Customs of the Modern World

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Customs of the Modern World

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CUSTOMS OF THE MODERN WORLD

THE COMMERCIAL ORIGIN OF THE MODERN CITY

William McNeil, The Rise of the West, a History of the Human Community (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1964), Pt. I, Ch. V, C, “The Formulation of Greek Civilization”, p. 196:

Noble families active in government tended to take up residence near the seat of administration, which thus gradually assumed the character of a town. Such a center, normally chosen for its defensive strength, also attracted artisans and merchants, though these groups were at first of little importance. Town life was therefore originally aristocratic, not mercantile or industrial. This fact gave an enduring stamp to Greek city life. Even in the most active commercial and industrial centers of later centuries, the aristocratic ideal of public and private life was never effectively challenged.

This distinguished Greek cities from the towns which arose in northern Europe during the high Middle Ages. The social leaders and magistrates of medieval towns were merchants who developed an ethos that stood in more of less conscious opposition to the ideals of the landed aristocracy. Since the higher manifestations of culture were in ancient as in more recent times largely the product of the town populations, this difference in the original character of ancient as against modern towns subtly but profoundly colored the whole civilization of the two eras. Industriousness, for example, was never a virtue in Greek or Roman eyes; and artisan trades always carried a certain taint of indignity.

William McNeil, The Rise of the West, a History of the Human Community (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1964), Pt. II, Ch. IX, C, pp. 452-456:

...it was precisely in the ninth and tenth centuries, when north-western Europe was most cruelly harried by Viking and Magyar raids, that the type of agriculture known as ‘manorial’ achieved the technical basis that soon made it possible for European peasants to produce a considerable grain surplus on lands that had lain waste in earlier ages. The solid occupation of the north European plain by peasant farmers was thereby assured; and medieval Europe attained an agricultural base broad enough to sustain both a numerous military aristocracy and a vigorous town life. The conquest of the northern European plain, together with the conquest of the northern seas, laid the economic basis for the rise of northwestern Europe to a level of wealth, power and culture surpassing that of the older Mediterranean centers of civilization. The northward shift of the political and cultural center in the West thus proved not a passing accident of the political geography of the seventh to the tenth centuries, but a permanent feature of European society.

The military advance of northwestern Europe in the ninth and tenth centuries depended directly upon the agricultural surplus which the newly developed manorial system made possible. For it was the dues and rents collected from the peasants that supported the rise of a formidable class of professional fighting men, equipped and trained for battle according to the best technical models of the time; i.e., as heavy-armed cavalrymen...When a hard crust of professional knights formed atop the agricultural community of north-western Europe, raiders and pirates soon lost their accustomed easy superiority...Obviously enough, piracy rapidly lost its charm when the intended victims developed means to resist or even overcome the attacker. But when it was no longer safe to seize valuables by main force, trade offered an alternative way of getting possession of foreign goods formerly acquired through piracy. Oscillation between raiding and trading has certainly occurred repeatedly in history and was all the easier because even successful pirates seldom got the right assortment of booty for their own use and normally found it convenient to trade booty surpluses for such essentials as weapons or food.

Hence with the development of an effective local self-defense in western Europe, pirate ships and raiding parties predictably gave way to merchant shipping and pack trains. The important point here is the continuity of ethos between the piratical raider of the ninth and European merchant of the tenth centuries. Undoubtedly, pirate-traders often shifted from one role to the other as local circumstances suggested; but even when trading became prudent in more and more circumstances, bands of itinerant merchants still expected, like their piratical predecessors, to manage their own affairs and look after their own defense. They also tended to treat peasants and lords of the land as strangers - potential victims of sharp practice, if no longer often of the sword. Eventually, such merchant communities began to establish themselves permanently at some convenient location - often near a bishop’s seat or, more rarely, under the walls of an abbey or feudal castle. From such nuclei, the towns of northern Europe took form. The growth of towns occurred mainly after 1000; but the central and essential psychological and institutional forms of north European urban life were shaped in the chaotic age when piracy transformed itself into trade.

In Byzantium, the Middle East, India, and China, the ethos of the townspeople contrasted fundamentally with that of the reformed pirates of northwestern Europe. Merchants and artisans of the other civilizations of Eurasia were primarily caterers to the tastes of their social superiors: officials, landlords, rulers. They were accustomed to regulation and taxation from above; in return they relied upon the political authorities for protection. The aggressive, ruthless, and self-reliant ethos of western European merchants was profoundly different. The distinctive characteristics of subsequent Western history arise largely from this fact; for in Europe, as elsewhere in the civilized world, towns became the principal centers and sustainers of high culture once the brute problems of economic and military survival had been solved.

THE MATHEMATICAL UNION OF NATURAL AND TECHNICAL SCIENCE

Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, Harper & Brothers, 1958:

In considering the process of expansion of modern physics, it would certainly not be possible to separate it from the general expansion of natural science, of industry and engineering, of medicine, etc., that is, quite generally of modern civilization in all parts of the world. Modern physics is just one link in a long chain of events that started from the work of Bacon, Galileo and Kepler and from the practical application of natural science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The connection between natural science and technical science has from the beginning been that of mutual assistance: the progress in technical science, the improvement of the tools, the invention of new technical devices have provided the basis for more, and more accurate, empirical knowledge of nature and finally the mathematical formulation of natural laws have opened the way to new applications of this knowledge in technical science. (p. 188)

At the same time, the human attitude toward nature changed from a contemplative one to the pragmatic one. One was not so much interested in nature as it is; one rather asked what one could do with it. Therefore, natural science turned into technical science; every advancement of knowledge was connected with the question as to what practical use could be derived from it. This was true not only in physics; in chemistry and biology the attitude was essentially the same, and the success of the new methods in medicine or in agriculture contributed essentially to the propagation of the new tendencies. (pp. 196-197)

Werner Heisenberg. The Physicist’s Conception of Nature, Hutchinson & Co., 1958:

It has become clear that the desired objective reality of the elementary particles is to crude an oversimplification of what really happens...For if we wish to form a picture of the nature of these elementary particles, we can no longer ignore the physical processes through which we obtain our knowledge of them. While in observing everyday objects, the physical process involved in making the observation plays a subsidiary role only, in the case of the smallest building particles of matter, every process of observation produces a large disturbance. We can no longer speak of the behaviour of the particle independently of the process of observation...The atomic physicist has had to resign himself to the fact that his science is but a link in the infinite chain of man’s argument with nature, and that it cannot simply speak of nature ‘in itself’. Science always presupposes the existence of man and as Bohr has said, we must become conscious of the fact that we are not merely observers but also actors on the stage of life. (pp. 14-16)

Science no longer confronts nature as an objective observer, but sees itself as an actor in this interplay between man and nature. The scientific method of analysing, explaining and classifying has become conscious of its limitations, which arise out of the fact that by its intervention science alters and refashions the object of investigation. (p. 29)

Werner Heisenberg, Gifford Lectures, Physics and Philosophy, Harper, 1958, p. 149:

Since the time of Galileo,the fundamental method of natural science had been the experiment. This method made it possible to pass from general experience to specific experience, to single out characteristic events in nature from which its “laws” could be studied more directly than from general experience. If one wanted to study the structure of matter, one had to do experiments with matter. One had to expose matter to extreme conditions in order to study its transmutations there, in the hope of finding the fundamental features of matter which persist under all apparent changes.

C.F.V. Weizsacker, The World View of Physics, University of Chicago Press, 1952, p. 199:

The thinking of our science proves itself only in action, in the successful experiment. To experiment means to exert power upon nature. The possession of power is then the ultimate proof of the correctness of scientific thought.

The limits of the applicability of certain concepts or laws appear to us only in the form of the impracticability of certain experiments - for instance, the determination of an absolute speed - or in the form of the mutual incompatibility of position and impulse in an electron. Concepts like relativity, complementarity, and invariance under transformation groups take account even in abstract theory of this operative character of our science.

Exponents of an older ideal of science are often surprised at the seeming naivete with which we "confuse" the non-demonstrability of a situation with its non-existence. In truth, our science has merely adapted its conceptual form by one more degree to the fact, existing since Galileo, that its ultimate criterion of truth is the experiment. We have only to inquire rigorously whether an experiment is impracticable for us because of inadequate technical means or ideas or for every and any experimenter because it conflicts with a positive law of nature.

C.F.V. Weizsacker, The History of Nature, University of Chicago Press, 1959, p. 71:

But as we try to penetrate to the last foundations of nature in the infinitely small, or to her outermost borders in the infinitely distant, we grow aware that our plain picture of the world was only an aspect of the immediate background.

In those remotest reaches of nature, only that is still comprehensible to us which is of our making or which, at least, could be of our making

It has become clearer than ever before that knowledge and power belong together.

We have to give up forming concepts about objects which cannot become the objects of a subject, at least in principle.

Pragmatic science has the view of nature that is fitting for a technical age.

THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONS & THE SOCIAL CONDITION OF EQUALITY

Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Volume I, Author’s Introduction, Vintage Books, p. 3:

Among the novel objects that attracted my attention during my stay in the United States, nothing struck me more forcibly than he general equality of condition among the people. I readily discovered the prodigious influence that this primary fact exercises on the whole course of society; it gives a peculiar direction to public opinion and a peculiar tenor to the laws; it imparts new maxims to the governing authorities and peculiar habits to the governed.

I soon perceived that the influence of this fact extends far beyond the political character and the laws of the country, and that it has no less effect on civil society than on the government; it creates opinion, gives birth to new sentiments, founds novel customs, and modifies whatever it does not produce. The more I advanced in the study of American Society, the more I perceived that this equality of condition is the fundamental fact from which all others seemed to be derived and the central point at which all my observations terminated.

I then turned my thoughts to our own hemisphere, and thought that I discerned there something analogous to the spectacle which the New World presented to me. I observed that the equality of condition, though it had not reached the extreme limit which it seems to have attained in the United States is constantly approaching it; and that the democracy which governs the American communities appears to be rapidly rising into power in Europe.

Hence I conceived the idea of the book that is now before the reader.

It is evident to all that a great democratic revolution is going on among us, but all do not look at it in the same light. To some it appears to be novel but accidental, and, as such, they hope it may still be checked; to others it seems irresistible, because it is the most uniform, the most ancient, and the most permanent tendency that is to be found in history.

Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Volume II, First Book, Chapter Ten, “Why the Americans are More Addicted to Practical than to Theoretical Science, Vintage Books, Vol. II, pp. 43-47:

In America, the purely practical part of science is admirably understood, and careful attention is paid to the theoretical portion which is immediately requisite to application. On this head, the Americans always display a clear, free, original, and inventive power of mind. But hardly anyone in the United States devotes himself to the essentially theoretical and abstract portion of human knowledge. In this respect the Americans carry to an excess a tendency that is, I think, discernible, though in a less degree, among all democratic nations.

Nothing is more necessary to the culture of the higher sciences or of the more elevated departments of science than meditation; and nothing is less suited to meditation than the structure of democratic society. We do not find there, as among an aristocratic people, one class that keeps quiet because it is well off; and another that does not venture to stir because it despairs of improving its condition. Everyone is in motion, some in quest of power, others of gain. In the midst of this universal tumult, this incessant conflict of jarring interests, this continual striving of men after fortune, where is that calm to be found which is necessary for the deeper combinations of the intellect? How can the mind dwell upon any single point when everything whirls around it, and man himself is swept and beaten onwards by the heady course that rolls all things in its course?.....

Men who live in democratic communities not only seldom indulge in meditation, but they naturally entertain very little esteem for it. A democratic state of society and democratic institutions keep the greater part of men in constant activity; and the habits of mind that are suited to an active life are not always suited to a contemplative one. The man of action is frequently obliged to content himself with the best he can get because he would never accomplish his purpose if he chose to carry every detail to perfection. He has occasion perpetually to rely on ideas that he has not the leisure to search to the bottom; for he is much more frequently aided by the seasonableness of an idea than by its strict accuracy; and in the long run he risks less in making use of some false principle than in spending his time in establishing all his principles on the basis of truth. The world is not led by long or learned demonstration; a rapid glance at particular incidents, the daily study of the fleeting passions of the multitude, the accidents of the moment, and the art of turning them to account decide all its affairs.

In the ages in which active life is the condition of almost everyone, men are generally led to attach an excessive value to the rapid bursts and superficial conceptions of the intellect, and on the other hand to undervalue its slower and deeper labors. This opinion of the public influences the judgment of the men who cultivate the sciences; they are persuaded that they may succeed in those pursuits without meditation, or are deterred from such pursuits as demand it....

In aristocratic societies, the class that gives the tone to opinion and has the guidance of affairs, being permanently and hereditarily placed above the multitude, naturally conceives a lofty idea of itself and of man. It loves to invent for him noble pleasures, to carve out splendid objects for his ambition. Aristocracies often commit very tyrannical and inhuman actions, but they rarely entertain groveling thoughts; and they show a kind of haughty contempt of little pleasures, even while they indulge in them. The effect is to raise greatly the pitch of society. In aristocratic ages, vast ideas are commonly entertained of the dignity, the power, and the greatness of man. These opinions exert their influence on those who cultivate the sciences as well as on the rest of the community. They facilitate the natural impulse of the mind to the highest regions of thought, and they naturally prepare it to conceive a sublime, almost a divine love of truth. Men of science at such periods are consequently carried away towards theory; and it even happens that they frequently conceive an inconsiderate contempt for practice. "Archimedes", says Plutarch, "was of so lofty a spirit that he never condescended to write any treatise on the manner of constructing these engines of war. And as he held this science of putting together engines, and all arts generally speaking which tended to any useful end in practice, to be vile, low and mercenary, he spent his talents and his studious hours in writing only of those things whose beauty and subtlety had in them no mixture of necessity". Such is the aristocratic aim of science; it cannot be the same in democratic nations.

The greater part of the men who constitute these nations are extremely eager in the pursuit of actual and physical gratification. As they are always dissatisfied with the position that they occupy and are always free to leave it, they think of nothing but the means of changing their fortune or increasing it. To minds thus predisposed, every new method that leads by a shorter road to wealth, every machine that spares labor, every instrument that diminishes the cost of production, every discovery that facilitates pleasures or augments them, seems to be the grandest effort of the human intellect. It is chiefly from these motives that a democratic people addicts itself to scientific pursuits, that it understands and respects them. In aristocratic ages science is more particularly called upon to furnish gratification to the mind; in democracies, to the body.....

If the democratic principle does not, on the one hand, induce men to cultivate science for its own sake, on the other it enormously increases the number of those who do cultivate it. Nor is it credible that among so great a multitude a speculative genius should not from time to time arise, inflamed by the love of truth alone. Such a one, we may be sure, would dive into the deepest mysteries of nature, whatever the spirit of his country and age. He requires no assistance in his course; it is enough that he is not checked in it. All that I mean to say is this: permanent inequality of condition leads men to confine themselves to the arrogant and sterile research for abstract truths, while the social conditions and the institutions of democracy prepare them to seek the immediate and useful practical results of the sciences. This tendency is natural and inevitable; it is curious to be acquainted with it, and it may be necessary to point it out.