Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book Eight

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Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book Eight

Love & Friendship · A Discourse on Friendship

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Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book Eight — Reading 1 - Proemium

After these things, we should go through friendship. For it is a virtue or with virtue.

Further, it is most necessary for life. For no one having all other goods would choose to live without friends. For the rich and those possessing rule and power seem especially to have need of friends. For what is the advantage of such prosperity without doing good which is done especially and most praiseworthily towards friends? Or how could it be guarded and preserved without friends? - for the greater it is, the more insecure it is. And in poverty and other misfortunes, men think friends their only refuge. And it is an aid to the young to avoid mistakes and to the old for care and their failing powers, and to those in the prime of life for noble deeds, for when two go together, they are more able to understand and act.

And it seems to exist by nature within the parent for its offspring and in the offspring for its parent, not only in men, but also in birds and most other animals, and to those of the same race, and especially to men, whence we praise lovers of mankind. For one can see in wanderings that every man is akin to and friend of man.

And friendship seems to hold together cities and lawgivers are more concerned about it than justice. For harmony seems to be something like friendship and this they most of all desire. And they especially try to banish discord as being something unfriendly

And being friends, there is no need of justice; but being just, they still need friendship. And what is most just seems to fit a friend.

It is not only necessary, but also noble. For we praise those who love their friends, and to have many friends seems something beautiful. And some think that good men and friends are the same.

But there is no little disagreement about this. For some lay down that it is a likeness and those alike are friends. Whence they say like to like and jackdaw to jackdaw and other such things. And others on the contrary say that all such are potters to each other. And some seek higher and more in accordance with nature about these things; as Euripides says that the earth when dry wants rain and the revered heavens filled with rain want to fall upon the earth. And Heraclitus says that the opposite is useful and the most beautiful harmony is from those differing and all things come to be by strife. On the contrary, others such as Empedocles say that like want like.

Let the doubts about natural things be set aside for they do not belong to the present inquiry. But whatever are human and pertain to customs and passions, these we will examine; as whether friendship comes to be in all or it is not possible for the bad to be friends, and whether there is one form of friendship or many.

Those thinking it one because it admits of more and less do not believe by a sufficient sign. For thing other in form receive more and less. But this has been spoken of before.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book Eight — Reading 2 - What Is Friendship

Perhaps these things would become clear if the lovable is known. For everything does not seem to be loved, but the lovable. And this is the good or the pleasant or the useful. But the useful seems to be that through which some good or pleasure comes to be, so that the good and the pleasant would be lovable as ends.

Do they love the good or what is good for them? For these differ sometimes. And likewise about the pleasant. It seems that each one loves what is good for himself and that the good is simply lovable, but to each what is good for each. But each loves not what is good for himself, but what appears so. This however makes no difference for the lovable will be apparent.

There being then three things on account of which we love, friendship is not spoken of in the love of inanimate things. For there is no loving in return or wishing good to that. It is perhaps laughable to wish good to the wine but, if at all, one wishes it to keep well so that one might have it. But it is said that one ought to wish good things to a friend for his sake.

Those wishing good things thus are called well-wishers if the same does not come to be from the other. But friendship is in undergoing good-will in return.

Or ought one to add not hidden? For many wish well to those they have not seen, thinking them to be good or useful, and one of these might undergo the same towards them. Such then would seem to wish well to each other, but how could one call friends those ignorant of how they are to each other?

It is necessary therefore that they have goodwill towards each other and wish good things knowingly on account of some thing said above.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book Eight — Reading 3 - Forms of Friendship Between Equals

But these differ in form; and therefore the lovings and the friendships. Thus there are three forms of friendship equal in number to the loved. For according to each, there can be a return of love not hidden. But men loving each other wish good things to each other in that whereby they love.

Those loving on account of the useful do not love each other in themselves, but insofar as there comes to be some good to them from each other. Likewise, those on account of pleasure. For they do not love the witty for the sort of person they are, but because they are pleasant to them. Now those loving on account of the useful love because of what is good for them, and those on account of pleasure, because of what is pleasant to them, and not as the one loved is, but as useful or agreeable. These friendships are by accident. For the one loved is not loved as he is, just as he is, but insofar as these provide a good and those a pleasure.

Such as these are easily loosened when they do not remain the same. For if they are no longer pleasant or useful, they cease to love. But the useful does not remain, for it is other at other times. When that on account of which they were friends has ceased to be, the friendship is also dissolved, as if the friendship were only in regard to that.

Such a friendship seems to come about especially in the old for such do not seek the pleasant but the useful. And to those in the prime of life or the young who seek the useful. For such do not at all live together, for sometimes they are not even pleasant. Nor do they have need of such association unless they are useful. For they are pleasant to the extent that they have hope of some good. And some place with these that of strangers.

The friendship of the young seems to be on account of pleasure. For these live by emotion and especially seek what is pleasant to them and the present.

And as their age changes, so other things become pleasant. Hence, they become friends and cease to be quickly. For the friendship changes together with the pleasant, and the change of such pleasure is swift.

And the young are amorous for the most of passionate love is by emotion and on account of pleasure. Hence, they love quickly and quickly cease, changing many times the same day. And these wish to remain together and to live together for thus it comes to them according to friendship.

But the friendship of the good and alike in virtue is perfect.

For these wish good things alike to each other insofar as they are good, but they are good in themselves. Those wishing good to their friends on account of them are most of all friends. For they are thus through themselves and not by accident. Hence, the friendship of these remains as long as they are good; virtue however is stable.

And each is good simply and to his friend. For the good are both simply good and useful to each other. And likewise pleasant for the good are pleasant simply and to each other. And one's own actions are with pleasure for each for each and such of the good are the same or similar. Such a friendship is with reason stable for it joins together in itself all things that ought to belong to friends. For all friendship is on account of the good or on account of the pleasure, either simply or to the one loving, and by some likeness. But all the foresaid belong to this as such, for in this they are alike and the rest. And the good simply is also pleasant simply. But these are most of all lovable. And hence to love and friendship in these will be the greatest and the best.

And such are likely rare. For such men are few. Further there is need of time and being accustomed to each other. For according to the proverb, it is impossible to know each other before they have taken the required amount of salt together. One cannot receive or be friends before each appear lovable to each and is trusted. Those quickly being friendly to each other wish to be friends, but are not if they are not worthy of love and know this. For the wish for friendship can come about quickly, but friendship cannot.

This then is perfect both according to time and according to the rest; and according to all these, there comes to be similar things to each from each, which ought to be in friends.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book Eight — Reading 4 - Comparison of Friendships

The one through the pleasant has a likeness to this. For the good are also pleasant to one another. Likewise, that through the useful. For the good are also such to each other.

And friendships in these especially last when the same comes to be from each, such as pleasure; and not only thus, but also from the same, such as in the witty and not as in the lover and the beloved. For these do not take pleasure in the same things, but the one in seeing that person and the other in being served by the lover. But the beauty ending, sometimes the friendship comes to an end. For the seeing is no longer pleasant to this one and to that one, service is no longer paid.

But many again last, because they have the same customs - if they love the habits from familiarity.

But those exchanging not the pleasant but the useful in amorous matters are less friends, and their friendship less lasting.

But those who are friends because of the useful cease to be together with the useful. For they were not friends of each other but of profit.

It is possible then for the bad to be friends of each other on account of pleasure or on account of usefulness, and the good of the bad and those neither to any. But it is clear that only the good can be friends on account of themselves. For the bad do not rejoice in themselves if some utility does not come about.

And the friendship of the good is alone without slander. For one does not quickly believe about someone tested by oneself over a long time. For there is trust in these and never to have been unjust and whatever else is deemed worthy of true friendship. But nothing prevents such things coming to be in others.

But, since men call friends also those on account of the useful, just as cities (for alliances seem to come to be in cities on account of the useful) and also those loving each other on account of pleasure, as children, perhaps we also ought to call those such friends.

But there are many forms of friendship, and first and chiefly is that of the good as good, the rest however by likeness. Insofar as there is something good and something like, in this way they are friends. For the pleasant is good to those who love pleasure. But these are not all joined together, nor do the same become friends on account of the useful and on account of the pleasant. For things by accident are not at all joined together. Friendship then being divided into these forms, the bad will be friends through pleasure or the useful, being alike in the same, but the good will be friends through themselves insofar as they are good. These then will be friends simply, but those by accident and in being likened to these.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book Eight — Reading 5 - Friendship and Its Act

Just as in the virtues some are called good according to habit and some according to act, so also in friendship. For those living together enjoy each other and bring about good things; but those sleeping or separated in places do not act. However, they are disposed to act friendly in that way. For the places do not destroy the friendship simply, but the act.

However, if the absence comes to be for a long time, it seems to make the friendship forgotten. Whence it has been said, "Lack of conversation destroys many friendships."

Neither the old, nor the harsh, seem to be fitted for friendship. For there is little that is pleasant in these, and no one is able to pass the day together with one painful or not pleasant. For nature seems especially to flee the painful and to desire the pleasant.

Those approving of each other but not living together, seem more to wish well to each other than to be friends.

For nothing belongs more to friends than living together. For those in need want usefulness, but even the blessed, to spend the day together. For it is suitable least of all to these to be solitary. But it is not possible to live together if they are not pleasant or do not enjoy the same things which companionship seems to have.

The friendship then of the good is the greatest, as has been said many times. For the good or pleasant simply seems to be loved and chosen, but by each what is such to him. But the good by the good through both of these.

Loving seems to be like a passion, but friendship like a habit.

For loving is just as much towards inanimate things, but they love in return with choice; choice however is from habit.

And they wish good things to the beloved for their sake, not by passion, but by habit.

And loving the friend, they love what is good for themselves. For the good becoming a friend becomes good to whom he is a friend. For each loves what is good for himself and they give back the equal in wish and in kind. For friendship is called equality. These things belong most of all to that of the good.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book Eight — Reading 6 - Friendship and Its Subjects

Friendship comes to be less in those harsh and those old inasmuch as they are more discontented and enjoy company less. But these things seem to be especially friendly and productive of friendship. Wherefore the young become friends swiftly, but the old do not. For they do not become friends of those whom they do not enjoy. Likewise, neither the harsh. But such are well-wishers to each other. For they wish good things and come to each other in need. But they are not altogether friends because they do not spend the day together or enjoy each other, which especially seems to befit friends.

It is not possible to be a friend of many according to the perfect friendship, just as sexual love is not of many together. For it seems like the excessive, but such is apt to come to be towards one.

Further, it is not easy for many to be pleasing to the same one at the same time, and perhaps not good.

Further, it is necessary to have experience and to become intimate which is the most difficult of all.

But it is possible to please many through the useful and the pleasant. For there are many such and the services are in a short time.

But of these, that through the pleasant seems more like friendship whenever the same things come to be from both and they enjoy each other or the same things, such as are the friendships of the young. For the liberal is more in these. But that through the useful is commercial.

And the blessed have no need of the useful, but of the pleasant. For they wish to live together with someone. One may put up with the disagreeable a sort time, but no one can submit to this continuously - not even the good itself if it were disagreeable to oneself.

Whence they seek pleasant friends. And perhaps such ought to be good and further to them for thus there will belong to them whatever ought to friends.

Those in power seem to have separate friends. For some are useful to them and others pleasant, but the same are not at all both.

They seek neither those pleasant with virtue nor those useful in noble things, but the witty when desiring the pleasant or the terribly efficient to do their commands. But these do not at all come to be in the same.

It has been said that the good man is at the same time both pleasant and useful. But such a man does not become a friend of one placed over others unless he be also overtopped in virtue. If not, he will not make equal the proportional, being overtopped. But it is not at all customary for such to come to be.

The foresaid friendships then are in equality. For the same things come to be from both and are wished to each other; or they exchange one thing for another, such as pleasure for utility.

That these are less friendships and less lasting has been said. They seem through likeness and unlikeness to the same, to be and not to be friendships. They seem to be friendships by likeness to that of virtue. For this has the pleasant and the other, the useful, but these belong to that. But in this one being without slander and lasting, but those quickly changing, and differing in many other things, they do not seem to be friendships on account of their being unlike that one.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book Eight — Reading 7 - Friendship Among Unequals

There is another form of friendship, the one according to superiority; such as the father toward the son and in general the older to the younger, and the man to the woman and every ruler to the ruled.

But these differ from each other. There is not the same of parents to children and rulers to the ruled; but neither of the father to the son and the son to the father, nor of the husband to the wife and the wife to the husband.

For the virtue and the work of these is different.

That on account of which they love is also different. Hence, the lovings and the friendships are also different.

The same things do not come to be to either from the other, nor ought they to be sought. For whenever children give to parents what is owed to those who have engendered and the parents have given to sons what is owed to children, the friendship of these will be lasting and good.

The loving ought to be proportional in all the friendships according to superiority; as the better ought to be loved more than he loves, both the more useful and each of the others likewise. For when the loving comes to be according to worth, then there comes to be in some way equality, which seems to belong to friendship.

But the equal does not seem to come about in the same way in the just and in friendship. For in matter of justice, the equal is first according to worth, but second according to quantity while in friendship that according to quantity is first but that according to worth second.

It is clear that if there is a great distance in virtue or wickedness or wealth or something other, they are no longer friends or expected to be.

This is clear in the gods. For these excel much in all goods. This is clear also in kings. Those falling short of them a lot do not expect to be friends of them. Nor do those worthy of nothing expect to be friends of the best or wisest.

There is no precise limit in such things up to which they are friends for many things taken away, it remains. But when separated much, as from God, no longer.

Whence also it is asked if friends do not wish to friends the greatest of goods, such as to be gods; for they would no longer be friends to them or goods. For friends are goods

If it has been well said that the friend wishes good things to the friend on account of the latter, it would be necessary that the latter remain such as he is. For he wished the greatest goods to him as being a man.

Further perhaps not all, for each one wishes good things especially to himself.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book Eight — Reading 8 - Loving and Being Loved

Many seem through love of honor to wish to be loved more than to love.

Whence the many are lovers of flattery. For the flatterer is a friend excelled or pretends to be such and to love more than to be loved.

For to be loved seems close to being honored which the many desire.

However, they do not seem to desire honor for itself, but by accident. For the many rejoice being honored by those in power on account of hope. For they think to obtain from them what they need. So they rejoice in honor as a sign of undergoing good things. But these desiring honor from the good and knowing, desire their own opinion about themselves to be confirmed. They rejoice that they are good, believing in the judgment of those saying so.

But they rejoice in being loved by itself.

Whence it would seem to be better than to be honored, and friendship is desirable through itself.

However, it seems to be more in loving than in being loved. A sign is that mothers rejoice in loving. For some give theirs to be nourished and they love knowing, but do not seek to be loved in return if both are not possible. But it seem to be enough for them if they see them doing well, and they love them even if the latter impart nothing that befits a mother through ignorance.