← Library · Metaphysics translations
Aristotle, Sixth Book of Wisdom (The Metaphysics)
Metaphysics translations
From his file: METAPHYSICS 6.doc.
Read from in 5 classes
- Wisdom (2005) — 33. Metaphysics V, Reading 18 on 'Perfect' and the Start of Book VI: How Wisdom Differs from the Making and Doing Sciences
- Wisdom (2005) — 34. Metaphysics Book 6, Part 1: Wisdom's Subject, and How the Making, Doing and Looking Sciences Are Divided
- Wisdom (2005) — 36. Metaphysics VI, Reading 2: Accidental Being and Why No Reasoned-Out Knowledge Is About It
- Wisdom (2005) — 37. Is Moral Effect Accidental to the Poet? Accidental Causes, No Science of the Accidental, and Modern Determinism
- Wisdom (2005) — 38. Metaphysics VI: The Whole Truth, Contradiction, and Truth in the Mind, Good in Things; Predicates and Definition in Logic
Aristotle, Sixth Book of Wisdom (The Metaphysics) — First Reading
The beginnings and the causes of beings are sought and, it is clear, as beings. There is some cause of health and vigor, and there are beginnings and elements and causes of mathematical things. And in general, every science [reasoned out knowledge or reazsoend out understanding], understanding or partaking of understanding, is about causes and beginnings, either more precise or more simple
But all these, drawing a line around, consider about some being and some kind, but not about being simply, nor as being, nor do they give an account of the what it is. But from this (some by sensation make this clear, some taking the what it is as laid down) they demonstrate, more necessarily or loosely, what belongs as such to the kind of thing they are about. Hence it is clear from such an induction that there is no demonstration of substance or of the what it is, but some other way of being shown. Likewise they say nothing as to whether the kind of thing about which they consider exists or does not exist because it belongs to the same understanding to make clear what it is and if it is.
Since natural science is about some kind of being, for it is about such substance as has in itself a beginning of motion and rest, it is clear that it is neither a doing nor a making science. For the beginning of things made is in the maker, either mind or art or some power while of things done it is choice in the doer. For what is done and what is chosen are the same. Hence, if every science is either doing or making or looking, natural science will be a particular looking science which is about such being as is able to be moved, and about the substance which by definition is for the most part not separable.
How the what was to be and the definition are, must not be hidden because to seek without this is to do nothing. Now some of the things defined and their what it is are as the snub nose while others are as the concave. These differ because the snub nose is taken with matter – the snub nose is a concave nose, but concavity is without sensible matter. If then all natural things are said in like way to snub nose; as nose, eye, face, flesh, bone and in general animal; and leaf, root bark and, in general, plant for the definition of none of these is without motion, but it always has matter, it is clear how the what it is ought to be sought and defined in natural things, and why it belongs to the natural scientist to consider about some soul, so far as it is not without matter. That natural science is a particular looking science is clear from these things.
But the mathematical is also a looking one. However, it is unclear now whether it is of immovable and separated things. But it is clear that some mathematical sciences consider things as immovable and separated.
If there is something eternal and immovable and separated, it is clear that to know it will belong to a looking science. It will surely not belong to natural science for natural science is about certain movable things, nor to the mathematical, but to one before both of them. For natural science is about inseparables, but not as immovables, but some of the mathematical are about immovables, not separated perhaps, but in matter. But the first is about things separated and immovable. For it is necessary that all the causes be eternal, but especially these. These are causes of what is manifest in divine things.
Hence, there will be three looking philosophies: mathematical, natural and theological.
For it is not unclear that, if the divine exists somewhere, it exists in such a nature.
And the most honorable science ought to be about the most honorable kind of thing. The looking are more desirable than the other sciences, and this, than the other looking sciences.
One might ask whether the first philosophy is universal or about one kind of thing and one nature. For it is not the same way in the mathematical sciences, but geometry and astronomy are about some nature while the universal is common to all.
If then there is not another substance besides those constituted by nature, natural philosophy will be the first science. If however there is some immovable substance, this will be before and the first philosophy and thus universal because first. And it will belong to this science to consider about being as being and the what it is and the things that belong as being.
Aristotle, Sixth Book of Wisdom (The Metaphysics) — Second Reading
But since being simply said is said in many ways, of which one was that by happening (or accident), another as true and non-being as the false, and besides these are the figures of predication, as the what, the how, the how much, the where, the when, and if something other signifies in this way. Further, besides all these, what is in ability and in act.
Since then being is said in many ways, one ought to speak first about that by happening (accident), that there is no consideration about it. A sign: no science pays attention to this – neither the doing, nor the making, nor the looking. For the one making a house does not make whatever happens to the house made. For they are endless. For nothing prevents the thing made from being pleasant for some, harmful to others, and useful to others and different so to speak from all other things. But the art of the house builder is productive of none of these. In the same way, neither does the geometer consider what happens thus to figures, nor if triangle and triangle having two right angles are other.
And this takes place reasonably. For the accidental is, as it were, only some name.
Whence, in a way, Plato did not badly put sophistry about non-being. For the arguments of sophists are about the accidental most of all; as whether the musical and the grammatical are the same or other, and musical Coriscus and Coriscus. And if everything that is but not always, has come to be, so that if the one being musical has become grammatical, also the on being grammatical, musical, and whatever other arguments are such. Indeed the accidental seems close to non-being
It is clear also from these reasons. There is generation and corruption of what is in another way, but there is not of the accidental.
Nevertheless, one should speak further about the accidental (what happens), as far as it is possible – what is the nature of it and through what cause it is. At the same time, it will probably become clear also why there is no science of it.
Since then among the things that are, some are always in the same way and by necessity (not that by force, but the one in which we say it cannot be otherwise) while others are not by necessity nor always, but for the most part; the latter is the beginning and cause that the accidental is.
For we call what is neither always, nor for the most part, an accident; as when storm and cold come to be in the dog days, we say it happened; but not when stifling heat because the one is always or for the most part, but the other not. And man happens to be white, for this is neither always nor for the most part, but he is not an animal by accident. And the house builder restores to health by accident because the house builder is not apt to do this, but the doctor – and the house builder happens to be a doctor. And the cook aiming at pleasure would make something healthful but not by cookery. Whence it happens, we say; and in some way he makes but simply he does not. For there are powers productive of other things, but there is not determined art or power of the accidental. For of the things that are and come to be by accident, the cause is also accidental.
Hence, since all things do not exist or come to be by necessity and always, but most, usually, it is necessary that what is by accident exists; as the white is musical neither always nor usually, but since it comes to be sometimes, it will be by accident. If not, all things will be by necessity. Whence the matter, which can be other than what it is for the most part, will be the cause of the accidental. One must take this beginning, whether nothing is neither always nor for the most part or this is impossible. There is something therefore besides these: what happens whichever way and by accident. But whether the usual exists, but always belongs to nothing, or there are some eternal things - about these one must investigate later.
It is clear that science will not be of the accidental. For every science is about either the always or the usual. How else could one learn or teach another? For it must be limited by always or for the most part; as that honey-water is beneficial to the fevered for the most part. But apart from this, it cannot say when not; as at the new moon. For what is at the new moon is either always or usually. But the accidental is besides these.
It has been said then what the accidental is and through what cause it is and that there is no science of it.
Aristotle, Sixth Book of Wisdom (The Metaphysics) — Third Reading
It is clear that there are beginnings and causes generated and corrupted without generation and corruption [of their effects]. For if this is not so, all things will be by necessity, if of the generated and corrupted there is necessarily some cause not by happening.
Whether this will be or not; if this has come to be, it will be; and if not, not. And this if another. And thus it is clear that always taking away time from a limited time one will arrive at what is now.
So that thus he will die by violence if he goes out. But this if he is thirsty and this if another. And thus one will come to what is now or in something of what has come to be, as if he is thirsty, but this because he ate something sharp And this either exists or not. So that by necessity he dies or will not die.
Likewise if someone goes over to the past, there will be the same reason. For already this will belong to some thing, I say the what has come to be. Therefore all future things will be by necessity, as for the living to die. For already something has come to be, such as contraries in the same. But if by sickness or by violence not yet, but if this comes to be. It is clear that it goes up to some beginning, but this no longer unless this has come to be.
It is clear that it will go up to some beginning, but this not further to another. It will be of whatever happens itself the cause, but there will be no other cause of the coming to be itself.
But the leading up will be to such a beginning and such a cause, whether as to matter, or as to that for the sake of which, or as to the mover, must most of all be considered.
Let us leave then about what is by happening. For it has been determined enough
Aristotle, Sixth Book of Wisdom (The Metaphysics) — Fourth Reading
Being as true and non-being as false: since they are according to putting together and taking apart, as a whole they are about the dividing of a contradiction. For the true has the affirmation in the put together and negation in the divided. The false has the contradiction of this division.
There is a discussion elsewhere about how understanding together or apart happens. I call together and separate, not one after another, but in becoming something one.
The false and the true are not in things, as if the good is true and the bad, false, but in the mind. Nor is it in the mind about the simple and what it is. Whatever ought to be considered about this way of being and not being, will be examined later.
Since putting together and taking apart are in the mind, but not in things, being in this way is other than being properly – for the mind joins together or takes away the what it is or the how or the how much or something other.
Accidental being and being as true should be set aside. For the cause of the one is indeterminate while the other is some undergoing of the mind. And both are about the remaining kind of being and do not show outside some existing nature of being. Whence let these be set aside.
The causes and the beginnings of beings as being should be considered. It is clear where we distinguished in how many ways each is said, that being is said in many ways.