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A Misunderstood Distinction
Wisdom about Beginnings · Nature, Reason, Will
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A MISUNDERSTOOD DISTINCTION
When Aristotle distinguishes the rational powers or abilities from the natural ones in the ninth book of the Metaphysics, he does so by pointing out that a natural ability is determined to one while a rational ability is open to opposites. The fire will always burn what is placed before it. But the doctor can heal or make sick by his art. Shakespeare touches upon this in the words of Aufidius as to the possible causes of Coriolanus' intransigence and downfall (Coriolanus, (Act IV, Sc. 7):
.........................................................First he was A noble servant to them, but he could not Carry his honours even; whether ‘twas pride, Which out of daily fortune ever taints The happy man; whether defect of judgment, To fail in the disposing of those chances Which he was lord of; or whether nature, Not to be other than one thing, not moving From the casque to the cushion, but commanding peace Even with the same austerity and garb As he controll’d the war....................................
Since there is the same knowledge of opposites, one is able by the same art to do opposite things. But the natural form is in matter and excludes its opposite. Since the art is open to opposites, but one cannot do both opposites at the same time, the rational ability does not, like the natural one, go automatically into act in the presence of its material. Rather, there is need of desire to determine which opposite will be done.
Since the above distinction between a natural ability or power and a rational one seems to determine the fundamental division of movers, there is significance in the examples Aristotle gives when distinguishing the four kinds of causes. In the second book of Natural Hearing, the Physics and in the fifth book of the Metaphysics, Aristotle gives as examples of the mover, one from nature and the other from reason. The father or seed is given as an example of a natural cause and the doctor or the advisor as a rational cause.
The division also appears exhaustive because it is by opposites. An active ability is either determined to one of two opposites or it is not. It is either capable of both opposites or it is not. Reason by dialectic and rhetoric can argue to opposite conclusions And men often come by their reason to opposite conclusions and even the same man sometimes goes from affirming to denying or vice-versa. The will, like reason, is capable of opposites for we can will to do or not do, to do in this way or even in an opposite way.
Some thinkers understand this distinction between nature on the one hand and reason or the will on the other hand such that there is no part or side of any contradiction (neither the affirmative, nor the negative) which reason must assent to and cannot agree to its opposite; and likewise that there is nothing that the will must will and cannot will its opposite. John Stuart Mill, for example, in his defense of liberty of thought sees such liberty as respecting reason which is nowhere determined necessarily to one side of a contradiction. And Jean Paul Sartre sees man's will with no determination to any object. There are, of course, many others who share these positions. Indeed, the many who think, in accord with scientific customs, that every thought is an hypothesis to be tested by its consequences (as Claude Bernard taught) would hold this position, especially when it is realized that even the confirmation of an hypothesis does not force reason to accept the hypothesis. (One cannot affirm necessarily the antecedent because the consequent has been affirmed.) And these positions would at first sight seem to agree with the above distinction of a natural and a rational ability going back to Aristotle, if not before. Indeed, it seems to be a case of the excluded middle. Either an ability is determined to one of the opposites or it is not.
The problem of the distinction of nature and reason, or nature and will, as causes, arises in those texts of Thomas where he maintains that reason knows or understands some things naturally and cannot think the opposite and where he maintains that the will naturally wills something and cannot will its opposite. The will naturally wills happiness and cannot will its opposite, misery or wretchedness. The will can will something only if it is good in some way. The reason naturally knows and assents to the axioms, especially the statement about contradiction. Having distinguished between nature and reason and between nature and will, how can one assert that reason knows some things, or assents to them, naturally and the will wills something naturally.?
There are two ways in which Thomas explains how this is possible. The first way is in the Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. X, Art. 1, Obj. 1 & Ad 1:
1. Agens enim naturale dividitur contra agens voluntarium, ut patet in principio II Physic. Non ergo voluntas ad aliquid naturaliter movetur.”
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod voluntas dividitur contra naturam, sicut una causa contra aliam: quaedam fiunt naturaliter, et quaedam fiunt voluntarie.
Est enim alius modus causandi proprius voluntati, quae est domina sui actus, praeter modum qui convenit naturae, quae est determinata ad unum.
Sed quia voluntas in aliquid natura fundatur, necesse est quod motus proprius naturae, quantum ad aliquid, participetur in voluntate; sicut quod est prioris causae, participatur a posteriori.
Est enim prius in unaquaque re ipsum esse, quod est per naturam, quam velle, quod est per voluntatem.
Et inde est quod voluntas naturaliter aliquid vult.
In this text, Thomas says the will is founded in some nature, the nature of man or the soul (what man is or what the soul is and what a thing is, is one) and that it partakes of the proper motion of this prior cause, as any secondary cause partakes of the motion of the primary cause. The same could be said of reason. In this solution, neither reason nor the will is said to be a nature because they know or will something naturally. Rather they do so insofar as they partake of the motion of nature as a cause before them.
This solution could be compared to and manifested by the way that reason is moved by the will or the will by reason. Reason can be moved by the will as well as by nature. Thomas speaks of this, for example, in the De Potentia, Q. 2, Art 6, Ad1:
nihil prohibet aliquam potentiam ad aliquem actum imperari a voluntate et ad alium inclinari a natura. Sicut intellectus noster ad credendum inclinatur a voluntate, et ad intelligendum prima principia ducitur ex natura.
One would not say that reason is a will because it is moved by the will. Hence, likewise, one should not say that reason is a nature because it is moved by nature. One could also say that, when the will is moved by reason or partakes of the order which is proper to reason, it is not a reason. Hence, it should not be called a nature when it wills something naturally, being moved by nature. When the reason knows something naturally, it is not a nature although it partakes of the movement proper to nature because nature is a prior cause. And when the will wills something naturally, it is not a nature, but partakes of the movement proper to nature, as a second cause partakes of the motion of the first. In this way, one can maintain that both reason and the will do something naturally, in which they are determined to one as is nature, without denying that nature and reason, or nature and will, are distinct causes.
[[[[[One could also say that the will can partake of the order which is proper to reason. Likewise, reason can partake of nature or of the will. In this solution, neither reason nor the will is said to be a nature because they know or will something naturally. Rather they do so insofar as they partake of the motion of nature as a cause before them. And this is also clear from the last text. One would not say that reason is a will because it is moved by the will. And likewise, when the will partakes of the ordering of reason, we would not say that the will is a reason. Likewise, then, when the reason knows something naturally, it is not a nature although it partakes of the movement proper to nature because nature is a prior cause. And when the will wills something naturally, it is not a nature, but partakes of the movement proper to nature as a second cause partakes of the motion of the first. In this way, one can maintain that both reason and the will do something naturally, in which they are determined to one as is nature, without denying that nature and reason, or nature and will, are distinct causes.]]]]
There is a difficulty with this first solution that will lead us into Thomas' second solution and the correct understanding of the distinction between these kinds of cause.
The difficulty in Thomas' first solution is that, in maintaining the opposite ways in which these causes work (nature being determined to one and the reason and will being open to opposites), the way in which reason is determined to one in assenting to the axioms, or the will to one in willing happiness, seems to be a violent or forced necessity. But Thomas speaks of this determination to one as being natural necessity, not a violent or forced necessity. Why would not this determination to one of reason and will be not more like St. Paul's description of faith where reason is led captive by the will rather than be a natural necessity.
A second solution of Thomas involves seeing that reason is a nature and the will is a nature. Here one understands nature in the broadest sense where everything that is has a nature. Thomas touches upon this broad sense in many places. In the Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. X, Art. 1, c:
Sicut Boethius dicit in libro de Duabus Naturis et Philosophus in V Metaph., natura dicitur multipliciter. Quandoque enim dicitur principium intrinsecum in rebus mobilibus. et talis natura est vel materia vel forma materialis, ut patet ex II Physic. - Alio modo dicitur natura quaelibet substantia vel etiam quodlibet ens.
Nature in this second and broadest sense means what a thing is. But what a thing is is first said in substance and then extended to the other Categories. Hence, Thomas says "quaelibet substantia vel etiam quodlibet ens."
In the Sentences, Thomas even says that grace can be called a nature in this way (Scriptum super Lib I Sententiarum, Dist XVII, Q. I, Art. 1, Ad 8):
natura dicitur multipliciter, secundum Boetium de Duabus Naturis: dicitur enim uno modo natura omne quod est vel substantia vel accidens; et hoc modo gratia est natura quaedam. Alio modo dicitur natura quod est principium motus et quietis ipsius in quo est.
And in the De Veritate, Q. 25, Art. 2, Ad 8, Thomas says that every power or ability of the soul is a nature:
quaelibet potentia animae natura quaedam est, et naturaliter in aliquid inclinatur.
And about the will in particular, De Veritate, Q. 23, Art. 4, c:
...voluntas natura quaedam est, et naturalem ordinem ad aliquid habet
Nature in this broad sense is what a thing is. Every thing is what it is and what a thing is is one. Hence, every thing has a determination to one
Hence, in this solution, the will or reason can be determined to one insofar as each is a nature. Thomas replies, for example, to the common objection in the De Veritate, Q. 22, Art. 5, Sed Contra 5 & Ad 5, thus:
5. Praeterea, potestates rationales se habent ad opposita, secundum Philosophum. sed voluntas, rationalis est potentia; est enim in ratione, ut dicitur in II de Anima. Ergo se habet ad opposita; et ita non de necessitate determinatur ad aliquid.
Ad quintum dicendum quod voluntas, in quantum est rationalis, ad opposita se habet: hoc enim est considerare ipsam secundum hoc quod est ei proprium; sed prout est natura quaedam, nihil prohibet eam determinari ad unum.
Thomas also points out one way in which determination to one from the nature of the will is understood to be compatible with a known indetermination of the will in the Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. X, Art. 1, Obj 3 and Ad 3:
3. Praeterea, natura est determinata ad unum. Sed voluntas se habet ad opposita. Ergo voluntas nihil naturaliter vult.
Ad tertium dicendum quod naturae semper respondet unum, proportionatum tamen naturae. Naturae enim in genere, respondet aliquid unum in genere, et naturae in specie acceptae, respondet unum in specie; naturae autem individuatae respondet aliquid unum individuale.
Cum igitur voluntas sit quaedam vis immaterialis, sicut et intellectus, respondet sibi naturaliter aliquod unum commune, scilicet bonum: sicut etiam intellectui aliquod unum commune, scilicet verum, vel ens, vel quod quid est. Sub bono autem communi multa particularia bona continentur, ad quarum nullum voluntas determinatur.
But there would seem to be a greater problem with this second solution than with the first. If reason is a nature and the will is also a nature, what happens to the distinction between a natural ability and a rational one, between nature and reason or nature and will.
Thomas explains the distinction in this reply to an objection (De Veritate, Q. 22, Art. 5, Sed Contra 6 & Ad 6):
6. Praeterea, quod de necessitate determinatur ad aliquid, naturaliter est determinatum ad illud. Sed voluntas contra naturalem appetitum dividitur. Ergo voluntas non de necessitate aliquid vult.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod voluntas dividitur contra appetitum naturalem cum praecisione sumptum, id est qui est naturalis tantum, sicut homo contra id quod est animal tantum; non autem dividitur contra appetitum naturalem absolute, sed includit ipsum, sicut homo includit animal.
When reason is divided against nature. or will against nature, it is divided againt what is nature only. Another text that touches upon this is De Veritate, Q. 22, Art. 5, c.:
...in rebus ordinatis oportet primum modum includi in secundo, et in secundo inveniri non solum id quod sibi competit secundum rationem propriam, sed quod competit secundum rationem primi;
sicut homini convenit non solum ratione uti, quod ei competit secundum propriam differentiam, quae est rationale, sed uti sensu vel alimento, quod ei competit secundum genus suum, quod est animal vel vivum.
Et similiter videmus in sensibilibus; quod cum tactus sit quasi fundamentum aliorum sensuum; in organo uniuscuisque sensus non solum invenitur proprietas illius sensus cuius est organum proprium, sed etiam proprietas tactus: sicut organum sensus visus non solum sentit album et nigrum, inquantum est organum visus, sed sentit calidum et frigidum, et corrumpitur ab eorum excellentiis, secundum quod est organum tactus.
Natura autem et voluntas hoc modo ordinata sunt, ut ipsa voluntas quaedam natura sit; quia omne quod in rebus invenitur, natura quaedam dicitur. Et ideo in voluntate oportet invenire non solum id quod voluntatis est, sed etiam quod naturae est.
Hoc autem est cuiuslibet naturae creatae, ut a Deo sit ordinata in bonum, naturaliter appetens illud. Unde et voluntati ipsi inest naturalis quidem appetitus sibi convenientis boni. Et praeter hoc habet appetere aliquid secundum propriam determinationem, non ex necessitate; quod ei competit in quantum voluntas est.
Sicut autem est ordo naturae ad voluntatem, ita se habet ordo eorum quae naturaliter vult voluntas, ad ea respectu quorum a seipsa determinatur, non ex natura. Et ideo, sicut natura est voluntatis fundamentum, ita appetibile quod naturaliter appetitur, est aliorum appetibilium principium et fundamentum.
In appetitibilibus autem finis est fundamentum et principium eorum quae sunt ad finem; cum quae sunt propter finem, non appetantur nisi ratione finis. Et ideo, quod voluntas de necessitate vult quasi naturali inclinatione in ipsum determinata, est finis ultimus, ut beatitudo, et ea quae in ipso includuntur, ut est cognitio veritatis, et alia huiusmodi; ad alia vero non de necesitate determinatur naturali inclinatione, sed propria dispositione absque necessitate.
Although we distinguish the sense of touch from the other senses, it is included in the organs of the other senses.
Now it may seem strange that an ability to do something in a non-natural way is also an ability naturally determined to do something. But we can see the reason for this, and we can see from things more known to us that this is so. The general reason is given in these words of Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, Caput 46:
In quolibet ordine, quod est per se est prius eo quod est per aliud, et principium eius [VIII Phys.,V, 7, 257A]
And this reason is applied by Thomas in the continuation of a text used above (Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. X, Art. 1, c):
Sicut Boethius dicit in libro de Duabus Naturis et Philosophus in V Metaph., natura dicitur multipliciter. Quandoque enim dicitur principium intrinsecum in rebus mobilibus. et talis natura est vel materia vel forma materialis, ut patet ex II Physic. - Alio modo dicitur natura quaelibet substantia vel etiam quodlibet ens. Et secundum hoc, illud dicitur esse naturale rei quod convenit ei secundum suam substantiam. Et hoc est quod per se inest rei.
In omnibus autem ea quae non per se insunt, reducuntur in aliquid quod per se inest, sicut in principium.
Et ideo necesse est quod, hoc modo accipiendo naturam, semper principium in his quae conveniunt rei, est naturale.
Et hoc manifeste apparet in intellectu: nam principia intellectualis cognitionis sunt naturaliter nota. Similiter etiam principium motuum voluntariorum oportet esse aliquid naturaliter volitum.
A second reason is given by Thomas in Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Q. 82, Art. 1, c:
nec necessitas naturalis repugnat voluntati. Quinimmo necesse est quod, sicut intellectus ex necessitate inhaeret primis principiis, ita voluntas ex necessitate inhaereat ultimi fini, qui est beatitudo: finis enim se habet in operativis sicut principium in speculativis, ut dicitur in II Physic.
Oportet enim quod illud quod naturaliter alicui convenit et immobiliter, sit fundamentum et principium omnium aliorum: quia natura est primum in unoquoque et omnis motus procedit ab aliquo immobili.
But we can see this in things more known to us. Summa Contra Gentiles, II, Caput 83:
Si ita esset animae naturalis cognitio conclusionum sicut principiorum, eadem esset sententia apud omnes de conclusionibus, sicut de principiis: quia quae sunt naturalia, sunt eadem apud omnes. Non est autem apud omnes eadem sententia de conclusionibus, sed solum de principiis. Patet igitur quod cognitio principiorum est nobis naturalis, non autem conclusionum.
Quod autem non est naturalis nobis acquirmus per id quod est naturale; sicut etiam in exterioribus per manus instituimus omnia artificialia.
Non ergo conclusionum scientia est in nobis nisi ex principiis acquisita.
Philosophers have long distinguished between nature and custom, between what is by nature and what is by custom. We speak, for example, a particular language in our country, not by nature, but by custom. But common customs arise by imitation and man is by nature the most imitative of the animals. Children imitate the language spoken by their parents and others around them. Here, again we acquire what is not natural but by custom through our natural tendency to imitate. The fashionable arises in the same way, from man being by nature the most imitative of animals.
The two solutions of Thomas, as we have called them, are not unconnected. The nature of our reason and the nature of our will are both a natural result of the nature of our soul.
Summa Contra Gentiles, III, Caput 107:
Quicquid est in rebus, oportet quod vel causa vel causatum sit: alioquin ad alia ordinem non haberet...
Primum autem in unoquoque et eius natura vel essentia.
A thing is what it is and what it is is one (even more so than it is good or true).
Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Q. 41, Art. 2, corpus:
...voluntas et natura secundum hoc differunt in causando, quia natura determinata est ad unum; sed voluntas non est determinata ad unum.
Cuius ratio est, quia effectus assimilatur formae agentis per quam agit. Manifestum est autem quod unius rei non est nisi una forma naturalis, per quam res habet esse: unde quale ipsum est, tale facit.
Sed forma per quam voluntas agit, non est una tantum, sed sunt plures, secundum quod sunt plures rationes intellectae: unde quod voluntate agitur, non est tale quale est agens, sed quale vult et intelligit illud esse agens.
Eorum igitur voluntas principium est, quae possunt sic vel aliter esse. Eorum autem quae non possunt nisi sic esse, principium natura est.
Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Q. 41, Art. 2, Ad 3:
....etiam voluntas, inquantum est natura quaedam, aliquid naturaliter vult; sicut voluntas hominis naturaliter tendit ad beatitudinem.
Et similiter Deus naturaliter vult et amat seipsum. Sed circa alia a se, voluntas Dei se habet ad utrumque quodammodo, ut dictum est.
Spiritus autem Sanctus procedit ut Amor, inquantum Deus amat seipsum. Unde naturaliter procedit, quamvis per modum voluntatis procedat.
Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Q. 41, Art. 2, Ad 4:
...etiam in conceptionibus intellectualibus fit reductio ad prima, quae naturaliter intelliguntur.
Deus autem naturaliter intelligit seipsum. Et secundum hoc, conceptio Verbi divini est naturalis.