Summa III, Q. 21: The Prayer of Christ – Whether He Prayed, Through His Sense Nature, for Himself, and Whether He Was Always Heard

Orientation #

He opens straight into the prologue of q. 21, noting that “this has been said in the second part” for the definition of prayer, and that he had set up this question earlier. The previous class treated q. 20 on Christ’s subjection to the Father and closed by setting up this question on Christ’s prayer.

The class, in order #

1. The prologue and the four articles (“about the prayer of Christ”) #

The four questions: whether it belongs to Christ to pray; whether it belongs to him according to his sensuality — “his animal nature, right? That’s strange”; whether for himself or only for others; whether every prayer of his was heard. On the third he notes John 17 gives three prayers: for himself, for the apostles, for those who will believe through the apostles.

2. Article 1, objections (“prayer is the asking of suitable things from God”) #

Three objections read:

1. Damascene’s definition (a definition “used a lot by Thomas”); but Christ could do all things, so need ask nothing.
2. One does not pray for what one knows certainly will happen (“just as we do not pray that the sun will rise tomorrow — maybe we should, I don’t know”), nor for what one knows will not happen; Christ knew all futures.
3. Damascene’s second definition: prayer is the ascent of the understanding to God; but Christ’s understanding was always joined to God, both by the hypostatic union and by the beatific vision, “face to face.” He flags the two definitions as both needed for a perfect definition of prayer, and calls this “a very interesting answer… much more interesting than the previous question.” Sed contra: Luke 6, he went out to the mountain and spent the whole night in the prayer of God. Aside: “Yes, some night the one I had this morning.”

3. Article 1, body and replies (“prayer is a certain unfolding of one’s own will”) #

Argument: (1) prayer is an unfolding (explicatio) of one’s own will before God that it be fulfilled; (2) the divine will is of itself effective of all it wills — Ps 134, “all things whatever he wills, God makes”; so if Christ had only the divine will, prayer would not belong to him; (3) but Christ’s human will is not of itself efficacious except through divine power; therefore as man, having a human will, it belongs to him to pray. “That seems reasonable to me.” Replies: (1) he could do all he willed as God, not as man; he prayed not from impotence but for our instruction — to show himself from the Father (John 11: “that they might believe that you have sent me”; Hilary: “he did not need prayer, but he prayed for us, lest we be ignorant of his being the Son”), and to give example (Ambrose on Luke: do not think the Son of God asks as one infirm; he is author of power, teacher of obedience; Augustine: he could have prayed in silence, but wished to show himself a prayer to the Father as our teacher by example). (2) Some future things he knew were to come about on account of his prayer, and these he suitably asked — “kind of a subtle thing that he tells us.” (3) See next segment.

4. The two senses of motion (“motion is said to be the act of the perfect”) #

Reply 3 turns on a distinction he then expands at a student’s request (“Can you review that with us again?”).

• Motion properly: the going forth from ability to act, the act of the imperfect — the sense of motion in the eight books of “natural hearing”; ascent in this sense means being in potency to what is above. In this sense Christ’s understanding did not need to ascend.
• Motion as the act of the perfect, of what is in act: to understand and to sense are called a motion; in this sense Christ’s understanding always ascended, contemplating God as above himself. “It’s beautifully said.” Aristotle, De anima III, denies strictly that sensing and understanding are motion; but because motion is the activity most known to us we carry the word over — even of God, “moved by his own goodness.” The test from the ninth book of wisdom: when you are walking home you have not walked home, and when you have walked home you are not walking home — the activity never becomes complete; but when you are understanding what a triangle is, you have understood it; likewise hearing Mozart. Thomas’s word for this is operatio as against motion. Hence Plato’s saying that the first mover moves itself is understood of God’s knowing and loving himself; and verbs signify with time, and time measures motion, so language tends to carry “motion” over to what is really a perfect act.

5. Article 2, objections: prayer according to sensuality (“sensualitas is said to be the desire of the flesh”) #

1. Ps 83, in the person of Christ: “my heart and my flesh have exulted in the living God”; sensuality is the desire of the flesh, so it can ascend to God. He compares the psalm “O God, you are my God… my flesh pines, my soul thirsts.”
2. Prayer belongs to whom the desiring belongs; Christ’s sensuality desired when he said “let this chalice pass from me.” Aside: expounding the psalms Thomas sometimes says God answers not the prayer but the desire of the man, since desire is a prayer in principle or potency.
3. It is more to be united to God in person than to ascend by prayer; sensuality, like the body, was assumed in unity of person — “the Word was made flesh.” Sed contra: Phil 2, he was made in the likeness of man; other men do not pray according to sensuality. “So, do I pray by my emotions?”

6. Article 2, body: prayer is an act of reason (“prayer is an act of reason”) #

Two senses of “praying according to sensuality.” (a) As prayer being an act of sensuality — so Christ did not, since his sensuality is of the same nature and species as ours, and in us it cannot pray for two reasons: the motion of sensuality cannot transcend sensible things, hence cannot go up to God; and prayer implies an ordering, desiring something to be fulfilled by God, which belongs only to reason, “looking before and after.” Aside on Halloween candy: the child asking for candy — sensuality is asking for the candy, but the asking is not sensuality’s act. Attached discussion: in the Second Part the fundamental act of religion is devotion, prayer its second act; prayer is the interpreter of desire. A student asks whether devotion is an act of the will — yes, and prior, because the will moves the reason. Dispositions needed for prayer to be heard: devotion, humility, and (supplied by a student) hope; indulgence formulas require prayers said devoutly and humbly and do not always spell out all three. Devotion comes from charity: hence “Our Father” — Father a name of endearment (St. Teresa meditating on how sweet it is to call him Father), Our because you should love your neighbour; Thomas asks why we say “Our Father” and answers, to arouse devotion. Catechetically, creed to faith, prayer to hope, commandments to charity. He returns to a. 1’s oratio quaedam explicatio propriae voluntatis, and notes the two reasons here correspond to Damascene’s two definitions. (b) As reason proposing in prayer what is in the desire of sensuality — prayer expressing sensuality’s affection, reason acting “as the advocate and the lawyer, representing the sensuality.” In this sense Christ could pray according to sensuality (the psalms: “my flesh pines” — even the body desires to be glorified). And this for three instructions: that he had taken a true human nature with all its natural affections; that it is licit for man according to natural affection to will something God does not will; that man ought to subject his affection to the divine will. Augustine, Enchiridion: Christ bearing humanity shows the private will of a man — “let this chalice pass from me” — but wishing to be a rectified man directed to God he adds “not as I will but as you,” “because he is able to see yourself in me.” Student parallel: Paul asking for the sting of the flesh to be removed.

7. Article 2, replies (“through the overflowing from the heart to the flesh”) #

1. The flesh exults in the living God not by an act of the flesh ascending, but by overflowing from the heart to the flesh, the sense desire following the motion of the rational. Examples: Moses coming down the mountain with shining face; Teresa of Avila coming out and wanting to dance with the nuns. Aside: the partridge story — a nun thought she enjoyed it too much; “penance is penance, and partridge is partridge. Doctor of the Church, don’t forget that.”
2. Sensuality willed what reason asked, but the praying was reason’s, not sensuality’s.
3. Union in person is according to personal being, which pertains to each part of human nature; the ascent of prayer is by an act belonging only to reason — so there is no like reason.

8. Article 3: whether Christ prayed for himself (“not for himself, but for us, would pray”) #

Objections: (1) Hilary — prayer’s speech did not benefit him but the progress of our faith; (2) no one prays but for what he wills, and Christ willed what he suffered (Augustine, Contra Faustum XXVI: a man is saddened, sleeps, eats, thirsts unwillingly — “he sleeps at me now in my old age” — but Christ had all these because he wanted them); (3) Cyprian: the Master of peace and unity did not wish prayer to be private; and Christ did what he taught (Acts 1, “began to do and to teach”). He counters with his own objection from John 17’s three prayers: “of course we pay most attention to the Our Father, but Christ teaches us some other prayers in that chapter, so they shouldn’t be neglected.” Body: Christ prays for himself in two ways — expressing the affection of sensuality, or of the simple will considered as nature (the chalice); and expressing the affection of deliberate will considered as reason (the glory of the resurrection). “He doesn’t mean the will is reason, but reason as opposed to nature.” Reasonably so, since he prayed to give example and to show the Father the author both of his eternal procession and of whatever good his human nature has: for goods already received he gave thanks (Matt 26-27; John 11:41), for goods lacking — the glory of the body — he asked. The example for us: “you can’t ask God for the creation of your immortal soul, but you should thank him”; and ask for the vision. Replies: (1) Hilary speaks of vocal prayer, needed only on our account; if God hears the desire of the poor (Ps 9), much more Christ’s will — desire having the vim rationis, a phrase he attributes to Thomas’s commentary on the Psalms; John 11, “I know that you always hear me, but on account of the people standing around.” (2) He willed to undergo those sufferings for that time, but willed afterwards the glory of the body, expected from the Father as its origin. (3) That glory pertains to others’ salvation too — Rom 4, “he rose again for our justification”; so whoever asks a good to use it for others’ usefulness prays also for others.

9. Article 4, objections: was his prayer always heard? (“I cried through the day, and you didn’t hear me”) #

1. The chalice was not taken away. 2. “Father, forgive them” — but not all had that sin remitted; the Jews were punished for it. 3. He prayed that all who believe be one and be with him, and not all arrive at this. 4. Ps 21 in the person of Christ: “I cried through the day and you did not hear me” — “That’s a rough one.” Sed contra: Heb 5:7, with great clamour and tears he was heard for his reverence — “let’s have the idea of humility there in prayer, reverence.”

10. Article 4, body: will simply and will secundum quid (“more be called velleitas than absolute will”) #

Argument: (1) prayer is interpretativa of the human will (he glances at Aristotle’s De interpretatione for the word); (2) a prayer is heard when the will of the one praying is fulfilled; (3) man’s will simply is the will of reason, deliberating; what we will by the motion of sensuality, or by the simple will considered as nature, we will not simply but secundum quid — better called velleitas, since man would will it if nothing else stood in the way; (4) by the will of reason Christ willed nothing but what he knew God to will; therefore his absolute human will was always fulfilled, and every prayer heard. So too others’ prayers are fulfilled by conformity to God — Rom 8, he who scrutinizes hearts knows, i.e. approves, what the Spirit desires, i.e. what he makes the saints desire, and asks for the saints with unspeakable groanings. Asides: Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations — most mistakes come from overlooking a distinction, so one learns the kinds of distinction needed both to avoid error and to see the truth. “I don’t want to do it, but I will.” St John of the Cross: God sometimes grants childish requests as a tolerant parent gives a spoiled child what he would rather not give. His own example: reading stories to his children (they had no TV) — you want to stop, but your deliberate will is to keep going.

11. Article 4, replies (“diversely expounded by the saints”) #

On the chalice, the expositions of the saints:

• Hilary on Matthew: that it pass from him to others, i.e. that others may share it — that as it is drunk by him it be drunk by others, without diffidence of hope, without sense of pain, without fear of death; so he prays for those who would suffer after him.
• Jerome: “this chalice,” i.e. of the Jewish people, who having law and prophets could not plead ignorance in killing him.
• Dionysius of Alexandria: a chalice that had not come could not “pass”; passing is neither untouched nor permanent — a lightly pressing trial that may come upon him and go away. He reads the Latin haltingly and says “I don’t know if that’s it there, or not.” [The clause about scourging the flesh is left unresolved.]
• “The more simple explanation,” Ambrose, Origen, Chrysostom: he asks as a man, by natural will refusing death — “that’s the way it’s usually explained.” On the first readings (Hilary; or that fear of drinking not trouble him, or that death not detain him) what he asked was wholly fulfilled; on the reading that he asked not to drink it, or not from the Jews, what he asked was not done, because the reason proposing the petition did not wish it fulfilled — he wished to declare to us his natural will and the motion of sensuality he had as man. “That’s kind of complicated. Well, I should say it’s subtle.” Reply 2: he prayed not for all, but only for the predestined who through him obtain eternal life. Attached: reading Thomas on John, “a prophet is not [honoured] in his own country” — but some were; Christ speaks in what Aristotle calls an indefinite sentence, true for the most part, like “boys will be boys.” So “forgive them, for they know not what they do” is not explicitly all. Student: does that explain Paul’s “all have sinned” not including Mary? — Yes. Aside: “women are crazy” said seriously means most, not every one. Reply 3 is solved the same way as reply 2. Reply 4: “I cried and you do not hear” is understood of the affection of sensuality, which refused death — he let his body naturally fear; but he was heard as to the affection of reason. “You see the perfect order in his prayer”: sensuality expressed what is natural, then subjected to reason. Closing aside: Aristotle’s man who throws cargo overboard to save the ship — he does not want to lose it, but simply speaking he chooses to throw it over, all things considered. Thomas uses the example in the question whether our evils, sins, or damnation sadden our guardian angel: not simply; absolutely they will our salvation, but if we deserve damnation, “to hell with them.”

His words #

• sensuality (sensualitas) — “his animal nature,” his sensory nature; the desire of the flesh.
• “natural hearing” — [ed.: Aristotle’s Physics], the eight books where motion means going forth from ability to act.
• “ability” — [ed.: potency]; “act of the imperfect” vs. “act of the perfect.”
• operatio — Thomas’s word for the perfect act, as opposed to motion.
• “ninth book of wisdom” — [ed.: Metaphysics IX].
• oratio quaedam explicatio propriae voluntatis — prayer as an “unfolding” of one’s own will before God that it be fulfilled.
• “prayer is the interpreter of desire”; interpretativa of the human will.
• vim rationis — desire having “the force of reason,” i.e. counting as a prayer though not in the full sense.
• “simple will considered as nature” vs. “deliberate will considered as reason.”
• velleitas — what one would will if nothing else stood in the way; willing secundum quid, not simply.
• “indefinite sentence” — Aristotle’s term for “boys will be boys,” true for the most part.
• Gerens humanitatem — “bearing humanity” (Augustine, Enchiridion).

Texts #

Read in class: Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae III, q. 21, prologue and aa. 1-4 (objections, bodies, replies, with the authorities quoted there: Damascene III, Hilary De Trinitate X and on Matthew, Ambrose on Luke, Augustine on John and Enchiridion and Contra Faustum XXVI, Cyprian on the Lord’s Prayer, Jerome, Dionysius of Alexandria, Origen, Chrysostom; Ps 9, 21, 83, 134; Luke 6; John 11, 17; Phil 2; Acts 1; Rom 4, 8; Heb 5:7; Matt 26-27).

Mentioned: Aristotle, De anima III; Metaphysics IX; Sophistical Refutations; De interpretatione; Thomas, Secunda Pars on prayer and on the virtue of religion and devotion; Thomas on the Psalms; Thomas, Commentary on John (the prophet in his own country); Thomas on whether our evils sadden the guardian angels; St Teresa of Avila (the dancing, the partridge); St John of the Cross on God granting childish requests; St Paul’s sting of the flesh.

His questions #

• Does it belong to Christ to pray, given that he can do all things? — Yes, as man, because his human will is not of itself efficacious.
• Why did he pray at all, if he did not need to? — For our instruction: to show he is from the Father, and to give example.
• How can his understanding “ascend” to God if it was always joined to God? — Not by motion as act of the imperfect, but by motion as act of the perfect, contemplating God as above himself.
• “So, do I pray by my emotions?” — No; prayer is an act of reason, though reason can act as advocate for sensuality’s affection.
• Is devotion an act of the will, and why is it first? — Yes; because the will moves the reason.
• Why do we say “Our Father”? — To arouse devotion (Father endearment, Our love of neighbour).
• Did Christ pray for himself? — Yes, in two ways, and even that prayer was also for others (Rom 4).
• Was every prayer of Christ heard? — Yes, because his deliberate will was always conformed to the divine will.
• “Forgive them” — were all forgiven? — No; he prayed only for the predestined, and the saying is an indefinite sentence.
• What does “I cried and you did not hear me” mean? — Unheard as to the affection of sensuality refusing death, heard as to the affection of reason.