Aristotle: Natural Philosophy

Aristotle: Natural Philosophy #

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Foreword to the Elements of Euclid #

foreword · EuclidElements · 5 pages · PDF · MATH_Foreward_to_Euclids_Elements.pdf

Covers: Introduction to Euclid’s Elements, unfolding its matter (geometry and arithmetic), end, form (how things are defined and demonstrated), and author (Euclid).

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First Book of Natural Hearing, Reading One #

reading · Physics Reading 1 · 1 pages · PDF · NH_01-Reading_1.pdf

Covers: Translation of Physics I.1: the science of nature must begin with the beginnings; the road from what is more known to us (the confused whole, the general) to what is more known by nature; names and definitions; children calling all men father.

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Note for Book One of Natural Hearing, Reading I #

note · Physics Reading 1 · 12 pages · PDF · NH_02-Note_for_Reading_1.pdf

Covers: Commentary on the Proemium to Natural Hearing (Physics): the goal of natural philosophy is to know the causes of natural things; the order of consideration is general before particular. Distinguishes ‘particular’ as singular from ‘particular’ as less universal, and explains that reason knows confusedly before distinctly.

(The description of what this handout covers was resolved with medium confidence.)

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Note for Book One of Natural Hearing, Reading 2 #

note · Physics Reading 2 · 7 pages · PDF · NH_03-Note_for_Reading_2.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s commentary on Reading 2 of Book I of the Physics (“Natural Hearing”). It takes up Aristotle’s division of the opinions of his predecessors on the beginnings: one or many, movable or immovable, limited or unlimited. It treats the diversity of opinion as a sign of the weakness of human reason and asks how to proceed in that situation. The note is 7 pages long and signed Duane H. Berquist.

(The description of what this handout covers was resolved with medium confidence.)

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Aristotle, First Book of Natural Hearing (Physics), Reading Eight #

reading · Physics Reading 8 · 1 pages · PDF · NH_04-Reading_8.pdf

Covers: The two ways of the natural philosophers: those who make one underlying body and generate by condensation and rarefaction, versus those who separate the contraries out of the one (Anaximander, Empedocles, Anaxagoras); and how these differ.

(The description of what this handout covers was resolved with medium confidence.)

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Natural Hearing (Physics), First Book, Reading Ten #

reading · Physics Reading Ten · 2 pages · PDF · NH_06-Reading_10.pdf

Covers: Physics I.5: all earlier thinkers make the beginnings contraries; the argument that things come to be from and are corrupted into contraries or intermediates; the differences among predecessors’ contraries; conclusion that the beginnings should be contraries.

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Note for Book One, Reading Ten #

note · Physics Reading 10 · 12 pages · PDF · NH_07-Note_for_Reading_10.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s commentary on Physics Book One, Reading Ten. It recalls the earlier readings in which Aristotle finds what the early natural philosophers hold in common (Heraclitus’ advice to be strong in what is common to all). It compares Anaxagoras and Empedocles on mixture and segregation. It ends on the role of seeing proportions or analogies, with quotations from Duhem and Einstein.

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Whether the beginnings are two, three or more #

reading · Physics Reading Eleven · 2 pages · PDF · NH_08-Reading_11.pdf

Covers: Translation of Physics I.6: the beginnings are neither one nor unlimited, because contraries are not one, what-is would be unknowable, and there is one contrariety in each genus. The reading then argues for a third underlying nature besides the contraries. It concludes that the elements are two or three, not more, and that deciding between two and three is difficult.

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Note for Book One, Reading Eleven #

note · Physics Reading Eleven · 7 pages · PDF · NH_09-Note_for_Reading_11.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s commentary on Reading Eleven of Physics Book One: how many beginnings there are. It rules out one beginning and an infinity of beginnings, argues that the two contraries are not enough and a third beginning is needed for change, and argues that three is enough. It stresses the first argument for the third beginning, that contraries cannot act on each other without an underlying subject, as a way of resolving contradictions, and looks ahead to Readings Twelve and Thirteen.

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Note on the Eight Books of Natural Hearing #

foreword · Physics 0 · 9 pages · PDF · NH_0_Note_on_the_Eight_Books.pdf

Covers: Introductory note on the importance and subject of the eight books of Natural Hearing (Physics): change and changing things in general, why they are considered first, and why the work is called Natural Hearing.

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Becoming: the underlying subject and the opposite (simple and composed becoming) #

reading · Physics Reading 12 · 2 pages · PDF · NH_10-Reading_12.pdf

Covers: Aristotle’s general analysis of becoming in Physics I.7: things come to be from one another, either simple or composed; something always underlies (man, bronze) and remains, while the opposite (unmusical, unshaped) does not; becoming simply is of substances, other categories presuppose a subject; everything that comes to be is composed, from an underlying subject and the opposite.

(The description of what this handout covers was resolved with medium confidence.)

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Note for Book One, Reading Twelve #

note · Physics Reading Twelve · 6 pages · PDF · NH_11-Note_for_Reading_12.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s commentary on Physics I, Reading Twelve (with reference to Reading Thirteen): Aristotle finds a common understanding among all men about becoming, from the ways they speak, and that becoming involves three things, of which only two are causes as such. Ends with Aquinas texts distinguishing mutari (removal from the term from which) and fieri (attaining the term to which).

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Natural Hearing (Physics) I, Reading 13: the principles as subject and form (and privation); how many principles #

reading · Physics Reading 13 · 2 pages · PDF · NH_12-Reading_13.pdf

Covers: Translation of the end of Physics I.7: everything comes to be from underlying subject and form; the principles are two in one way and three in another (contraries plus subject); the underlying nature is known by proportion; privation as contrary to form; conclusion that the principles are three.

(The description of what this handout covers was resolved with medium confidence.)

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Note for Book One, Reading Thirteen #

note · Physics Reading 13 · 10 pages · PDF · NH_13-Note_for_Reading_13.pdf

Covers: Commentary on Physics I, Reading 13: of the three things in every becoming only two (subject/matter and form) are intrinsic causes; the contrary is not a part of what comes to be; what becomes is one in subject and two in definition; the ways the principles can be counted as two or three. Ends with a Thomistic passage on kinds of composition (De Veritate q.16 a.1 ad 16).

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Introductory Note for Readings Nine, Fourteen and Fifteen #

note · Physics Readings 9, 14 and 15 (Introductory Note) · 2 pages · PDF · NH_14-Intro._Note_for_Readings_9_14_15.pdf

Covers: Introductory note explaining why Readings Nine, Fourteen and Fifteen are taken together: they help distinguish the three beginnings (matter, form, lack of form). Cites Aquinas on NE I on the importance of distinguishing beginnings; discusses confusion of matter with form (Anaxagoras, Locke, Socrates and the slave-boy in the Meno) and of matter with privation (Plato, Fifteenth Reading).

(The description of what this handout covers was resolved with medium confidence.)

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Anaxagoras’ unlimited beginnings and their refutation #

reading · Physics Reading 9 · 2 pages · PDF · NH_15-Reading_9.pdf

Covers: Why Anaxagoras posited unlimited beginnings (nothing comes from what is not; everything mixed with everything), and arguments against him: the unlimited is unknown, parts of animals and plants have limited sizes, flesh etc. cannot be separated out endlessly, accidents are not separable; concludes it is better to take fewer, limited beginnings as Empedocles does.

(The description of what this handout covers was resolved with medium-high confidence.)

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Note for Book One, Reading Nine #

note · Physics Reading 9 · 14 pages · PDF · NH_16-Note_for_Reading_9.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s commentary on Physics I, Reading 9, in which Aristotle recalls Anaxagoras’s arguments about matter and refutes his position with eight arguments. The note groups the eighth, fifth and first arguments under the principle of fewness. It compares Anaxagoras with 20th-century particle physics and cites Aquinas’s Quaestio Disputata de Virtutibus in Communi, Art. 11, in a footnote.

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Matter and privation distinguished; matter ungenerated and incorruptible; end of Book I #

reading · Physics Reading 15 · 2 pages · PDF · NH_17-Reading_15.pdf

Covers: Translation of Physics I.9 (the last chapter of Book I): earlier thinkers (Parmenides, the Platonists’ large and small) did not distinguish matter from privation; matter is like the female desiring form, and is ungenerated and incorruptible; form is left to first philosophy. Ends Book I.

(The description of what this handout covers was resolved with high for work, book and unit; medium for the Bekker end confidence.)

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Note for Book One, Reading Fifteen #

note · Physics Reading 15 · 7 pages · PDF · NH_18-Note_for_Reading_15.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s commentary on Physics I, Reading 15. It covers matter and privation, including Plotinus’s identification of matter with non-being and Aquinas on privation and evil (De Potentia and Summa Contra Gentiles II). It also covers the three senses of “bad” and the incorruptibility of first matter, which the note ties to the first mover in Book Eight.

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Note for Book Two About the Soul, Readings 1-4 #

note · DeAnima Readings 1-4 · 15 pages · PDF · OS2_01-Note_for_Bk._2_Readings_1-4.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s commentary on the first four readings of De Anima Book II, on thinking out the definition of the soul. It covers the six divisions or distinctions that come first and the demonstration of the definition. It draws on Aquinas’s commentary, and the last page cites Aquinas’s Scriptum super Sententiis.

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Note for Book Two About the Soul, Readings 5-6 #

note · DeAnima Readings 5-6 · 12 pages · PDF · OS2_02-Note_for_Bk._2_Readings_5-6.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s commentary on De Anima Book 2, Readings 5-6, on how powers of the soul are distinguished by acts, objects and mode of acting (vegetative, sensitive, intellective genera). It draws on Aquinas’s Sentences commentary and De Veritate q. 22 a. 4 ad 4.

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Note for Book Three About the Soul, Reading 11 #

note · DeAnima Reading 11 · 1 pages · PDF · OS3_03-Note_for_Bk._3_Reading_11.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s commentary on De Anima III, Reading 11: the first two acts of reason (simple understanding and composing/dividing), the three ways of being one, truth presupposing unity, and why the understanding cannot consider many things at once (Aquinas quotations).

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Note for Book Three About the Soul, Reading 12 #

note · DeAnima Reading 12 · 4 pages · PDF · OS3_04-Note_for_Bk._3_Reading_12.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s commentary on the proportion that phantasms are to the intellect as sensibles are to sense. He uses Aquinas’s texts, including De Veritate Q. 19 Art. 1, to show how the two ratios are alike and unlike. He also explains why Aristotle speaks in De Anima III only of understanding while the soul is joined to the body.

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Note for Book Three About the Soul, Reading 13 #

note · DeAnima Reading 13 · 3 pages · PDF · OS3_05-Note_for_Bk._3_Reading_13.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s commentary distinguishing thinking from imagining (thought from image): by the third act of reason, by the second act (true or false), and by universal vs. singular. Criticizes Locke’s and Berkeley’s confusion of idea as image and as thought, esp. Locke’s abstract general idea of a triangle. Ends with Aquinas (De Veritate q.8 a.7 ad 2) on likeness as the ground of knowing.

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Note for Book Three About the Soul, Readings 14-16 #

note · DeAnima Readings 14-16 · 8 pages · PDF · OS3_06-Note_for_Bk._3_Readings_14-16.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s note on De Anima Book 3, Readings 14-16, on the appetitive power (desire as inclination, motion vs. knowing). It quotes Aquinas (ST I Q.81 a.1; I Q.87 a.4; Scriptum super III Sent. d.26 q.1 a.2 on the irascible and concupiscible).

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