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Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book III
Metaphysics translations
From his file: META 3 - 3 READINGS.doc.
Read from in 7 classes
- Wisdom (2005) — 21. Metaphysics III, Reading 1: Tying and Untying the Knots — Doubting Well and How Discoveries Are Made
- Wisdom (2005) — 23. Metaphysics III, Second Reading: Which Causes Wisdom Studies, the Axioms, and Whether the Way We Know Must Be the Way Things Are
- Wisdom (2005) — 24. Wisdom's Questions About Substance and the Plan of the Third Reading: Is There a Cause Besides Matter?
- Wisdom (2005) — 26. Metaphysics Book III, Part 1: How Many First Causes? Corruptible and Incorruptible Things, the One and Being, and Universal vs. Individual Causes
- Wisdom (2005) — 27. Metaphysics Book III, Part 2: Which Comes First, Ability or Act? Mathematical Things, and the Start of Book IV (Knowledge of Being as Being)
- Wisdom (2006, Colorado) — 50. Metaphysics Book Three: The Fourteen Questions Around Plato's Position
- Wisdom (2006, Colorado) — 51. Books Two to Four: Truth, Dialectic, Being as Being and the Axioms
Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book III — First Reading
It is necessary for the reasoned-out knowledge sought that we go over first those things about which one should first raise questions. These are both questions on which some have taken up different positions and also whatever else has been over-looked.
To doubt well before is necessary for those who wish to discover. For the discovery afterwards is an untying of the difficulties seen before. But it is impossible to untie without considering the knot. The doubt of the mind shows this about the thing — for insofar as it doubts, it undergoes something like those tied up. In both cases it is impossible to go forward. Hence, for these reasons, one should have considered before all the difficulties.
And because those investigating without having first considered the difficulties are like those who do not know where they ought to go.
And in addition, they do not know if the thing sought has been found or not. For the goal is not clear to this one, but it is to one who has brought out the difficulties before.
Moreover, the one who has heard all the reasons of those disagreeing, like that of two parties in a lawsuit, is necessarily better prepared to judge.
Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book III — Second Reading
The first difficulty is that about which we doubted in paving the way: whether it belongs to one or many forms of reasoned-out knowledge to consider the causes.
And whether it belongs to this reasoned-out knowledge to consider only the beginnings of substance or also the beginnings from which all demonstrate, as whether the same can be affirmed and denied at the same time, or not, and about other such things.
If it is about substance, whether there is one about all, or many.
And if there are many, whether all are akin or whether some are wisdom while others ought to be called something else.
And it is also necessary to investigate whether only sensible substances exist or others besides them.
And whether there is one or many kinds of such substances, as those making Forms and mathematical ones between these and the sensible.
And whether the consideration is about substances alone or also about what happens as such to substances.
And further, about the same and other and the like and unlike and contrariety, and about the before and after and all other such things about which the dialecticians try to inquire, making inquiry from only probable opinions, to whom does it belong to consider about all these?
Further, whatever happens as such to these and not only what each of these is, as whether one is contrary to one.
Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book III — Third Reading
And whether the beginnings and the elements are the genera or those into which each thing is divided, existing within.
And if the genera, whether the last said of individuals or the first; as whether animal or man is a beginning and is more apart from the singular.
Most of all should be sought and considered whether there is some cause as such besides matter.
And whether this is separable or not.
And whether one or many in number.
And whether there is something besides the wholetogether (I call that a wholetogether when something is said of matter) or nothing or of these but not of those, and what sort of things they are.
And whether the beginnings are limited in number or in kind, both those in the definition and those in the subject.
And whether those of corruptible and incorruptible things are the same or other. And whether all are incorruptible, or those of the corruptible, corruptible.
Further, the most difficult of all and having the most question, whether the one and being, as the Pythagoreans and Plato say, are not something other, but the substance of what is; or not, but some other subject, as Empedocles says love, another fire, another water or air.
And whether the beginnings are universal or as individual things.
And in ability or act?
Further, whether otherwise than by motion. For these also present much difficulty.
Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book III — Third Reading - Continued
In addition to these, whether numbers and lines and figures and points are substances or not.
And if substances, whether separated from sensible things or existing in them.
It is not only difficult to find the truth about all these, but it is not even easy to doubt well about them by reason.