Causes of a Closed Mind to the Wisdom of Nature

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Causes of a Closed Mind to the Wisdom of Nature

Natural Philosophy · Physics Book 1

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CAUSES OF A CLOSED MIND TO THE WISDOM OF NATURE

THE NATURAL PHILOSOPHER AND THE PHYSICIST

Sir Arthur Eddington, The Philosophy of Physical Science, p. 8:

Not so very long ago the subject now called physics was known as "natural philosophy". The physicist is by origin a philosopher who has specialized in a particular direction.

The causes of a closed mind can be a mistake and custom (familiar things seem obvious and, hence, are no longer taken as open to question and discussion) and will (if our will does not want a certain kind of knowledge or the consequences of it, our mind will often be impeded. this is true not only in moral and political questions.)

Causes of a closed mind in regard to the wisdom of nature

1. Mistakes a. The certain is clear and distinct. Descartes makes this mistake in the Rules for the Direction of the mind and, hence, ridicules definition of motion by Aristotle.

b. Clear and distinct knowledge replaces confused & indistinct knowledge. This is also the mistake of Descartes. Heisenberg especially has shown that this is not so in Physics and Philosophy.

The most basic mistake that closes the mind to the possibility of the philosophy of nature is the belief that the exp. sciences and the special experience required for them replaces the ordinary or common experience which all men have of natural things and the confused or general notions resulting from that experience.

The further one goes in the exp. sciences, the more one is apt to fall into this belief because one is getting further from our common experience and the confused notions tied to that experience. So long as one can assume without question the basic parts of the experimental sciences, one can easily forget there is anything before them. These basic parts of the experimental sciences become so familiar that one assumes them as the obvious starting-point of any investigation of the natural world (and assumes that one understands them well - A mistake similar to that of the decadent scholastics). This is what happened, for example, when Newtonian physics became so well established and successful that it seemed the only solid foundation to build upon and the perfect model to imitate in the rest of exp. science. However the development of physics in the twentieth century has led some reflective physicists to a profound realization that something is presupposed to or comes before the precise concepts of exp. science. Albert Einstein was led to this realization in connection with the need to re-examine the fundamental notions of Newtonian physics, which seems to be the most fundamental part of the exp. sciences in modern times. The other main development of the physics of the twentieth century, quantum theory, has led another reflective physicist to a realization of there being a knowledge before exp. science that is more stable than the precise findings of exp, science. Werner Heisenberg brings this out forcefully in his Gifford lectures.

Even if one admits that our common experience of natural things and the vague notions tied to it are more stable than the experimental sciences, one may still have a closed mind in regard to the philosophy of nature. Being accustomed only to the exp. method, we find it difficult even to imagine another method which would develop our knowledge beyond the common experience and vague notions which all men have. The philosophy of nature is a very general development of our knowledge by method from and in dependence upon our common experience and the vague notions tied to it, but before the much more intensive and recognizable development of the exp. sciences takes over. It is very difficult for us to se what kind of knowledge and method could come between our common experience with its vague notions and the experimental sciences (Perhaps even Heisenberg does not see this.)

c. Confusion of the universality in Aristotle’s Physics with the universal cause. This confusion can be seen in Francis Bacon. But note Aristotle’s praise of Democritus for being able to frame more general theories because he lived in greater intimacy with phenomena of nature.

d. The relation of the wisdom of nature to experimental sciences is like plane geometry to solid geometry or like the premisses to a conclusion. The rejection of some of Aristotle’s experimental science was thought to entail a rejection of his wisdom of nature. See Duhem Aim & Structure of Physical Theory where he shows that physical theories cannot be deduced from common sense laws or knowledge. Also consider difference in order of determination in nat. sc. and in geometry. The modern like to criticize the Greeks for trying to do experimental science from the general knowledge and then try to reject the general knowledge as if exp. science was deduced from it.

e. Every idea or thought is an hypothesis to be tested by its consequences. This is clearly the position of Claude Bernard.

2. Custom Our reason must return to the senses in order to complete its judgment. This is especially true in natural science. Even in Aristotle’s Physics, there is a return to the senses. Many times Aristotle gives a reason for something and then a sign (as the rhetorician gives an enthymeme and then an example.) (See also unmoved mover in Aristotle’s books on animal motion.) But this return to the sense is not always made through consequences deduced from an idea or thought. When our reason judges that the whole is greater than a part of it, it returns to the senses because we form an image of whole and part in which we consider this truth, but there is no deduction of consequences as if the particular whole and part imagined were a consequence by which we test our judgment

In making, in the exp. sciences and in dialectic, we judge beginning ideas by their consequences. (See Aristotle II De Caelo where exp. sc., art and dialectic are compared for this reason). We are thoroughly accustomed to judge ideas by their consequences because the above occupy so much of our attention. Hence, by the force of custom, this seems the only way to judge ideas. All ideas must be judged in this way, it seems, and what cannot be judged in this way is rejected or ignored. That this is not the only way of returning to the sense easily escapes us and second nature (custom or habit) seems to fuse with first nature (the necessity of returning to sense). This custom influences the last mistake above.

3. Will: Heisenberg points out the change of will at the time of the Renaissance (Physics and Philosophy, pp. 196B-197A). Like under custom, we must realize that this goes beyond the natural preoccupation of our will with making and exterior things. As Heisenberg also points out (pp. 188-189 ibid.) exp. sc. involves a mutual penetration of nat. sc. and technology. This change of will makes us interested only in that part of nat. sc. which has application to making; i.e. the experimental sciences.

This concern with the practical also concentrates our attention on the precise and the particular. Only the singular is a practical matter in the fullest sense of practical. (And the more precise and particular our knowledge of the situation and tools etc., the more sure or certain is our practical operation; that is the more sure we are of attaining the goal or succeeding.) We are inclined by the intellectual customs of our time to believe that all knowledge should have a practical application. Most people are totally unaware of the extent to which their determination in this matter is due to the chance event of their having been born in the intellectual environment that surrounds us today. Any man who does not investigate carefully by reason the question of whether all knowledge should have a practical application or be for the sake of the practical will necessarily be a victim of the intellectual environment into which he happened to have been born.

Anyone who considers this question with reason will find that there is in man a natural desire to know for the sake of knowing and that this desire is reasonable. Man’s natural desire to know is shown first of all in the senses. We desire to see and hear many things that are of no concern for our doing or making. But man’s natural desire to know for the sake of knowing becomes especially manifest when our mind faces some problem or conflict whose resolution is not a practical necessity. The problem or conflict increases our desire to know because it intensifies the awareness of our ignorance; as the desire for water is intensified by the sensation of thirst. This is shown by the delight that man takes in games and the plots of literature. Why is it that man invents all sorts of games both physical and mental with problems or conflicts that hold his attention until he sees their resolution? Or why does man wonder how a story will turn out? In both case, our interest is aroused by some conflict or problem to be resolved. Our mind is not satisfied until it sees the solution or resolution - until then we wonder how it will turn out. And this wonder is not so we can make a practical application of the solution. People become engrossed in the complications of a late movie on television and their desire to see the unraveling of the problem wins out over the sleep that would make getting up the next morning easier. It is a problem or complicated knot to be untied that most manifests to man his ignorance and hence whets his appetite to know. The fact that man alone of all the animals invents all kinds of games and writes plots without end is a sign that man alone among the animals has an intensive desire to know. The cause of man having this natural desire is that he alone knows his ignorance and what it is to know.

Sciences, both the philosophical and the experimental, are like the plots of literature or the contests of games in that they too consist of problems that engross the minds of men until they are solved. As man wishes to see the resolution of the problems or conflicts in games or literature, so too his mind wishes to resolve the problems that arise when one contemplates the natural world around us. This is most natural since this world impinges upon our senses whence all our knowledge starts. The basic difference between these problems and those in games or literature is that the latter (or, at least, their conditions) have been invented by man while the former arise from a world that he has not made. Hence the problems in literature or games are easier to understand and are more easily resolved for us while those arising in the contemplation of a world we did not make are often difficult to see and even more difficult to resolved. This is one reason why those who pursue the looking sciences are few in comparison to those interested in the results of games and the way plots turn out.

Even though man must necessarily spend the greater part of his time pursuing knowledge for practical applications, it does not follow that he should suffocate his natural desire to know for its own sake. What most of all distinguishes man from the other animals is the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. Hence, it would be absurd for a man to call himself human, to regard himself as different from the other animals, and never to pursue seriously knowledge for its own sake.

If man excels the other animals by his reason, then reason is what is best in man. But surely the frustration of a natural desire of what is best in man cannot be to his advantage. Nor is the comparatively short time in which man is free to pursue knowledge for its own sake an argument against his doing so. No one has ever thought that the best moments in life are the longest or the most frequent, but they are nevertheless the best for all that. Einstein was right in saying that the man who does not wonder is as good as dead. He is dead as far as being a human being. Indeed to seek to make all knowledge relevant to one’s situation or practical is to become like one of the other animals.

The reasonableness of this natural desire can be shown in many ways.

If man excels the other animals by his reason, then reason is what is best in man. But the perfection of what is best in man has more the character of an end or goal for him than anything else because an end or goal is always better than the things which are for the sake of it. Now the perfection of reason as such consists in knowledge. Hence the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake is the highest goal or end for man.

We cab state the last argument in another way. If man excels the other animals by his reason, is it reasonable that he should uses his reason only to satisfy his body or what he has in common with the other animals? If this were reasonable, then it would be reasonable for the higher to exist only for the sake of the lower. This is absurd however because an end or goal should be better than the things for which are for the sake of it. Even when reason must spend more time in caring and providing for the body than itself out of necessity, it does not mean that it is ultimately for the sake of the body. Parents may spend more time on their young children than on themselves, but this does not mean that adulthood is for the sake of childhood as an ultimate goal. For what are the parents trying to prepare and bring up the children if not adulthood?

If the mind never thinks merely for the sake of knowing, it is a slave (the definition of a slave is one who exists merely for the sake of another). Hence, people who think that all knowledge of reason should be practical have enslaved what is best in them.

The fact that the basic principle of communist philosophy is a denial that man should pursue knowledge for it own sake should give us pause to reflect a bit. The real consequence of making all knowledge practical is a kind or practical atheism, as we find in the doctrine of Karl Marx. The reason for this is that al practical knowledge has man for its end so that if all knowledge is confined or ordered to practical application, our ultimate concern becomes man rather than God. Man becomes the center of all that is or of al that is taken into consideration. Knowledge for its own sake however disposes the mind to look for the causes of natural things and to rest in the knowledge of those causes. And since God is the first cause of natural things, knowledge for its own sake is a preparation for heaven which is nothing other than looking at God.

If we try to make all knowledge practical we will be trying to live in a world of our own making (as Marx and Sarte urge us to do). Man’s trying to live entirely in a world of his own making is especially characteristic of modern times. Yet this attempt must ultimately frustrate him since such a world is necessarily inferior to man. Moreover, it exists for man and not man for it, so that we are placed in an absurdity similar to that of a man who exists and works for the sake of making money.

Although the philosophy of nature is knowledge for the sake of understanding, it is not without importance for the practical. The practical is divided into doing and making. Although the philosophy of nature is not useful for making, as are the exp. sciences, it is nevertheless important for doing, for the sciences of human action.

The philosophy of nature is necessary for the study of the soul and the study of the soul is to ethics what biology is to medicine.

The distinction between nature and art is necessary for ethics and this distinction is made in the wisdom of nature.

Most of all, the wisdom of nature defends the existence of end or purpose in the natural world. This is necessary if reason, in directing our actions, is to be measured by nature. When reason is no longer measured by nature, the will and the emotions are no longer measured by reason. If reason cannot base itself on nature in directing our actions, if it can find no end or purpose by nature, it loses all authority over the will and emotions and becomes their tool or pimp, as in rationalization, ideology and propaganda.

An introduction to the wisdom of nature today must open the mind to its possibility which we tend to overlook or even deny because of our customary approach to nature. It is extremely difficult to overcome the effect of custom in the determination of a method. We expect the method to which we are accustomed and other methods seem unsuitable. Yet it is not difficult to see that custom is not the same as reason in the determination of a method. The intellectual customs of men are not the same in different ages and schools while reason wishes to be the same for all men insofar as they have a share in it. Moreover, custom is a non-discriminating force that molds things in the same way while reason seeks out the differences of things and what is suitable to each. Custom leads us to adopt a method by imitation while reason demands a reason why a given method should or should not be used. Since a method should be suitable to the matter we are trying to know and the relation of our reason to that matter, custom cannot be a sufficient means of determining our choice. Custom does not lead us to search out the method that is adapted to a given matter and to the relation of our reason to that matter. Reason must attempt to make this judgment independently of undue influence from the importance or success of the dominant method of the time. But reason cannot avoid this undue influence if it is not aware of it. Since we are concerned with knowing natural things, it might be well for us to examine the particular intellectual customs of our age and country in the study of natural things.

There seems to be three dominant elements in the intellectual customs of our age and country in the study of nature: (1) its experimental character - the insistence that the principles and conclusions of natural science are always in need of being subjected to experimental verification; (2) its technical character - science must have application to making things; and (3) its mathematical character - the attempt to apply mathematics in all parts of natural science and the tendency to regard as scientific only what can be expressed mathematically. These three elements which have become dominant in our study of nature since the Renaissance tend to give us a blind spot with respect to any part of the study of nature which is not capable of mathematical elaboration or in need of constant experimental verification or which is useless for making things. But all three of these are true of the wisdom of nature.

The exclusive use of any method can tend to blind us to the possibility of other methods, let alone to their reliability and necessity; but there are 4 reasons to think that our habitual use of the exp. method can especially give rise to such mental obtuseness in regard to other methods in the study of natural things. These reasons are not far to seek.

First, the experimental method does characterize the vast majority of our knowledge of natural things (and correctly so I think); and there is obviously a far greater danger of over-extending such a method and suffocating others than there is in the case of those methods which are suitable only in a small part of man’s knowledge of natural things. This is why Aristotle understood the exp. method much better than scientists understand the method of the wisdom of nature. Indeed he understood that exp. method better than most even of the famous scientists. (For example, Newton‘s well known deficiencies in this regard.); in part because he was able to compare them.

Second, much greater specialization is required in the use of the exp. method than in any other method of natural science; and over-specialization is obviously a prime cause of narrow-mindedness in regard to methods.

Finally, this method most of all conforms itself to the natural practical bent of the human mind in regard to making and serves our bodily needs and comforts by contributing new products so that the customary dominance of this method is fused with the unchanging inclinations of human nature.

The combination of these three factors with the habitual and successful practice of the exp. method in our times makes one suspect that the danger of ever-extending the dominant method of any age and neglecting or eliminating other legitimate ones is greater in our time than it has even been or will be.

One conclusion to be drawn from these things is that we cannot assume the student’s awareness or acceptance of the possibility of a wisdom of nature. Something must be done to open the mind to this possibility before we can really begin to teach the philosophy of nature.

The question of the possibility of the philosophy or wisdom of nature is the question concerning the possibility of a general reasoned-out knowledge of natural things which comes after our common experience of them and depends upon that experience, but which is before and more sure than and independent of the vast and detailed knowledge of natural things obtained in the experimental sciences which are based on prolonged observations and/or experiments not shared in or had by all men.

It is difficult to convince someone of the possibility of the wisdom of nature who has never experienced it. Nor are the chances of a thinker having experience of it good in an age where the intellectual customs lead us to neglect it.

Moreover, even when the wisdom of nature has been experienced, it is experienced as a transplant from an intellectual environment in which it could flourish to one where it can hardly grow. Such transplants are often defective; and a bad defense of truth is more damaging than a good attack upon it. We must, insofar as we can, enter into the spirit of the period in which the wisdom of nature first flourished. This was the period of the ancient Greeks from Tales through Aristotle, summed up and brought to perfection in the eight books of the Physics. Travel in time out of our own intellectual environment into this earlier one will tend to diminish the force of custom in our intellectual life by enabling us by contrast to distinguish what is peculiar to the intellectual customs of our age in the study of nature. And it will prepare us to perceive what is good or bad or lacking in those customs. And something bad or lacking is apt to be found in an intellectual environment since custom does not discriminate.

At the same time, as we weaken the force of custom by experience of the wisdom of nature, we must strengthen the force of reason’s consideration. There are two main steps for reason before it can see the possibility of he wisdom of nature.

The first step is to se that our common experience of natural things is not destroyed or replaced by the private or special experience and knowledge gained in the experimental sciences of nature.

The second step is to see how our mind can investigate and understand natural things in a very general way on the basis of this common experience. Since the second step requires us to see a method that is not our customary one in the investigation of nature, we shall have a hard time grasping it, let alone accepting it. Hence, we shall attempt to prepare the mind gradually for it by showing the likeness between it and the method of the mathematical science of nature. Then, we shall attempt to show that their differences are due to their place in the complete science of nature - that if the philosopher of nature were to do exp. science, he would do it in the way the exp. scientist does it and vice-versa.

The first step toward establishing the possibility of the philosophy of nature is to recognize that it is not the same thing to assert that the experimental sciences go beyond our common and familiar experience of natural things and to say that they replace that experience. The former is true; the latter is false as eminent physicists themselves have repeatedly told us:

Albert Einstein, “The Problem of Space, Ether, and the Field in Physics” in Essays in Physics, Philosophical Library, N.Y., p. 61:

“Scientific thought is a development of pre-scientific thought. As the concept of space was already fundamental in the latter, we must begin with the concept of space in pre-scientific thought.”

Albert Einstein, “Physics and Reality” in Essays in Physics, Philosophical Library, N.Y., pp. 16-17:

“1. General Consideration Concerning the Method of Science.

“It has often been said, and certainly not without justification, that the man of science is a poor philosopher. Why then should it not be the right thing for the physicist to let the philosopher do the philosophizing? Such might indeed be the right thing at a time when the physicist believes he has at his disposal a rigid system of fundamental concepts and fundamental laws which are so well established that waves of doubt cannot reach them; but it cannot be right at a time when the very foundations of physics have become problematic as they are now. At a time like the present, when experience forces us to seek a newer and more solid foundation, the physicist cannot simply surrender to the philosopher the critical contemplation of the theoretical foundations; for, he himself knows best, and feels more surely where the shoe pinches. In looking for a new foundation, he must try to make clear in his own mind just how far the concepts which he uses are justified and are necessities.

“The whole of science is nothing more than a refinement of everyday thinking. It is for this reason that the critical thinking of the physicist cannot possibly be restricted to the examination of the concepts of his own specific field. He cannot proceed without considering critically a much more difficult problem, the problem of analyzing the nature of everyday thinking.”

Niels Bohr, Essays 1958-1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Interscience Publishers, a division of John Wiley and Sons, p. 1:

“Notwithstanding refinements of terminology due to accumulation of experimental evidence and developments of theoretical conceptions, all account of physical experience is, of course, ultimately based on common language, adapted to orientation in our surroundings and to tracing relationships between cause and effect.”

SELECTIONS FROM THE COLLECTION OF MAX BORN PAPERS PHYSICS IN MY GENERATION, PERGAMON PRESS, LONDON & NEW YORK:

“I now regard my former belief in the superiority of science over other forms of human thought and behaviour as a self-deception due to youthful enthusiasm over the clarity of scientific thinking as compared with the vagueness of metaphysical systems.” (Preface, p. vii)

Werner Heisenberg, “The Role of Modern Physics in the Present Development of Human Thinking”, Chapter 11 of Physics and Philosophy, Harper:

“...we have now to discuss again those features of modern physics which are essentially different from the previous development of natural science, and we have for this purpose once more to go back to the European history of this development that was brought about by the combination of natural and technical sciences.” (p. 194)

“...natural science proceeded to get a clearer and wider picture of the material world. In physics this picture was to be described by means of those concepts which we nowadays call the concepts of classical physics. The world consisted of things in space and time, the things consists of matter, and matter can produce and be acted upon by forces.” (p. 196)

“At the same time the human attitude toward nature changed from a contemplative one to the pragmatic one. One was not so much interested in nature as it is; one rather asked what one could do with it. Therefore, natural science turned into technical science; every advancement of knowledge was connected with the question as to what practical use could be derived from it.” (pp. 196-197)

“In this way, finally, the nineteenth century developed an extremely rigid frame for natural science which formed not only science but also the general outlook of great masses of people. This frame was supported by the fundamental concepts of classical physics, space, time, matter and causality; the concept of reality applied to the things or events that we could perceive by our senses or that could be observed by means of the refined tools that technical science had provided. Matter was the primary reality. The progress of science was pictured as a crusade of conquest into the material world. Utility was the watchword of the time.

“On the other hand, this frame was so narrow and rigid that it was difficult to find a place in it for many concepts of our language that had always belonged to its very substance, for instance, the concepts of mind, of the human soul or of life.” (p. 197)

“It was especially difficult to find in this framework room for those parts of reality that had been the object of the traditional religion and seemed now more or less only imaginary.” (p. 198)

“Coming back now to the contributions of modern physics, one may say that the most important change brought about by its results consists in the dissolution of this rigid frame of concepts of the nineteenth century, Of course many attempts had been made before to get away from this rigid frame which seemed obviously too narrow for an understanding of the essential parts of reality. But it has not been possible to see what could be wrong with the fundamental concepts like matter, space, time and causality that had been so extremely successful in the history of science. Only experimental research itself, carried out with all the refined equipment that technical science could offer, and its mathematical interpretation, provided the basis for a critical analysis - or, one may say, enforced the critical analysis - of these concepts, and finally resulted in the dissolution of the rigid frame.” (p. 198)

“This dissolution took place in two distinct stages. The first was the discovery, through the theory of relativity, that even such fundamental concepts as space and time could be changed and in fact must be changed on account of new experience. This change did not concern the somewhat vague concepts of space and time in natural language; but it did concern their precise formulation in the scientific language of Newtonian mechanics, which had erroneously been accepted as final. The second stage was the discussion of the concept of matter enforced by the experimental results concerning the atomic structure. The idea of the reality of matter had probably been the strongest part in that rigid frame of concepts of the nineteenth century, and this idea had at least to be modified in connection with the new experience. Again the concepts so far as they belonged to the natural language remained untouched.” (pp. 198-199)

“These new results had first of all to be considered as a serious warning against the somewhat forced application of scientific concepts where they did not belong. The application of the concepts of classical physics, e.g., in chemistry, had been a mistake. Therefore, one will nowadays be less inclined to assume that the concepts of physics, even those of quantum theory, can certainly be applied everywhere in biology or other sciences. We will, on the contrary, try to keep the doors open for the entrance of new concepts even in those parts of science where the older concepts have been very useful for the understanding of phenomena.” (p. 199)

“Furthermore, one of the most important features of the development and the analysis of modern physics is the experience that the concepts of natural language, vaguely defined as they are, seem to be more stable in the expansion of knowledge than the precise terms of scientific language, derived as an idealization from only limited groups of phenomena. This is in fact not surprising since the concepts of natural language are formed by the immediate connection with reality; they represent reality.” (p. 200)

“Keeping in mind the intrinsic stability of the concepts of natural language in the process of scientific development, one sees that - after the experience of modern physics - our attitude toward concepts like mind or the human soul or life or God will be different from that of the nineteenth century, because these concepts belong to the natural language and have therefore immediate connection with reality.” (pp. 200-201)

THIS BRINGS US TO OUR SECOND STEP: is there any valid method which the philosopher of nature can use in investigating and understanding nature on the basis of that common experience?

We are all somewhat familiar with the approach to nature found in the experimental sciences. The experimental method has been used to deepen our knowledge of natural things, especially since the Renaissance although the method was known in a general way to Plato, Aristotle and their great followers. It is difficult for us even to imagine any other method of investigating nature, let alone to see the validity and importance of any other method.

Perhaps the best way of introducing someone to the methods of the philosophy of nature in our time is to begin with the exp. method which is familiar and use it as a manuductio by likeness and then difference for the method of the natural philosopher. Because our impediment to the latter is first our unfamiliarity with the latter, we should first note the similarities which it has to the exp. method. Then we can bring out the differences. Finally we shall attempt to show that these differences are due to the very general level on which the philosopher of nature is considering natural things and that the rather specific or particular level on which the exp scientist does so that one method is suitable to his work but not correct for the other. We shall take the exp method of physics as our example of the experimental method.

Likeness of Book One of Physics & Mod. Math. Sc. of Nature

1. Wonder about what and why, wonder about the cause.

2. Common basis. The philosopher and the scientist insist on a common basis in human knowledge and a common way of going forward based on nature of our reason. Both seek a knowledge that is in principle accessible to all. Will these roads lead to contradictory results?

3. The senses. Both are based on sense experience of natural things and must be in agreement with that experience. Both seek a confirmation of their explanation. Both the wisdom of nature and the experimental sciences of nature begin and end in our sense-experience. Einstein says that “All knowledge of reality begins and ends in experience” But the wisdom of nature begins and ends substantially in the common experience which all men have and cannot avoid having while the exp. sciences depend on a special and private experience had by only some men. Einstein says in The Evolution of Physics (Essandress Paperbacks, Simon & Shuster, p. 294):

“Physical theories try to form a picture of reality and to establish its connection with the wide world of sense impressions. Thus the only justification for our mental structures is whether and in what way our theories form such a link.”

4. from vague to precise} 5. from effect to cause from more known to us but less knowable by its nature to reverse Both seek to explain the things we know by things less known to us (in opposition to geometry

C.F. von Weizsacker in the beginning of his Contemporary Physics (George Braziller Inc. N.Y., p. 14:

“We can see that we must advance to the uttermost limit of the unknown in order to understand the structure of any known field. This is no paradox. It is an old truth that what is known immediately is not, in itself, simple. Aristotle had already distinguished between what comes first ‘for us’ and what comes first ‘objectively”

and in the end of the same book Contemporary Physics (George Braziller Inc. N.Y., p. 131:

“Our line of approach so far has gone from the more known to the less known, from the visible to the hidden, from the extended body to the elementary particles. Atomic physics, if correct, should enable us to reverse the problem. How, if we assume the presence of elementary particles, can we explain the properties of extended bodies? We should now be able to deduce from atomic physics the great number of empirical facts which emerged from our study of chemistry and of classical physics, and which paved the way for our inductive advances in atomic physics.”

6. role of contradiction. both find the explanation lies beyond an apparent or real contradiction. Both seek an explanation that is consistent and simple. 7. role of proportion or analogy. Both in explaining more difficult or less known things makes use of analogy to things more known to us. The proportion of man-made things and natural things and of one natural thing to another.

8. unity. Both seek to know the order of one thing to another or the relation of one thing to another in the natural world. 9. simplicity

10 unchanging explaining changing 11. unlimited

12 opposites 13 difference between quantity of nat. things and quantity in pure math.

14. potency 15 substantial change.

16. Both the wisdom of nature and the experimental sciences of nature must make use of human art or technical science and its products which also fall under sense-experience. But the wisdom of nature distinguishes natural things and artificial things and uses the later as a manuductio for knowing nature and its works; while in exp. science. natural science and technical science are intertwined. The experience required for the wisdom of nature does not require special tools but the private experience of the exp. scientist often or usually requires some special tools.

COMPARISON OF CONCLUSIONS OF WISDOM OF NATURE AND EXP. SC.

1. Same conclusion by different roads (H 187, H 41A, H 166B, H 180C-181A, H 149C-!50B, Rothman Laws of Physics 21A 2. Analogous or proportional conclusions, complementary 3, Confirming conclusions 4. Completing (Math. completing conclusions of purely nat. science H 149C, 166B) 5. Contradicting (only when one or both are defective)(apparent contradiction H 29A & 43 A, H 200C-201

(Examples of above: changing explained by unchanging; quantitative version of potency; difference between quantity in nature and quantity in mathematics; time is more cause of corruption - 2nd law of thermodynamics; contact of mover and moved; local motion before other motions; more than one kind of change.)

Reasons for studying the Greek natural philosophers 1. Dispositions of will need in the pursuit of knowledge 2. Basic road in human knowledge 3. Origin of philosophy and natural science: the man who follows the development of a thing from its origin will come to understand it best

Philosophic problems of natural science A problem is especially called philosophic because it concerns the whole and not just one part. there are three groups of such problems 1. Those that concern the way of acquiring natural science 2. Those that concern what is common to or said of all natural things or changes 3. Those that concern the first causes of natural things or the principal theories of natural science that reflect those causes.

The words natural philosophy cover the second and third of these groups.

Meanings of the word natural philosophy.

1. Natural philosophy or the philosophy of nature originally meant the whole of natural science.

2. Today it is used usually in a more restricted sense for the knowledge of natural things that comes before or after the experimental sciences. Natural philosophy thus has two parts: the first is based on the common or ordinary experience which all men have of natural things; and the second is a reflection on the principal theories which the experimental sciences have arrived at. The two parts of natural philosophy form one whole with the experimental sciences which are a continuation of the first part of natural philosophy and a foundation for the second.

The first part of natural philosophy was developed by the /Greek philosophers from Thales (c. 600 B.C) to Aristotle (d. 322 B.C.). The final result of this long development is the Physics of Aristotle which is the only full consideration of the first part of natural philosophy.

The second art of natural philosophy is still very young. The greatest development of this second part of natural philosophy has ben made by the great physicists of recent times. This is due in part to the fact that physics is the oldest and most well established of the experimental sciences. Werner Heisenberg and Louis de Bogie are outstanding examples of physicists who have contributed to the second part of natural philosophy.

The first and second parts of natural philosophy, although separated by the experimental sciences. comes together in many ways (like the beginning and the end of a circle). In fact these points of intersection are where natural philosophy becomes the most interesting. Heisenberg has put this idea well in his Gifford Lectures (Physics and Philosophy, Harper, N.Y., p. 187):

“The philosophical implications of modern physics have been discussed in the forgoing chapters in order to show that this most modern part of science touches very old trends of thought at many points, that it approaches some of the very old problems from a new direction. It is probably true quite generally that in the history of human thinking the most fruitful developments frequently take place at those points where two different lines of thought meet.” (See also De Broglie and Einstein on the connection between quantum theory and the paradoxes of Zeno.)

The natural philosophy based on common experience comes before and does not depend upon the experimental sciences because common experience comes before and does not depend upon special or private experience. However, the natural philosophy based on common experience is ordered to the experimental sciences where the natural world is known in more detail.

One should not conclude that the Physics of Aristotle is an easy work because it is based on our common experience of natural things. It is the fruit of about two and a half centuries of Greek thought about nature. It is an extraordinarily concise work (some people say it is Aristotle’s notes or the official notes of his school) and even short sentences in it may need to be elaborated at length to be fully understood. An adequate understanding of it can be reached only after many years of studying it with the help of the great Greek, Arabic and Latin commentators on it.

The English title of Aristotle book (the Physics) does not translate well the title in Greek which means Hearing or Listening about Nature. Physics is a transliteration of the Greek word for nature, but what we call physics today is a highly specialized study corresponding more to Aristotle’s later works such as the book On the Universe.

The book is called Listening about Nature because everyone has sufficient experience of nature for this general part of natural science. Because the Listening about nature is based on our common experience of change in the natural world, it can only give us a very general knowledge of change. Aristotle often refers to the books on Listening to Nature as the books about nature or about change.

The experimental sciences are a continuation of the knowledge begun in the natural philosophy of the Greeks and an endless approach to the completion of that knowledge. Progress in the exp. sciences is tied to progress in the acquisitions of special experiences that everyone does not and cannot have.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NAT. PHIL AND EXP. SC.

In general wisdom of nature exp. science

common experience private experience (first without special tools and then by special tools)

beginnings forced on reason beginnings freely imagined

(The experimental method has an empirical and a theoretical part. the empirical part helps us to acquire a special experience not had by all men which is needed to suggest and test hypotheses. The theoretical part is concerned with the formulation of hypotheses that explain the known phenomena in a consistent and simple way and the deductions of consequences from these hypotheses that may be tested by simple observation or experiment. The method of the philosophy of nature doe snot have an empirical part since the philosophy of nature is based on common or ordinary experience of natural things, an experience that al men possess after merely living a number of years.

Inductions in the exp. sciences do not lead to general statements that we can be sure of while the inductions in the philosophy of nature do so.,

The philosopher of nature tries to find the vague and shadowy seeds of philosophic knowledge in all men’s minds by dialectic. When he has found them, he tries to clarify them by dialectic divisions and definitions. From the seeds thus clarified, the philosopher will demonstrate certain conclusions. The clarified seeds must resolve the difficulties brought to light by the dialectic And show why they occurred.

Common experience of natural things forces some vague notion about them on our mind which it cannot avoid having. It is important to find and clarify these vague notions. How can we find these vague notions? Why is there a quasi-finite distance between these notions and their clarification? How can we avoid a pre-mature clarification of these ideas? How can we clarify these vague notions slowly enough?

The exp. scientist freely imagines a hypothesis that is plausible and will help to explain the known phenomena. He then deduces further consequences from it that can be checked by future observation and predicts also new things whose existence was not until then suspected.

And Milton Rothman in the Laws of Physics, Basic Books Inc., N.Y., Introduction, p.4:

(“The evidence, and the constant examination and re-examination of the laws and their consequences, are what make science. Scientists never stop testing the basic principles on which their understanding of the universe is founded.”)(The reason for the exp. scientist always returning to his beginning is that the beginning is not sure or certain. Its probability is always relative to the number of consequences that are in agreement with experience. The reason why the philosopher of nature must always return to his beginning is not the incertitude of that beginning, but the unlimited possibility of making a mistake when clarifying that beginning.)

Finding & clarification of seeds testing of hypotheses by dialectic, division & definition consequences

In particular between wisdom of nature and mathematical exp science

definitions of things operational definitions

statements equations

syllogism calculation

aims at what and why more universal and simple in deductive capacity

Aristotle’s Physics is based on common experience (no method is required to get this experience) while exp. sc. is based on private experience (which requires an empirical method to obtain). Hence, Physics is more certain than exp. sciences Some thoughts are forced on our mind by experience in the wisdom of nature (these are seeds of phil. knowledge - vague, extremely general notions forced on reason by common experience) but in the exp. sciences thoughts are hypotheses freely imagined which must be tested by their conclusions. The seeds of philosophical knowledge must be found and clarified by dialectic, division and definition.. But hypotheses are tested by deducing their consequences which are confirmed or rejected by further observation and experiment. But the exp. sciences are more precise. (But Duhem and others point out how scientific ideas, when experience is ripe, generate in many minds apart - This bears some likeness to coerced by the truth.)

All knowledge is the wisdom of nature is expressed in words and sentences while much knowledge in exp. sc. is expressed in mathematical symbols and equations. Hence in the latter the simplicity is mathematical as are the analogies. There is missing matter and motion, the mover and the end in different degrees. There is a quantitative version of potency. After statements, the philosopher syllogizes. But the exp. scientist calculates after equations

In the wisdom of nature, the mind of the philosopher is to nature as a student is to his teacher but in the exp. sciences the scientist is to nature like the judge or lawyer to the witness. Nature leads us to ask what and why and these can be known in a general way. but perhaps on the particular level of exp. science we cannot know why. Perhaps exp. science, like dialectic, is only about the an est. (The questions where and when pertain to the Does it exist? not to “what is it?” as Thomas explains in the beginning of his Commentary on St. John’s Gospel) The physicist wants to know where the falling stone will be when or vice-versa. Newton, at least, denied that he knew why.)

COMPARISON OF MATHEMATICAL SCIENCE OF NATURE TO A PURELY NATURAL SCIENCE

1. Some purely natural knowledge of nature comes before mathematical knowledge of nature. Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, pp. 58A, 168A, 181A

2. Mathematical method based on measurement is not useful for the first general part of natural science because it is too precise, unable to answer the question “What is it?” and because we can only measure a particular kind of change - one measuring instrument cannot measure different kinds of change (also we demonstrate that the mobile is a body in Physics of Aristotle. See Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, p. 149C

3. Especially useful to complete our knowledge of Parts II and III of natural science because quantity is an accident of matter. See Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, p. 149C

4. Also useful in Part IV because of role of physico-chemical principles in living bodies. See Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, pp. 154C-155A What are the two false extreme positions on the use of physico-chemical principles in biology?

Can the role of physico-chemical principles in biology be properly understood without the distinction between prior and posterior per se causes? Why?

5. Less sure or certain than parts involving definition and demonstration, but allows us to go further in other parts. See Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, pp. 149C, 200 B-C

WHICH IS BETTER?

The wisdom of nature is better than exp. science because it is more sure., can talk about what matter, motion, time, mover and nature are while exp. sc. shadows these.

The exp. sc. are better than the wisdom of nature because more precise. In this way, exp. science completes the wisdom of nature

The wisdom of nature is more useful for the study of the soul, for ethics, for metaphysics and for theology while the exp. sciences are more useful for the medical art and for making in matter

THE INTEREST WHICH EACH NATURALLY TAKES IN THE OTHER

Philosopher of nature in the exp. sciences:

1. Continuation and completion of his own knowledge

2. Probable confirmation of his own knowledge.

3.Same conclusion sometimes by a different road

4. Apparent or real contradictions which are an opportunity to re-examine his own positions

The experimental scientist in the philosophy of nature:

1. The origin of his own knowledge and naturally presupposed to it.

2. Anticipation of his own knowledge

3.Same conclusion sometimes by a different road

4. Apparent or real contradictions which are an opportunity to re-examine his own positions

5. Division of experimental sciences and their place in natural science.

DANGERS OF NEGLECTING THE WISDOM OF NATURE

It is not by chance that the wisdom of nature was the first part of philosophy or that philosophy because of the neglect of natural philosophy is in a crisis today, unable to see what is above it and subservient to what is below it.

Either one man embraces both the philosophy of nature and the experimental sciences (but this is almost impossible) or the philosopher of nature and the scientist go off independently of each other or there is contact between both. (See de Tocqueville on England and France in regard to the contact between the men of political foresight and the political philosophers and Heisenberg’s remarks in the question period after his talk at the 1958 Geneva Conference on Atomic Energy.)

Most men do not realize the dangers inherent in such limitation.

It eliminates two most noble parts of natural science. The general part and the study of the soul. As a consequence, metaphysics and theology are eliminated, also ethics, logic etc.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE WISDOM OF NATURE

The importance of the wisdom of nature can be considered in itself, in reference to the whole of natural science, and in its effect on or use in the other sciences.

Our outline of its importance will be incomplete because it is impossible to enumerate all the reasons for studying the wisdom of nature since new ones always occur when we study or apply it. This is not strange since the wisdom of nature is the most basic part of the science which is the most fundamental in the whole of life of our reason. Hence, the way we do it will influence the whole of our intellectual and scientific life and even our daily life.

The importance of the wisdom of nature in itself does not mean that it takes us very far in the understanding of the natural world or that we should be content with going just that far. Such knowledge is only a beginning of that knowledge of natural things which the experimental sciences are to complete. However the basic questions asked in the wisdom of nature are not asked elsewhere in our consideration of nature; and a question is no less a question for being over-looked. The fact that we cannot go very far in the knowledge of nature without employing exact measurement or, more generally without making prolonged observations and/or experiments, is no reason for neglecting those questions that arise before such special procedures. Without trying to be complete, let us list some of the chief questions of the wisdom of nature:

1. What is found in everything that changes? 2. How can the possibility of substantial change be understood? 3. Is there anything in natural things that persists through out all their changes?

4. What is nature? How does it differ from art? 5. What kinds of causes are found in natural things? 6. What is chance in nature? 7. Does nature act for an end?

8. What is motion? 9. What is the infinite and how does it exist?

10 What is place? 11. What is time?

12. What are the kinds of motion or change?

13. How is motion divided quantitatively?

14. Does every motion depend upon a mover?

15. Is there an unmoved mover?

These questions and others like them in the wisdom of nature become more interesting as we begin to investigate them. Many men do not recognize their ignorance of the things considered by the wisdom of nature. The cause of this is either the familiarity we all have with these things (familiarity is often confused with understanding) or a belief that exp. science raises al the questions that can be investigated about natural things. Heraclitus was well aware of this first cause: “Most men have no comprehension even of such things as they meet with, nor do they understand what they experience, though they themselves think they do.? The inability of most men to solve arguments whose conclusions contradict their obvious experience is a striking sign of their not understanding well the things they meet every day. The paradoxes of Zeno are common examples of such arguments, as are the arguments, which deny the existence of time or concern the nature of the now. Socrates especially reminded us not to think we know what we do not know.

The belief that exp. science raises all the questions that can be profitably investigated about natural things cannot really be changed without some experience of natural philosophy. This belief is cause, not by reason, but by the intellectual environment in which we live. An intellectual environment, however, should never be the entire cause of the direction the entire development of our reason takes since custom should not direct reason and is, in fact, more or less opposed to reason which always requires discrimination.

Many questions asked in the wisdom of nature are important for the whole of natural science and for the rest of it:

1. What is the subject of the complete science of nature and how far does the consideration of the natural scientist extend?

2. What are the main parts of natural science and the order of these parts?

3. What is the difference between a purely natural science and a mathematical science of nature?

Again, the man who follows things from their beginning will get the clearest picture of them and the wisdom of nature is the beginning of all natural science. This is why many eminent physicists desire to follow natural science up from the early Greeks.

Finally, the goal of natural science is set up by the wisdom of nature, which thus gives direction to the whole of natural science (Why the goal of natural science is the solution of four great problems and in what parts of natural science these four problems are found.)

More in particular, the wisdom of nature is absolutely necessary for the of nat. sc. that investigates living bodies from internal experience and leads to a knowledge of the soul and its parts.

Moreover in particular, the wisdom of nature sometimes reaches conclusions that the math. exp. method reaches by another road. It is most striking and important when two lines of inquiry cross. Sometimes the exp. sciences complete or confirm the answers given in the wisdom of nature.

The importance of the wisdom of nature for other sciences. first the theoretical.

The mathematical sciences profit from the distinction made in Books I and II between quantity in the consideration of nat. science and quantity in the mathematical sciences. The discussion of the infinite in Bk.III is obviously important for the mathematician. The discussion of the continuous in book VI supplies or shows one of the principles of geometry (and consequently of arithmetic.)

Metaphysics, as its name implies, cannot be undertaken seriously until the Physics has been mastered. The possibility of the science of metaphysics, the very existence of its subject, requires demonstrations made in the last part of the wisdom of nature. And the development of metaphysical doctrine requires much borrowing and manuductio form the philosophy of nature as is especially evident in Bus. I, V, VI, VIII, IX, XI and XIII. Neither the existence nor the development of metaphysics is possible without the wisdom of nature.

Practical sciences: The consideration of whether nature acts for an end underlies all other questions of practical philosophy. the study of the soul is to ethics as the study of the body is to the medical art.

Theology which is both practical and theoretical, requires the wisdom of nature, not only to demonstrate the existence of God, but also especially in so far as it uses the via negativa. The negation of the more general is more useful than the negation of the particular and the wisdom of nature is the most general part of natural science, Hence, we reason that God is unchanging and eternal, using negations of motion and of time from Books III and IV of the Physics

There are countless ways that the wisdom of nature contributes greatly to the whole development of our reason. Some prime examples

The whole development of our reason should follow the natural road inscribed in us and aspects of this natural road are exposed in the beginning of the Physics.

Classic examples of the distinction between the per se and the per accidens in Bus. I, II, V and VIII

The solution of the Manichean heresy and any similar mistake based on the confusion of privation and matter or of what are proportional to them

The division of causes and their relations in Bk. II of the Physics cannot be underestimated in its importance for all the sciences. Any science that in any way touches upon causes must base itself on this doctrine of Book II of the Physics.

Books I and IV especially give perfect models or exemplars of the philosophical method; and one cannot avoid philosophizing in life - one can only do so well or badly.

Max Born, “Physics & Metaphysics”, in the collection of born papers Physics in My Generation, Pergamon Press, London, N. Y. p. 93:

I cannot claim in any way to be expert in what is customarily treated in philosophical books and lectures under the title of metaphysics. What I know of it is more or less recollection from my student days, refreshed by some sporadic reading.

Long years of neglect have not deleted the deep impression received in my youth by the age-old attempts to answer the more urgent questions of the human mind: the questions about the ultimate meaning of existence, about the Universe at large and our part in it, about life and death, truth and error, goodness and vice, God and eternity.

But just as deep as this impression of the importance of the problems is the memory of the futility of the endeavour. There seemed to be no steady progress as we find in the special sciences, and like so many others, I turned my back to philosophy and fond satisfaction in a restricted field where problems can actually be solved.