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Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book V
Metaphysics translations
From his file: META 5 - 3 READINGS.doc.
Read from in 2 classes
Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book V — First Reading
That is called a beginning whence one would first move over a thing; as on a line and road, here is the beginning itself, but at the opposite limit, the other.
Then whence each would come to be best; just as in learning, sometimes one should not begin from what is first and the beginning of the thing, but from where one would learn most easily.
Then whence first something comes to be existing within it; as the keel of the ship and the foundation of a house and of animals, some think the heart, others the brain, and yet others whatever they hit upon as being such.
Then whence something first comes to be, not existing within it, and whence motion and change is first apt to begin; as a child from the father and mother and the fight from the insult. And the one by whose choice things are moved and things changed are changed, as the princes of cities and the powers and kings and tyrants. And the arts are also called beginnings, and among these especially the chief arts.
Then whence a thing is first known is also called a beginning of a thing; as what underlies demonstrations.
Causes are also said in as many ways. For all causes are beginnings.
It is common to all beginnings to be that whence first something is or comes to be or is known.
But some of these are within and some, outside.
Whence nature is a beginning and also element and understanding and choice and substance and that for the sake of which. For the good and the beautiful are often the beginning of knowledge and of motion.
Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book V — Ninth Reading
This is called being by happening and that by itself.
By happening, as we say that the just is musical and the man, musical, and the musical, a man; speaking in the same way as the musician builds a house because it happens to the housebuilder to be musical or to the musician to be a housebuilder. Likewise in the foresaid. For when we say the man is musical and the musical, a man, or the white, musical or this white, it is because both happen to the same or because one happens to what is. For the musical is said to be a man because musical happens to it. Thus also not white is said to be because that to which it happens is. Thus what are said to be by happening are thus said, either because both happen to the same existing thing or because it belongs to that existing thing or because it is itself that to which belongs what is said of it.
By itself are said to be whatever signify the figures of predication. For in as many ways being is said, in so many ways it signifies. Since then some predicates signify what it is; some, how; some, how much; some towards something; some to act upon or undergo; some where; some, when – for each of these, being signifies the same. There is no difference between man gets well and man is getting well, or between man is walking or is cutting, and man walks or cuts. Likewise, in the others.
Further, being and it is signify that it is true; non-being that it is not true, but false. Likewise, in affirmation and negation, as Socrates is musical because this is true or that Socrates is not white, because true; but the diagonal is not commensurable, because false.
Further, to be and being signify that some of the foresaid are said in ability and some in act. For we call seeing both what is able to see and what actually sees. Likewise, to know, both the one able to use the knowledge and the one using; and resting, both the one able to whom rest already belongs and the one able to rest. Likewise, also in substance. For we say Hermes is in the stone, and the half of the line, and grain that is not yet ripe. It should be determined elsewhere when a thing is able and when not.
Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book V — Eighteenth Reading
Perfect (complete) is said in one way that outside of which not even one part can be taken; as the complete time of each thing is that outside of which it is not possible to take any time which is a part of that time.
And that not exceeded according to virtue and goodness in its kind; as a perfect doctor and a perfect flute-player when they fall short of nothing in regard to the form of their own virtue. Thus metaphorically we speak in bad things of a perfect slanderer and a perfect thief since we also call them good, as a good thief and a good slanderer. For each thing is then perfect and every substance is then perfect when, in regard to the form of its own virtue, no part of the magnitude it has by nature is lacking.
Further, those are called perfect to which the end, when good, belongs. They are perfect by having the end. Since then the end is one of the last things, we also speak metaphorically about bad things, that they are completely lost and completely corrupted when nothing is lacking of corruption and the bad, but they have reached the last. Hence, death is called an end metaphorically because both are last. An end however is a last thing which is that for the sake of which.
Things called perfect by themselves are said in so many ways. But some by lacking nothing in goodness – neither having anything above, nor taking anything outside; and some in not having an above in some genus, nor anything outside.
But others are called perfect according to those – in making something such or in having or conforming to it or in some way or other being said toward what are first called perfect.