Coming Into Philosophy

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Coming Into Philosophy

Intro to Philosophy

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COMING INTO PHILOSOPHY

Men can and have come into philosophy in many ways. But does it make any difference how they come into philosophy? This can be measured only if we know how men should come into philosophy. What is the best way of coming into philosophy?

Since brevity is the soul of wisdom, a beginning statement of how men should come into philosophy should be brief and to the point although the unfolding of this statement will be longer. The following is a beginning statement of how one should come into philosophy: one should come into philosophy \emph{from its natural beginnings through the use of reason}. This is the best way of coming into philosophy.

It is necessary to unfold both parts of this beginning statement. What are the natural beginnings of philosophy? And why should we come into philosophy from these natural beginnings? What is reason and what is it to use reason? And why should one come into philosophy through the use of reason?

\section{What are the natural beginnings?}

The natural beginnings of philosophy are either in our desire or in our knowledge.

There are two natural beginnings of philosophy in our desire. The first is the desire to know.

It has been said that all men \emph{by nature }desire to know. Wonder is either this natural desire to know or a part of it. Wonder is \emph{the natural desire to know the cause}. It can also be defined as \emph{the natural desire to know what and why} (to know what a thing is and why it is as it is). These two definitions of wonder are in harmony because the questions what and why are answered by a knowledge of causes. Wonder is a desire to know not for anything further than the knowing itself.

Wonder is most of all said to be the beginning of philosophy. We can see this desire in the first philosophers and it is expressed in a fragment of Democritus.\footnote{Democritus, DK 118: "βούλεσθαι μᾶλλον μίαν εὑρεῖν αἰτιολογίαν ἢ τὴν Περσῶν βασιλείαν γενέσθαι", "I would rather discover one cause than be master of the kingdom of the Persians."} And both Plato and Aristotle at the end of the Golden Age of Greek Philosophy state that wonder was and is the beginning of philosophy.\footnote{Plato, \emph{Theaetetus,} 155C-D: Theaetetus: "By the gods, Socrates, how greatly I wonder what these things are and sometimes when looking at them, I am really dizzy." Socrates: "Theodorus seems to guess not badly about your nature, my friend. For this wonder is very much the undergoing of a philosopher. There is no other beginning of philosophy than this. And the one saying that Iris is the offspring of Thaumas did not make a bad genealogy. But do you begin to understand why these things are so?"\par Aristotle, \emph{Metaphysics,} Proemium, Book One, Chapter 3: "For men both now and at first began to philosophize through wonder - in the beginning, wondering about strange things close at hand; then going forward thus little by little, raising questions about the greater things, as about the changes of the moon and of the sun and stars, and about the origin of the universe."}

Another part or aspect of the natural desire to know is the desire to know what is true and what is false. Thomas begins his work on the unity of the understanding against the Averroists with these words:

Just as all men naturally desire to know the truth, so too there is a natural desire in men of fleeing errors, and of refuting them when the capacity to do so is present.\footnote{Thomas Aquinas, \emph{De Unitate Intellectus Contra Averroistas,} Proemium, Opuscula Philosophica, ed. Marietti, n. 173: "Sicut omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderant veritatem, ita naturale desiderium inest hominibus fugiendi errores, et eos cum facultas adfuerit confutandi."}

Just as man has a natural desire to know the truth, so too there is a natural desire in man to avoid error or mistake. Indeed, the natural end of reason is a knowledge of truth while a mistake is contrary to nature:

False judgments in the operations of the understanding are as the monstrous in natural things which are not in accord with nature, but outside of nature. For the knowledge of truth is the good of the understanding and its natural end.\footnote{\emph{Summa Contra Gentiles,} Liber III, Caput 107: "falsa enim iudicia in operationibus intellectus sunt sicut monstra in rebus naturalibus, quae non sunt secundum naturam, sed praeter naturam; nam bonum intellectus, et eius finis naturalis est cognitio veritatis."}

The desire to know the cause and the desire to know the truth are connected because the cause is more true than the effect\footnote{Aristotle shows this in the beginning of the second book of wisdom, the second book of the \emph{Metaphysics}.} and because he best reason for thinking something is true is the reason why it is so. We know that a statement is true when it is tied down by its cause, as Socrates said in the \emph{Meno}.

The other natural beginning of philosophy in our desire is \emph{the natural desire to live well}. Men naturally desire, not only to live, but to live well. Living well is the end of man (in the sense of that for the sake of which) and therefore the chief good of man. If \emph{happiness} is used to name living well, then we could also call this the natural desire for happiness.

The natural desire to know is most of all a beginning of theoretical or looking philosophy and the natural desire to live well is more the beginning of practical philosophy or the philosophy of doing.

The natural desire to know is more the beginning of looking philosophy than of practical philosophy because it is a desire to know for the sake of the knowledge itself. And looking philosophy is for the sake of understanding or knowing while practical philosophy is for the sake of living well and doing well. Nevertheless, there is some wonder in practical philosophy. For one wonders what happiness is and why governments fall and so on. So wonder is not simply, but in some limited or qualified way, also a beginning of practical philosophy.

Likewise, the natural desire for living well is also connected with looking philosophy. For in the full consideration of living well in practical philosophy, we learn that the knowing pursued out of wonder is a chief part of living well. Nevertheless, the natural desire to live well is more the beginning of practical philosophy for there we consider first what it is for a man or a family or a city to live well and then how this can be achieved.

And as knowing truth is a great part of the happiness we all naturally desire most of all, so avoiding error is very important in escaping misery or wretchedness which we all naturally flee:

…deception and error is a great part of misery and this is what all naturally flee\footnote{Thomas Aquinas, \emph{Summa Contra Gentiles,} Liber III, Caput XXXIX: "…deceptio autem et error magna pars miseriae est: hoc est enim quod omnes naturaliter fugiunt."}

There are also two natural beginnings of philosophy in our knowledge.

One is the natural road in our knowledge. Since man is by nature an animal with reason, the natural road in his knowledge is \emph{the road from the senses into reason}. For animal is defined by having senses. However, man is not just an animal, but an animal with reason. And what is general in a thing is before what is particular in time and generation. Hence the natural road in man's knowledge is from the senses into reason.

A full understanding of the natural road requires one to see all the order which is in that road. For a road in our knowledge is nothing other than an order therein. And since order is a before and after, we must see the before and after along that road. A complete knowledge of the natural road involves seeing every before and after therein.

Although closely connected, we can consider separately the before and after in \emph{different kinds of knowing} along this road and the before and after in \emph{things as known} along this road.

One kind of knowing is before or after another along this road. Thus, sensing is before memory along the natural road. And memory is before experience (in which many memories of the same are brought together). And experience is before a knowledge of the universal. And in the knowledge of the universal, the natural understanding of the most universal comes before the reasoned out understanding of the universal. And after natural understanding and many forms of reasoned out understanding comes wisdom which perfects both natural and reasoned out understanding.

But when we consider the order in which things are known along this road, it should not escape us that there is both an order in which \emph{different} things are known along this road and an order in which the \emph{same} thing is known along this road.

We know sensible things before things that cannot be sensed along this road and the more sensible before the less sensible. And this is why we know material things before immaterial things and usually effects before causes and composed things before simple things. These orders explain why the philosophy of material things comes before the philosophy of immaterial things and why a knowledge of the first causes and simplest things comes last in our discovery and learning.

But there is also an order in which the same thing is known along this road. As Boethius said, a thing is singular when sensed and universal when understood. Likewise, a thing is known in an outward way before in an inward way and in a confused way before distinctly. And these orders explain why men give examples of a thing before its universal definition and induce universal statements before they syllogize from them and why we think about something before we can think it out and why we must define, divide and distinguish to go forward in our thinking.

Both in the order in which different things are known to us and in the order in which the same thing is known to us, there is common that the more known to us is before the less known to us. But what is more known to us is less known because it is imperfectly known.

There is another natural beginning of philosophy on the side of reason and the senses besides the above road. Some statements about things (and the parts of these statements) are naturally known. There are some statements (and their parts) which man naturally comes to understand from sensing, memory and experience. He does not have to reason to them from other statements. Indeed, if man understood nothing before reasoning or defining, he would have nothing to reason from or define by. So naturally does man come to know these statements that some have thought that he is born knowing them.

But what statements (and their parts) does man naturally know or naturally come to know? It would seem to be what is most general for we know the general before the particular. (This follows from knowing the confused before the distinct.) Hence, the statements about being as being and their parts are naturally known by men.\footnote{ Thomas Aquinas, \emph{Summa Contra Gentiles,} Liber II, Capitulum LXXXIII: "... Cum natura semper ordinetur ad unum, unius virtutis oportet esse naturaliter unum obiectum: sicut visus colorem, et auditus sonum. Intellectus igitur cum sit una vis, est eius unum naturale obiectum, cuius per se et naturaliter cognitionem habet. Hoc autem oportet esse id sub quo comprehenduntur omnia ab intellectu cognita: sicut sub colore comprehenduntur omnes colores, qui sunt per se visibiles. Quod non est aliud quam ens. Naturaliter igitur intellectus noster cognoscit ens, et ea quae sunt per se entis inquantum huiusmodi; in qua cognitione fundatur primorum principiorum notitia, ut non esse simul affirmare et negare, et alia huiusmodi. Haec igitur sola principia intellectus noster naturaliter cognoscit, conclusiones autem per ipsa: sicut per colorem cognoscit visus tam communia quam sensibilia per accidens."}

Thus, man naturally understands that \emph{something cannot both be and not be} (at the same time and in the same way) and that \emph{something must either be or not be} (at the same time and in the same way).

"To be or not to be: that is the question" says Hamlet. It is a question because one cannot both be and not be, and one must either be or not be. Even if one were to question whether these axioms about being and non-being are certain or sure, his question would indicate that he thinks they cannot both be and not be certain and that they must be one or the other.

And he naturally knows that \emph{a whole is more than one of its parts} and \emph{the perfect or complete is better than the imperfect or incomplete} And that \emph{nothing is a beginning of itself} and \emph{nothing is before or after itself}.

There are other statements and their parts which man naturally comes to know. Euclid, for example, has enumerated some of them which are especially useful in mathematics. But no one has enumerated them all to my knowledge.

When we say that man naturally knows these statements, we do not mean that he is born knowing them.\footnote{Thomas Aquinas, \emph{Summa Contra Gentiles,} Liber II, Capitulum LXXXIII: "Id quod per sensum in nobis acquiritur, non infuit animae ante corpus. Sed ipsorum principiorum cognitio in nobis ex sensibilibus causatur: nisi enim aliquod totum sensu percepissemus, non possemus intelligere quod totum esset maius parte; sicut nec caecus natus aliquid percipit de coloribus. Ergo nec ipsorum principiorum cognitio affuit animae ante corpus. Multo igitur minus aliorum."} But he comes to know them so naturally that it seems he is born knowing them. If man knew nothing naturally, he would know nothing. A reasoned out knowledge of things is possible only when one has something to reason from. Anyone who wants to reason against the existence of any natural knowledge of statements about things has no statements to reason from. We can reason against him from statements naturally known, but he has no statements to reason from in return.

Moreover, what is so through itself is a cause of what is so through another. (Quod est per se, causa est eius quod est per aliud.) Hence, before the statements known through another, there must be statements known through themselves which are the causes of our coming to know the former.

But among these very general statements and their parts, the statements about being and non-being are naturally the first. For in every other statement, one is saying that something either is or is not. Moreover, seeing the truth of a statement involves seeing that it is saying that \emph{what-is} is or \emph{what-is-not} is not while the falsehood of a statement is its saying that \emph{what-is} is not, or that \emph{what-is-not} is. Hence, seeing the truth or falsity of any other statement involves seeing being and non-being.

\section{Why we should come into philosophy from its natural beginnings}

There are, at least, thirteen good reasons why we should come into philosophy from its natural beginnings.

One reason is that the man who considers something from its beginning will understand it the best. As Aristotle has noted in the \emph{Politics,} we can understand a thing best if we follow its development, or growth, from its beginning. Thus, in writing the biography of an individual or the history of nation, we begin from their origin and follow their development from that origin. And in \emph{Romeo and Juliet,} the Duke says after the discovery of the bodies at the Capulet's tomb:

Seal up the mouth of outrage for a while, Till we can clear these ambiguities, And know their spring, their head, their true descent\footnote{\emph{Romeo and Juliet,} Act V, Sc. 3.}

And the natural beginnings of philosophy are its \emph{first} beginnings. For the nature of a thing, or what it is, is always first in it. (A thing must be what it is before it can be anything else.) Hence, the natural beginnings of philosophy are its \emph{first} beginnings. Therefore, we will come to understand philosophy best if we follow its development, or growth, from its natural beginnings.

A second reason is that an ordered approach to philosophy must proceed from its beginnings. Since order is determined in reference to some beginning (a beginning is the origin or source of some order), an ordered approach to philosophy must start from its beginnings. Hence, one cannot approach philosophy in an orderly way if one does not start from its beginnings. And its first beginnings are its natural beginnings. And an ordered approach to philosophy is surely called for if the philosopher is seeking wisdom. For it belongs to the wise to know order and to order things. And in general, philosophy is a work of reason thinking out and reasoning out things, so that there must be some order in it just as in any work of reason. Further, a disordered approach to philosophy results in mistakes or errors about philosophy. Hence, the Latin word \emph{error} comes from the verb \emph{errare} meaning \emph{to wander}. Therefore, to have an ordered approach to philosophy (as distinguished from a disordered one), it is necessary to proceed from its natural beginnings.

The third reason is suggested by the Greek proverb that \emph{the beginning is half of all}. Plato goes further and states that the beginning seems to be more than half. Since everything else depends upon the beginning, it does seem to be more than half. The beginning is like a seed, which although small in size, is great in power. Hence, to go forward well in philosophy, we must consider very carefully its natural beginnings. Nothing is more necessary in philosophy than to begin well, as Plato and Aristotle and others have taught us. But the natural beginnings of philosophy are its first beginnings so that philosophy especially depends upon these beginnings. Hence, the more we are rooted in the natural beginnings of philosophy, the more we will be able to go forward well in philosophy. But if we begin badly, we will be harmed by this beginning throughout philosophy. Even a small mistake in the beginning is a great one in the end when all the power of the beginning has been drawn out.

A fourth reason can be drawn from judgment. Knowing involves grasping something and then judging it. Judgment is the separation of the true from the false (or the good from the bad) by some beginning in our knowledge. Hence, if we do not come into philosophy from its natural beginnings, we will not be able to judge or judge well in philosophy. And judgment is the perfection of knowing. Thus, we cannot judge what is true or false in philosophy without possessing its natural beginnings.

A fifth reason can be found in the Royal Fragment of Heraclitus, the central thinker in the history of human thought, in which he speaks of wisdom in connection with nature. The philosopher, as his name indicates, is a lover of wisdom. And Heraclitus sees the connection of wisdom with nature in the Royal Fragment:

Moderation is the greatest virtue and wisdom is to speak the truth and to act, according to nature, giving ear thereto.\footnote{DK 112 - the Royal Fragment by antonomasia: σωφρονεῖνὴ ἀρετὴ μεγίστη, καὶ σοφίη ἀληθέα λέγειν καὶ ποιεϊν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαΐοντας.}

How is one listening to nature if one neglects the natural beginnings of philosophy? And if one does not listen to nature, one thinks oneself wiser than nature which is what the fool thinks. Hence, all who enter philosophy or pursue wisdom should begin from the \emph{natural} beginnings of philosophy.\footnote{Thomas Aquinas, \emph{Super Primam Epistolam Ad Corinthios Lectura,} Caput XI, Lectio III, n. 619: "Tertio ostendit unde debeant sumere suum iudicium, quia ab ipsa natura, et hoc est quod dicit nec ipsa natura vos docet. Et vocat hic naturam ipsam inclinationem naturalem....Quae quidem inclinatio naturalis esse ostenditur, quia in pluribus invenitur. Oportet autem ab ipsa natura doceri, quia est Dei opus: sicut in pictura instruitur aliquis artificio pictoris."}

A sixth reason can be drawn from the dependence of what is not natural in us upon what is natural. The natural order in things is not only before in time the order made by reason, but also the order made by nature can be without the order made by reason, but not vice-versa. Further, we acquire what is not natural by what is natural, as we acquire the artificial tools we use (such as hammer and knife) through our hands and language by imitation which is natural to man. And reason and art imitate nature. And thus nature also seems to be a measure of what is by reason. Hence, although philosophy is not something we have by nature or that is assured by our nature, it cannot be without what is natural, or be acquired except through what is natural.\footnote{Thomas Aquinas, \emph{Summa Contra Gentiles,} Liber II, Capitulum LXXXIII: "Si ita esset animae naturalis cognitio conclusionum sicut principiorum, eadem esset sententia apud omnes de conclusionibus sicut de principiis: quia quae sunt naturalia, sunt eadem apud omnes. Non est autem apud omnes eadem sententia de conclusionibus, sed solum de principiis. Patet igitur quod cognitio principiorum est nobis naturalis, non autem conclusionum. Quod autem non est naturale nobis, acquirimus per id quod est naturale: sicut etiam in exterioribus per manus instituimus omnia artificialia. Non ergo conclusionum scientia est in nobis nisi ex principiis acquisita."} Hence, we can see that the beginnings private to each reasoned out knowledge depend upon the beginnings common to all reasoned out knowledge which are naturally known.\footnote{Thomas Aquinas, \emph{Summa Contra Gentiles,} Liber III, Capitulum XLI: "Omnia enim propria principia cuiuscumque scientiae dependent ex principiis primis indemonstrabilibus per se notis, quorum cognitionem a sensibilibus accipimus, ut patet in fine Posteriorum."} Thus we should come into philosophy from its \emph{natural} beginnings

Moreover, what is so through itself is before and a cause of what is so through another. But nothing is more through itself than the natural. For what belongs to a thing through what it is, most of all belongs to it through itself. A thing is most of all what it is. Thus it belongs to two through itself (or through being two) to be a number and to be half of four.

An eighth reason can be drawn from the end or purpose of philosophy. The end of philosophy is that for the sake of which everything else is pursued in philosophy. And since the order of things among themselves is because of their order to an end, the whole order of philosophy depends upon its end. But what is the end of philosophy is determined by nature although the achieving of this end requires the use of reason as reason. Hence, those who do not come into philosophy from its natural beginnings are ignorant of its end with the result that the whole of philosophy is cast into chaos.

A ninth reason is also taught us by Heraclitus. We should wake up and follow what is common. But the common is the natural.

We should not act and speak like those asleep.\footnote{DK 73: οὐ δεῖ ὥσπερ καθεύδοντας ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν.}

For the waking there is one world, and it is common; but when men sleep, each one turns aside into a private [world].\footnote{DK 89: τοῖς ἐγρηγορόσιν ἕνα καὶ κοινὸν κόσμον εῖναι, τῶν δὲ κοιμωμένων ἕκαστον εῖς ἴδιον ἀποστρέφεσθαι.}

Therefore, we ought to follow what is common. Although reason is common to all, the many live as if having a private wisdom.\footnote{DK 2: διὸ δεῖ ἕπεσθαι τῶι κοινῶι· ξυνὸς γὰρ ὁ κοινός. τοῦ λόγου δ᾽ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ζῶουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ιδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν.}

Those who speak with understanding must be strong in what is common to all, as much as a city is strong in its law, and even more so. For all human laws are fed by one divine law which governs as far as it wishes and is more than sufficient for all.\footnote{DK 114: ξὺν νόωι λέγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ τῶι ξυνῶι πάντων, ὅκωσπερ νόμωι πόλις, καὶ πολὺ ἰσχυροντέρως. τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἑνὸς τοῦ θείου· κρατεῖ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὁκόσον ἐθέλει καὶ ἐξαρκεῖ πᾶσι καὶ περιγίνεται.}

If we want to speak with understanding of philosophy and avoid the many private or idiotic\footnote{\emph{idiotic} comes from the Greek word for \emph{private}.} philosophies that abound, we must begin what is common. But it is the natural which is common.

A tenth reason is the necessity of beginning from what is more known to us. The natural beginnings of philosophy are more known to us and therefore more certain for us than any of those private beginnings freely imagined by different philosophers.

An eleventh reason for coming into philosophy from its natural beginnings is that these are unchanging and the changing depends upon the unchanging.

A twelfth reason for coming into philosophy from its natural beginnings is from the alternatives. If we do not come into philosophy from its natural beginnings, we will come into philosophy somewhat by chance as whatever the first man one encounters speaking or writing in philosophy happens to be talking about, or from some beginning customary in one's place or time, or fashionable there, or else from some freely imagined beginning. Only a foolish man would build philosophy upon such unstable and incertain beginnings. We cannot go forward from such accidental beginnings well and far, as we can from the natural beginnings.

There is a thirteenth reason for coming into philosophy from its natural beginnings. These natural beginnings introduce us into the fuller consideration of the three kinds of things necessary to become and be a good philosopher. The natural beginnings of philosophy are not all that is necessary to become and be a good philosopher, but they do lead us into the three kinds of things necessary to become and be a good philosopher (besides having a good mind).

The natural desire to know and the natural desire to live well introduce us to the dispositions of will and emotion necessary to become and be a good philosopher. Are there other dispositions of will and emotion are necessary for the philosopher? And if so, what are they?

The natural road in our knowledge introduces us to the more general questions about all the roads in our knowledge. Are there other roads in our knowledge necessary for the philosopher? What is the order among these roads and how should they be determined?

The natural knowledge of the very general beginning statements about things (statements known by all men in, at least, a confused way) leads us to ask whether there are other more particular beginning statements about things necessary for the philosopher (even though not known by all men) and, if so, how these become known.

\section{What is reason and the use of reason}

The beginning statement of how one should come into philosophy said not only that one should come into it from its natural beginnings, but also through or by the use of reason. What is reason and the use of reason?

The definition of reason not only tells us what reason is, but also what it is to use reason. For reason is an ability for some act and therefore must be defined by this act which is also its use.

Shakespeare has given us the first definition of reason as reason in his Exhortation to Use Reason. He has defined reason as \emph{the ability for large discourse, looking before and after}. A defense of this as the first definition of reason would require a long discourse, but a brief explanation of the definition can be given here.

In order to understand Shakespeare's definition of the ability called reason, we should recall that an ability is defined by its utmost. If a man is able to lift 300 pounds, but no more (the 301'st pound being like the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back), he is also able to life 200 or 100 pounds. But we would not define his weight lifting ability by 100 or 200 pounds because this would not enable us to understand his full ability. The ability to life 100 or 200 pounds is included in the ability to lift 300, but not vice-versa.

The word \emph{discourse,} which names the act of reason by carrying over the Latin word for running to the movement of reason, is not just the going of reason from one thing to another. For even the senses, such as the eye or the ear, go from seeing or hearing one thing to seeing or hearing another thing. The discourse which separates reason from the going of the senses and therefore enables us to define reason is the coming to know one thing through knowing other things. Reason is not only able to know one thing before or after another, but also one thing through another or by another. (But the ability for the former is included in the ability for the latter.) The main forms of such discourse are defining and reasoning, counting and calculating. Reasoning, the discourse named from reason, is coming to know or guess a statement from other statements already known or accepted. Defining is coming to know distinctly what a species, or particular kind of thing, is through knowing its genus and differences. Counting is coming to know a number through the repetition of the unit or one. Calculating is coming to know or guess a number through other numbers, as in adding, subtracting multiplying and dividing.

But since in the inward senses there seems to be something like discourse, as when for example we remember one thing by remembering another, Shakespeare adds that reason is the ability for \emph{large} discourse. The discourse of reason can be called \emph{large} because it is \emph{about the universal} which covers as it were a large area in that the universal is said of many things. When reason discourses, for example, about even and odd numbers, its discourse covers an infinity of numbers. The senses, both inward and outward, know only singulars.

Reason is also capable of a large discourse in other senses in which a discourse can be called \emph{large}. Reason can discourse about great things such as the soul or the universe or God. The senses cannot do this. This sense of \emph{large} is opposed to \emph{small} as in \emph{small talk} which is talk about little or unimportant things.

The discourse of reason can be large also in the sense that its limit is large. The limit of a discourse is its beginning or end. Sometimes from knowing many things, reason comes to know one thing. Thus we speak of a \emph{large} induction when reason comes to know one universal truth from many singulars. Likewise, from one universal principle or equation, reason comes to know many things. These discourses also separate reason from the inward as well as the outward senses.

The discourse of reason can also be called large because the discourse itself is large or long. Reason is capable of a large discourse in the sense of going through many steps to reach a conclusion, as we see in geometry; or in the sense of going between things far apart, as in reasoning from motion to God.

One would not know fully the ability for discourse which is reason if one did not know that it is an ability for \emph{large} discourse. Although reason is also capable of a small discourse, we define an ability by the utmost of which it is capable.

Since we define an ability by what it is an ability for, and \emph{discourse} names an act (of the ability called \emph{reason}) which is like a motion, and motion is not for its own sake, it was necessary, to complete the definition of reason, for Shakespeare to add the end of this movement. The thinking or reasoning of reason is like a motion, but what is the end of this motion? What is reason trying to arrive at by the motion of thinking or reasoning? The end of thinking or reasoning is to understand. The end of thinking or reasoning is think out or reason out something, and the result of this is some understanding. Hence, Shakespeare adds the word \emph{looking} to the definition. \emph{Looking} means \emph{trying to see} and \emph{to see} here means to understand. When reason is in motion, thinking or reasoning, it is trying to understand.

But Shakespeare tell us more, that trying to understand is looking before and after, and therefore that reason in its discourse is looking before and after. What is the connection between \emph{understanding} and \emph{before and after}?

Shakespeare likes to pun on the etymology of the word \emph{understanding}. But in thus drawing our attention to its etymology, he also leads us to consider the connection between its etymology and its meaning. To understand something means to know what is said to stand under it or to know it by what is said to stand under it. To understand an effect means to know its underlying cause. Hence, the native English word for cause is \emph{ground}. To understand a word means to know the thing or meaning that is said to stand under it. Hence, we are said to place a name upon something. And to understand a thing means to know its \emph{substance} (which has the same etymology in Latin as \emph{understanding}) or what it is

The word \emph{before} (and consequently the word \emph{after} and every word defined by them) is equivocal by reason; that is, the word \emph{before} has many senses or meanings not by chance, but by reason which sees an order and connection among these meanings. And after we have seen in order the senses of the word, we must also see that reason looks before and after in every sense of the words \emph{before} and \emph{after}.

The distinction and order of the central and chief senses of the word \emph{before} is made by Aristotle in the \emph{Categories}. Ignorance of that text is ignorance of reason and therefore the lover of reason will turn often to it. Shakespeare was, of course, aware of these different senses of \emph{before}. Indeed, he puns upon the first and last central senses in \emph{All's Well That Ends Well}.

In the twelfth chapter of the \emph{Categories,} Aristotle distinguishes in order four central senses of \emph{before}. The first sense of \emph{before} is in time, as today is before tomorrow. The second is in being: what can be without another, but not vice-versa, is before in this sense. Thus one can be without two, but not vice-versa. And the letter \emph{c} can be without the word \emph{cat,} but the word \emph{cat} cannot be without the letter \emph{c}. The third sense is before in the discourse of reason. Thus, the premisses of a syllogism are before its conclusion. To this sense can be led back any before and after in our knowledge. And the fourth sense is better. The end is better than what is for the sake of it.

The \emph{crowning} sense of \emph{before,} which is the sense in which a cause is before its effect, is given by Aristotle after he has distinguished in order the four central senses of \emph{before}. The crowning sense of \emph{before,} which is the sense in which a cause is before its effect, seems most like the second central sense because what is after in being also depends upon what is before in being.

Reason looks before and after in all these senses (and in the senses which are led back to them). But the philosopher who wonders looks before most of all in the \emph{crowning} sense.

We can now see the connection between understanding and looking before and after. To understand something means most of all to know its cause and this corresponds to the crowning sense of \emph{before} (the sense in which the cause is before the effect). And since we name things as we know them, a thing and our awareness of it are before the name. A thing is before our knowledge of it, and our knowledge is before our naming it, in the first and second senses of \emph{before}. And understanding a name equivocal by reason, such as the name \emph{before,} is impossible without seeing the order of its meanings. Since we name things as we known them, the order in naming follows the order in knowing. And this corresponds to the third sense of \emph{before}.

The axioms of before and after lead us to see what is before seeing a before and after. Since nothing is before or after itself and something is before or after another, some distinction between what is before and what is after must be seen before one can see that one is before or after the other. Hence, in the ability to see a before and after is included the ability to see a distinction. Reason must be able to distinguish, divide and define if it is able to see a before and after. But it is possible to see a distinction between two things without seeing that one is before the other.

\section{Why we should come into philosophy by the use of reason}

It was said in the beginning statement that one should come into philosophy, not only from its natural beginnings, but also through or by the use of reason. Why should the philosopher use reason and what use of reason is necessary for the philosopher?

Although philosophy has four natural beginnings, it is not itself immediately by nature. Rather it is in the beginning a search or investigation by reason (a sort of hunting by reason, as Plato and Aristotle and John Locke say) and in the end, if successful, a reasoned out knowledge. Reasoned out knowledge is a result of thinking out things. Reason must think out distinctions, divisions and definitions of things. And then it must think out the statements about things which can be seen to be true immediately from these definitions, divisions and distinctions. And then reason must think out, or reason out, the conclusions about things which follow from the aforesaid statements. All of this thought out knowledge can be called \emph{reasoned out} knowledge from the last thinking out in it.

The search of reason is more apt to be successful and lead to reasoned out knowledge if it is made from reasonable guesses rather than from wild guesses. And reasoned out knowledge is clearly both a work of reason and a perfection of reason. Hence, it is clear that the philosopher in particular must use reason. No one can become a philosopher without the use of reason. And a good use of reason is required to become a good philosopher

There is, of course, a general reason why the philosopher should use reason. The philosopher is a man and every man should use his reason, as Shakespeare shows so fully in his \emph{Exhortation to use reason}. Since a knowledge of the general is before a knowledge of the particular, it is necessary to know why man should use his reason before knowing why the philosopher in particular must do so. But we cannot here enter into the study and exposition of that Exhortation.\footnote{The interested reader could consult our Proemium to the Exhortation, and Questions for the study of the Exhortation, and Exposition of the Exhortation.}

But there are particular reasons why the philosopher must especially use his reason. Philosophy is not the wisdom of God, but the wisdom of man. And such wisdom is both a perfection of reason and acquired by the use of reason. The biologists call man \emph{homo sapiens} which could be translated as \emph{the wise ape}. Man is wiser than the other animals by his reason

Since philosophy goes from reasonable guesses about things towards a reasoned out knowledge of them, no one can come into philosophy without the use of reason.

Since wonder especially is the beginning of philosophy, and wonder is the natural desire to know the cause, the philosopher must look before in the crowning sense of \emph{before}. And since reason is the ability to look before and after, it is clear that the one who wonders and comes into philosophy must use his reason.

And since wonder is the natural desire to know what and why, and we know \emph{what} by defining and \emph{why} by demonstrating, and defining and demonstrating are two forms of discourse, it is clear that one must come into philosophy by the use of reason which is nothing other than the ability for discourse. And from this, it is also clear that the philosopher must look before and after in the third central sense of before (which is in the discourse of reason). For reason is also the ability to look before and after in its discourse.

And whoever wants to know how to live well must try to know what is better and what are the things without which other things cannot be or be well. But these are a result of looking before and after in the second and fourth senses of \emph{before} in the \emph{Categories}. Hence, the philosopher must come into practical philosophy looking before and after which is the work of reason

Moreover, philosophy is knowledge over a road or knowledge that follows a road. And one cannot follow a road without knowing it. And since a road in our knowledge is nothing other than a before and after therein, it is clear that no one can know the road to follow in philosophy without looking before and after. And since one road is before another and enters into the one after, one must also look before and after to see the order among the roads.

And how can he philosopher come to know other things from the things naturally known without discourse which is the act defining reason?\footnote{Thomas Aquinas, \emph{Summa Contra Gentiles,} Liber II, Capitulum LXXXIII: "Si aliquis scientiarum ignarus de his quae ad scientias pertinent interrogetur, non respondebit veritatem nisi de universalibus principiis, quae nullus ignorat, sed sunt ab omnibus eodem modo et naturaliter cognita. Postmodum autem ordinate interrogatus, respondebit veritatem de his quae sunt propinqua principiis, habito respectu ad principia; et sic deinceps quousque virtutem primorum principiorum ad ea de quibus interrogatur, applicare potest. Ex hoc igitur manifeste apparet quod per principia prima, in eo qui interrogatur, causatur cognitio de novo."}

And in general, how can the philosopher come into philosophy from its natural beginnings without recognizing them as beginnings. And a beginning cannot be known \emph{as a beginning} without looking before and after. For a beginning is before everything else and other things are after it.

And experience also tells us that the philosopher must use his reason to the utmost; that is, for a \emph{large} discourse. The discourse of the philospher is larger than that of other men in most senses of \emph{large} discourse.

The discourse of the wise man is the largest in five of the six senses of \emph{large} discourse. His discourse is the most universal because he considers what is said of all. And his discourse is about the greatest things for he considers the immaterial substances and most of all, God. And the limits of his discourse are the largest becasue he draws the truth he considers from all things and applies it to all things. And his discourse goes from imperfect being to God. (The mathematician seems to have more steps to go through in his later demonstrations.)

But the discourse of the philosopher in the particular parts of philosophy is still larger than that of other men. The moral and political philosopher considers all the goods of man in general and the chief good of man and about the best government and the rise and fall of governments. And the philosopher of nature and the soul considers change and place and time in general and reasons from motion to the unmoved mover and considers the soul which is the best thing in the material world.

The discourse of the philosopher is also large in the sense of being long. For we see that the mathematical philosopher in geometry, for example, goes through many steps to arrive at the Pythagorean theorem and before the moral philosopher can complete his consideration of happiness or living well, he must go through all the human virtues. And when the philosopher reasons from motion to the unmoved mover, his discourse is very large in the sense of going between things that are very far apart in their nature. And from the discourse of the philosopher being long, it is again very obvious that he must look before and after in the third central sense of \emph{before} which is in the discourse of reason.

And the limits of the philosopher's discourses are also very large because of the large inductions he must make in coming to his universal considerations and the manifold consequences he sees from the principles or beginnings which he has found.

Since wonder is the beginning of philosophy, it is clear that the philsopher must look before and after in the crowning sense of before. The natural philospher looks before and after in the first sense of \emph{before} for he considers the before and after in time and motion and in the magnitude over which something moves (as can be seen in the sixth book of \emph{Natural Hearing}). And the logician especially must look before and after in the third sense of before (which is in the discourse of reason). And it is clear that the practical philosopher must especially look before and after in the fourth central sense of \emph{before} (which is better) and therefore use his reason which is the ability to look before and after.

The fact that logic has been considered a part of philosophy since Plato and Aristotle, and indeed the tool of philosophy, is a sure sign that one must come into philosophy through the use of reason.

\section{The connection of philosophy and reason}

Since philosophy is a reasoned out knowledge, every kind or part of philosophy has \emph{at least} two connections with reason: (1) it is acquired by the use of reason and (2) after it is acquired, it is a good disposition or habit of reason, a perfection of reason.

But the knowledge of the soul (which is a part of the philosophy of nature) has another connection with reason because it is (in part) about what reason is by nature.

But the inward kinds of philosophy (as Boethius calls logic and wisdom) have three or four connections with reason. Like every kind of philosophy, they are acquired by the use of reason and, when acquired, are a perfection of reason. (Wisdom is indeed the highest or the greatest perfection of reason.) But they also direct reason. Logic directs reason towards reasoned out knowledge. And wisdom directs reason and all the lesser forms of reasoned out knowledge towards wisdom which is the end of reason. Logic and wisdom also have a fourth connection with reason. The end or limit of judgments in natural philosophy is in the senses and the end or limit of judgments in geometry is in the imagination. But in logic and wisdom, judgments end in reason because immaterial things cannot be judged by what is sensed or imagined.

The philosopher must be concerned with what reason is and what it is to use reason and why we should use reason because of the above connections of philosophy with reason. Otherwise, he cannot know what philosophy is or how to acquire it.

Since the philosopher is a lover of wisdom and wisdom is the highest or greatest perfection of reason, the philosopher must love reason. One cannot love the greatest good of reason without loving reason. And vice-versa, how can one be said to love reason if one does not love its greatest good?

Because of the above connections of philosophy with reason and the love of wisdom with the love of reason, the philosopher should consider the Exhortation to Use Reason by Shakespeare. For there we learn what reason is and what it is to use reason and why man should use reason.