A Likeness from Theology
Logic as a Whole · Subject of Logic
From his file: A LIKENESS FROM THEOLOGY.doc.
A LIKENESS FROM THEOLOGY
The teaching of Thomas on the subject of theology is clear (Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Q. I, Art. 7, C. ):
Omnia autem pertractantur in sacra doctrina sub ratione Dei vel quia sunt ipse Deus; vel quia habent ordinem ad Deum, ut ad principium et finem. Unde sequitur quod Deus vere sit subiectum huius scientiae.
Thomas Aquinas also wrote a commentary on a book of Dionysius, the De Divinis Nominibus. Let us ask the question: what is this book about? Should one answer that it is about the names of God as its title indicates or should one say that it is about God?
The first answer would be that it is about the names of God. Does this mean that it is about the names of God rather than about God, that it is about the names of God and not about God? No. This is surely to misunderstand what the book is about. One cannot talk about the names of God and explain them without talking about God. A discussion of the names of God will necessarily include a discussion of God.
Can one go a step further and say that one talks about the names of God so that one can talk about God? This seems reasonable. Perhaps one could say more fully that one talks about the names of God, not only so one can talk about God (and eventually praise Him using his name - "Hallowed be thy name"), but also so that one can learn about God through His names.
If then the names of God are considered so that one can talk about God or learn about Him, can one go a step further and say that the book of Dionysius is really more about God than about the names of God for the latter are considered for the sake of the former? Such a conclusion is also in agreement with the above determination (from the Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars) of the subject of theology and the De Divinis Nominibus is a book in theology.
"Wisely and slow: they stumble that run fast." It is surely not false to say that the De Divinis Nominibus is about God. Further, there is a way in which we can truly say that it is more about knowing and praising God (through His names) than about the names of God. For the ultimate purpose of considering the names of God is to know and praise Him. But is this the whole truth? There is the little matter of the title of the book - De Divinis Nominibus - and the intention of Dionysius in the book which is, as he says in the first sentence, "the unfolding of the divine names so far as possible."
Further, one cannot explain the distinction of this book of Dionysius from the one that follows it without saying that they are about names. As Thomas observes at the end of his commentary on the De Divinis Nominibus (C. XIII, L. IV, n. 1007):
Et in hoc fit finis expositionis intelligibilium divinorum nominum quantum ad ipsum. Sed intendit ulterius transire Deo duce ad symbolicam theologiam in qua scilicet exponit nomina quae symbolice dicuntur de Deo, puta: quod dicitur leo, lapis, ignis et alia huiusmodi; qui quidem liber apud nos non habetur.
The distinction between these two books is based on a distinction between the names of God, a distinction that involves the general distinction between naming things properly and figuratively (or more particularly, metaphorically). In this way, the books of Dionysius are more properly said to be about the names of God than about God. An example will bring this out. In one part of the discussion of God, we talk about the justice of God. To this consideration of the justice of God, we could attach as a secondary or related consideration, the discussion of the ways in which the justice of God can be named. Here we could point out that God can be called just or angry, but in the first case one is speaking properly and in the second case figuratively or metaphorically. Then one could proceed to a consideration of the mercy of God and in this consideration, as a secondary matter, there might be some discussion of the way the divine mercy is named. This is the way Thomas proceeds in the Summa Theologiae. But in Dionysius' works, the justice of God will be considered in the book De Divinis Nominibus under its proper name (justice or just ) and in the subsequent book under its metaphorical name (anger or angry ).
Hence, unless one says that the book of Dionysius is about the names of God, one cannot explain the name of the book, the stated intention of Dionysius, or the distinction of this book from his subsequent book.
If there is a way in which Dionysius' book is more about God (or knowing and praising God) than about the names of God, there is also a way in which it is more about the names of God than about God. Clearly these two cannot be the same. We have a knot to untie.
In the beginning of the Metaphysics, Aristotle shows that wisdom is about causes and, then, more precisely, that it is about the first causes. But in Book four, he shows that wisdom is about being as being. He uses the Greek word for about (peri) in both cases. Has he changed his mind in going from Book One to Book Four? Does the word about mean the same when it is said that wisdom is about the first causes and when it is said that wisdom is about being as being?
Wisdom is about being as being as its subject and about the first causes as its end or goal. This is clear from the epilogue of the proemium and from the contrast of being as being with the subjects of the other sciences. Perhaps a science is more said to be about its subject than about its end although both are said. This distinction is not sufficient to untie our knot, but it does help us a little. Dionysius' book is about knowing and praising God as its end or purpose, but it is about the names of God as its subject. But in what way is it about God? God is not only the end of revealed theology, but he is also the chief subject of revealed theology (although not of metaphysics). Nevertheless since one talks about the names of God for the sake of talking about God or hearing about God, the consideration of God is an end of the consideration of the divine names. At the same time, the consideration of God seems to be a part of the consideration of the names of God so that God is also on the side of the subject and not just the end.
A second distinction is made by Thomas in his commentary on the Psalms (In Davidem, Psalm 48, n. 2):
Quicumque docet, aut docet res aut docet verba. Quando praedicamus fidem et mores, docemus res: quando exponimus Scripturam, docemus verba.
This distinction should not be made so precisely that we think that the one who teaches things will not say something about the words he must use (as Thomas does, for example, in Q. 13 of the Prima Pars of the Summa Theologiae ) or that the one who teaches words will not speak of the things which these words signify. But there is a difference in the way Thomas proceeds, for example, in the Summa Theologiae and in the Lectura Super Evangelium S. Ioannis. In the former, one goes from the consideration of one thing to another while in the commentary on John, one must follow the words (even if the same thing comes up more than once - Thomas notes the effect this can have upon the student whom he has in mind in his Prologue to the Summa.) Now Dionysius' work, although not an exposition of any particular book of Sacred Scripture, is nevertheless close to such expositions in that he teaches words (docet verba . (Perhaps Moses Maimonides' Guide for the Perplexed is in part teaching verba.) Although Dionysius is teaching verba, his work is nevertheless in one way closer to the Summa than to an exposition of a book of the Bible. Since the same name or word may be used in many different books of S. Scripture, the expounder of S. Scripture would have to take up that word in many different places while Dionysius takes it up but once at length and in connection with other words closely connected in meaning. Yet Dionysius might have to speak of justice again in his book on symbolical theology. To proceed in such a way that the same must be said over and over again and without speaking of other things closely connected in understanding might seem to be a malum modum docendi. But there are reasons why S. Scripture proceeds as it does and why it is necessary to expound the words of S. Scripture.
Is logic about three acts of reason or about the tools necessary for these three acts? Thomas says both. One could distinguish perhaps by saying that logic is about three acts of reason as its end, but about tools needed for these acts as it subject.
But is logic about as its subject the tool which is in reason or the tool which is in voice? Is it, for example, about the definition and statement in thoughts or the definition and statement in words?
Many think that logic is chiefly about the definition and statement and syllogism in thoughts and only secondarily about those in words. This is like thinking that Dionysius' work is about God and only secondarily or indirectly about words. But if we read Dionysius' own title and statement of his intention, we can see that his book is actually about the names of God (and that is why he must speak of God). Likewise, when we read Aristotle's logical works carefully, we can see that he intends to speak about a statement or definition in words.
But these names and speeches that logic is about are not related to what was thought by many to be the chief subject of logic as are the names Dionysius considers to what is thought to be the primary subject of theology. The Categories, for example, is not about the names of thoughts, but rather about names signifying things through thoughts. The reasons too are different although there is possibly some distant likeness.
One cannot talk about names signifying things through thoughts without talking about things and thoughts as well as names (just as Dionysius cannot talk about the names of God without talking about God and our knowledge of God.) But the order is important here. Names and things (the first known by us, at least) are sensible while thoughts are not. Just as Aristotle did not talk about the number of separated substances except through the number of sensible motions in the heavens, so he does not talk of the tools in reason except insofar as they are signified by the tools in speech.
Should Dionysius have written a book about God (De Deo ) rather than the De Divinis Nominibus? Did Dionysius think that theology was chiefly about the names of God rather than about God? This is perhaps laughable to think when we reflect on Thomas' testimony to the excellence of Dionysius at the end of his commentary (Cap. XIII, Lectio IV, n. 1008):
Et nos, post expositionem dictorum beati Dionysii, longe ab eius intellectu deficientes, corrigi de non recte dictis postulamus.
Let us assume that Dionysius had good reason for writing a book on the names of God rather than about God. Likewise, let us assume that Aristotle had good reasons for writing logical treatises about names and speeches and seek to understand those reasons.