Beginning Well in Philosophy

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Beginning Well in Philosophy

Wisdom about Beginnings

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BEGINNING WELL IN PHILOSOPHY

Proemium

A consideration of beginning well in philosophy can be divided into a consideration of four statements. The first statement is nothing is more necessary in philosophy than to begin well. The second statement is nothing is more difficult in philosophy than to begin well. The third statement is we need a wise teacher most of all to begin well. The fourth statement is beginning well is the soul of philosophy.

Nothing is more necessary in philosophy than to begin well

Nothing is more necessary in philosophy than to begin well. The reason for this is that everything else depends upon the beginning. Without a good beginning, nothing else can be done well in philosophy. Hence, if one begins well, one is helped by this throughout the whole of philosophy. But if one makes a bad beginning, one is impeded by this in the rest of philosophy. As Hamlet said (Hamlet, Act III, Sc. 4): "Thus bad begins and worse remains behind."

The importance of the beginning should be judged, not by its size, but by the things to which its power extends; for a beginning is the origin of other things. The beginning in philosophy is small in size compared to the whole of philosophy, but great in power. The beginning can be compared to a small seed from which a great tree comes. The beginning in philosophy is like a seed which, although small in size, contains everything else in its power. Hence, to begin well in philosophy and human knowledge is to go a long way in them; and the man who begins well in philosophy will be helped by this beginning through the whole of them. As the whole plant (roots, trunk, branches leaves, etc.) is contained in the power of a small seed, so the whole of philosophy is contained in small beginnings. This is why it is not out of proportion to spend a long time on the beginning in philosophy. The Greeks had a proverb that the beginning is half of all and this is a witness to the importance of the beginning. But Plato in the Laws and in the Republic and Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics say that the beginning is more than half.

Hence, even a small mistake in the beginning is like taking the wrong turn at a fork in the road - the further one proceeds, the further one is from where he should be. The necessity for beginning well can also be seen from the effect of making a mistake in the beginning, We must be careful to avoid even a little mistake in the beginning of human knowledge because such a mistake will increase without limit as we proceed. This is because everything else is contained in the power of the beginning. The man who makes a mistake in the beginning of human knowledge is like a man who takes the wrong turn at a fork in the road. Although his mistake seems small in the beginning, the more he proceeds, the further he departs from where he should be.

We can see that the necessity of accuracy in the beginning increases in direct ratio to the distance of the target one aims at; just as a slight movement of the arm of a man aiming at a target that is close at hand will not be as important as that same movement in a man aiming at a target far away. Since the philosopher aims at wisdom which is the target most distant from the beginning, he especially must be accurate in the beginning.

The good is from an integral cause, but the bad from any defect. Hence, if any part of the beginning is defective, the whole will be defective. Therefore, it is necessary to divide and subdivide the beginning of philosophy so that no part will be neglected to the detriment of the whole

We must consider the beginning in philosophy because everything else depends upon this beginning and nature does not complete or perfect this beginning.

Again, the man who begins well is like a man whose house has a solid foundation or is built on rock while the man who does not begin well is like a man whose house does not have a sold foundation or is built on sand. This is important most of all for the philosopher since the man who wants to build the highest, must have the most solid foundation upon which to build. Everything else rests upon the foundation.

Moreover, the importance of beginning well has a necessary connection with the use of reason. For in every work of reason, there is found order. But order consists in the before and after, and these are said in reference to some beginning. Hence, the concern for beginning well is a concern for order and vice-versa. The two are inseparable. Thus, if anyone wants to use his reason well, he should be concerned with beginning well. This is most of all true of the man who aims at wisdom since wisdom is the highest perfection of reason and most of all concerned with order. Hence, the philosopher or lover of wisdom should especially be concerned with beginning well.

The beginning of philosophy and human knowledge comes to be in part by nature. All men by nature desire to know. and there are some things which all men naturally come to know; such as that the whole is greater than one of its parts. Likewise. all men naturally follow the road from the senses into reason.

But nature does not complete or perfect this beginning so that a man has by nature everything he needs to go forward in philosophy and human knowledge. This will become clear in the course of the consideration. The natural desire to know is not sufficient in the will because of the difficulties of coming to know and avoiding errors and of the necessity of being disposed to learn from and with others. And it is clear from the Posterior Analytics, that common beginnings naturally known (such as that the whole is greater than one of its parts) are not sufficient for the reasoned-out knowledge which must proceed from beginnings that are proper or private to that reasoned-out knowledge. And the history of philosophy, and especially of modern philosophy, shows that men often go astray or against the natural road in human knowledge. Many other things might be brought forth to show the insufficiency of nature here.

Nevertheless, the perfection or completion of this beginning must be made in accordance with nature. Otherwise, it would not be a man who was philosophizing or coming to know.

But if beginning well is the soul of philosophy, a bad beginning is the death of philosophy. Plato in the Cratylus and Aristotle in the book On the Universe warn us how even a small mistake in the beginning is a great one in the end.

Nothing is better in philosophy than to end well. All's well that ends well. And the end is always better than what is for the sake of it (when both are good). But one cannot end well if one has not begun well.

The beginning in philosophy made by reason or by choice should be in harmony with the beginning made by nature. The first beginning is always by nature. There are many philosophers who make an unnatural beginning by choice or custom or mistake or chance or fashion.

Appendix to necessity of beginning well

After a particular consideration of the beginnings of philosophy, we can see better the necessity of beginning well. The particular consideration is in a sense a manuductio through less universal statements for the necessity of beginning well. There was a manuductio through similar sensible things here, such as the seed, fork in the road, gun, foundation of building. Growth, generation and change of place are useful for bringing out the importance of the beginning, but not alteration.

A more distinct knowledge of the necessity of beginning well can be had once the parts of the beginning are seen. For example: the private road or way of going forward in any particular reasoned-out knowledge is a universal beginning of that knowledge. The common road or way of going forward in reasoned-out knowledge is a universal beginning of all reasoned out knowledge. Hence, by a careful consideration of these ways of going forward, we will be much helped in knowing all those things to which their power extends.

Thus, a little error about the proper road of any reasoned-out knowledge will have a bad effect all through it. An error in logic will be even more serious since it will be multiplied without limit through all our reasoned-out knowledge. And an error about the way of going forward along the natural road will be the most serious of all since it will have a bad effect upon all our knowledge.

The importance of the beginning about things in our mind must be especially considered in reference to judgment as distinguished from reception or apprehension. We judge or separate the true from the false always and only by some beginning in our knowledge.

Nothing is more difficult in philosophy than to begin well.

It is also true that the most difficult part of philosophy is beginning well. For the beginning, although great in its power, is small in size and easily overlooked. And a small mistake in the beginning is often missed, but the result of such is enormous.

And it is difficult to see the beginning as a beginning or to understand its power. We understand a seed as a beginning and respect its power only after we have seen to what it gives rise.

It is difficult to begin well in philosophy and human knowledge. Many reasons can be given for the difficulty of beginning well. This difficulty can be seen in general and in particular.

Since the beginning is small in size, it is easily neglected or despised. And since the beginning is small, a mistake in it is hard to see. And we have seen how bad is even a small mistake in the beginning. Moreover, a mistake is bad and happens in many ways, if not an infinity of ways, all of which must be avoided to achieve the good. Furthermore, our division of the beginning has shown how many things are involved in beginning well, and one of these cannot stand without the others, so that a defect in even one will corrupt the whole beginning. The seriousness of a mistake about the beginning can be seen not only from its consequences, but also from the truth that there is nothing before the beginning to correct a mistake by.

Even if a man were to avoid all mistakes in the beginning, it would still be difficult to possess the beginning well enough for all subsequent needs. Rather, it seems that man's mind and will must grow like a tree - the higher they want to reach, the more they must sink their roots down into the ground or the beginning. The further one wants to go in knowledge, the more perfectly one must possess or acquire the beginning. One need not (indeed cannot) acquire all the depth of a beginning before going forward. But every going forward must be accompanied by a return to the beginning, as the roots of a tree must balance the growth above ground. Thinkers fail to deepen their possession of the beginning through bad appetite or by failing to recognize the beginning as a beginning. It is difficult to know a beginning as a beginning. A man can know a beginning as a beginning, or know its power, only after he sees what follows from it. But the latter is possible only for a man who has made a long effort following some grasp and acceptance of a beginning. One can see the power of a beginning fully only after he has gone through the whole of human knowledge. Until the beginning is somehow established in a man, he cannot see what follows from it. And until one sees what follows from it, he cannot appreciate its power or know it as a beginning.

The difficulty of beginning well can also be seen from the strength of fashion and custom. Fashion especially corrupts the beginning on the part of our desiring ability. And custom corrupts us often in regard to beginnings in reason, in regard to the road we should follow and also in regard to statements known through themselves.

A sign of the difficulty of beginning well in philosophy is that the famous philosophers down through history did not begin in the same way (but opposed ways) even though many of them talked about the importance of the beginning.

Another particular sign of the difficulty of the beginning can be found in our experience of the origin and growth of many sciences. Comparatively rapid growth is made after the beginning is seen and many men are able to contribute to this development. Yet the beginning took a long time to be seen and it is one man or a few men of genius who discover the beginning. (See Aristotle's words at the end of the On Sophistical Refutations)

One should also consider the difficulty of beginning well in particular by going though the various parts of the beginning, but perhaps this must be left for the consideration itself.

We need a wise teacher most of all to begin well.

Although we need wise teachers throughout the life of our reason, nowhere do we need such teachers more than in the beginning. For it is most difficult to begin well. And if we have begun well, it is easier to add to, or build upon, this beginning. And if we err in our later thinking, we can be recalled to the truth by the beginning. But if we begin badly, all is lost.

Beginning well is the soul of philosophy

Aristotle in the Poetics and Leo XIII in Providentissimus Deus share a similar use of the word soul. Aristotle said that plot was the soul of tragedy while Leo XIII said that "the study of the sacred page is, as it were, the soul of sacred theology" (Quoted also in Vatican II, Constitution on Divine Revelation, n. 24). For like reasons, it can be said that beginning well is the soul of philosophy. Such a use of the word is first suggested by the words of Shakespeare In Hamlet

Brevity is the soul of wit (Hamlet, Act II, Sc. 2)

Metaphysics, Book VII, 1041A, 19-20:

ἀλλὰ τοῦτο κοινόν γε κατὰ πάντων καὶ σύντομον

Moerbeke:

Sed hoc commune, quia de omnibus, et quod breve.

Thomas, In VII Metaphysicorum, Lectio XVII, n. 1654:

hoc etiam est commune omnibus, quia unumquodque est indivisibile ad seipsum. "Et est quod breve", idest se habet ad modum principii, quod est parvum quantitate et maximum virtute.

Metaphysics, Book 14 or N, 1091 a 5-9:

Πάντα δὴ ταῦτα ἄλογα, καὶ μαχεται καὶ αὐτὰ ἑαυτοῖς καὶ τοῖς εὐλόγοις, καὶ ἔοικεν ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶναι ὁ Σιμωνίδου μακρὸς λόγος· γίγνεται γὰρ ὁ μακρὸς λόγος, ὥσπερ τῶν δούλων ὅταν μηθὲν ὑγιὲς λέγωσιν.

King Henry IV, Part Two, Act II, Sc. 2, Poins reading the letter of Falstaff:

[Reads] "I will imitate the honourable Romans in brevity": he sure means brevity in breath, short-winded.

Love's Labour's Lost. Act IV, Sc. 2 from Lyly's Latin grammar:

vir sapit qui pauca loquitur

Measure for Measure, Act I, Sc. 4 (?):

Fewness and truth, 'tis thus.

Much Ado About Nothing, Act III, Sc. 2:

I have studied eight or nine words wise words to speak to you, which these hobby horses must not hear.

Plutarch, Life of Phocion, Mod. Lib Ed. of Plutarch's Lives, p. 898:

Although he was most gentle and humane in his disposition, his aspect was stern and forbidding, so that he was seldom accosted alone by any who were not intimate with him. When Chares once made some remark on his frowning looks, and the Athenians laughed at the jest, "My sullenness," said Phocion, "never yet made any of you sad, but these men jollities have given you sorrow enough."

In like manner, Phocion's language, also, was full of instruction, abounding in happy maxims and wise thoughts, but admitted no embellishment to its austere and commanding brevity.

Zeno said a philosopher should never speak till his words had been steeped in meaning; and such, it may be said, were Phocion's, crowding the greatest amount of significance into the smallest allowance of space.

And to this probably, Polyeuctus, the Sphettian, referred, when he said that Demosthenes was, indeed, the best orator of his time, but Phocion was the most powerful speaker.

His oratory, like small coin of great value, was to be estimated, not by its bulk, but its intrinsic worth.

He was once observed, it is said, when the theatre was filling with the audience, to walk musing behind the scenes, which one of his friends taking notice of said, "Phocion, you seem to be thoughtful." "Yes," replied he, "I am considering how I may shorten what I am going to say to the Athenians."

Even Demosthenes himself, who used to despise the rest of the haranguers, when Phocion stood up, was wont to say quietly to those about him, "Here is the pruning-knife of my periods."

Charles Dickens, David Copperfield, Chapter LII, Mod. Lib. Ed., p. 793:

Again Mr. Micawber has a relish in this formal piling up of words, which, however ludicrously displayed in his case, was, I must say, not at all peculiar to him. I have observed it, in the course of my life, in numbers of men. It seems to be a general rule. In the taking of legal oaths, for instance, deponents seem to enjoy themselves mightily when they come to several good words in succession, for the expression of one idea - as, that they utterly detest, abominate, and abjure, and so forth - and the old anathemas were made relishing on the same principle.

We talk about the tyranny of words, but we like to tyrannize over them too. We are fond of having a large superfluous establishment of words to wait upon us on great occasions; we think it looks important, and sounds well. As we are not particular about the meaning of our liveries on state occasions, if they be but fine and numerous enough, so the meaning or necessity of our words is a secondary consideration, if there be but a great parade of them. And as individuals get into trouble by making too great a show of liveries, or as slaves when they are too numerous rise against their masters, so I think I could mention a nation that has got into many great difficulties, and will get into greater, from maintaining too large a retinue of words.

Charles Dickens, Martin Chuzzlewit, Chapter II, Dodd. Mead ed.., p. 30:

"Playful - playful warbler, " said Mr. Pecksniff. It may be observed in connection with his calling his daughter a "warbler," that she was not at all vocal, but that Mr. Pecksniff was in the frequent habit of using any word that occurred to him as having a good sound, and rounding a sentence well, without much care for its meaning. And he did so boldly, and in such an imposing manner, that he would sometimes stagger the wisest people with his eloquence, and make them gasp again.

If the beginning is half of all or more than half because of its power (not its size), surely beginning well most of all helps reason to grow in philosophy. And since order depends upon the beginning, the order within philosophy depends upon beginning well, just as the order of a play is found in its plot.

Beginning well is the soul of philosophy for three reasons: (1) Since the soul is responsible for the unity of the body and the unity of philosophy is a unity of order and order depends upon a beginning, clearly beginning well ensures or gives rise to the order in philosophy. (2) Since the soul is the cause of growth, and philosophy or reasoned out knowledge grows by reason thinking out or reasoning out what is in the beginnings and reason cannot do this unless it has begun well (as Aristotle says in N. Ethics, from a beginning well considered many other things become manifest), clearly beginning well is what enables reason and reasoned out knowledge to grow. (3) Since the soul is the cause of life, and the life of reason is knowing truth and its death being deceived, and deception takes place in thinking because of the defect of some beginning which ought to have been observed or kept in mind (as Thomas says in his major proemium to logic) while something is judged to be true by some beginning in our knowledge, clearly beginning well is necessary to avoid error and to judge what is true. A defect in some beginning takes away part of the life of reason. And the more fundamental the beginning, the more life a defect in it takes away. If one was to abandon the statement about contradiction, one would fall to the level of a plant as Aristotle notes in the Metaphysics.

REASON AND BEGINNING

Since reason is the ability to look before and after, it can understand what a beginning is and it can understand the power of a beginning (and, hence, the importance of a beginning) and it can recognize beginnings as beginnings and their order. Let us unfold each one of these.

After Aristotle has distinguished in order the central senses of the word beginning (in the beginning of the fifth book of the Metaphysics), he gives a common account of beginning as what is first in being or becoming or knowing. But first is defined by before and after. The first is before all the rest and not after anything. Hence, the common account of beginning is able to be seen by reason which looks before and after. And since that common account is not said with one meaning as a genus and it is also necessary to distinguish in order the senses of beginning (which Aristotle does before he gives the common account, perhaps to help us avoid a univocal understanding of beginning), reason is also able to follow the order of these meanings. For order is nothing other than a before and after.

In his book About the Poetic Art, Aristotle also defines beginning, middle and end which are the parts of a plot in tragedy and comedy and epic. There he defines beginning, not through first, but immediately through before and after. The beginning is before something, but not after anything. So from this definition of beginning, it is also clear that reason (which is the ability to look before and after) can understand and has understood what a beginning is.

Reason can also understand the power of a beginning because it can look before and after. A beginning is small in size in comparison to what comes from it, but great in its power. This why the beginning is like a seed which is small in comparison to a tree that comes from it. But when reason considers what follows from the seed, that a tree comes after and from it, reason can understand the power of the seed. And so in the case of every beginning. Reason looks before and after, at the beginning and what comes after and from it. And in this way reason comes to understand the power of a beginning and that that power must be measured, not by the size of the seed, but by what comes after and from it. And in this way, reason comes to see the importance of a beginning.

Since reason is the ability to look before and after, only reason can see a beginning as a beginning. One can see a beginning as a beginning only when one sees what it is a beginning of and this comes after it. Hence, one must look before and after before one can see a beginning as a beginning. And since order is a before and after, clearly reason can see an order among beginnings.

In the Categories which pertain to logic and hence the use of reason, Aristotle distinguishes in order the central senses of the word before. But in the fifth book of the Metaphysics which pertains to wisdom, a knowledge of the first beginning, he distinguishes the senses of before according to the common account of beginning. This shows the intimate connection between beginning and before and after.

The failure of the modern mind to understand the importance of the beginning and to distinguish beginnings and see their order and to consider how they can be acquired is a sure sign of the defect or eclipse of reason in modern thought.

Again, since one man is wiser than another because he can see what is before or after what the other man sees or because he can see a before and after which the other man does not see, believing a wise man can be important in coming to know a beginning or to acquire it as a beginning.

Scriptum super Lib. I Sententiarum, Dist. I, Q. IV, Art. 2, Ad 1:

invenimus in processu cognitionis quod in cognitione principiorum venit quis per principiata, quibus tamen habitis, magis ipsa cognoscit quam principiata.

In the Proemium to the De Coelo et Mundo, Thomas says that it is proper to reason to order and in the Proemium to the N. Ethics, he says that it is proper to reason to know order. In the former, he applies this to the order within science itself and in the latter to the order in things which is known by science.

We should note too that Thomas calls scientia or philosophy an opus rationis, a work of reason in the first and a perfection of reason in the second. Given this twofold connection of philosophy with reason and of reason with order and of order with beginning. it is not strange to think that nothing is more necessary in philosophy than to begin well.

Thomas Aquinas, Proemium to In Libros Aristotelis De Caelo et Mundo Expositio, nn. 1-2:

Sicut Philosophus dicit in I Physicorum, tunc opinamur cognoscere unumquodque, cum causas cognoscimus primas, et principia prima, et usque ad elementa. Ex quo manifeste Philosophus ostendit in scientiis esse processum ordinatum, prout proceditur a primis causis et principiis usque ad proximas causas, quae sunt elementa constituentia essentiam rei.

Et hoc est rationabile:

nam processus scientiarum est opus rationis, cuius proprium est ordinare; unde in omni opere rationis ordo aliquis invenitur, secundum quem proceditur ab uno in aliud.

Et hoc patet tam in ratione practica, cuius consideratio est circa ea quae nos facimus, quam in ratione speculativa, cuius consideratio est circa ea quae sunt aliunde facta.

Invenitur autem processus de priori ad posterius in consideratione practicae rationis secundum quadruplicem ordinem...Similiter etiam invenitur quadruplex ordo in consideratione rationis speculativae.

THOMAS AQUINAS’ PROEMIUM TO THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

Thomas Aquinas. Proemium to the Nicomachean Ethics:

As the Philosopher says in the beginning of the Metaphysics, ordering belongs to the wise. The reason for this is that wisdom is the greatest perfection of reason whose property is to know order. For, although the sense powers know some things absolutely, nevertheless to know the order of one thing to another belongs only to the understanding or reason.

There is found, however, a two-fold order in things.

Nothing is more necessary in philosophy than to to begin well. For everything else depends upon the beginning.

If one begins well, one will be helped by this through the whole use and development of one’s reason. For a beginning is like a seed which, although small in size, is nevertheless great in power. If one begins well, the excellence of the beginning will be felt in everything to which its power extends.

But even a small mistake or defect in the beginning will be a great one in the end. This is like taking the wrong turn at a fork in the road: the further one proceeds, the further one is from where one should be.

Cratylus, 436D Importance of beginning

“ωσπερ των διαγραμματων ενιοτε του πρωτου σμικρου και αδηλου ψευδους γενομενου, τα λοιπα παμπολλα ηδη onta epomena omologein αλληλοις. dei dh peri της αρχης παντος πραγματος panti andri ton polun logon einai kai την πολλην σκεψιν ειτε ορθως ειτε μη υποκειται; εκεινης δε εξετασθεισης ικανως, τα λοιπα φαινεσθαι εκεινη epomena”

De Veritate, Q. 10, Art. 1, c:

nomen mentis a mensurando est sumptum. Res autem uniuscuiusque generis mensuratur per id quod est minimum et principium primum in genere suo, ut patet in X Metaphys.; et ideo nomen mentis hoc modo dicitur in anima, sicut et nomen intellectus. Solum enim intellectus accipit cognitionem de rebus mensurando eas ad sua principia.

De Veritate, q. 20, Art 4, c:

nihil potest videri in aliquo nisi illo modo quo est in illo. Contingit autem aliqua multa esse in uno dupliciter.

Uno modo divisim et pluraliter; sicut plures formae resplendent in speculo unaquaeque divisim, et sicut plures homines sunt in domo.

Alio modo uniformiter et simpliciter; sicut plures effectus sunt virtute in causa, ut conclusiones in principio, et membra in semine.

Quicumque igitur aliquid intuetur, consequens est ut illa videat quae in eo sunt multipliciter et divisim , eo quod unumquodque eorum ita offertur sicut et illud unum in quo continentur; et pro tanto qui videt speculum, videt formas in speculo resultantes.

Sed qui videt aliquid unum, non oportet quod omnia videat quae in eo sunt uniformiter sive unite, nisi quando totam virtutem illius unius comprehendit; sicut qui videt aliquid principium, non oportet quod videt omnes conclusiones virtute in eo existentes, nisi forte illud comprehendat.

De Veritate, Q. 20, Art 5, c:

in cognoscendo duo sunt consideranda: scilicet id quod cognoscitur, et modus cognoscendi. In quorum uno contingit quandoque aliquos convenire qui in altero differunt: sicut cum unum et idem est quod a diversis cognoscitur; ab uno tamen minus, et ab altero magis.

Illud autem quod per se offertur ad cognoscendum, pertinet ad id quod cognoscitur. Quod autem in alio cognoscitur, pertinet ad modum cognoscendi eius in quo cognoscitur; sicut si aliquis cognoscat aliquod principium, et in eo accipiat cognitonem aliquarum conclusionum, illarum conclusionum cognitio dependet ex modo cognoscendi principium.

Quando enim aliquis principium perfectius cognoscit, tanto plures conclusiones in eo intuetur; sed quantumcumque debiliter principium cognoscat, semper substantia ipisus principii remanet ei cognita; et ideo eius cognitio non determinat aliquem modum cognoscendi, sicut determinat cognitio conclusionum quae in eo cognoscebantur.

Et inde est quod eorum quibus offertur unum principium, omnes ipsam substantiam principii cognoscunt, non autem aequales numero vel easdem conclusiones; sed in hoc differunt, sicut et in modo cognoscendi principium.

Compendium Theologiae, Prima Pars, Caput 216:

Principium autem et immobile esse oportet, et virtute praestantisimum

Quantitas virtutis secundum effectus mensurari solet.

In VII Metaphysicorum, Lectio XVII, n. 1654:

"Et est quod breve", idest se habet ad modum principii, quod est parvum quantitate et maximum virtute.

THE ABOVE TEXT EXPLAINS ‘BREVITY IS THE SOUL OF WIT’, THE SOUL OF WISDOM IS ITS UNDERSTANDING OF BEGINNINGS. WE MEASURE BY SQ. FEET AND SQ. INCHES - SEE PROP. 5 IN BK. TWO OF EUCLID

"The Adventure of the Creeping Man" in The Case Book of Sherlock Holmes (in The Complete Sherlock Holmes, Garden Pub., 1938, p. 1262):

He had filled his pipe and resumed his seat, taking no notice of my comment. "The Practical application of what I have said is very close to the problem which I am investigating. It is a tangled skein, you understand, and I am looking for a loose end. One possible loose end lies in the question: why does Professor Presbury's wolfhound, Roy, endeavour to bite him?"

I sank back in my chair in some disappointment. Was it for so trivial a question as this that I had been summoned from my work? Holmes glanced across at me. "The same old Watson!" said he. "You never learn that the gravest issues may depend upon the smallest things."

"The Adventure of the Empty House" in The Return of Sherlock Holmes (in The Complete Sherlock Holmes, Garden Pub., 1938, p. 561):

All day I turned these facts over in my mind, endeavouring to hit upon some theory which could reconcile them all, and to find that line of least resistance which my poor friend had declared to be the starting-point of every investigation.

"The Adventure of Wisteria Lodge" in His Last Bow (in The Complete Sherlock Holmes, Garden Pub., 1938, p. 1029):

I have not all my facts yet, but I do not think there are any insuperable difficulties. Still, it is an error to argue in front of your data. You find yourself insensibly twisting them around to fit your theories.

How much more so in the beginning of the philosopher!

HOW TO BEGIN WELL IN PHILOSOPHY OR HOW TO ACQUIRE THE BEGINNING WELL

Five things are necessary before one can attempt to begin philosophy well. Two of these must be provided by nature, two are made possible by society, and one is a result of chance.

The two which must be provided by nature are good natural mental ability and a temperament disposed to quiet study rather than to action

The two made possible by society are leisure and contact with other minds through the spoken and the written word.

The thing which is by chance is to meet a good teacher. Thus we read that Plato thanked the gods for three things: that he was born a man and not a woman, a Greek rather than a barbarian, and that he had met Socrates. And Aristotle was fortunate to have spent almost twenty years in the school of Plato.

The beginning of philosophy exists in part by nature, but the whole of this beginning can be had only after our efforts. Nature insures that everyone will have something of the beginning of philosophy, but this is not sufficient to do well in philoso1phy. We possess the beginning of philosophy imperfectly by nature while the perfection of the beginning requires education. All men by nature desire to know, but nature does not insure that this desire will be strong, let alone that men will be willing to make the efforts necessary to pursue what is naturally desired. Nor does our common nature insure that men will have the fear necessary for good investigation and judgment or the docility needed towards great thinkers, or the tranquillity of feelings necessary for learning. Again, men naturally follow the first road from the senses into reason. Our common use of words and examples shows this. But nature does not insure a deep understanding of this road or a complete following of it, let alone a sufficient understanding of the common road studied in logic or an understanding of the special roads studied at the beginning of each reasoned-out knowledge. Again, nature insures some understanding of common beginnings which are know by all in a vague way. But it does not insure a precise understanding of these beginnings (which is fully had only in the last part of philosophy, wisdom or metaphysics), let alone an understanding of the private beginnings of each reasoned-out knowledge.

Nature insures much more of the poet's beginning than the philosopher's, but less of the experimental scientist's beginning (while the beginning of the theologian requires grace, our nature being insufficient for this science), Yet the completion or perfection of the beginning of philosophy is according to nature.

The education necessary for perfecting the beginning of philosophy should start by listening to the great music of the 18th century, especially that of Mozart. This is useful for acquiring that tranquillity of feelings necessary for serious thinking. Moreover music is especially necessary for temperance or moderation as Plato taught us in the Republic. But the moral virtues rectifying the appetite in regard to the life of looking reason are attached to temperance or have the mode of moderation (for example, studiositas, humility, mildness) Moreover the love of the beautiful (which is shown especially in the mathematical sciences) is a remote disposition for the philosophical life. The love of the beautiful disposes in three ways. First, the beautiful is sought to be seen or heard for its own sake and wisdom is a knowledge sought only for the sake of knowing . Second, the three main forms of the beautiful, order, symmetry and the limited or moderate are closely related to the life of reason. Order is most known to be an object of reason and the lover of wisdom must have a love of order.. Symmetry is like a proportion and the role of proportion is enormous in the mind's going forward. And we have already seen the importance of moderation. And finally wisdom is itself about beautiful things. God is the beautiful itself.

Next, one should read the great poets, especially the plays of Shakespeare and Sophocles and the epics of Homer. The wonder of the philomuthos is akin to the wonder of the philosopher and is a remote disposition for that latter wonder. The wonder of the philomuthos is between the wonder about the singular in daily life and the wonder about the universal in philosophy. The muthos has two parts, a tying of the knot and the untying of the knot. And this is like the work of the philosopher. (See Metaphysics, Book III) Moreover, the plot has a beginning middle and end or order. Again the emotions are purged of their restlessness by the great works. Again the internal senses are exercised in a pleasant way. And the philosopher finds many examples and witnesses to the truth of philosophy in the great poets, examples remarkable for their clarity and universality.

Then one should learn the Elements of Euclid. Socrates speaks of wonder at the beginning of philosophy in his conversation with the geometer Theaetetus. The μαθηματικος is one fond of learning and like the philosopher or lover of wisdom. The word philosopher was first used by Pythagoras to name himself. The beauty spoken of in music is also especially seen here. An experience of definition, division and demonstration here is necessary for logic and the whole of philosophy. The importance of seeing a proportion here is also developed, especially in Books 5-9. Proportion seems to be found first in quantity and then carried over to other things (just as the one). Indeed mathematics is the first part of looking philosophy to be learned.

Next one should read the fragments of the first philosophers before Plato arranged in order. This will introduce one to the remaining parts of philosophy and give one the seeds that are developed into philosophy by Plato and Aristotle.

Then one should read and study the dialogues or Socratic conversations by Plato. These conversations are very useful for acquiring the dispositions of will and feeling necessary for the philosophical life. Such dispositions are acquired more by example and imitation than by teaching what they are. Moreover, these dialogues give us an experience of the difference between rhetoric and dialectic, and exercise us in the use of dialectic. Finally these dialogues introduce us dialectically to many of the major problems of philosophy, show the difficulty of solving them, and prepare our mind for the eventual solution of them.

Aristotle's On the Poetic Art should be read after one has much experience of the plays of Sophocles and Shakespeare and the epics of Homer. His book On the Art of Rhetoric should be read after seeing persuasion represented in Marc Antony's speech in Julius Caesar and in Iago's persuasion of Othello in Othello and other examples. His books About Places and On Sophistical Refutations should be read after reading many Socratic Conversations or Dialogues by Plato. The Before and After Analysis and the other books of the Organon can be read after some of Euclid's Elements has been mastered.

As we move into Aristotle's eight books of Natural Hearing or Natural Listening and his three books On the Soul and the other books in natural philosophy, we are not only beginning well, but are in the heart of philosophy. Even later will come the books in ethics and politics and in wisdom.

The need for good teachers to help us becomes increasingly greater and more manifest as we move along in the above order. But the finding of a good teacher for such things is a very rare occurrence (according to a wish or prayer, as Aristotle says about the possibility for the best city). This increasing need for good teachers corresponds to an increasing role for reason in addition to nature. Music is more natural than fiction and the love of fiction naturally comes before the love of wisdom. We have child prodigies in music, such as Mozart, but not in the play or drama. And music imitates the natural sign of the emotions in the human voice while words imitate through agreement and through our thoughts about things. And some men are more born poets but no one could be born a philosopher. The transition from the poets to Euclid is clear in the use of imagination in both. But the poets write more to please the imagination than does Euclid while in geometry, the imagination is more a slave of reason.

THE CHOICES THE PHILOSOPHER MUST MAKE

1. "One should not choose every pleasure but that over the beautiful."

2. "I would rather discover one cause than be master of the kingdom of the Persians."

3.. The philosopher and the sophist differ by their choice, Aristotle observes in the fourth book of the Metaphysics. One must choose truth over honor.

Does one choose to pursue truth as a common good rather than a private good?

4. The philosopher must choose the knowledge which is better because it is more sure or about a better thing. And he must choose the latter, more than the former.

5. The philosopher must choose to acquire the means, for example, the roads to knowledge

6. The philosopher must choose to persist in the face of difficulties rather than give up.

7. The philosopher must choose to proceed slowly so as to avoid mistakes: "Wisely and slow: they stumble that run fast."

8. The philosopher must choose to hear or read carefully, frequently and reverently the words of those wiser than himself.

9. One must chose to remain calm in discussion and investigation

10. Following Timaeus, one must choose to pray before investigating.

HOW TO BEGIN WELL IN KNOWING THINGS

A. What is necessary for beginning well

1. find the beginning

2. come slowly or gradually to a distinct knowledge of it

B. How to find the beginning

1. Which is easier to find: the beginning or the before and after?

2. How can we find the beginning from the before and after

3. How do we determine the before and after in our knowledge (by determining the more known and the less known)

C. How to come gradually or slowly to a distinct knowledge of the beginning

1, manuductio, including dialectic

2. dividing and defining

3. constant or continual application

4. frequent return

Sophistical impediment: By constantly ignoring basic beginnings, your Aristotelian opponent will constantly be forced to restate them again and again while you can always be saying something different (which gives you praise because the fashionable is praised and praise is the object of the sophist). but the Aristotelian will appear to be babbling because he is always repeating himself, always saying the same things about the same things like Socrates.

CONNECTION OF THE DISPOSITIONS OF WILL WITH THE PROCEEDING OF OUR REASON

The mutual influence of reason and will in the development of our knowledge: their mutual dependence and help and the different way in which each depends upon the other. Some examples:

love of truth as a common good and reason's search for a common basis

love of truth for its own sake and search for a beginning

desire and effort of will and reasons recognition of a contradiction

fear and careful investigation step by step

humility and work of many

belief and fruitfulness, seeing many consequences along a road.