Contradiction-growth

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Contradiction-growth

Wisdom about Beginnings · 1st Axiom about Things

From his file: CONTRADICTION-GROWTH.doc.

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If we take what are perhaps the three most important mistakes for philosophy (the first in speech and the first and second outside speech or in things), underlying these contradictions are the three fundamental kinds of distinction. Each mistake is the result of not seeing some distinction. The unraveling of each of these mistakes is the discovery of the distinction hidden underneath it. Under one is the distinction of the senses of a word. Under another is the distinction of the as such and what happens. And under the third can be found the distinction of what is so simply and what is so not simply, but in some qualified and imperfect way. Meno's sophistical objection leads to the discovery of the distinction underlying all investigation of the unknown by the known. The ability to distinguish the senses of a word and the ability to distinguish the as such and the accidental and the ability to distinguish what is so simply and what is so only in some imperfect and qualified way enable reason to get to the beginnings of reasoned out knowledge. Here we can join the end of our investigation to the beginning. We said before that distinction is before division in the strict sense of the separation of the parts of some whole. Every division is a distinction of the parts of some whole, but not every distinction is a division. The three most common and important distinctions that are not divisions of a whole into its parts correspond to the three kinds of mistake just considered in the last paragraph. All philosophy, all reasoned out knowledge, rests upon these three kinds of distinction. This can be made more known by looking art what is common to all things and by looking at the roads underlying all knowledge. What is common to all and said of all is distinguished in these three ways as can be seen in the distinctions of one and being in Book Five or D of the Metaphysics.[1] This is the book in which Aristotle distinguishes in order the senses of the words naming what is studied in wisdom. These are also the words used in the statements known through themselves by all. And they are used everywhere because of their universality. Further, both one and being are distinguished into by itself or through itself and by accident or happening. And when being through itself is distinguished into substance and accident or into act and potency, we find the distinction between what is so simply and what is so in some diminished imperfect way. This third kind of distinction (between what is so simply and what is so in some diminished imperfect way) is in all knowledge of the roads and ways of going forward in our knowledge. When considering the first road in our knowledge, it is necessary to distinguish between what is more known simply and what is more known to us.[2] When considering the private road of a reasoned out knowledge, it is necessary to distinguish between what is the best simply and what is best in a given matter.[3] When speaking of the common road of reasoned out knowledge, it is necessary to see the distinction underlying the sophistical argument of Meno.[4] In general, since every reasoned out knowledge is about the as such, it is necessary to see this distinction in every form of reasoned out knowledge. Whoever, for example, considers the first book of Aristotle's Physics with the exposition of Thomas Aquinas will be surprised as to how many of these three kinds of distinction (and especially that between the as such and the accidental) are necessary to find under contradictions before one can see clearly the beginnings of the subject. One can object sophistically even to obvious things such as that change exists or a whole is always larger than one of its parts. But even here there are distinctions underlying these apparent contradictions, distinctions which not everybody sees and which were not seen clearly by anyone until after these apparent contradictions had been brought out. If then the apparent contradictions brought out by the sophist even about obvious things lead to the discovery of distinctions unknown before, how much more will contradictions arising from the probable opinions of men lead to the discovery of the unknown. Almost the whole of wisdom seems to lie under the contradictions brought out in the third book (or Book B) of the Metaphysics. But elsewhere the dialectic is particular and under each particular contradiction lies a truth waiting to be discovered and/or clarified.

The Philosopher and the Philomuthos

We can see from the above another reason why the philomuthos is in some way a philosopher, as Aristotle said in his proemium to wisdom.[5] The reason given there was that the μυθος is composed of wonderful things and wonder is the beginning of philosophy. The Greek word μυθος can mean (1) myth, (2) more generally, story and (3) precisely, plot. In this third sense, we can say that the lover of plots is in some way a philosopher. For as Aristotle teaches us in the Poetics, the plot is composed of a tying up and an untying[6] or a twining (twisting) and unraveling.[7] This is like Aristotle's words in the beginning of the third book of the Metaphysics where he compares reason's state in dialectic to being tied up and the subsequent discovery to the untying of the mind. But in this comparison, we should also remember what Aristotle points out about poets: many tie up well, but untie badly.[8] It takes a master poet to untie well. How much more is this true in philosophy? Lesser minds can easily tie themselves or others into knots, but it takes an Aristotle or a Thomas to untie the difficult knots.

----------------------- [1] Metaphysics, D, 1051b 17 - 1017b 9 [2] Physics, A, 184a 16 - 21 [3] Metaphysics, A Ellaton, 995a 14-20 [4] See, for example, the Posterior Analytics, A, 71a 24 - 71b 9 [5] Metaphysics, A, 982b 18-19: "= φιλόμυθος φιλόσοφος πώς ἐστιν" [6] Poetics, Chapter 18, 1455b 24: "'´Esti δὲ πάσης τραγῳδίας τὸ μὲν δέσις τὸ δὲ λύσις" [7] Poetics, Chapter 18, 1456a 7-9: "δίκαιον δὲ καὶ τραγῳδίαν ἄλλην καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν λέγειν οὐδενὶ ὡς τῷ μύθῳ· τοῦτο δέ, ὧν ἡ αὐτὴ πλοκὴ καὶ λύσις." [8] Poetics, Chapter 18, 1456a 9-10: "Πολλοὶ δὲ πλέξαντες εὖ λύουσι κακῶς:"