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Confused Before Distinct
Wisdom about Beginnings · Roads in Our Knowledge
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CONFUSED BEFORE DISTINCT
Confused or indistinct knowledge is before distinct knowledge in time, in being, in the discourse of reason, and it is even better in some way (although distinct knowledge is simply better).
We know things in a confused way in time before we know them distinctly.
We can know things in a confused way without knowing them distinctly, but we cannot know them distinctly without knowing them in a confused way. We can know that six is a number wihout knowing it is a perfect number. But we cannot know that six is a perfect number without kniowng it is a number. Hence, it is laughable to think that distinct knowledge replaces confused knowledge.
The discourse of reason goes from what is more known to us to what is less known to us. But the confused is more known to us than the distinct. We know more that we are drinking beer than that we are drinking Heineken.
We are more sure of what is more known to us. But the confused is more known to us than the distinct. Hence, our confused knowledge is more sure than our distinct knowledge. In this way, confused knowledge is better. But simply, distinct knowledge is better. It is better to know something distinctly even though we are more sure when we remain in our confused knowledge. What is known is more essential to knowledge than how it is known. We would rather smell a rose with a stuffy nose than smell some other things with a clear nose. It is better to read Homer in translation than most poets in the original.
We can consider why confused knowledge is before distinct knowledge and that it is before.
The reason why is that the senses and reason are in ability to receiving their objects and knowing them. Both the senses and reason go from ability to act, from being able to know to actually knowing. Knowing a thing in a confused way is between not knowing it at all and knowing it fully in act. Hence, as the senses and reason go from ability to act, they necessarily know things in a confused before knowing them distinctly.
We can see that confused knowledge is before distinct knowledge in the above ways by less universal statements easily exemplified.
Both the composed whole (which is put together from its parts) and the universal whole (which is said of its parts) are known in a confused way before their parts are distinguished.
A sensible composed whole is sensed in a confused way before its parts are distinguished. A salad dressing is tasted and may please before its ingredients are recognized. A symphony is first heard without the instruments being distinguished. A painting is first seen without all the parts being noticed distinctly.
We name a thing before we can define it, as a child names a circle without being able to define. But the definition breaks up an understandable composed whole into its parts.
We see the family resemblance in two twins before we can distinguish them. We see "something" on the horizon before we recognize it is a ship and we recognize it as a ship before seeing that it is a friendly or enemy ship. This in the senses resembles going from the general to the particular in reason.
Reason sees the genus before it distinguishes the species which are the parts of that universal whole.
The more precisely we try to guess the age or weight of a man, the less sure we are. The same for the number of pages of a book or the size of a lot.
We use a word with a confused understanding of its meanings before we distinguish those meanings. Hence, people are easily deceived by the equivocation of a word.
People also have enormous difficulty is distinguishing between the as such and what happens. Even the wise are deceived here.
Likewise, they have difficulty in distinguishing between what is so simply and what is so in some respect. This also gives rise to many mistakes.
Man also seems to have a confused knowledge of a thing when he does not see its properties. But this requires statements and demonstrations.
And men do not have a distinct knowledge of a beginning as a beginning until they see what follows from it. Men need a manuductio from examples and less universal statements to grasp distinctly universal beginnings. The latter would be received in great confusion and stupefaction by the student if he was not led by the hand to them.
We can see that confused knowledge is before distinct knowledge in the above ways by less universal statements easily exemplified.
Both the composed whole (which is put together from its parts) and the universal whole (which is said of its parts) are known in a confused way before their parts are distinguished.
A sensible composed whole is sensed in a confused way before its parts are distinguished. A salad dressing is tasted and may please before its ingredients are recognized. A fine wine sauce in an excellent restaurant delights the sense of taste, but one must savor it for a while before one can begin to pick out the ingredients. A symphony is first heard without the instruments being distinguished. Everything the orchestra plays is heard by the ears at first in a confused way, but in time the ears learn to distinguish the and recognize the various instruments playing and their themes. A painting is first seen without all the parts being noticed distinctly. The eye sees the whole painting on the museum wall before it begins to distinguish all the parts.
We must also note that the senses do not go pass from a confused knowledge of the painting, symphony or sauce to a distinct knowledge of all the parts at once. The senses recognize one part after another, thus gradually coming to a distinct knowledge of the whole. The eyes notice distinctly one part of the painting and then another and only in this part by part way do they come to know the whole distinctly. Benjamin Britten's Young Person's Guide to the Orchestra does something like this for the ears. The whole orchestra is heard by the ear. And then each part (strings, brass etc.) is heard separately. Finally the whole orchestra is heard again, but the listener has a more distinct knowledge of the whole than he did in the beginning. Again, we might let someone sniff a jar of one of the spices used in a sauce; and when he tastes the whole sauce again, he may be able to pick it out. Or if one has tasted wine made from one grape, he may be able after some time to distinguish the wines used in some blends.
Reason also does not know a composed whole distinctly at first. We must divide such a whole into its parts, consider each of these parts, and then see how they make up the whole. We thus take apart a machine, seeking to know its parts and putting them together again to have a distinct knowledge of the whole. The natural scientist does not have a distinct knowledge of an animal, a plant or an atom before he has discovered their parts. And not even then, for he must see how these parts make up the whole. The student of human society must resolve that society into its constituent parts and understand these parts before he can hope to see how they make up the whole and thus get a distinct knowledge of the whole; e.g.; the student of the family must divide it into father and a mother and child, define these and understand their role in the family. The grammarians had a vague knowledge of language before they could distinguish the parts of speech. Then they were able to proceed to an understanding of the use of these parts of speech in a sentence which gave them a distinct knowledge of their subject. The student of the drama comes to a distinct knowledge of his subject by resolving it into its parts (plot, character, thought, diction etc.), investigating each one of these, and through this coming to a distinct knowledge of the whole he first knew in a confused way. Likewise, the logician has a confused knowledge of definition, statement and syllogism before he divides these into their parts: respectively, genus and difference; noun and verb; and two premisses and at last three terms. After he knows these parts, he will be able to come to a distinct knowledge of his subject.
There is another kind of composed whole known only by the understanding. This is the understandable composed whole, the definition. We name a thing before we can define it, as a child names a circle without being able to define. But the definition breaks up an understandable composed whole into its parts. We know enough to name a thing before being able to define it. Our asking the question "What is it?" is a sign of this. We could not ask the question "What is it?" about anything unless we knew that thing in some way. We could neither know what we were trying to define, nor what someone else was asking us to define. But this knowledge of the thing before definition is indistinct or confused. If it were a distinct knowledge, there would be no need to ask "What is it?" and seek a definition. But if we didn't know the thing in a confused way before trying to define, we wouldn't seek a definition of it. But our seeking a definition of it is a sure sign that we do not yet have a distinct knowledge of it
We see the family resemblance in two twins before we can distinguish them. A mother can tell her twins apart, but a stranger cannot. This is because the mother has been with them for a long time. Twin sisters have been known to switch dates without their boy-friends knowing it. In one class in grade school, we students could distinguish twins we had known in the previous year; but the new teacher couldn't tell them apart. The twins would change seats and the teacher would call on one thinking it was the other according to her seating-chart. A child often calls a cat a dog until he learns to distinguish them. And there is the saying that every china-man looks the same (to a Westerner) although they are as distinct to one another as we in the West are. And the ear recognizes the differences between a wood wind and a string instrument before the differences among string-instruments and the differences among wood-wind instruments. We see "something" on the horizon before we recognize it is a ship and we recognize it as a ship before seeing that it is a friendly or enemy ship. This in the senses resembles going from the general to the particular in reason.
A further sign that the confused is before the distinct is that by the senses we are more able to judge the confused than the distinct. We are more sure of the confused and the more distinct or precise we try to be, the less sure we are or the more apt we are to be mistaken. By our sense of taste, we distinguish more easily and more certainly between wine and beer than between two kinds of beer or two kinds of wine. Our ears distinguish a man's voice and a woman's more easily than between the voices of two men or the voices of two women.
The confused coming before and being more sure than the distinct can be seen not only in each sense's knowing, but also to some extent among the different senses. The sense of touch is the most basic sense as can be seen even in the womb while the sense of sight is the last to develop. The sense of touch gives us a confused knowledge in comparison to the sense of sight whose knowledge would seem to be the most clear and distinct of any of the senses. But the sense of touch is more sure than the sense of sight. A sign of this is that we trust the sense of touch more than the sense of sight, as in the example of the doubting Thomas. A man in the desert who "sees" water will trust his sense of touch more if he gets a mouthful of sand. There is the story of the painter who made so like the real a painting with a cord that someone tried to pull the cord. The sense of touch undeceived the man.
Reason sees the universal whole (which is said of its parts, but not composed of them) before it distinguishes its parts. Reason knows the genus before it distinguishes the species which are the parts of that universal whole. Even though we know singulars by sense before we know universals by reason, among the universals we know the more universal first. We know singular trees before the universal tree. But we know broad-leaf and needle-leaf tree before their particular kinds. We know the difference between beer and wine before the difference between particular kinds of beer. Even though the less universal is closer to the singular than the more universal, reason going from ability to act knows the more universal before the less universal. And the difference between beer and wine being greater than the difference between particular beers, reason will see it first. Again we are more sure of the more universal difference than the particular difference.
Since knowledge based on common experience is to knowledge based on private experience as general knowledge is to particular knowledge, and general knowledge is to particular knowledge as confused knowledge is to distinct knowledge, one very important consequence of confused knowledge coming before distinct knowledge is that knowledge for which common experience is enough experience is before knowledge that depends upon private experience.
In general, the need to define and divide throughout reasoned-out knowledge is a sign that confused knowledge is before distinct knowledge.
We do not go from a confused knowledge of a composed whole or a universal whole to a distinct knowledge of all its parts at once. We see one part distinctly before another. Knowing each part distinctly takes time. Reason draws a line around the whole and fills in the parts bit by bit. One man often sees one part, but not another, so that through the efforts of many we come to a distinct knowledge of the whole.
The more precisely we try to guess the age or weight of a man, the less sure we are. The same for the number of pages of a book or the size of a lot.
We use a word with a confused understanding of its meanings before we distinguish those meanings. Hence, people are easily deceived by the equivocation of a word.
People also have enormous difficulty is distinguishing between the as such and what happens. Even the wise are deceived here.
Likewise, they have difficulty in distinguishing between what is so simply and what is so in some respect. This also gives rise to many mistakes.
Man also seems to have a confused knowledge of a thing when he does not see its properties. But this requires statements and demonstrations.
And men do not have a distinct knowledge of a beginning as a beginning until they see what follows from it. Men need a manuductio from examples and less universal statements to grasp distinctly universal beginnings. The latter would be received in great confusion and stupefaction by the student if he was not led by the hand to them.
Three universal signs that the confused is more known to us than the distinct can be pointed out in all the above. First, men are more sure of the confused than the distinct. I am more sure that I am drinking dry red wine than Pinot Noir. Second, men agree more about the confused than the distinct. And three, men are more apt to be deceived in trying to be distinct than remaining in the confused.
SOME CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFUSED COMING BEFORE THE DISTINCT
Many mistakes are possible before one has a distinct knowledge. Before we distinguish the senses of a word or distinguish between the as such and what happens or between what is so simply and what is so in some respect, we can fall into three kinds of mistake studied in the book On Sophistical Refutations of Aristotle. Seeing the likeness of things, but not their difference is a confused knowledge and such knowledge comes before countless mistakes.
Reason has difficulty in separating or distinguishing things that are not separated in our experience. This is only one of the ways in which reason depends upon the senses for going from a confused knowledge to a distinct knowledge. Reason needs to travel before we can separate the natural from the customary. Change is necessary to separate matter from form. Many singulars before the universal from the singular and so on. We separate surface form color because we know surface without color by touch. This shows the weakness of reason.
We can also direct ourselves by a confused knowledge towards a distinct knowledge. By knowing in general what I want to know, for example the number of students in class, I can direct myself to knowing distinctly the number by counting. And by knowing in a confused way what something is, I can direct myself by one of the roads to definition to a distinct knowledge of the same.
Opposition plays a very essential role in going from the confused to the distinct. We distinguish by opposites in dividing and the "square of opposition" is necessary for grasping statements distinctly. Opposite arguments in dialectic and rhetoric also help us to see distinctions. Untying the knot produced by opposite arguments is often the discovery of some distinction. And in general "opposites laid along side each other, shine forth more"; so we see them more distinctly.
The order of confused and distinct knowledge in man
The order of confused and distinct knowledge in man can be summarized in five statements:
1. We know things in a confused way before we now them in a distinct way.
2. We are more sure of the confused than the distinct.
3. We can know things in confused way without knowing them in a distinct way, but we cannot know them in a distinct way without knowing them in a confused way. Hence, confused knowledge is not replaced by distinct knowledge.
4. Distinct knowledge is a continuation and completion of confused knowledge as regards the object known, but not as regards the certitude with which it is known.
5. Distinct knowledge depends upon confused knowledge, but distinct knowledge cannot be deduced from confused knowledge.
All men would agree that confused knowledge comes in time before distinct knowledge.
But not all men would agree that the confused is more certain than the distinct. Descartes identifies certitude with the clear and distinct in his Discourse on Method..
Again, not all men would agree in whole with the third statement. They would have to agree that the confused knowledge can be without the distinct since they agree that it is before distinct knowledge in time. But some think that distinct knowledge replaces confused knowledge. Perhaps this is a result of a false imagination which likens the becoming distinct of knowledge to that of matter begin formed more fully or to the dispersal of the cloud by the sun.
But if the confused is more sure than the distinct, as is said in the second statement, then distinct knowledge would not replace it. For a more certain and stable knowledge is not replaced by a less certain or uncertain and changing science.
And if (as is said in statement n. 3), confused knowledge can be without distinct knowledge, but not vice-versa, then distinct knowledge cannot replace confused knowledge.
The main causes why men deny that confused knowledge is more sure than distinct knowledge are a misunderstanding of the words and a confusion of the determination of the object as known with the determination of reason in judgment.
The word confused comes from the Latin word meaning poured together. Aristotle in the beginning of the first book of Natural Hearing (the incompletely translettered Physics) uses the Greek word for poured together. The word confused is like our word mixed-up which indicates disorder in reason and a mistake or close to a mistake in reason. To say you are mixed-up is almost the same as saying you are mistaken. The confused in this sense does not always come before a distinct knowledge. We are not always mistaken before we know. This is perhaps the first sense or meaning of confused when said of reason. But confused also has a second sense which means indistinct. When I say that the dog is an animal, animal does not distinguish between dog and cat. But it is one thing to grasp only what is common to dog and cat without distinguishing between them and another thing to say a dog is a cat. The latter is a mistake, but the former, indistinct or confused knowledge. The man who confuses these two senses of confused can easily think that the confused is less sure than the distinct. How could we be more sure where we are mistaken or close to being mistaken? (The same could be said of vague as a synonym for confused. Vague comes from the Latin for wandering just as does the word error.)
Again, since judgment is a separation of the true from the false, it might seem to belong more to our distinct knowledge where things are more separated than to our confused knowledge where they are mixed-up. And the use of the same word in Greek and Latin and English for sure and distinct or precise seems to witness to this. Consider the Greek words σαφης, σαφες, and δῆλος
The small Liddell and Scott Greek dictionary gives the following meanings:
σαφης, σαφες - clear, distinct, plain, sure, certain
δῆλος - 1. visible, clear 2. manifest, evident, certain
And the word Aristotle often uses for certain ακριβης, ακριβες has also the meanings of exact, accurate, precise, perfect.
Consider also the Latin words certus and clarus. One Latin dictionary gives the following meanings:
certus - 1. separated 2. certain, definite..determined
from cerno - 1. to separate, sift 2. to distinguish 3. to decide, determine
clarus - 1. clear, bright, shining, brilliant 2. clear, evident, plain 3. illustrious, distinguished
Like the Latin word clarus, the English word clear can mean distinct or certain. What is unclear, misty, cloudy or obscure cannot be seen or seen well. We lack evidence for such things, but it is only the evident which is certain for us.
One could also come to the conclusion that the precise, determined, clear and distinct is more certain than the vague and confused from a consideration of the diverse certitude of the sciences. The mathematical sciences are more certain than natural science, and natural science is more certain than political science. But the subject of mathematics would seem to be more determined, precise, clear and distinct than the subject of natural science which involves matter and change. And the subject of natural science would seem to be more determined than that of political science for nature is more determined than custom and choice. Indeed weaker reasoning is found in subjects which have less certitude in themselves. In I Posteriorum Analyticorum, Lectio 1, n. 12:
in rhetoricis..persuasio fit per enthymema aut per exemplum: non autem per syllogismum vel inductionem completam, propter incertitudinem materiae circa quam versatur, scilicet circa actus singulares hominum, in quibus universales propositiones non possunt assumi vere.
Descartes seems to have been influenced by a third figure enthymeme (ironically).
Mathematics is more certain (than the other sciences) Mathematics is more clear and distinct (than the other sciences) Hence, the more clear and dsitinct is more certain.
Concerning the word confused, it should be noted first that we name things as we know them. Since ability is known through its act, it is sometime named from its act or from something more actual than it. For example, the ability to sense is sometimes given the same name as its act: "he sees" can mean the act or the ability. The second case can be seen in the senses of the word in. The first meaning of this word involves the actuality of that which is in another. If I am in the room, I actually exist and actually exist in the room. But later the word in is said of things that do not actually exist; as when it is said that something is in my power or that there are many forms in the ability of matter. Anaxagoras, when trying to state how all things were in matter, spoke of the mixture of all things. The word mixture seems to indicate actually existing things, but chairs and tables do not actually exist in the trees in the forest. However, if we listen to what Anaxagoras was trying to say, we can see that he was trying to understand how all things were in matter. By making the things mixed be infinitely small so that nothing was distinct, he made them as little actual and distinct as possible. But it is difficult to find a word that does not signify some actuality, at least in its first meaning. However, some words are better than others. Composed or put together would not be a good choice because it signifies that the things composed are actual and distinctly placed in that which they compose. Mixed-up is better because there is no order (which presupposes distinction), the things mixed-up are not deliberately placed or fixed in reference to each other. But confused or poured-together is even better since liquids have no fixed shapes or positions and mix more completely so that the eye cannot distinguish them. (We can also note how that the word difference comes from the words to carry apart, as if the first difference of things for us was to be here or there.) Of course, species are not poured together to form the genus (as Locke seems to think). Scalene, isosceles and equilateral triangles are not pressed together or melted together to form the genus triangle. Yet the genus does contain the species without actually containing their differences (which nevertheless are determinations of the determinable in the definition of triangle). When we think that confused means mistaken, we are taking an earlier meaning of confused where the two things confused are actually somewhat distinct on our knowledge. To make the mistake of thinking a cat is a dog requires that in some imperfect way they are distinct in my knowledge; otherwise we would be saying that an animal is an animal which is no mistake. The word vague in its Latin origin means wandering, roaming, unsettled, vagrant. A vague person is a vagrant with no settled home, but is now here and then there. But a genus is not vague in the sense that it is now one species and now another.
Judgment is the separation of the true from the false by some beginning in our knowlege. Such a separation is certain. This does not mean, however, that our judgment of the more separated or distinct is more certain. The certitude of judgment involves the complete determination of reason to one half of a contradiction. But the judgment the every whole is greater than one of its parts is the true half of a contradiction is more determined than the judgment that every atom is more than a proton.
As regards the objection from the same word meaning both distinct and certain, it is necessary to distinguish between the determination of the object and the determination of reason to one half of a contradiction.
When one says that a chair is wooden, one leaves undetermined the particular kind of wood out of which it is made. But one's reason might be more determined to say it is wooden (rather than not wooden) and less or not at all determined that it is or is not maple wood.
As regards the argument from the sciences, one should not confuse the diverse certitude which comes from the matters of the sciences with that which comes from our reason going from ability to act. Even though we can know numbers with more certitude than nations, we are still more sure that 28 is a number than a perfect number.
SOME TEXTS FROM ARISTOTLE ON CERTITUDE IN OUR KNOWLEDGE
On The Soul, Book 1, Chapter 1, beginning at 402A:
τῶν καλῶν καὶ τιμίων τὴν ἔιδησιν ὑπολαμβανοντες, μαλλον δ’ ἑτερον ἑτέρας \ kat' ἀκριβειαν \ t? βελτιόνων τε καὶ θαυμασιωτέρων einai, di' ἀμφότερα ταῦτα τὴν της ψυχῆς ἱστοριαν ἐυλόγως ἄν εν πρώτοις τιθείημεν
Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, Chapter 3 - 1094B 11seq.:
λέγοιτο δ’ ἄν ἱκανῶς ἔι κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην διασαφηθείη· Τὸ γὰρ ἀκριβὲς ὀυχ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς λόγοις ἐπιζητητέον, ὥσπερ ὀυδ’ εν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις· τὰ δε καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια...πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην
Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, Chapter 3 - 1094B 23seq.:
pepaideuménou gar ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τ’ακριβες επιζητεῖν καθ’ ἕκαστον γένος, ἐφ’ ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πραγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται· Παραπλησιον γάρ φαίνεται μαθηματικοῦ τε πιθανολογουντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικόν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν.
Posterior Analytics, Book I, Chapter 27, 87A 31 seq.:
Ἀκριβεστέρα δ’επιστήμη ἐπιστήμης καὶ προτέρα ἥ τε τοῦ ὅτι καὶ διότι ἡ ἀυτή, ἀλλὰ μὴ χωρὶς τοῦ ὅτι τῆς τοῦ διότι, καὶ ἡ μὴ καθ’ ὕποκειμένου τῆς καθ’ ὕποκειμένου οιον αριθμητικὴ ἁρμονικῆς καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων τῆς ἐκ προθέσεως οιον γεωμετρίας ἀριθμητική
Physics, Book I, Chapter 1, 184A 16 seq.:
πέφυκε δὲ ἐκ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ημῖν ἡ ὁδὸς καὶ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτα ἡμῖν τε γνώριμα καὶ ἁπλῶς. διόπερ ανάγκη τόν τρόπον τοῦτον προάγειν ἐκ τῶν ασαφεστέρων μὲν τῇ φυσει ἡμῖν δὲ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τα σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα. ἔστι δ’ ἡμῖν τὸ πρῶτον δῆλα καὶ σαφῆ τὰ συγκεχυμένα μᾶλλον· ὕστερον δ’ ἐχ τούτων γίγνεται γνωριμα τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ ἁι ἀρχαὶ διαιροῦσι ταῦτα.
Nicomachean Ethics, Book One, 1098a 21-26):
Περιγεγράφθω μὲν οὖν τἀγαθὸν ταύτῃ· δεῖ γὰρ ἴσως ὑποτυπῶσαι πρῶτον, εἶθ’ ὕστερον ἀναγράψαι.δόξειε δ’ ἂν παντὸς εἶναι προαγαγεῖν καὶ διαρθρῶσαι τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα τῇ περιγραφῇ, καὶ ὁ χρόνος τῶν τοιούτων εὑρετὴς ἢ συνεργὸς εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν γεγόνασιν αἱ ἐπιδόσεις· παντὸς γὰρ προσθεῖναι τὸ ἐλλεῖπον.
A line has been drawn around the good in this way. It is perhaps necessary to sketch first and then afterwards to fill it out. It would seem to belong to everyone to bring forward and to distinguish what is well done in outline. And time is a finder and co-worker of such things. Whence also came about the advances of the arts.; everyone adding what was lacking.
Metaphysics, Book II, Chapter 3, 995A 8:
καὶ ὁι δὲ μὲν πάντα ἀκριβῶς, τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ τὸ ἀκριβὲς \ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι συνείρειν \ διὰ τὴν μικρολογίαν· ἔχει γάρ τι τό ἀκριβὲς τοιοῦτον, ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπι τῶν συμβουλαίων, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἀνελεύθερον einai tisi δοκεῖ. διο δεῖ πεπαιδευσθαι πῶς ἕκαστα ἀποδεκτεον, ως ἄτοπον ἅμα ζητεῖν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τρόπον ἐπιστήμης. ἔστι δ’ οὐδὲ θατερον ῥαδιον λαβεῖν. τὴν δ’ἀκριβολογιαν τὴν μαθηματικὴν ὀυκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἀπαιτητέον, αλλ’ ἐν τοίς μὴ ἐχουσιν ὕλην. διόπερ οὐ φυσικὸς ὁ τρόπος.
THE ORDER OF KNOWLEDGE BASED ON COMMON EXPERIENCE & KNOWLEDGE BASED ON PRIVATE EXPERIENCE
By common experience is meant a universal and necessary experience, an experience which all men have and cannot avoid having; such as the experience of whole and part, of motion and rest, of place and time, of good and bad, of pleasure and pain, of choice and so on.
By private experience is mean the experience which only some men have. Such experience may require some special effort that all men do not make such as the experience gained by prolonged observation of an animal in his natural habitat, the experience gained by anatomy or by performing experiments in a lab; the experience gained of government from a prolonged study of history.
The order of knowledge based on common experience and knowledge based on private experience can be summarized in five statements:
1. Knowledge based on common experience comes before knowledge based on private experience.
2. Knowledge based on common experience is more sure than knowledge based on private experience.
3. Knowledge based on common experience is not replaced by knowledge based on private experience.
4. Knowledge based on private experience is a continuation of knowledge based on common experience, even though there are important differences in the roads they follow.
5. Knowledge based on private experience depends in some way upon knowledge based on common experience although one cannot deduce the former from the latter.
All of the above statements follow from the natural road in human knowledge in which confused knowledge is before distinct knowledge and general, before particular. For knowledge based on common experience is to knowledge based on private experience as the general is to the particular. Hence, the statements about our confused and distinct knowledge can all be applied to knowledge based on common experience and knowledge based on private experience.
There are several reasons why people are ignorant of and even deny some of the above statements. We shall now give some of these reasons which are in addition to those given above in our consideration of the order of confused and distinct knowledge.
When we say that confused and general knowledge come before distinct and particular knowledge, or that our knowledge goes from confused to distinct, many understand these words (before & after, from & to) only in their first sense, both of which imply the non-existence of the former at the end of this going. The past no longer is when the present is here or the future comes. When one goes from here to there, one is no longer here. When a body goes from cold to hot, it is no longer cold.
But before is used in its second sense or in its third sense like the second. And from is used in like manner. The second sense of before is in being. One is before two because one can be without two, but two cannot be without one. Likewise, one can know what a square is without knowing what a cube is, but the reverse is impossible. When one goes from premisses to conclusions, one does not give up the premisses. Indeed the perfection of such reasoning is when the conclusions are seen in the premisses. Confused knowledge is before distinct knowledge in the second sense of before and in the third sense as well as the first. Those whose knowledge of before stops on the first sense are easily deceived about the order of confused and distinct knowledge, of general and particular knowledge, and of knowledge based on common experience and knowledge based on private experience.
Another reason why people reject knowledge based on common experience is the confusion between two kinds of universal. Universal may refer to what is said of many or to what is a cause of many. What is universal in the first sense comes before in our knowledge and what is universal in the second sense comes after. Aristotle talks about the first in the beginning of the first book of Natural Hearing and praises Democritus about the second in the book On Generation and Corruption. Francis Bacon confused these two in the beginning of modern thought and this confusion runs right through modern thought to Hegel and beyond.
Another reason why some reject the knowledge based on common experience is because they think particular knowledge is deduced from it. If the particular is mistaken, they then think the general is mistaken. This is a serious mistake. Sometimes too the particular is confused with the general by accident, as when an example is taken from the particular to illustrate the general and the example turns out to be mistaken.