mixes up “two or three different senses of grace” — “shame on him”. Aside on “grace” as favour: “you are in my good graces” — the new translations’ “favor” is not outside the word’s meanings. Digression, the Philosopher (Sophistical Refutations): the most common mistake is mixing up senses of a word.

• His four senses of “before” (from Aristotle’s text, taught with Shakespeare’s definition of reason): in time; in being (this can be without that, not vice versa); in the discourse of reason; in goodness. He warns students they will mix them, and they do: “is it better to philosophize or to breathe?” — they say breathe, because you can’t philosophize without breathing; that shows before in being, not in goodness. Counter-examples: water can be without beer or wine, is it better? Piled bricks can be without a brick wall, are they better? They confuse the second and fourth sense.
• Whole and part: “the whole is more than a part”; but animal is only part of what man is (animal with reason), and animal includes dog, cat, horse — so “the part is more than the whole”? Two wholes confused: the universal whole (animal said of more than dog) vs. the composed whole (the definition, of which animal is a part, always more than one composing part). So one can build an argument against an axiom by mixing senses; that is why the Philosopher devotes the whole fifth book of wisdom to distinguishing senses of words used everywhere, especially in wisdom and the axioms, and uses the same dialectical tool elsewhere.
• Rule from the book on places: look at the opposite. “Liberal”: opposed to conservative (politics), to stingy (Ethics IV), to servile (liberal arts) — three opposites, three meanings. Asides: political conservatives give more to charity; a political liberal is “generous with other people’s money”; liberal professors voting their pocketbook on faculty raises; the cars Marxist historians drive.

7. Reply to obj. 2: disposition in the way of generation vs. property (“just as the heat, which was a disposition for the form of fire”) #

Point: disposition precedes the perfection it disposes for in the way of generation, in things perfected gradually; but it follows a perfection already achieved. Famous example: heat disposes matter for the form of fire, yet once the form is there, heat is an effect flowing from it as a property. So “is heat before or after fire?” — after, as property, once the nature is had; before, as disposition, while it is being acquired. But human nature was united to the Word from the beginning without succession in time; so habitual grace is not a prior disposition but falls upon the union as a natural property; hence Augustine (Enchiridion): grace is in a way natural to the man Christ. He stresses: thinking of habitual grace as disposing for the union means imagining a human nature “out here” being made suitable — but such a nature by itself would be a human person; that nature never existed except in union with the second Person. Hence habitual grace is always an effect flowing from the union. Parallel from Thomas on dialectic and demonstration: for us, who come to truth gradually, dialectic is a disposition for knowing the truth; once one has demonstration, one more easily sees the probable arguments that prepared it; for God, who knows the truth eternally, dialectic is in no way a disposition, yet he knows the probable arguments better than we do. “That’s a very subtle thing, but it’s a common thing in philosophy.” Asides: “Read him enough, things become clear”; the story of Thomas sitting quietly when students objected and gradually explaining, “one fond old man”.

8. Reply to obj. 3: common before private only within a genus (“the common is before the private if both are of one genus”) #

Point: the objection has some truth in development (fertilized egg: growth first, then sensing, then reason). But the common is before the private only if both are of one genus; across diverse genera the private may be before. The grace of union is not in the genus of habitual grace, not even a super-excellent habitual grace, but above every genus, like the divine person; so this private thing is before the common, not by addition to the common (as man adds to animal) but as the beginning and origin of the common — the source of the whole genus of habitual grace, Christ’s and ours. Translation note: he renders proprium “private”, not “proper” (student’s translation queried); bonum commune / bonum proprium should be common good and private good.

9. Proemium of q. 8: Christ’s grace as head of the Church (“about this, eight things are asked”) #

Point: after the grace of union (treated with the Incarnation) and habitual grace (q.7), the grace of Christ as head of the Church. Eight questions: (1) whether Christ is head of the Church; (2) head of men as to body or only soul — “unusual”; (3) head of all men — “some bad guys out there”; (4) head of angels — not human. These four all concern being a head: (2) the composing parts of man, (3) the subject parts, everything man is said of, angels added as superior. (5) whether the grace by which he is head is the same as his habitual grace as singular man — “a very interesting question”, really distinct; (6) whether being head is private (proprium) to Christ — “what about Benedict the Sixteenth?”; a distinction to be seen. (7) and (8) divided against the rest, the opposite: whether the devil is head of all the bad (Screwtape Letters), whether the Antichrist is head of all the bad — perhaps a distinction between devil and Antichrist like that between Christ and his vicar. Asides: Anaxagoras “like a sober man” for saying mind is the origin, attributing to mind distinction and order; Thomas always sees a distinction and an order before him. Story: a mother superior introduced to John XXIII as “mother superior of the Holy Spirit”; “I am just a humble vicar of Christ.” Article 1 next week.

His words #

• grace of union; the very union of human nature to the divine person, no separate question since treated under the Incarnation
• habitual grace; grace given with charity, whose principle is the Holy Spirit
• order of nature and understanding vs. order of time; ordo naturae (Augustine)
• sending / mission; said only of the persons that proceed from another
• supposita, hypostasis; individual substances, to which actions belong
• way of generation (“road of generation”); order in which a disposition precedes the perfection
• four senses of “before”: in time, in being, in the discourse of reason, in goodness
• universal whole vs. composed whole
• “the fifth book of wisdom” [ed.: Metaphysics V]; “the book on places” [ed.: Topics]
• proprium, “private” (his rendering) [ed.: usually "proper"]; bonum commune / bonum proprium
• “the Philosopher” for Aristotle

Texts #

Read in class

• Thomas Aquinas, ST III q.7 a.13, objections, sed contra, body, replies (verified source)
• Thomas Aquinas, ST III q.8, proemium (verified source, “q. 8”)
• Isaiah 42 (in sed contra); Ezekiel 43 (in body)
• Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints and Enchiridion (as quoted by Thomas)
• probably handout “The Matter and Order of Wisdom”, p. 11, and DHB Vol III p. 460 (verified sources; likely the digression on senses of “before” and whole/part, inferred)

Mentioned

• John (only-begotten, full of grace and truth); Christ’s saying “unless I leave the Holy Spirit won’t come”
• Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations; Topics; Metaphysics V (inferred); Ethics IV on the liberal man
• Descartes, “I think, therefore I am”; C. S. Lewis, Screwtape Letters; Anaxagoras via Aristotle

His questions #

• Does habitual grace precede the union in time? No; only the union precedes, in the order of nature and understanding.
• Is it better to philosophize or to breathe? Breathing is before in being, not in goodness; the students confuse the senses.
• Is a whole more than a part, given that animal (part of man) includes more than man? Two senses of whole confused: universal vs. composed.
• How does your translation translate proprium? Student: “proper”; he prefers “private”.
• Is heat before or after fire? After, as a property, once the nature is had; before, as a disposition, while being acquired.
• Is Benedict XVI head of the Church? Left open; “some distinction to be seen there” (q.8 a.6, next week).
• Is there a distinction between the devil and the Antichrist as heads of the bad? Left open; suggested as parallel to Christ and his vicar.