Descartes and the Way of Proceeding in Philosophy

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Descartes and the Way of Proceeding in Philosophy

Berquist

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FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF LAVAL UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

Duane H. Berquist B.A., Ph. L.

DESCARTES AND THE WAY OF PROCEEDING IN PHILOSOPHY

Quebec April, 1964

PROPOSITIONES

1. Relatio quae est rationis tantum est duplex.

2. Dialectica et rhetorica utuntur locis.

3. Privatio est principium per accidens rerum naturalium.

4. Anima est actus primus corporis physici organici.

5. Politica est operativa ad imitationem naturae.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

PART ONE DESCARTES AND THE PROPER MODE OF PROCEEDING

Section One: Description of Descartes' Universal Method

Section Two: Dialectical Critique of Descartes' Universal Method

Section Three: An Approach to A Scientific Refutation of Descartes' Position

PART TWO DESCARTES AND ONE PART OF THE COMMON MODE OF PROCEEDING: DIALECTIC

Section One: Descartes' Rejection of Dialectic as a Result of his Method

Section Two: A Cartesian Critique of Dialectic

Section Three: Dialectical Objections Against Descartes' Position on Dialectic

Section Four: A Brief View of the Art of Dialectic

Section Five: An Answer to Descartes' Objections to Dialectic

PART THREE DESCARTES AND THE MODE OF PROCEEDING WHICH IS IN CONFORMITY WITH THE HUMAN INTELLECT

Section One: Some Elements of the Mode of Proceeding Which is in Conformity with the Human Intellect

Section Two: Descartes' Position on the Mode of Proceeding of the Human Intellect

Section Three: How Descartes' Position on the Diversity of the Sciences, their Proper Modes, and Dialectic Follow from his Position on the Mode of our Intellect

BIBLIOGRAPHY

INTRODUCTION

Either there is a determinate way of proceeding for the philosopher or there is not. But, the philosopher cannot achieve his end by chance. For he is a lover of wisdom which is the perfection of reason; and, to the extent that something is subject to reason, it is not a result of chance. Hence, unless the end of the philosopher is vain, there must be a determinate way of proceeding for him.

Moreover, wisdom is the perfection of the speculative intellect. But the end of the speculative intellect is the true as known. Truth, however, is the conformity of the intellect to things. This conformity might be arrived at by chance (although this would seem to be rare since error is infinite, truth, one), but one could hardly be said to know that conformity by chance. Hence, there must be a determinate way of proceeding for the speculative intellect or for the philosopher.

Again, art, which is in the practical intellect, has determinate ways of proceeding. But it seems more likely that the speculative intellect would have determinate ways of proceeding than that the practical intellect would have such, since the former concerns the necessary, the latter, the contingent. Hence, if art has determinate ways of proceeding, a fortiori does the speculative intellect.

Further, if the speculative intellect did not have a determinate way of proceeding, it would seem to be like prudence. But prudence can not perfect the intellect with respect to the truth as defined above; practical truth is not a conformity of the intellect to things, but to rectified appetite. Hence, it would be vain to pursue the end of the speculative intellect which seems strange since man has a natural desire for that end.

But this determinate way of proceeding is not obvious in that experience shows that different philosophers have proceeded in diverse or opposed ways. Hence, it needs to be investigated.

We propose to make a small contribution to that investigation in this thesis by examining the position of Descartes on the way of proceeding in philosophy. Although we believe that the position of Aristotle and St Thomas Aquinas on the way of proceeding is correct, we think it useful to see Descartes' opposite position. For opposites brought together light up each other; and the attempt to untie the arguments of Descartes will bring us to a fuller understanding of the true position of Aristotle and St Thomas.

Aristotle and St Thomas distinguish many ways of proceeding in regard to the individual sciences: each science has its own proper way or mode of proceeding. But, before all of these proper modes, they lay down a common mode or way of proceeding in all the sciences which is called logic. And, before logic, they place a third mode which is the way of proceeding of the human intellect. This last mode is the most universal one, extending to the whole speculative life of man, and is involved in every other mode of proceeding. It must be observed in the acquisition of logic which is universal with respect to all the sciences. In logic, we can consider the part concerning demonstration (in the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle and the parts of logic presupposed to it) which directs us in demonstrating in all the sciences although such demonstrations cannot be made until we also know the proper principles, or accept from the proper principles, of the things about which we are going to demonstrate; and the part concerning dialectic (in the Topics) which shows us how to make probable conclusions in every science and which can be used to make probable conclusions in every science. The proper mode of an individual science is universal with respect to all the conclusions of that science.

Descartes is famous for proposing another universal mode or method. He attempted to extend the proper mode of geometry (or of arithmetic) to all the sciences. This position of Descartes, dialectical objections against it, and the opposite position of Aristotle and St Thomas on the proper modes of proceeding will form the three sections of Part One of our thesis. In Part Two, we shall limit ourselves to Descartes' position on only one part of the common way of proceeding in the sciences: dialectic. After noting in section one how Descartes' rejection of dialectic arises from his position on the mathematical method, we shall give the objections that can be drawn from him against dialectic in the second section. In the third section, we shall give dialectical objections against Descartes' position. After explaining something about the nature of dialectic in the section four, we shall answer Descartes' objections against it in the fifth and last section. In the Third Part, we shall first touch upon some elements of the way of proceeding of the human intellect according to Aristotle and St Thomas. Then, in section two, we shall show how Descartes fell away from these; and, in the third and last section, we shall see how the first source of Descartes' errors about the geometrical method and dialectic is found in his position on the mode of proceeding of the human intellect.

The importance of the investigation of the ways of proceeding in philosophy falls under the more general reason for a careful consideration of principles. St Thomas gives the latter when expanding the words of Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics:

homo debet insistere ad hoc, quod singula principia pertranseat, scilicet eorum notitiam accipiendo et eis utendo, secundum quod nata sunt cognosci et studendum qualiter determinentur in hominis cognitione, ut scilicet sciat distinguere principia ab invicem et ab aliis. Cognitio enim principiorum multum adiuvat ad sequentia cognoscenda. Principium enim videtur plus esse quam dimidium totius. Quia scilicet omnia alia quae restant continentur in principiis. . .per unum principium bene intellectum et consideratum, multa fiunt manifesta eorum quae quaeruntur in scientia. (1)

The importance of a principle should be judged, not by its size, but by the things to which its power extends; for a principle is that from which other things follow. Hence, it is not difficult to see the immense importance of the ways of proceeding in philosophy. Not every principle in philosophy is a way of proceeding (e.g., the principles of the thing, even when understood, are not ways of proceeding), but every way of proceeding is a principle: the proper mode of proceeding in a particular science is a universal principle of that science. Logic is a universal principle of all the sciences. The way or mode of proceeding of the human intellect is a universal principle of the entire speculative life of man. Hence, by a careful consideration of these ways of proceeding, we will be much helped in knowing all those things to which their power extends.

Likewise, the importance of a careful consideration of a principle can be judged by the effect which follows from even a little error about that principle. St Thomas makes this point well when expanding the words of Aristotle in the De Caelo et Mundo:

qui modicum transgreditur a veritate circa principium, procedens in ulteriora fit magis longe a veritate decies millies. Et hoc ideo, quia omnia subsequentia dependent ex suis principiis. Et hoc maxime apparet in errore viarum: quia qui parum elongatur a recta via, postmodum procedens fit multum longe. . .et huius causa est, quia principium, etsi sit modicum magnitudine, est tamen magnum virtute, sicut ex modico semine producitur magna arbor: et inde est quod illud quod est modicum in principio, in fine multiplicatur, quia pertingit ad totum id ad quod se extendit virtus principii, sive hoc sit verum sive falsum. (2)

Thus, a little error about the proper mode of proceeding in a science will have a bad effect all through that science. An error about logic will be even more serious since it will be multiplied without limit through all the sciences that are, or will be discovered. And an error about the mode of proceeding of the human intellect will be the most serious since it will have a bad effect on the whole of man's speculative life.

Descartes, whose position we are to investigate, also warns us about the danger of an error in regard to principles, using an example similar to that above:

. . .just as in travelling while we turn our backs on the place to which we desire to go, the longer and quicker we walk, the further we recede from the place we are making for. . .so when our principles are bad, the more we cultivate them and the more carefully we apply ourselves to derive from them various consequences, thinking that we are philosophising very well, the further we are moving from the knowledge of the truth and from wisdom. (3)

And in his Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Descartes is most strong about the importance of method:

. . .it were far better never to think of investigating the truth at all, than to do so without a method. For it is very certain that unregulated inquiries and confused reflections. . .only confound the natural light and blind our mental powers. (4)

Another reason for a careful consideration of the ways of proceeding in philosophy is to help us avoid error which is the customary condition of the human mind:

deceptio videtur esse magis propria animalibus quam cognitio secundum conditionem suae naturae. Videmus enim quod homines ex seipsis decipi possunt et errare. Ad hoc autem quod veritatem cognoscant, oportet quod ab aliis doceantur. Et iterum pluri tempore anima est in deceptione quam in cognitione veritatis; quia ad cognitionem veritatis vix pervenitur post studium longi temporis. (5)

We begin to understand the seriousness of this condition of the human mind when we realize that it (our mind) can even make errors about the ways of proceeding. Man often makes errors about the main tools for helping him avoid errors. And this brings us to the last part of our introduction: the difficulty of investigating the ways of proceeding.

What way of proceeding should be observed in investigating the ways of proceeding in philosophy? If we should investigate without any determinate way of proceeding, or by taking anyone at random that occurs to us, would we not leave to chance the investigation of such important principles? If this is unacceptable, must we first investigate what way of proceeding we should use in our investigation? But this would involve us in an infinite regress since one could say that this prior investigation should not be left to chance; so we should have to investigate the way of proceeding in it and so on ad infinitum.

Must not, then, the first way of proceeding be left to chance? But, if this is so, would not the whole of man's speculative life be left to chance? Perhaps, someone will say that the first way of proceeding is obvious. But, how can this be true, seeing that the philosophers disagree even about the way of proceeding of the human intellect (and this mode would seem to be first)?

Moreover, if we make a dialectical investigation of these ways of proceeding, are we not put into the position of asserting what we should investigate? This would seem to be a special problem in investigating Descartes' position since he denied dialectic. Is it not unfair, then, to examine him dialectically? On the other hand, it should not escape us that, in making our investigation, we are forced to adopt some determinate way of proceeding; and a dialectical one seems the most natural one and the least objectionable. For the various ways in which different philosophers have proceeded is more known to us than the determinate way in which we should proceed. Hence, we tend to proceed from their opinions to investigate the latter. Besides, what philosopher or man can object when we proceed from his opinions?

Moreover, it might be asked which comes first: the investigation of the ways of proceeding or the investigation of the nature of the human intellect? Since the way or mode of proceeding of the human intellect is presupposed to the other modes and must be in conformity with the nature of the human intellect, it would seem that we must first investigate the human intellect. Then, we will be able to see the way of proceeding which is in conformity with it. On the other hand, to overcome the difficulty of knowing the nature of the human intellect would seem to require knowledge of the three ways of proceeding.

Again, should we begin our consideration of logic and the proper mode of proceeding in a science from our experience of thinking in general and in that science, respectively? If we do, how can we avoid the fallibility of custom as a starting-point? But, not to start from our experience of thinking seems strange.

Finally, the difficulty of our investigation is shown by the great division of thinkers today on the following alternatives: either there is a natural way of proceeding in philosophy or there is not. It seems, on the one hand, that there is no natural way of proceeding in philosophy since most philosophers have proceeded in diverse ways. If our common nature provided us with a way of proceeding, it would be obvious to all or possessed by all. All philosophers would have proceeded in the same way. Besides, how are we to determine whose way of proceeding is the natural one? This is the position of those who would reduce philosophy to a history or narration of the opinions, arguments, and connections of philosophers. On the other hand, if there were no natural way of proceeding, we would fall into the position that it makes no difference how we proceed in philosophy. But, this does not seem to be so since it is admitted (even by philosophers who have proceeded in diverse ways) that one way is better than another; and one way is better than another in that it approaches closer to the natural way. This is the position of those who think that the philosopher has something to teach as well as narrate.

PART ONE

Section One: Description of Descartes' Universal Method

The first part of this section will be concerned with Descartes' position in itself. The second part will touch upon some striking applications of that method.

The second of Descartes' Rules for the Direction of the Mind states that "Only those objects should engage our attention, to the sure and indubitable knowledge of which our mental powers seem to be adequate" since "Science in its entirety is true and evident cognition." (6) Since, however, "of all the sciences known as yet, Arithmetic and Geometry alone are free from any taint of falsity or uncertainty," it follows that "of the sciences already discovered, Arithmetic and Geometry alone are left, to which the observance of this rule reduces us." (7) From this, there follows another conclusion:

But one conclusion now emerges out of these considerations, vis. not, indeed, that Arithmetic and Geometry are the sole sciences to be studied, but only that in our search for the direct road towards truth we should busy ourselves with no object about which we cannot attain a certitude equal to that of the demonstrations of Arithmetic and Geometry. (8)

In his Discourse on Method, Descartes indicates to us how he arrived at this way of proceeding, why he thinks it is possible, and how he exercised himself in it. Descartes came to imagine that all the sciences might be similar to the reasoning he had experienced in geometry:

Those long chains of reasoning, simple and easy as they are, of which geometricians make use in order to arrive at the most difficult demonstrations, had caused me to imagine that all those things which fall under the cognizance of man might very likely be mutually related in the same fashion. (9)

Although there are many more things to be considered in the other sciences than in geometry or arithmetic; yet, once those things have been enumerated and put into the proper order, there is no more difficulty in knowing each step than there is in geometry and arithmetic:

. . .having but one truth to discover in respect to each matter, whoever succeeds in finding it knows in its regard as much as can be known. It is the same as with a child, for instance, who has been instructed in Arithmetic and had made an addition according to the rule prescribed; he may be sure of having found as regards the sum of figures given to him all that the human mind can know. For, in conclusion, the Method which teaches us to follow the true order and enumerate exactly every term in the matter under investigation contains everything which gives certainty to the rules of Arithmetic. (10)

The observations of Descartes on the manner of exercising himself in the use of his method confirm the description above:

to exercise myself in the method. . .I set aside some hours from time to time which I more especially employed in practising myself in the solution of mathematical problems according to the Method, or in the solution of other problems which though pertaining to other sciences, I was able to make almost similar to those of mathematics, by detaching from them all principles of other sciences which I found to be not sufficiently secure. (11)

Let us now describe the only two operations whereby Descartes thinks we can arrive at certain knowledge. In his Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Descartes observes that "mankind has no road towards certain knowledge open to it, save those of self-evident intuition and necessary deduction." (12) These remind one somewhat of the traditional doctrines of per se known propositions and of the syllogism. Descartes' definitions of these two operations are not entirely clear and distinct. Intuition can be defined as "the conception which an unclouded and attentive mind gives so readily and distinctly that we are wholly freed from doubt about that which we understand." (13) Deduction is defined as "necessary inference from other facts that are known with certainty." (14) Descartes' position should be summarized thus: every proposition is either self-evident or not. If it is self-evident, the knowledge of it requires nothing other than itself. If it is not self-evident, either it can be deduced necessarily from those that are, or not. If it can be, we should deduce it from the self-evident propositions with the same rigor that we deduce conclusions in geometry. If it cannot be, then we might as well ignore it for the purposes of certain knowledge. here is Descartes' summary in the letter he wrote to the translator of his The Principles of Philosophy:

we must begin with the investigation...with the Principles. It is...necessary that these Principles should have two conditions attached to them; first of all they should be so clear and evident that the mind of man cannot doubt their truth when it attentively applies itself to consider them; in the second place it is on them that the knowledge of other things depends, so that the principles can be known without these last, but the other things cannot reciprocally be known without the Principles. We must accordingly try to so deduce from these Principles the knowledge of the things that depend on them, that there shall be nothing in the whole series of the deductions made from them which shall not be perfectly manifest. (15)

Next we should recount the order which Descartes' method seeks to introduce into our thought. This order is stated in the fifth of his Rules for the Direction of the Mind:

Method consists entirely in the order and the disposition of the objects towards which our mental vision must be directed if we would find out any truth. We shall comply with it exactly if we reduce involved and obscure propositions step by step to those that are simpler, and then starting with the intuitive apprehension of all those that are absolutely simple, attempt to ascend to the knowledge of all others by precisely similar steps. (16)

This order must be established everywhere. In his Discourse on Method, Descartes speaks of his resolution "to carry on my reflections in due order, commencing with objects that were the most simple and easy to understand, in order to rise little by little, or by degrees, to knowledge of the most complex, assuming an order, even if a fictitious one, among those which do not follow a natural sequence relatively to one another." (17) And in his reply to the second set of objections to his Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes speaks of order in the following way:

order consists merely in putting forward those things first that should be known without the aid of what comes subsequently, and arranging all other matters so that their proof depends solely on what precedes them. (18)

The first part of this description of order is broad enough to contain Descartes' position on even the order of determination.

In his Discourse on Method, Descartes writes of his "seeking the true method of arriving at a knowledge of all the things of which his mind was capable." (19) As he says in the letter to Picot, this method or "road is to seek out the first causes and the true principles from which reasons may be deduced for all that which we are capable of knowing." (20) What kind of principles or causes does Descartes have in mind? They must be causes of all that is if we are going to deduce all other things from them in some way. This is how Descartes describes them:

...if we desire to philosophize seriously, and apply ourselves to the research of all the truths we are capable of knowing, we must, in the first place, rid ourselves of our prejudices, and must take great care sedulously to set aside all the opinions which we formerly accepted, until, on applying to them further examination, we discover them to be true. We should afterwards hold an orderly review of the conceptions which we have within us, and accept as true those and only those which present themselves to our apprehension as clear and distinct. In this way we shall know, first of all that we exist, inasmuch as our nature is to think, and at the same time that there is a God on whom we depend; and after having considered His attributes, we shall be in a position to inquire into the truth of all other things since God is their cause. (21)

Thus, for Descartes, the whole of philosophy is one science--something like Theology. This is the meaning of Descartes' metaphor: "philosophy as a whole is like a tree whose roots are metaphysics, whose trunk is physics, and whose branches, which issue from this trunk, are all the other sciences. These reduce themselves to three principal ones, viz. medicine, mechanics and morals." (22) This amounts to saying that all the sciences are really just one science and that they must all be studied together. This is in fact what Descartes says in his Rules for the Direction of the Mind:

. . .all the sciences are so inter-connected, that it is much easier to study them all together than to isolate one from all the others. If, therefore, anyone wishes to search out the truth of things in earnest, he ought not to select one special science; for all the sciences are conjoined with each other and interdependent. . . (23)

In the same place, Descartes observes that previous thinkers have made a mistake because in "distinguishing the sciences from one another according to their subject matter, they have imagined that they ought to be studied separately, each in isolation from all the rest. But this is certainly wrong. For since the sciences taken all together are identical with human wisdom, which always remains one and the same, however applied to different subjects. . .there is no need for minds to be confined at all within limits." (24) This is enough for the general consideration of Descartes' method. Let us turn, now, to some striking applications of it to the study of God, the human soul, and nature in general.

In his Discourse on Method, Descartes wrote that "it is at least as certain that God, who is a Being so perfect, is or exists, as any demonstration of geometry can possibly be." (25) In the fifth of the Meditations on First Philosophy, we find a very explicit identification by Descartes of the types of demonstration used in geometry and in regard to the existence of God:

It is certain that I no less find the idea of God, that is to say, the idea of a supremely perfect Being, in me, than that of any figure or number whatever it is; and I do not know any less clearly and distinctly that an actual and eternal existence pertains to this nature than I know that all that which I am able to demonstrate of some figure or number truly pertains to the nature of this figure or number, and therefore. . .the existence of God would pass with me as at least as certain as I have ever held the truths of mathematics (which concern only numbers of figures) to be. (26)

Descartes did not attempt to prove the existence of God through sensible things since he "deemed the existence of God to be much more evident than that of any sensible things." (27)

After his "doubt" about the existence of sensible things, Descartes came to recognize that he could not also doubt his own existence and that he was thinking when he doubted. Hence, being certain of his thinking, but not that he had a body (if we can believe him), Descartes wrote as follows:

From that I knew that I was a substance the whole essence or nature of which is to think, and that for its existence there is no need of place, nor does it depend on any material things; so that this "me", that is to say, the soul by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from body, and is even more easy to know than is the latter; and even if body were not, the soul would not cease to be what it is. (28)

In his Discourse on Method, Descartes speaks of seeking this same geometrical clarity in regard to nature in general:

I tried to represent it [nature] in such a way, that it seems to me that nothing in the world could be more clear or intelligible, excepting what has just been said of God and the soul. For I even went so far as to assume that there was in it none of those forms or qualities which are so debated in the Schools, nor anything at all the knowledge of which is not so natural to our minds that none could ever pretend to be ignorant of it. (29)

We might wonder how Descartes could hope to accomplish this since all natural things involve matter and the indetermination and change inseparable from matter. The answer is that for Descartes "the nature of matter or of body in its universal aspect, does not consist in its being hard, or heavy, or colored, or one that affects our senses in some other way, but solely in the fact that it is a substance extended in length, breadth and depth." (30) If the matter of natural things was identical with the abstract continuum of mathematics, much of the incertitude of natural science would disappear. Some contemporaries of Descartes criticized his physics in that he had identified the matter of natural things with this abstract continuum of mathematics. On the occasion of this objection, Descartes observed in a letter to Clerselier that "I have something substantial wherewith to console myself, inasmuch as my critics here conjoin my Physics with pure Mathematics, which it is my deepest wish my Physics should resemble." (31) This is, in fact, a principle for Descartes in the study of nature. We find it stated as the sixty-fourth principle in Part Two of his Principles of Philosophy: "I do not accept or desire any other principle in Physics than in Geometry or abstract Mathematics, because all the phenomena of nature may be explained by their means, and sure demonstration can be given of them." (32) In the third principle of the same part, we find the most amazing statement of how Descartes intends to proceed: ". . . we shall without difficulty set aside all the prejudices of the senses and in this regard rely upon our understanding alone, by reflecting carefully on the ideas implanted therein by nature." (33) It is instructive to illustrate Descartes' procedure in regard to two basic questions that he faced in natural science. The first is in regard to atoms:

We also know that there cannot be any atoms or parts of matter which are indivisible of their own nature. For however small the parts are supposed to be, yet because they are necessarily extended we are always able in thought to divide any one of them into two or more parts_ and thus we know that they are divisible. For there is nothing which we cannot divide in thought, which we do not thereby recognize to be divisible; and therefore if we judge it to be indivisible, our judgment would be contrary to the knowledge we have of the matter. (34)

We would certainly agree with Descartes that he has rendered the natural problem similar to a mathematical one. But can one assume that what is true of the abstract quantity of mathematics is also true of the quantified in nature?

Another striking example of Descartes' procedure occurs when we go in the other directions--the question of the infinity of the universe in extension:

We likewise recognize that this world, or the totality of corporeal substance, is extended without limit, because wherever we imagine a limit we are not only still able to imagine beyond that limit spaces infinitely extended, but we perceive these to be in reality such as we imagine them, that is to say that they contain in them corporeal substance indefinitely extended. For as has been already shown very fully, the idea of extension that we perceive in any space whatever is quite evidently the same as the idea of corporeal substance. (35)

Let these things be enough for the present section and let us, now, turn our attention towards a dialectical critique of Descartes' position.

Section Two: Dialectical Critique of Descartes' Universal Method

Descartes does not seem to agree with himself always. In the Rules for the Direction of the Mind, he would seem to have contradicted his own principle about seeking the certitude of arithmetic and geometry everywhere:

. . .none of the mistakes which men can make are due to faulty inference; they are caused merely by the fact that we found upon a basis of poorly comprehended experiences, or that propositions are posited which are hasty and groundless. This furnishes us with an evident explanation of the great superiority in certitude of Arithmetic and Geometry to other sciences. The former alone deal with an object so pure and uncomplicated, that they need make no assumptions at all which experience renders uncertain, but wholly consist in the rational deduction of consequences. They are on that account much the easiest and clearest of all; and possess an object such as we require, for in them it is scarcely humanly possible for anyone to err except by inadvertence. (36)

Even in regard to arithmetic and geometry, Descartes does not act as if he thought that they were equally certain. One of the reasons for his analytical, or algebraic geometry is to introduce something of the certitude of arithmetic into geometry. This agrees with what he says above since the subject of arithmetic is more "pure and uncomplicated" than that of geometry. But if geometry falls short of the certitude of arithmetic for these reasons, then also the sciences whose subjects add to, or are more complicated than, the subject of geometry are less certain than geometry. Thus natural science would be less certain than geometry, and moral science, than natural science. This is also clear because these latter two sciences depend upon experience while the mathematical sciences "need make no assumption at all which experience renders uncertain." These two criteria both touch upon the incertitude deriving from a number or multitude of things to be considered. Complication involves multiplicity, and experience is always ex multis. Hence, the more a science depends on experience, the less certain it is.

Descartes admits the necessity of experiments as one proceeds in the science of nature:

experiments...become...more necessary the more one is advanced in knowledge...the power of nature is so ample and so vast, and these principles are so simple and general, that...any particular effect...might be deduced from the principles in many different ways; and my greatest difficulty is usually to discover in which of these ways the effect does depend on them. As to that, I do not know any other plan but again to try to find experiments of such a nature that their result is not the same if it has to be explained by one of the methods, as it would be if explained by another." (37)

But such a process of argument cannot give one certitude, as is clear even from formal logic. Thus natural science declines in certitude from mathematics which has no need of experiments in any of its parts. Thus, Descartes should not state that the certitude of mathematics should be sought everywhere. Rather the certitude sought should be in accord with the subject and our capacity to know that subject, as Descartes himself seems to say, excusing himself for his way of proceeding in the experimental part of the science of nature:

But here it may be said that although I have shown how all natural things can be formed, we have no right to conclude on this account that they were produced by these causes. For just as there may be two clocks made by the same workman, which though they indicate the time equally well and are extremely in all respects similar, yet in nowise resemble one another in the composite of their wheels, so doubtless there is an infinity of different ways in which all things that we see could be formed by the great artificer...This I most freely admit, and I believe that I have done all that is required of me if the causes I have assigned are such that they correspond to all the phenomena manifested by nature (without inquiring whether it is by their means or by others that they are produced). (38)

Moreover, since an understanding of the nature of a thing is a principle of the science about that thing, and the certitude of the latter is in accord with the mode of understanding the nature (both of which Descartes seems to admit when assimilating our knowledge of God's existence to that of the properties of a figure), we cannot have a certitude equal to that of geometry in either natural science or divine science. For Descartes writes, "I pass by for the present the lion and the horse because their natures are not wholly intelligible to us." (39) This is not true of the triangle or square whose natures are wholly known to us. Nor can Descartes say that our intellect is capable of knowing the nature of God as well as that of the triangle or square:

...whenever I have said that God can be clearly and distinctly known, I have understood this to apply only to this finite cognition of ours which is proportionate to the diminutive capacity of our minds. (40)

the infinite qua infinite is in nowise comprehended. (41)

But the natures of triangle, square, etc., are well proportioned to our intellect and can be comprehended by it. Hence, we can have greater certitude about them. Likewise, Descartes cannot have a certitude about the human soul equal to that which he has about the triangle, because he does not have a clear and distinct conception of the former (for, according to Descartes, clarity and distinction make for certitude). Descartes does not seem to realize the confusion in his own notion of the human soul or mind (he cannot distinguish between the two). For he does not distinguish between the way the body and the soul are one, and the way in which the arms, legs, etc. of a man are one; and, yet, they must be distinguished since the soul is for Descartes a spiritual or incorporeal substance. Here is a sample passage taken from Descartes' reply to some objections against his Meditations:

...the hand is an incomplete substance, when taken in relation with the body of which it is a part; but regarded alone, it is a complete substance. Quite in the same way mind and body are incomplete substances viewed in relation to the man who is the unity which together they form; but, taken alone, they are complete. (42)

Moreover, although nothing prohibits a thing from being both a whole and a part in different ways (as an individual man is a whole substance, but a part of the family or state), nothing can be both a whole and a part in the same way. Descartes, however, does not manifest how the human soul is both a whole (complete) and a part (incomplete) in his opinion. Hence, Descartes cannot have certitude about the soul equal to that had about the triangle etc., whose natures are clear.

Again, the contrary opinions and doubts generated by Descartes' writings on the soul, God etc., recorded for us in the Objections to his Meditations on First Philosophy and replied to by him, sufficiently manifest, at least, the lesser certitude of these matters. We say "at least" according to the opinion of Descartes himself who wrote that, if one of two opponents had a certain argument, he should be able to convince the other:

whenever two men come to opposite decisions about the same matter, one of them at least must certainly be in the wrong, and apparently there is not even one of them who knows; for if the reasoning of the second was sound and clear, he would be able so to lay it before the other as finally to succeed in convincing his understanding also. (43)

And, in general, since doubt is opposed to certitude, it seems there is less certitude where there is more doubt. But there is more doubt about those things studied in metaphysics, natural science, and moral science than there is about the things studied in the mathematical sciences. In fact, some people, who admit the certitude of mathematics, deny that man can have any certitude in the three former sciences.

Again, because the subject of natural science is with motion, Heraclitus thought that no science could be had about it. And, since the subject of moral science is so contingent and variable, many men think that morality exists merely by convention. And, because the subject of metaphysics is so elevated above the intellect of man, many men think that it can be known only by faith. But one does not hear these things said about mathematics.

Again, contrary opinions and, hence, errors are often found in men concerning the subjects of natural science, moral science, and metaphysics, but not about mathematics. Hence, the former are less certain for us since we disagree and make errors about those things which are difficult for us to know with certitude.

Let these things be enough for a dialectical critique of Descartes. Next we shall make an approach to, or an outline of, a scientific refutation of his position.

Section Three: An Approach to a Scientific Refutation of Descartes' Position

Descartes' universal method is opposed to the other three universal methods or modes enumerated in the introduction. For, by taking a method proper to one particular science, such as geometry or arithmetic, and extending it to all the other sciences, Descartes is obviously going against the proper modes or methods of all the other sciences. We shall be concerned with this opposition in the present section of our thesis.

Descartes' Method also involves a rejection of the common mode of proceeding in all the sciences, which is logic. This can be seen, not only from the fact that Descartes makes the proper mode of proceeding in mathematics the common mode of proceeding in all the sciences, but also from a consideration of those things which pertain to logic. Descartes ignores the basic distinctions in regard to demonstration, such as that between common and proper principles. This is connected with his rejection of the division of the sciences. The latter shall also be considered in this section since it is presupposed to seeing that there are diverse modes of proceeding for the different sciences. Descartes seems to regard the doctrine of the syllogism as an impediment to the natural development of man's thought. This is strange, considering the role of syllogism in mathematics, but it can perhaps be explained by Descartes' inability to distinguish precisely between the sciences of mathematics and the art of calculation. At times, when speaking of the syllogism, Descartes shows a complete ignorance of its nature:

we must note that the dialecticians are unable to devise any syllogism which has a true conclusion, unless they have first secured the material out of which to construct it, i.e., unless they have already ascertained the very truth which is deduced in that syllogism. Whence it is clear that a formula of this kind...can gather nothing that is new, and hence the ordinary dialectic is quite valueless for those who desire to investigate the truth of things. Its only possible use is to serve to explain at times more easily to others the truths we have already ascertained. (44)

This error results from using the mode of geometry in logic. Since geometry resolves to the imagination, it thus happens that Descartes thinks of the universal as a class which can be imagined. But the universal, which is the first thing to be considered in logic, is known by resolution to the intellect as is true of other things known in logic. The universal, as such, cannot be imagined. Now, if we based the syllogism on classes rather than universals, we would acquire no new knowledge by means of it. (Incidentally, Kant's false division of propositions is also based on trying to resolve to the imagination in logic.) Descartes' ignorance of the distinction between the quid rei and quid nominis is matched by the absence from his works of the entire logic of the first act of the reason. In regard to the inventive part of logic, we find in Descartes a rejection of dialectic which does not play a role in mathematics. The second part of our thesis will investigate this at length.

The root of Descartes' difficulties will be found to be in his rejection of the mode of proceeding which is in conformity with the human intellect. This will become clear in the third and last part of our thesis.

This is enough by way of a prelude. Next we shall look at the reason for a diversity of the sciences which Descartes denied, making them all parts of one. Then, after showing the multiplicity of the sciences, we shall consider some things about the modes or methods which are appropriate to them.

* * * * *

Before investigating the reason for the division of the sciences, it would be wise to look first at the reason for distinguishing the habit of principles (understanding) from the habit of conclusions (science). Both habits perfect us in a knowledge of the true which is the good of the intellect. Hence, both are virtues. But they are distinguished because the true is knowable in diverse ways:

virtus intellectualis speculativa est per quam intellectus speculativus perficitur ad considerandum verum: hoc enim est bonum opus eius. Verum autem est dupliciter considerabile: uno modo, sicut per se notum; alio modo, sicut per aliud notum... (45)

Why are there distinct habits whereby we know the per se nota and whereby we know the per aliud nota?

Principia vero demonstrationis possunt seorsum considerari absque hoc quod considerentur conclusiones. Possunt etiam considerari simul cum conclusionibus, prout principia in conclusiones deducuntur. Considerare ergo hoc secundo modo principia, pertinet ad scientiam quae considerat etiam conclusiones: sed considerare principia secundum seipsa, pertinet ad intellectum. (46)

It is commonly held that the habit of principles (at least in the speculative order) is not divided into many habits. The reason for this is that the per se nota are all known in the same way--through a knowledge of their terms:

Veritas et cognitio principiorum indemonstrabilium dependet ex ratione terminorum: cognitio enim quid est totum est quid pars, statim cognoscitur quod omne totum est maius sua parte. (47)

Why, then, is there not also only one habit of the per aliud nota since they are all known in the same way--that is, per aliud or through a medium?

Since the per se nota are all known in the same way, and "natura mentis humanae nullius cognitionis naturaliter potest esse principium, in quam non posset pervenire per principia per se nota, quae sunt prima instrumenta intellectus agentis." (48), it seems that there should be only one habit of conclusions since the latter are known only through the per se nota which are all known in the same way.

On the other hand, if we wish to maintain that there are many habits of conclusions, it seems that we shall have to maintain that the principles of these conclusions are known in diverse ways. And, indeed, Aristotle and St Thomas seem to speak this way sometimes:

Ipsa autem principia non eodem modo manifestantur. Sed quaedam considerantur inductione, quae est ex particularibus imaginariis, ut puta quod omnis numerus est par aut impar. Quaedam vero accipiuntur sensu, sicut in naturalibus; puta quod omne quod vivet indiget nutrimento. Quaedam vero consuetudine, sicut in moralibus, utpote quod concupiscentiae diminuuntur, si eis non obediamus. Et alia etiam principia aliter manifestantur; sicut in artibus operativis accipiuntur principia per experientiam quamdam. (49)

That the principles are known in diverse ways agrees with what is said about distinguishing the sciences on the basis of their mode of defining and of the terms to which their judgments resolve. For these three things--the mode of defining, the term of the judgments and the mode of manifesting the principles--follow each other. For, "iudicium...potissimum de unaquaque re fit secundum eius definitivam rationem" (50), and the judgment of the intellect always resolves to the principle of its knowledge. For example, natural science defines with sensible matter and its judgments must resolve to sense and its principles are also manifested by sense. But, if the principles are not known in the same way, it seems that there cannot be one habit of principles which is contrary to the common opinion. Or, if we say that there is one habit of principles, then it seems we must say that there is also only one habit of conclusions or science which is also contrary to the traditional doctrine. Descartes takes the second position.

When St Thomas says that "Ipsa autem principia non eodem modo manifestantur", he is referring to the proper principles of a science (which is clear from the examples he gives there). But this manifestation of the proper principles is the first part of the distinct knowledge had of them in science rather than something pertaining to the confused knowledge had of them by the habit of principles. We say the "first part" because the distinct knowledge of the principles in a science (where they are known with the conclusions, not just in themselves) begins when we are able to see conclusions arising from them and is perfected when we resolve the conclusions into the principles. Such a partial distinct knowledge of the principles is indicated by the words of St Thomas there:

Cognitio enim principiorum multum adiuvat ad sequentia cognoscenda. Principium videtur plus esse quam dimidium totius.Quia scilicet omnia alia quae restant continentur in principiis...per unum principium bene intellectum et consideratum, multa fiunt manifesta eorum quae quaeruntur in scientia. (51)

Hence, nothing hinders us from saying that the "principia non eodem modo manifestantur" in this sense and, yet, maintaining that there is only one habit of first principles (in the speculative order).

It is now time to consider the reason for the diversity of the sciences. We admit with Descartes that there are some first principles which are common to all the sciences and upon which all the sciences depend. Yet, we do not agree with Descartes in saying that that unity of first principles is sufficient to enable us to have one science of all things, as arithmetic is one science of all numbers. The multiplication of the sciences does indeed require a diversity of their first principles--not, however, a diversity of all first principles, but of those which are first in some genus scibile. St thomas gives this doctrine and shows how one genus scibile is distinguished from another:

Nec tamen intelligendum est quod sufficiat ad unitatem scientiae unitas principiorum primorum simpliciter, sed unitas principiorum primorum in aliquo genere scibili. Distinguuntur autem genera scibilium secundum diversum modum cognoscendi.Sicut alio modo cognoscantur ea quae definiuntur cum materia, et ea quae definiuntur sine materia.Unde sunt diversa prima principia utriusque generis,et per consequens diversae scientiae.Et utrumque horum generum distinguitur in diversas species scibilium, secundum diversos modos et rationes cognoscibilitatis. (52)

Why is one genus scibile distinguished from another by a diverse mode of defining? The Latin word scibile designates what is knowable by science. Science is an effect, however, of a demonstration that makes known a conclusion through a middle term which is a definition. Hence, it is necessary to distinguish sciences on the basis of a diverse mode of defining. In the words of St Thomas, "Cum omnis scientia per demonstrationem habeatur, demonstrationis autem medium sit definitio; necesse est secundum diversum definitionis modum scientias diversificari." (53) But what kind of diversity in definitions would diversify sciences? We can gather the answer from considering that science is in the intellect and that something becomes intelligible in act to the extent that it is separated from matter. Hence, according as things are diversely related to matter, they pertain to diverse sciences. It is this kind of diversity in definition that gives us the three speculative sciences. In the words of St Thomas again:

Sciendum est igitur quod quaedam sunt quorum esse dependet a materia sensibili, in eorum tamen definitione materia sensibilis non cadit. Et haec differunt ad invicem sicut curvum et simum. Nam simum est in materia sensibili, et necesse est quod in eius definitione cadat materia sensibilis; est enim nasus curvus; et talia sunt omnia naturalia, ut homo, lapis: curvum vero, licet esse non possit nisi in materia sensibili, tamen in eius definitione materia sensibilis non cadit; et talia sunt omnia mathematica, ut numeri, magnitudines et figurae. Quaedam vero sunt quae non dependent a materia, nec secundum esse nec secundum rationem; vel quia nunquam sunt in materia, ut Deus et aliae substantiae separatae; vel quia non universaliter sunt in materia, ut substantia, potentia et actus, et ipsum ens. De huiusmodi igitur est Metaphysica: de his vero quae dependet a materia non solum secundum esse sed etiam secundum rationem, est Naturalis, quae Physica dicitur. (54)

Since logic is different from the above, does it also have a mode of defining which has a diverse relation to matter from the above?

The definitions of logic differ from the above because they concern the "relationes quae attribuuntur ab intellectu rebus intellectis, prout sunt intellectae, sicut relatio generis et speciei." (55) They differ from the above and have a diverse relation to matter, not because they are abstracted from matter in a diverse way, but because they have an existence only in being understood by the intellect which is, of course, an immaterial power. As St Thomas says, "has enim relationes ratio adinvenit considerando ordinem eius quod est intellectu ad res quae sunt extra, vel etiam ordinem intellectuum ad invicem." (56) And, since it is by our concepts or thoughts that we express what we understand, this order in things understood results in an order in our concepts or thoughts. This last order is necessary for putting order into our thinking because we cannot think about something without having some kind of thought about it: "Alius autem est ordo, quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, puta cum ordinat conceptus suos adinvicem, et signa conceptuum, quia sunt voces significativae." (57) We should notice here that reason attains its own act, not directly like the subjects of the above sciences, but by a reflection upon itself:

Ratio autem non solum dirigere potest inferiorum partium actus, sed etiam actus sui directiva est. Hoc enim est proprium intellectivae partis, ut in seipsam reflectatur; nam intellectus intelligit seipsum et similiter ratio de suo actu ratiocinari potest. Si igitur ex hoc quod ratio de actu manus ratiocinatur, adinventa est ars aedificatoria vel fabrilis, per quas homo faciliter et ordinate huiusmodi exercere potest; eadem ratione ars quaedam necessaria est, quae sit derectiva ipsius actus rationis, per quam scilicet homo in ipso actu rationis ordinate, faciliter et sine errore procedat. Et haec ars est logica, idest rationalis scientia. (58)

Reflection is quite a different way of reaching a subject than the way of abstraction.

The moral or practical sciences differ from the above in regard to their end. The end of the speculative sciences (to which logic can be reduced as a tool) is truth while the end of the practical sciences is action. And, if it be asked whether this results in a diverse materiality, it can be said that action is always in the singular and hence the practical sciences tend towards the singular and are perfected as they approach it more closely. The speculative sciences, however, abstract from the singular, and, hence, it would seem that these two kinds of sciences proceed in contrary directions in regard to the singular. And since matter is the principle of the singular as such, this contrariety would seem to indicate a diverse immateriality in these sciences. This rough outline of the diverse immateriality in the sciences must suffice for the present since a full consideration would take more than one complete thesis.

We said above that one science must have the same first principles, and not just any first principles, but those which are first in some genus scibile. And we have just shown how one genus scibile is distinguished from another by a diverse mode of defining. Why is it that this kind of unity of principles distinguishes one science form another while the unity of first principles, simply speaking, does not give us one science? The answer is tied up with the fact that the principles which are first in some genus scibile are also proper principles of a science while the first principles simpliciter (that extend to more than one science) can only be common principles for a science. To penetrate this we shall need to recall the distinction between common and proper principles:

Principiorum, primus utimur in demonstrativis scientiis, alia sunt propria uniusque scientiae, alia vero communia...propria principia sunt, ut lineam esse huiusmodi, vel rectum. Tam enim subiecti quam passionis definitio in scientiis pro principio habetur. Communia vero principia sunt, ut si ab aequalibus aequalia demas, quae remanent sunt aequalia, et aliae communes animi conceptiones. (59)

Here we see the connection between the mode of defining and the proper principles which are definitions. Now, why should we assert that there are many sciences on account of the diversity of proper principles rather than that there is only one science on account of the unity of common principles? Is our decision arbitrary, or just a matter of taste?

If one is going to distinguish sciences, or the habits of conclusions, on the basis of principles, this can only be because those principles are seen as giving rise to the conclusions, and because the conclusions are known through them, and because the conclusions are resolved to, or judged by them. Concerning the common principles, however, we can say with St Thomas the following:

sufficiens est accipere unumquodque istorum communium, quantum pertinet ad genus subiectum, de quo est scientia. Idem enim faciet geometria, si non accipiat praemissum principium commune in sua communitate, sed solum in magnitudinibus, et arithmetica in solis numeris. Ita enim poterit concludere geometria, si dicat: si ab aequalibus magnitudinibus aequales auferas magnitudines, quae remanent sunt aequales; sicut si diceret: si ab aequalibus aequalia demas, quae remanent sunt aequalia. Et similiter dicendum est de numeris. (60)

Thus, the conclusions of a science do not depend upon the common principles, taken in their very generality, but only upon them insofar as they pertain to the subject of that science. This is why we can affirm and deny that science proceeds from common principles:

principiorum, quibus utimur in demonstrativis scientiis, alia sunt propria uniusque scientiae, alia vero communia. Et quia hoc posset videri contrarium ei, quod supra ostensum est, quia scientiae demonstrativae non procederunt ex communibus, ideo subiungit quod communia principia accipiuntur in unaquaque scientia demonstrativa secundum analogiam, idest secundum quod sunt proportionata illi scientiae. Et hoc est quod subdit exponens, quod utile est accipere huiusmodi principia in scientiis, quantum pertinet ad genus subiectum, quod continetur sub illa scientia... (61)

Thus, the conclusions of the diverse sciences do not proceed from the common principles in the way in which those principles are common to all the sciences, but only as they are proportioned to the subject of each science. But in this latter way, they cannot unite all the possible conclusions into one grand science.

Moreover, not just any knowledge of the principles gives rise to conclusions, but only a distinct one. But, as we saw above, a distinct knowledge of the principles requires that they be known in diverse ways. The common principles, however, are further from the conclusions than even a confused knowledge of the proper principles. Hence, a fortiori, one cannot consider the unity or diversity of the sciences on the basis of those common principles.

For a better understanding of this matter, it will be useful to compare the distinction between common and proper principles to the distinction between the primary and secondary principles of the same science in regard to the unity or multiplicity of the sciences. We can start with the following text of St Thomas:

considerandum est quod secunda principia virtutem sortiuntur a primis. Unde requiritur diversitas primorum principiorum ad diversitatem scientiarum. Quod quidem non erit, si vel diversorum principia ex eisdem principiis fluant, sicut principia trianguli et quadrati derivantur ex principiis figurae; vel principia unius deriventur ex principiis alterius, sicut principia isoscelis dependent a principiis trianguli. Nec tamen intelligendum est quod sufficiat ad unitatem scientiae unitas principiorum primorum simpliciter, sed unitas principiorum primorum in aliquo genere scibili. (62)

Although the primary principles of a science are more universal than its secondary principles, this greater universality does not destroy the unity of the science since the universality remains within the same kind of intelligibility or immateriality. Animal is more universal than dog, yet both are knowable in the same way; i.e., through a definition with common sensible matter, or through principles manifested by sensation, or by resolving judgments about them to sense. Similarly, triangle and some species of triangle pertain to the same science because they are both intelligible in the same way; i.e., through definitions leaving aside common sensible matter but retaining common intelligible matter, or through principles manifested by certain acts of the imagination, or by judgments which resolve to the imagination. Hence, although there is not just one science, neither are there as many sciences as there are species of things:

non omnis diversitas rerum facit diversas scientias, sed diversitas quae requirit diversam rationem cognoscendi, sicut naturalia distinguuntur a mathematicis...non quaelibet specierum diversitas facit diversum habet--sed diversitas specierum quae non reducitur ad eumdem modum cognitionis secundum genus. (63)

Since the common principles, taken in their generality, are not found within one genus scibile, they cannot found one science.

When the Latin text of Aristotle says that "Una autem scientia est, quae est unius generis" and lays down two conditions for such a subject: "quaecunque ex primis componuntur"; "et partes aut passiones eorum sunt per se"; the "ex primis" refers to what is first in some genus scibile.

Let these things suffice for seeing something of the reason for the multiplicity of the sciences which Descartes seems to deny. Next, we should see whether the same mode of proceeding is proper to each science, or whether each one has its own proper mode or way of proceeding.

* * * * *

The proper mode of proceeding is diverse in different sciences. This mode is derived from a consideration of that science and of the way in which that subject is related to our intellect. If a man does not make a careful consideration of these two things, he will probably adopt a method to which he is inclined by his natural aptitudes or by his customary way of proceeding. Moreover, man is the most imitative of animals, and, at first, he learns by imitation. Hence, he will often imitate in other subjects a method which he has found particularly useful in one or two subjects. But, it is not necessary that the method to which we are inclined by our individual natural dispositions or by our acquired habits be useful or best everywhere, or that the method which has proved useful, or been successful for one subject should be so for others. And since an error about method is very serious, as we saw in the Introduction, it is necessary to consider carefully the method or mode of proceeding which is suitable to a given subject, taking also into account the relation of that subject to our intellect.

Descartes undoubtedly had a natural aptitude for the methods of geometry and arithmetic, and this aptitude was perfected in him by long practice; but, neither the inclination he had towards the mathematical method, nor the success he had in employing it about quantities can be regarded as a sufficient reason for his attempt to extend it everywhere. We find something analogous to this in the senses. The success of our eyes in seeing colors and the delight we take in so using our eyes can not be regarded as sufficient justification for trying to know sounds or odors with our eyes. No one would make such a mistake about the use of the senses, and, yet, people do make such a mistake about the use of methods, although the principle is the same. Its application, of course, is obvious in the case of the senses, but not easy in the case of methods.

When we investigate the proper modes of proceeding in the various sciences according to the method proposed above (of examining the subject and its relation to our intellect), it becomes clear that one can not proceed in the same way in all sciences. The proper mode of proceeding is diverse in different sciences.

We can consider five elements in this diversity. First, there is a diversity according to the end, for we do not proceed in the same way in a science ordered to action as in one ordered to truth alone. Second, there is a diversity in the mode of demonstration found in each science. This diversity can be considered according to the species of demonstration which are demonstration propter quid and quia. And in regard to propter quid demonstrations in particular, we can consider that all sciences do not demonstrate from the same causes. In this place, we can also consider, in general any other diversity in those things from which the arguments proceed in different sciences, such as that some proceed from what is true always and others from what is true for the most part, or that one proceeds from fewer principles than another. One more thing might be considered under the second element, and that is the diverse terms to which the judgments of the various sciences resolve. We have chosen to consider the diversity in the mode of defining as distinguishing the subjects of the sciences although it might also be considered as a part of this element. The third thing we can consider is that the proper principles of diverse sciences are not manifested in the same way. Fourth, there is a diversity in the manuductio commanded by the subject of each science and the relation of that subject to our intellect. Fifth, there is a diversity in the order of determination in each science. All of these five elements are required or determined by the subject of the science and its relation to our intellect. One might add a sixth element, the certitude to be expected in each science. This, also, is known from the subject of the science and its relation to our intellect, and it can be made even more precise when one has considered the five elements above. Next, let us sketch briefly the diversity in each of these elements in the proper modes of proceeding.

The subject of practical sciences, such as ethics or political science, is human action ordered to an end. By "human action" is meant actions which proceed from the will of man as a result of deliberation. Thus, the subject of those sciences is something subject to human choice--something within the power of man to do or not to do, and not something merely within the power of man to know, as are natural things (as such). Thus man can study the former with a view to action while natural things (as such) can only be considered by man with a view to the truth about them. But our intellect must proceed in a diverse way when its consideration is ordered to action and when it is ordered to truth alone. For, when our goal is action, we seek to know how a given effect can be produced by us. Thus, in ethics, we seek to know how we may become good; i.e., how we may acquire the virtues. When our goal is truth or knowledge, we seek what makes us know a thing perfectly. We know a thing perfectly, however, when we know its cause and see its dependence upon that cause and that it could not be otherwise. Thus, in natural science, we seek to know eventually the why of those things we perceive by our senses, to know the cause of those effects sensed by us and to see, if possible, that the dependence of those effects upon their cause cannot be otherwise.

From these things, it can be seen that we not only proceed diversely in a practical science and in a speculative science, but even in a contrary way. In the speculative sciences, we reduce effects to their causes while in the practical sciences we know how to produce effects from their causes. Because a cause is simpler than its effects, these two diverse modes of proceeding are called, respectively, resolutive and compositive. It should not be thought that a treatise on practical science never proceeds in the resolutive mode, for practical knowledge presupposes some speculative knowledge; as, for example, it is useful to define virtue and to divide it into its species before determining how we may acquire each of the virtues. Yet, such speculative knowledge is not chiefly intended in a practical science which is concerned with how its subject may be produced. Hence, the resolutive mode is attributed to speculative science because its perfection consists only in observing the mode while practical science is perfected by proceeding in another way. If a speculative science does compose at times, as does geometry, this is only for the sake of knowing what has been composed and ultimately resolving.

The next diversity we can consider, even among the speculative sciences themselves, is in regard to their mode of demonstrating. First, we can consider the role of propter quid and quia demonstrations in the sciences. Since the former manifests the effect through the cause and the latter makes known the existence of the cause through the effect, we must consider in the subject of each science which is more known to us: the cause or the effect. For, we must proceed from what is more known to us. In natural things and also in human actions, the effect is usually more known than the cause. For example, that trees grow is more known to us than the cause of their growth and that animals walk is more known to us than the cause of their walking; i.e., the muscles, nerves, bones etc. Similarly, in human action, we know better the fact that giving in to all our sense desires results in the habit of intemperance and restraint, in the habit of temperance than we do the reason why this happens. But in geometry, we find the cause more known than the effect. For example, the intersection of straight lines is more known than the equality of the vertical angles formed; or the triangle is more known than the equality of its interior angles to two right angles. Thus we must employ demonstration quia in natural science and the practical sciences while in geometry we especially use demonstration propter quid.

This diversity in the mode of demonstrating is derived, not just from the subject considered in itself, but from the relation of the subject to our understanding. For the movements and exterior accidents of natural things fall directly under our senses (whence our intellectual knowledge is derived), while the natures of these things, which are also the causes of their movements and proper accidents, do not directly come under our senses. Similarly, human actions fall directly under our experience while the habits from which they proceed are not immediately manifest in our experience. Likewise, the long-range effects of our actions are not known in their causes, but vice-versa. But quantities and figures are directly sensible or imaginable while the relations they possess are not directly sensed or imagined. Thus the mode of demonstrating is diverse in these sciences. This does not mean that natural science does not use propter quid demonstration, but that it is not characterized by it as is geometry or arithmetic. Even after we have come to know the existence of the cause through the effect, we can still use that cause to manifest the why of the effect although not its existence. And, this suffices for having a propter quid demonstration.

Metaphysics would seem to require demonstration quia even more than natural science in one way, because even the existence of its subject must be shown through a quia demonstration.

In logic, the answer is more complicated, especially if we take logic in the broad sense of St Thomas in his Proemium to the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle. In the more formal parts of logic, such as those contained in the Peri Hermeneias and the Prior Analytics, the cause would seem to be more known than the effect or property, except insofar as we manifest the forms in the intellect through the ordered words which represent them. Enunciation and its species, affirmation and negation, are more known than the properties of opposition which follow upon them. And in the second book of the Prior Analytics, we manifest certain things which follow an understanding of the syllogism in the first book. Similarly, in the first book of the Posterior Analytics, we first determine the nature of demonstration, and then we determine certain things that follow upon this, such as comparisons of the kinds of demonstration and the effect of demonstration which is science. But, as one approaches those parts of logic in which there is an exterior work to consider, the mode of demonstrating would seem to resemble more that of natural science. Thus, in the imitative arts, it seems that a man should experience and appreciate works of art before he can render the reason why some have a better effect than others upon their audience or readers. Similarly in rhetoric, one seems in many cases to know that something is persuasive before knowing why it is so. But, to determine this more accurately in regard to these and to the other parts of logic is not necessary for our present inquiry.

In regard to propter quid demonstration alone, we can find a diversity in the various sciences. This diversity is in the causes from which a science demonstrates, and this diversity corresponds to the subject of a science. Thus, because the subjects of geometry and arithmetic are abstracted from matter and motion, neither of these sciences demonstrates from the agent cause or the material cause (unless, perhaps, one wished to say that the parts of the continuum were matter; but this would be matter in quite a different sense). Likewise, geometry and arithmetic do not demonstrate from the end or purpose since this is the term of a motion or that for the sake of which there is an operation. But, quantity and figures, which the mathematician considers, are not the source of any motion or operation. Thus, geometry and arithmetic demonstrate only from the formal cause which is clear from the definitions used in these sciences. But, in natural sciences, all four causes can and should be used. Since the subject of natural science is mobile being, it is clear that the cause of motion--the agent--will play an important role. And in the first book of the Physics, it is shown that matter and form are the per se principles of mobile being. And in book two of the Physics, it becomes clear that nature acts for an end, and, hence, that natural science should demonstrate from the end which is the causa causarum.

In metaphysics, the end and formal cause, especially, are used and, also, the agent. the material cause is not proper to this science because its subject is neither defined with matter nor does it depend for its existence upon matter. The end is especially important because it is the cause of all the other causes, and this science considers the first causes. The formal cause is important because this science has as its subject being of which form is the principle, and also because it belongs to this science in particular to consider the quod quid erat esse. The agent cause is also used since the separated substances are efficient causes of movement in the material world as well as of immaterial operations. The practical sciences would seem to demonstrate especially from the end, since the subject of these sciences are actions that proceed from the will whose object is the good which has the notion of an end. But, there seems to be something analogous to the other three causes found in natural things, for art imitates nature. Thus, for example, in political philosophy, we consider the forms of government and the types of people and classes suitable to them. And these two should correspond to each other; just as in natural things, the proper form is in the proper matter. And the efficient cause is also important there, for many things must be considered about the corruption, salvation and institution of governments although here we seem to be more concerned with how to corrupt, preserve, or institute a government. In logic, the end is again important in that every tool must be understood in reference to its end. Here, also, the other three causes seem to play a role, for the art of logic imitates nature. But in what sense agent and matter are said in logic is a question which need not detain us here.

There are other diversities in those things from which the sciences demonstrate or reason. When its subject is invariable, a science can proceed from what is true always. Thus, the geometer, whose subject abstracts from motion and matter, knows that the exterior angle of a triangle will always be equal to the two interior and opposite angles and, hence, that the triangle will always have its interior angles equal to two right angles. But, the natural scientist can not assume, for example, that man will always be born with five fingers on each hand. And this is because his subject (with matter) is variable and contingent. Likewise, the moralist finds that human beings and circumstances are quite variable and that what is, simply speaking, better is not so for everyone or always. Thus, if men were always good, one should always return what one has borrowed from them. But, one should not return a tool to someone who is manifestly going to misuse it for evil purposes. Thus, when the subject is variable, the principles must be less rigid. Logic and metaphysics are more like mathematics in regard to the invariability of their subjects than like natural science or moral science.

Another way in which the principles of sciences differ is in regard to their number: some proceed from fewer principles, some from more. This also can be considered in reference to the subject of the science. For the science which is ex additione, or whose subject is, involves more principles than one which is not. The subject of metaphysics is more abstract than that of arithmetic, and the subject of arithmetic, than that of geometry. Ens quantum adds to ens so that the subject of mathematics involves more principles than that of metaphysics. Similarly, the subject of arithmetic is more abstract than that of geometry, as can be seen when comparing the unit to the point. Next, the subject of natural science, mobile being, adds to the subject of mathematics which is more abstract. But the practical sciences add to the speculative ones, just as all practical knowledge involves some speculative knowledge, but not e converso. Thus metaphysics proceeds from fewer and simpler principles than arithmetic; arithmetic, than geometry; geometry, than natural science; and natural science, than the practical sciences whose principles are most of all multiplied as they approach the multiplicity of circumstances around the singular.

One more thing might be sketched under this second element in the proper modes of proceeding. This is the diversity of the terms to which the judgments of the sciences resolve. Natural things come under our senses, and their natures become known to us through the things which appear to our senses about them. Hence, judgment about them in natural science should resolve to what is sensed. We judge natural things in accord with what our senses reveal to us about them. Geometry and arithmetic, however, consider a subject that is abstracted from what the senses reveal to us. This subject, however, is attained in the imagination where we can represent triangles, circles, etc. Thus, our judgment about these things resolves to the imagination. In the practical sciences, judgment is made in accord with experience of life. this is why it is said that a young man is not a suitable hearer of political science for he lacks the experience of life required to judge these matters well. In logic, the judgment must transcend both sense and imagination. This is so because the subject of logic is second intentions which are found neither in things sensed nor in things imagined, but which are attributed to things understood in their state of being understood. By reason of its subject, it is clear that logic must chiefly resolve to the understanding. Metaphysics would have to be similar to the mode of resolving in logic since it (metaphysics) considers things whose natures do not involve matter or extension as do the things which are sensed or imagined. Yet, metaphysics would seem to be even further from the senses and the imagination than logic. For, the what-it-is of logical things (such as genus, species, etc.) can be manifested perfectly from a knowledge of sensible things even though such logical things are not found in sensation or imagination. This, however, is not true of such metaphysical things as the separated substances.

The third element to be considered in the proper mode of proceeding is that the proper principles of the various sciences are not manifested in the same way. As we saw above, the principles of mathematics are manifested through the imagination; the principles of natural science, by sense; those of the practical sciences, by experience of human life; the principles of logic, by reflection of the intellect upon itself and the comparison of things understood in the state of being understood among themselves and to things outside the intellect; and the principles of metaphysics through an experience of all the other sciences.

The fourth element to be considered is the diversity in the manuductio required for each science. Manuductio is one way in which the teacher leads the student from what is already known by him to a knowledge of what is unknown to him:

Ducit autem magister discipulum ex praecognitis in cognitionem ignotorum, dupliciter. Primo quidem, proponendo ei aliqua auxilia vel instrumenta, quibus intellectus eius utatur ad scientiam acquirendam: puta cum proponit ei aliquas propositiones minus universales, quas tamen ex praecognitis discipulus diiudicare potest; vel cum proponit ei aliqua sensibilia exempla, vel similia, vel opposita, vel aliqua huiusmodi ex quibus intellectus addiscentis manuducitur in cognitionem veritatis ignotae. (64)

The Manuductio required in each science is also commanded by the subject of that science and the relation of that subject to our understanding. In the practical sciences, it is necessary for the student to be led by the hand through an experience of the actions and things which take place in human life, in the family, and in the state:

oportet illum, qui vult sufficiens auditor esse moralis scientiae, quod sit manu ductus et exercitatus in consuetudinibus humanae vitae, idest de bonis exterioribus et iustus, idest de operibus virtutum, et universaliter de omnibus civilibus, sicut sunt leges et ordines Politicorum et si qua alia sunt huiusmodi. (65)

One can also use sensibilia exempla from literature which imitates human action and character, giving them a clarity not often found in life. One can draw similia from the arts, as Aristotle does in showing that virtue consists in hitting the mean. Dialectical opposita drawn from the opinions and customs of men are important because what is said in moral science must be shown to be not in opposition to the rightly understood experience of mankind.

Natural science also requires a manuductio from many experiences of natural things through sensation. Similia drawn from art are invaluable because art imitates nature, as is shown in the second book of the Physics. There is a great need for dialectic drawn from the things appearing to our senses since this science has for its subject things lacking in knowability, like matter, motion, time etc. whose nature is hard to arrive at without the help of dialectic.

Logic is especially in need of manuductio on account of the abstract quality of its subject, second intentions; and because the human intellect should learn this science before trying to acquire the other sciences perfectly. Hence, there is a lack of proportion between this science and the intellect of the young beginner, and, consequently, there is great need for manuductio. We can describe the manuductio suitable to the subject of this science both in general and in particular. One can be led by the hand to second intentions by the analogy of a word which applies to something close to the senses to begin with, and which has been later applied to a second intention because of a certain likeness of it to the original sensible thing. Thus Porphyry leads us to the second intentions of genus and species through the sensible impositions of these words. Sometimes one can be led to the second intention through the act of reason which founds it. Thus one can be led to the second intention of genus through the intellectual act of grasping what something is. Finally, one can be led to an understanding of a speculative act of the reason through a corresponding act in the practical reason, as when an analysis of counsel illuminates us about dialectical reasoning.

Or, in particular, we can see how there can be a suitable manuductio for the parts of logic. Thus rhetoric, which is more known and proportioned to us, can serve as a manuductio for dialectic. Or geometry, which involves imagination and can be learned in some way even by boys, can serve as an excellent manuductio for the doctrine on demonstration. Or the lower forms of reasoning (example, enthymeme, and induction), which are closer to sense and our daily experience, can serve as manuductio for the completely intellectual form of the syllogism. There are abundant possibilities for manuductio through similia between the parts of logic concerning the simple and the complex unknown. Thus definition is to the simple unknown, as syllogism is to the complex unknown. Or, just as one cannot prove every proposition, so one cannot define everything; hence, the necessity of the categories is analogous to the necessity of immediate propositions.

Of all the sciences acquired by the natural light of human reason, metaphysics would seem to require manuductio most of all. This results from a comparison of the subject of that science with out mind. The subject of this science depends neither for its existence nor for its definition upon what falls under our senses. And the separated substances, towards which this science tends, are the most difficult of all for our intellect to grasp, as is shown in the second book of the Metaphysics of Aristotle. Hence, all the inferior sciences serve as a manuductio for this science. We would have no thoughts in our intellect to correspond to the words used in this science unless we could extend words used in the inferior sciences, as is done in the fifth book of the Metaphysics. In the seventh and eighth books, we investigate substance from logical notions and from matter and form known in natural science. From seeing act and potency in natural things and their movements, we can be led on to more universal propositions on act and potency in the ninth book. In book ten, we go from mathematical notions of one and measure to the full breadth of their analogy. The proof of the existence of the separated substances in the later books obviously requires the previous sciences, especially natural science. Their intellects are known by analogy to, and negation of certain things found in our intellects studied in natural science.

Arithmetic and geometry would seem to require little or no manuductio, and this on account of their subjects which are so well proportioned to the human intellect.

The fifth element to be considered in the proper mode of proceeding is the order of determination in each science. This again is dictated by the subject of the science and the way in which our intellect is related to that subject. Because the subject of natural science falls under our senses whence all our intellectual knowledge is derived in some way, its order of determination is most in conformity with our human intellect. Natural science is the most conformed to the human intellect in its order of determination in that it proceeds from the more universal to the less universal which is in accord with the natural movement of the human intellect from the confused to the distinct. This latter occurs because our intellect proceeds from potency to act.

In geometry, most of the subjects about which we demonstrate are given to us neither by sensation nor by abstraction alone. Rather, we construct them in our imagination; e.g., we construct the equilateral triangle in Proposition 1, Book 1 of Euclid's Elements. And in our constructions, we proceed from the simple to the complex and, not only in the whole of geometry (when we go from plane to solid geometry), but also in its parts; e.g., In Book 1 of Euclid's Elements, Proposition 1 enters into the construction of Proposition 2 and this latter into that of Proposition 3. The complex constructions necessarily presuppose the simpler constructions which are their parts. Arithmetic would also seem to proceed from the simple to the complex.

Logic might also seem to proceed from the simple to complex in its three main parts, for the three acts of the reason are related this way and the three main parts are according to these three acts. Yet it does so much less than mathematics does as can be seen in its principal subject: argumentation. One kind of argument does not enter into another as one construction enters into another.

The order of determination in metaphysics is often misunderstood. Sometimes its order is assimilated to that of natural science. If this were so, then this science would tend not only towards the separated substances, but also towards material substance. Natural science would then be a part of metaphysics, which is absurd because the subject of metaphysics does not depend upon sensible matter for its definition or for its existence. Rather, metaphysics proceeds from those things which can exist in matter (such as being, act, potency, one etc.), although they are neither defined with matter nor dependent upon it for their existence, towards the separated substances which cannot exist in matter and which are, hence, even more remote from our experience. From these things, we can also see how serious is the error of those who assimilate the order of determination in metaphysics to that of revealed theology where God is the first thing studied and where even the angels are studied before the material world of man.

The practical sciences proceed figuraliter in their order of determination. By figuraliter, we mean to sketch and then later to fill in details. This order of determination is commanded by the subject of the science in which there are so many details to be considered concerning the circumstances surrounding human action that no one can consider them at once or completely. This is the process which Aristotle himself observes in the Nicomachean Ethics.

The sixth and last element to be considered in the proper mode of proceeding is that the certitude to be expected is not the same in the various sciences. This again is due to the subject of the science and the relation of our intellect to it. Arithmetic and geometry are the most certain sciences. They exceed natural science in certitude because their subject is abstracted from matter and motion and, hence, from the lack of intelligibility, the multiplicity and the variability consequent to having matter and being subject to motion. The practical sciences fall short of the certitude of arithmetic and geometry even more so on account of similar reasons. Arithmetic and geometry are more certain than metaphysics, not on account of the latter's subject considered in itself, but because of the weakness of our intellect in comparison to that subject. St Thomas summarizes well this whole doctrine:

cum enim mathematica sit media inter naturalem et divinam, ipsa est utraque certior. Naturali quidem, quia eius consideratio est a motu et a materia absoluta, cum naturalis consideratio in materia et motu versetur. Ex hoc autem quod consideratio naturalis est circa materiam, eius cognitio a pluribus dependet, scilicet a consideratione materiae et formae, et dispositionum materialium et proprietatum, quae consequuntur formam in materia. Ubicumque autem ad aliquod cognoscendum oportet considerare plura, est difficilior cognitio. Unde in I Posteriorum dicitur, quod minus certa scientia est, quae est ex additione, ut geometria ad arithmeticam.

Ex hoc vero quod eius consideratio est circa res mobiles et quae non uniformiter se habent, eius cognitio est minus firma, quia eius demonstrationes frequenter procedunt ut in maiori parte ex hoc, quod contingit aliquando aliter se habere. Et ideo quando aliqua scientia magis appropinquat ad singularia, sicut scientiae operativae, ut medecina, alchimia, et moralis, minus possunt habere de certitudine propter multitudinem eorum, quae consideranda sunt in talibus scientiis, quorum quodlibet si omittatur, frequenter erratur, et propter eorum variabilitatem.

Est autem processus mathematicus certior quam processus divinae scientiae, quia ea de quibus est scientia divina, sunt magis a sensibus remota, a quibus nostra cognitio ortum sumit, et quantum ad substantias separatas, in quarum cognitionem insufficienter inducunt ea quae a sensibus accipiuntur, et quantum ad ea quae sunt communia omnibus entibus, quae sunt maxime universalia, et sic maxime remota a particularibus cadentibus sub sensu.

Mathematica autem ipsa sub sensu cadunt, et imaginationi subiacent, ut linea, figura, numerus et huiusmodi. Et ideo intellectus humanus a phantasmatibus accipiens, facilius eorum cognitionem accipit et certius quam intelligentiae alicuius vel etiam quam quidditatem substantiae, potentiam et actum et huiusmodi.

Et sic patet quod mathematica consideratio est facilior et certior quam naturalis et theologica, et multo plus quam aliae scientiae operativae, et ideo ipsa maxime dicitur disciplinabiliter procedere. (66)

What St Thomas says here corresponds especially to the diversity that we talked about in reference to the first two elements in the proper modes of proceeding. Sciences that proceed in the compositive mode are necessarily less certain than those that proceed in the resolutive mode. For the compositive mode consists in "applicando universalia principia et simplicia ad singularia et composita in quibus est actus." (67) Because of the multiplicity and variability of the "singularia et composita", there is less certitude. St Thomas clearly refers to parts of the second element which is the mode of demonstrating. Mathematics is more certain because propter quid demonstrations excel quia demonstrations in certitude, and because it does not proceed from such causes as matter and the agent (which is the principle of motion), and because it proceeds from fewer principles that are true always, unlike those in natural science and the practical sciences, and because it resolves to the imagination (whose images or phantasms are to our intellect as exterior colors are to the eye) rather than to the senses (as in natural science), or to a long experience (as in the practical sciences), or to the intellect (as in logic or metaphysics).

And when we compare the ways in which the proper principles of the various sciences are manifested (which was the third element distinguished by us above), it is not hard to see that the proper principles of the mathematical sciences are the easiest to grasp or manifest. The fourth element (the diversity in the manuductio required for each science) is especially useful for manifesting the greater certitude of the mathematical sciences. The mathematical sciences seem to be the only ones not requiring manuductio. The fact that manuductio does not play the role in mathematics that it does in the other sciences is a sign that the mathematical sciences are the most certain for us.

Finally, the mathematical sciences surpass the other sciences, not only in their mode of demonstrating, but also in their order of determination (which was the fifth element in the proper mode of proceeding). For in the mathematical sciences, we most perfectly observe this order: that the prior should in no way depend upon the posterior for its manifestation. But, in the other sciences, this is not able to be so well observed. For example, in natural science the definition of nature is given before that of motion although the latter enters into the definition of the former. And the definitions of place and time are clarified by what comes after. Similarly, in moral science, the definition of moral virtue comes before the consideration of prudence even though prudence enters into the definition of moral virtue. And in metaphysics, we proceed as if it were a distinct science from natural science although this is not clearly seen until we have proven the existence of the separated substances in the last part of the science.

From all that has preceded, the order of the sciences in certitude would seem to be as follows: arithmetic, geometry, logic, natural science, metaphysics, and the practical sciences of which ethics is the first, then the science of the household or family, and last political science. the speculative sciences exceed the practical sciences in certitude because the former proceed in the resolutive mode and the latter, in the compositive mode. As one approaches the singular with its multiplicity of circumstances and variability, one ceases to have certitude. But, it is the compositive mode that approaches the singular. And, of course, there are more circumstances and elements to vary in the family than in an individual's life, and in a state, than in a family. Among the speculative sciences, we have already seen in St Thomas why arithmetic and geometry excel natural science and metaphysics in certitude, and why arithmetic excels geometry. Logic would seem to fall short of arithmetic and geometry because its subject does not fall under sense or imagination; yet, it excels metaphysics because we can arrive at a complete knowledge of second intentions, like genus and species, through sensible things while we cannot do this in the case of the separated substances. Natural science, at least in its first part, would excel metaphysics in certitude because its subject falls under our senses, but it falls short of logic on account of the variability of its subject.

Nothing prevents the modes of proceeding in the various parts of one science to differ in some way. In fact, since there is the least variation, if any, in the modes of proceeding in the parts of geometry or arithmetic, we have still another reason why those sciences excel all others in the certitude of their proper mode of proceeding.

It is perhaps difficult to judge without a more complete consideration of these matters; but, from all that has been said, it appears that Descartes is in serious error when seeking to proceed in all the sciences according to the mode which is suitable to arithmetic or geometry. Likewise, it is clear that there is more than one science. These things, however, have been more carefully investigated by us on account of the errors which Descartes made. Let these things, then, suffice for the first part of our thesis.

PART TWO

Section One: Descartes' Rejection of Dialectic as a Result of his Method

From Descartes' position on the mathematical method, there follows a rejection of the use of dialectic in the speculative sciences. Descartes' position was that "we should busy ourselves with no object about which we cannot attain a certitude equal to that of the demonstrations of Arithmetic and Geometry." (68) But, the certitude of arithmetic and geometry is such that no dialectic is required to prepare the mind of the student for their reception. Hence, if we proceed in all the sciences as in arithmetic and in geometry, there will be no need for dialectic. Descartes indicates this:

In the subjects we propose to investigate, our inquiries should be directed, not to what others have thought, nor to what we ourselves conjecture, but to what we can clearly and perspicuously behold and with certainty deduce, for knowledge is not won in any other way. (69)

Here Descartes implies that the acquisition of science is not helped by referring to the opinions of others or to our own probable conjectures. But dialectic proceeds from probable opinions. Hence, Descartes is rejecting dialectic itself.

There are only two operations which belong to the mathematical method according to Descartes. If these two operations are perfected, what else can be needed asks Descartes:

...if we are without the knowledge of any of the things which we are capable of understanding, that is only because we have never perceived any way to bring us to this knowledge, or because we have fallen into the contrary error. But if our method rightly explains how our mental vision should be used, so as not to fall into the contrary error, and how deduction should be discovered in order that we may arrive at the knowledge of all things, I do not see what else is needed to make it complete, for I have already said that no science is acquired except by mental intuition or deduction. (70)

Once science is acquired in this way, there will be no occasion for dialectical disputes:

...what is the object of the disputations which take place in the schools. Doubtless, it will be said, by their means to discover the truth. For if it were once discovered, the disputations would grow less frequent, as we see in regard to Geometry, as to which there is usually no dispute. (71)

This is enough for seeing that Descartes' general position on method involves a rejection of dialectic. Next, let us present the arguments which can be gathered from his works against the need or use of dialectical arguments.

Section Two: A Cartesian Critique of Dialectic

Many arguments against the necessity of dialectic can be drawn from, or are suggested by, the text of Descartes. We can divide these arguments into two groups: the first includes general objections against dialectic, and the second, particular objections against each of the four uses of dialectic (assigned by Aristotle in his Topics). The general objections will be given first.

The speculative intellect, whose end is truth, seeks to know conclusions with certitude. This is why it must reject dialectic which can never give one certitude:

For a long time I had remarked that it is sometimes necessary in common life to follow opinions which one knows to be most uncertain...But because...I wished to give myself entirely to the search after truth, I thought that it was necessary for me to take an apparently opposite course, and to reject as absolutely false everything as to which I could imagine the least ground of doubt, in order to see if afterwards there remained anything in my belief that was entirely certain. (72)

Since dialectic proceeds from probable propositions, it can be of no more use for knowing conclusions with certitude than are false propositions:

...for the purpose of investigating the truths which are metaphysically certain, we should pay no more credence to doubtful matters than to what is plainly false. (73)

This is the road Descartes himself used in the investigation of the truth:

I shall proceed by setting aside all that in which the least doubt could be supposed to exist, just as if I had discovered that it was absolutely false; and I shall ever follow in this road until I have met with something which is certain, or at least, if I can do nothing else, until I have learned for certain that there is nothing in the world that is certain. (74)

Since a dialectical or probable proposition (about which there can always be some doubt) might be false, we can make no use of it in the investigation of the true. Although a true conclusion can sometimes be drawn from false propositions, we can never know, or be certain, that a conclusion is true when it has been concluded from propositions that are, or might be, false. This, then, is the first general argument against dialectic.

The second objection is even more serious because it maintains that dialectic can lead us into error:

He is no more learned who has doubts on many matters than the man who has never thought of them; nay he appears to be less learned if he has formed wrong opinions on any particulars. Hence, it were better not to study at all than to occupy one's self with objects of such difficulty, that, owing to our inability to distinguish true from false, we are forced to regard the doubtful as certain; for in these matters any hope of augmenting our knowledge is exceeded by the risk of diminishing it. Thus...we reject all such merely probable knowledge and make it a rule to trust only what is completely known and incapable of being doubted. (75)

The reason why we are in danger of falling into error through dialectical reasoning is that the latter proceeds from propositions which may be false and, from false propositions, you are likely to get false conclusions. In fact, some dialectical propositions must be false:

...considering how many conflicting opinions there may be regarding the self-same matter, all supported by learned people, while there can never be more than one which is true, I esteemed as well-nigh false all that only went as far as being probable. (76)

This is also the reason for the Cartesian doubt:

...any true opinions we have before we philosophize seriously are mixed up with so many others that are either false or at least doubtful, that hence in order to separate them from the rest, it is best to reject all alike to begin with...so that it may be possible afterwards more conveniently to distinguish those that were true all the time, or to discover new truths, and to admit nothing but what is true. (77)

A third general objection is suggested by the following words of Descartes:

I could not, however, put my finger on a single person whose opinions seemed preferable to those of others, and I found that I was, so to speak, constrained myself to undertake the direction of my procedure. (78)

The necessity of making a choice among probable opinions is seen from the fact that they are opposed. But, even if we make a choice between two contradictory propositions, nothing prevents us from contradicting ourselves through other probable opinions we have accepted. For, probable opinions can be both true and false, and from true and false propositions we are likely to get eventually a contradiction. But contradiction is a sign of inconsistency which is a result of bad reasoning. Hence, dialectic is defective. Indeed, it is the nature of dialectic (and rhetoric) to lead us to opposite conclusions, to lead us to contradict ourselves, and to be inconsistent. Hence, dialectical reasoning is poor reasoning. Let us turn now to particular objections against the four uses of dialectic given in the Topics of Aristotle.

The first use or purpose of dialectic is to exercise the mind. But that exercise is bad because it produces bad habits such as scepticism, contentiousness, and even self-deception. Sceptics are produced by the custom of hearing proofs given for every side of a question. Thus the arguing to opposite conclusions (which is the work of dialectic) leads the listener to think that truth is not attainable by man. And this despair has the disastrous effect of turning men away from the investigation of truth:

if we wish in earnest to establish for ourselves those rules which shall aid us in scaling the heights of human knowledge, we must admit assuredly among the primary members of our catalogue that maxim which forbids us to abuse our leisure as many do, who neglect all easy quests and take up their time only with difficult matters; for they, though certainly making all sorts of subtle conjectures and elaborating most plausible arguments with great ingenuity, frequently find too late that after all their labours, they have only increased the multitude of their doubts, without acquiring any knowledge whatsoever. (79)

This multitude of doubts is the mother of scepticism and despair as Descartes observed in the account of his life as a student. The second reason why dialectic is bad exercise is that it disposes us to attack even the truth and, hence, it hinders us from perceiving that truth:

For from the very fact that anyone girds himself up for an attack upon the truth, he makes himself less capable of perceiving the truth itself, since he withdraws his mind from the consideration of those reasons that tend to convince him of it, in order to discover others that have the opposite effect. (80)

The third reason why dialectic is bad exercise is that it may lead us by custom or repetition to think that we have really attained certitude. This, according to Descartes, is what happened in ancient Greece in regard to

Plato and Aristotle, between whom the only difference that exists is that the former...confessed that he had never yet been able to discover anything for certain, and was content to set down the things that seemed to him probable...Aristotle, on the other hand, had less candour, and although he had been Plato's disciple for twenty years, and possessed no other principles than his master's, he entirely changed the method of stating them, and proposed them as true and certain. (81)

The second use of dialectic is in encounters with others for, when we can proceed from their opinions, we can meet them on their own grounds. But, there is no need of a special logic for arguing with other people because the same argument that convinces us should also convince others if it is a good argument:

...I shall first of all set forth in these meditations the very considerations by which I persuade myself that I have reached a certain and evident knowledge of the truth, in order to see if, by means of the same reason which persuaded me, I can also persuade others. (82)

The geometer uses in class, before the students, the same argument that convinced him the night before. A good argument should be objective; i.e., the same for all. For example, in experimental science, the experiment, which is the basis of the reasoning, should be objective: that is, able to be performed by others in the same way and with the same results.

The third use of dialectic is in relation to the sciences, for it is said that a consideration of both sides of a question will enable us to see the truth more clearly. But dialectic cannot really be of use for sciences as is clear from the following argument: In science where one gets necessary knowledge (as in geometry), a proposition is either obvious (as are the principles), or is shown through ones that are obvious (as are the conclusions). But in neither of these two cases is there a need for something clearer by arguing to opposites. What is obvious needs no manifestation, and why argue to its opposite which is manifestly false? The conclusions are made known by being necessarily deduced from the principles, not by arguing to opposites. Hence, we find no arguing to opposites in Euclid when he draws his conclusions necessarily. Thus, dialectic is useless for making the truth appear better in a science. This argument is collected from the many texts of Descartes where he says that there are only two ways to certain knowledge for man: "self-evident intuition" and "necessary deduction", as in the quote in the general objections against dialectic and the following text:

...we shall here take note of all those mental operations by which we are able, wholly without fear of illusion, to arrive at the knowledge of things. Now I admit only two; viz. intuition and deduction. By intuition I understand, not the fluctuating testimony of the senses, nor the misleading judgment that proceeds from the blundering constructions of the imagination, but the conception which an unclouded and attentive mind gives us so readily and distinctly that we are wholly freed from doubt about that which we understand...besides intuition there is deduction, by which we understand all necessary inference from other facts that are known with certainty. This, however, we could not avoid, because many things are known with certainty, though not by themselves evident, but only deduced from true and known principles...These two methods are the most certain routes to knowledge, and the mind should admit no others. All the rest should be rejected as suspect of error and dangerous. (83)

The position of Descartes becomes even clearer when he is answering a certain objection:

But perhaps some one will here raise the objection, that, while indeed a man ought not to seek for hostile arguments when he knows that it is the truth that is set before him, yet, so long as this is in doubt, it is right that he should fully explore all the arguments on either side, in order to find out which are the stronger. According to this objection, it is unfair of me to want to have the truth of my contentions admitted before they have been fully scrutinized, while prohibiting any consideration of those reasonings that oppose them.

This would certainly be a just criticism if any of the matters in which I desire attention and absence of hostility in my reader were capable of withdrawing him from the consideration of any others in which there was the least hope of finding greater truth than in mine. But consider that in what I bring forward you find the most extreme doubt about all matters, and that there is nothing I more strongly urge than that every single thing should be most carefully examined and that nothing should be admitted but what has been rendered so clear and distinct to our scrutiny that we cannot withhold our assent from it. Consider too that, on the other hand, there is nothing else from which I wish to divert the minds of my readers, save beliefs which they have never properly examined and which are derived from no sound reasoning, but from the senses alone. Therefore I hardly think that anyone will believe that there is much risk in confining his attention to my statement of the case; the danger will be no more than that of turning away his gaze from it towards other things which in some measure conflict with it and only darken counsel (i.e., to the prejudices of the senses). (84)

The fourth use of dialectic (which can be considered a particular one under the third use) is to be a way to the principles of a science. The latter cannot be discussed scientifically since there is nothing prior to them in the science. But, it is ridiculous to try to arrive at the principles of a science by dialectic. If dialectic were used to arrive at the principles of a science, you would come to know the principles from opinions. But, opinions are not certain. Hence, the principles would not be certain either, and this is opposed to the notion of principle of a science. This is what Descartes observes:

...none of the conclusions deduced from a principle which is not evident can be evident even though they are deduced from them in a manner which is evident and valid, and from this it follows that none of the reasonings which they rested on principles such as these probable opinions could give them any certain knowledge of anything, nor in consequence cause them to advance one step in the search after wisdom. (85)

Section Three: Dialectical Objections Against Descartes' Position on Dialectic

Descartes' lack of appreciation of dialectic is strange in view of his own opinion that "logic...teaches us how best to direct our reason in order to discover those truths of which we are ignorant." (86) For dialectic belongs to the inventive part of logic, the part ordered to discovery. Nor does Descartes seem to have substituted anything better. As is clear from the quote above and from what will be seen later in this section, Descartes sought a logic that could direct us to the unknown. But we cannot direct ourselves toward something that is in every way unknown to us, according to Descartes (see quote from Rules for the Direction of the Mind at the end of this section). The knowledge that we have of the unknown, however, cannot be clear and distinct; otherwise, we would know exactly what was unknown to us, as a teacher knows clearly and distinctly what is unknown to the student. But Descartes insists that we begin with clear and distinct ideas. Hence, he can never have a logic which will direct us to the unknown.

Moreover, Descartes should not reject dialectic in general because it can give us no certitude while the speculative intellect seeks certitude. For, although dialectic cannot by itself give us certitude, it may be the occasion for our perceiving something certain which is similar to what Descartes himself experienced: "...in destroying all those opinions which I considered ill-founded, I made various observations and acquired many experiences, which have since been of use to me in establishing those which are more certain." (87) Besides, Descartes himself was sometimes satisfied with less than certain knowledge, as in the latter or experimental part of natural science (see above in Part One).

Again, one should not reject dialectic in general because its conclusions can involve an element of falsehood while the speculative intellect seeks truth. For even a dialectical argument that leads to a false conclusion can be of use in clarifying the truth. This is what happened to Descartes himself when answering the objections made to his Meditations on First Philosophy: "there may perhaps have remained many obscurities which, however, will, I hope, be entirely removed by the Replies which I have made to the Objections which have been set before me." (88) Presumably, Descartes thought that the conclusions of the objections were false.

Moreover, would not dialectic be useful to Descartes even if it leads us to contradict ourselves and, hence, to be inconsistent? For Descartes is pre-eminent among all thinkers in insisting that we have clear and distinct ideas; yet he recognizes that it is not always easy to know when we have clear and distinct ideas:

the things which we conceive clearly and distinctly are all true...however...there is some difficulty in ascertaining which are those that we distinctly conceive. (89)

But, what is it, according to Descartes, that manifests to us when our ideas are not clear and distinct? It would seem to be precisely that for which dialectic is useful: "contradictoriness in our concepts arises merely from their obscurity and confusion; there can be none in the case of clear and distinct ideas." (90)

Let us look, now, at some other arguments which lead one to believe that Descartes should have paid more attention to the uses of dialectic. Descartes does not seem to reject dialectic entirely as an exercise for the intellect:

Yet we do not therefore condemn that method of philosophizing which others have already discovered and those weapons of the schoolmen, probable syllogisms, which are so well suited for polemics. They indeed give practice to the wits of youths and, producing emulation among them, act as a stimulus; and it is so much better for their minds to be moulded by opinions of this sort, uncertain though they appear, as being objects of controversy among the learned, than to be left entirely to their own devices. (91)

The first and third reasons drawn from Descartes against dialectic as an exercise (it produces scepticism and the deception that we have more than probability) seem to attack more the excess than the reality of dialectic. Descartes, however, recommends the study of the ancients even though there is a similar danger:

To study the writings of the ancients is right, because it is a great boon for us to be able to make use of the labours of so many men; and we should do so, both in order to discover what they have correctly made out in previous ages, and also that we may inform ourselves as to what in the various sciences is still left for investigation. But yet there is a great danger lest in too absorbed study of these works we should become infected with their errors. (92)

The second argument of Descartes against dialectic as an exercise (we can see truth less after attacking it) has already been considered above.

The second use of dialectic is in encounters with others where we attempt to proceed from their opinions. But Descartes should have seen the utility of this procedure for removing the impediments which others have to seeing the truth by reason of their habitual opinions. Descartes himself experienced that it is hard for one to root out customary opinions even in the face of truth: "ancient and commonly held opinions still revert frequently to my mind, long and familiar custom having given them the right to occupy my mind against my inclination and rendered them almost masters of my belief." (93) And in excusing his preoccupation with eliminating errors from the minds of others, Descartes wrote:

you would prefer me...to carry out my resolve only in a perfunctory manner. This is forsooth to assume that it is very easy for all to free themselves from the errors in which, since infancy, they have been steeped, and that too much care may be employed in carrying this out, a contention which no one maintains. (94)

But if it is false to say that "too much care may be employed in carrying this out", then we should not overlook that most efficacious way of leading a man out of his errors by showing him that his opinions do not agree. This, however, is precisely what dialectic intends in its second use.

The third use of dialectic is in regard to the sciences, for it is said that we can perceive the truth better when we have heard both sides. Descartes, however, observed in one place that "the reader, seeing objections and reply at the same time, will more easily judge of the truth." (92) Besides, no one maintains that the bene dubitare of dialectic is in itself a securing of the truth, but only a preparation for it. And, Descartes himself admits this when defending his method of doubting:

...mere doubting alone does not suffice to establish any truth; but that does not prevent it from being useful in preparing the mind for the subsequent establishment of the truth. This is the sole purpose for which I have employed it. (93)

And, in another place, Descartes writes that it was necessary for him to employ doubt so "that I might prepare my readers' minds for the study of intellectual matters and for distinguishing them from matters corporeal, a purpose for which such arguments seem wholly necessary." (94) The arguments that we brought against Descartes' general critique of dialectic can also be applied here.

The fourth use of dialectic is in regard to the principles of a science. Now, no one thinks that dialectic is a way to those principles that are obvious to all, and in this even Aristotle would agree with Descartes. Yet, not all principles are known to everyone, as Descartes himself admits:

...only those things which we conceive clearly and distinctly...have the power of persuading me entirely. And although amongst the matters which I conceive of in this way, some indeed are manifestly obvious to all, while others only manifest themselves to those who consider them closely and examine them attentively; still, after they have once been discovered, the latter are not esteemed as any less certain than the former. (95)

But, of what type are those principles which are not obvious to all? Let us again take our cue from Descartes:

Truly we shall learn how to employ our mental intuition from comparing it with the way in which we employ our eyes. For he who attempts to view a multitude of objects with one and the same glance, sees none of them distinctly; and similarly the man who is wont to attend to many things at the same time by means of a single act of thought is confused in mind. (96)

In order to employ the general principle laid down at the beginning of the quote, we can observe that some objects are too bright for our eyes; others, too dim or dark; and some are well proportioned. Is there anything similar in the case of the intellect's objects? Descartes' words seem to imply so:

...the primary notions that are the presuppositions of geometrical proofs harmonize with the use of our senses, and are readily granted by all. Hence, no difficulty is involved in this case, except in the proper deduction of the consequences...On the contrary, nothing in metaphysics causes more trouble than the making of its primary notions clear and distinct. For, though in their own nature they are as intelligible as, or even more intelligible than those the geometricians study, yet being contradicted by the many perceptions of our senses to which we have since our earliest years been accustomed, they cannot be perfectly apprehended except by those who give strenuous attention and study to them, and withdraw their minds as far as possible from matters corporeal. Hence if they alone were brought forward, it would be easy for anyone with a zeal for contradiction to deny them. (97)

But, using again the likeness of the intellect to our eyes, does not dialectic perform the same role for the intellect that a hand does which points out to our eyes something difficult to see? When I attempt to point out some object that you do not see in the distance, I make use of objects around it which are easy for you to see, and by these I lead your eyes to come upon the previously unnoticed object. Similarly, when probable opinions clash, there is something difficult for the intellect to see or understand. We can be led to notice the thing which is difficult to see through the opposed opinions and arguments which surround it. Moreover, the opposed opinions and the arguments from them do not prove the thing difficult to understand anymore than, in the case of the eyes, the objects around a thing just noticed make it to be seen. They could disappear now and our eyes could still contemplate the object discovered.

It might be useful in this section of our thesis to consider also the uses for dialectic given at the beginning of Book Three of the Metaphysics of Aristotle. The first of these is that the solution of doubts or difficulties generated by dialectic is the discovery of truth. But, Descartes should have employed dialectic for this since he also found truth by solving difficulties:

if I have succeeded in discovering certain truths in the Sciences...I may say that they are resultant from, and dependent on, five or six principal difficulties which I have surmounted. (98)

Dialectic concentrates our mind upon where the difficulty lies since men dispute about difficult points. And this is what Descartes wants us to do:

When we have once adequately grasped the meaning of a "question", we ought to try and see exactly wherein the difficulty consists in order that, by separating it out from all complicating circumstances, we may resolve it the more easily. (99)

The second use of dialectic given in the Metaphysics is that it enables us to know where we are going; and the third use, when we have arrived. Descartes criticizes those who do not know these two things:

For frequently people are in such a hurry in their investigations that they bring only a blank understanding to their solution, without having settled what the marks are by which they are to recognize the fact of which they are in search, if it chance to occur. This is a proceeding as foolish as that of a boy, who, sent on an errand by his master, should be so eager to obey as to run off without having received his orders or knowing where to go. (100)

After dialectic, we know when we have arrived; scil., when we can solve all the difficulties as well as know why people had difficulties. We also know where we are going insofar as dialectic points out something difficult to see, and this latter is the end of every investigation. The fourth use of dialectic given in the Metaphysics is close enough to the third one in the Topics as to require no separate consideration.

Let these things, then, suffice, for a dialectical critique of the position of Descartes. Next we should investigate the nature of dialectic in order to solve later his objections against dialectic.

Section Four: A Brief View of the Art of Dialectic

Before attempting to resolve Descartes' objections, it is necessary to see something of the nature of dialectic. The latter could easily occupy a whole thesis--our consideration will be brief. We shall touch upon the difference of the dialectical syllogism from the other species of syllogism, the uses of dialectic, the elements and the definitions of dialectical propositions and problems, the four tools of dialectic, and the nature of a dialectical place. We shall thus touch upon most of the things considered in the first book of the Topics.

It will be useful to recall the definition of the syllogism before dividing it into its species. The syllogism may be defined as an argument in which, certain things being laid down, something other than them happens from necessity on account of those things being laid down. The things laid down are the major and minor premises with their three terms arranged in the various ways taught in the Prior Analytics. The thing which results is called the conclusion, and the necessity is not of the conclusion (which may, or may not, be necessary), but of its following from the premises. Even a probable or false conclusion can follow necessarily from the positing of probable or false premises. Next comes the division of the syllogism.

A demonstration is a syllogism that proceeds from true and primary premises or from such that were derived from true and primary premises. Such premises must be seen as necessarily true by the intellect which uses them to demonstrate something else. By "primary" is meant lacking any prior middle term through which they could be demonstrated. Euclid's geometry contains many demonstrations.

The dialectical syllogism is one which proceeds from probable opinions, and these latter are divided into those that seem to be so to all men, or to most men, or to wise men, either all of them, or most of them, or those most known and held in honor.

A third kind of syllogism is the "contentious" or sophistical one which proceeds from premises only apparently probable, or only apparently from probable premises, or which does both of these (like the arguments of Melissus which do not have probable premises and whose conclusions only appear to follow). Of course, when the conclusion only appears to follow, we have a syllogism equivocally. The definition of syllogism given above would not apply.

A fourth kind might be noted, the paralogism, which proceeds from the opposite of the proper principles of some science. This occurs in geometry, for example, when the figure has been falsely drawn.

Next in line are the uses of dialectic. The first use of dialectic is for the exercise of the reason. Most people are aware that the body needs exercise and also the internal sense powers like the memory and imagination. But it is not so easy to recognize that the human intellect or reason, as such, is in need of exercise. Yet, we see that men are easily deceived, especially in the beginning of the speculative life, and this is a sign of the weakness of man's reason: "investigationi rationis humanae plerumque falsitas admiscetur, propter debilitatem intellectus nostri in iudicando, et phantasmatum permixtionem." (101) The human reason is like the human body in a weakened condition, a body that is easily susceptible to any disease that comes along. We can call error, by a certain proportion, a disease of the reason. Hence, as bodily exercise makes the body more capable of withstanding harmful things and of doing its proper operation well, so dialectic strengthens the reason so that it is less easily deceived and more capable of achieving its end. Even the errors of those who have gone before us are useful to exercise the reason: "priores errantes circa veritatem, posterioribus exercitii occasionem dederunt, ut diligenti discussione habita, veritas limidius appareret." (102) Hence, a fortiori, the consideration of probable opinions, and the arguments drawn from them, will exercise the intellect or reason.

The second use of dialectic is for intellectual encounters with others in which we can argue against them from their own opinions. This is the most effective way of removing that impediment to seeing the truth which a man has who assents to a false opinion. Such a man thinks himself to know when really he is ignorant. It is by leading a man into a contradiction that we make him realize his ignorance. This is precisely what Socrates was fond of doing. In the Meno, we find an example of this when Socrates refutes (by leading into a contradiction) the slaveboy who thinks that the way to double a square is to double its side. Socrates, speaking to Meno, observes that "we have certainly, as would seem, assisted him in some way to the discovery of the truth, and now he will wish to remedy his ignorance, but then he would have been ready to tell all the world again and again that the double space should have a double side." (103) We might also compare this to what takes place in the body. Just as the doctor cannot induce health into his patient without first curing him of his disease, so the teacher cannot bring truth into a student's mind without first curing him of any errors he may have.

The third use of dialectic is in reference to the sciences, especially the philosophical ones. Dialectic enables us to construct probable arguments on both sides of a question precisely because there is some truth hidden there, some truth difficult to see. The opposed arguments "point out" to the mind where the difficulty lies, and hence the mind knows where to give its attention to find the solution. The solution is the discovery of some truth.

Dialectic has a special use in helping us to come to know the first principles of some sciences. The principles of a science cannot be approached by that science because there is nothing prior to them in that science. Thus, in natural science, we arrive at the principles of its subject--matter, form, and privation--through a long dialectical process as can be seen in Book One of Aristotle's Physics.

Next in line to be considered are the elements from which we construct dialectical propositions and dialectical problems. These are four in number: accident, genus, property and definition. Why these are the elements can be seen from the following consideration: Since the dialectical syllogism proceeds from probable opinions and not from the principles or causes of the thing, it cannot manifest why the predicate of its conclusion belongs to the subject of its conclusion. Hence, it can only argue that the predicate belongs, or does not belong, to the subject in some way. But the predicate, which belongs to a subject, is either convertible with that subject or not. And in either case, it either pertains to its nature or it does not. If it is not convertible with the subject and does not pertain to its nature, we have the predicate accident. If it is not convertible with the subject and does pertain to its nature, we have the predicate genus. If it is convertible, but outside the nature, we have the predicate property. Last, if it is convertible with the subject and pertains to its nature, we have the predicate definition. Dialectical propositions and problems are constructed from these, although they differ in the way in which they ask about them. The dialectical problem proposes one of the predicates in regard to some subject to be investigated, as whether habit is the genus of virtue or not? In this case, we are asking about the connection of the predicate with the subject which we intend to investigate. A dialectical proposition, however, asks the answerer to agree or disagree to the probability of a predicate belonging to a subject in one of the four ways as, is habit the genus of virtue or not? What do you think is probable? The dialectical argument does not investigate this question, but it proceeds from the answer given to conclude something else.

We should not overlook how the problems of accident, genus, and property, can be ordered to the problem of definition. What belongs as a definition must be convertible as a property and pertain to the nature of the subject as a genus. Likewise, it has to belong to the subject as does accident. Hence, if we show that a predicate does not belong to, or that it is not essential to, or not convertible with the subject, we shall also be showing that it is not said of the subject as a definition.

We have already said that dialectic does not show why the predicate belongs to the subject. The demonstrator shows why a property belongs to a subject, but the dialectician only concludes that a predicate belongs to a subject as a property of it. Yet he does not show this absolutely any more than he shows that a predicate belongs to its subject absolutely. The dialectician only shows that the conclusions follow from what has been accepted, or admitted, as probable. This is why the dialectician can show that a conclusion is probable, but never that it is true.

Next in line are the definitions of dialectical proposition and of dialectical problem. A dialectical proposition is an asking about the probable or a questioning of the probable. This seems to be a strange way of defining it since a question, as such, cannot be the premise of a syllogism. And, again, it seems that the dialectician does not have his proposition, or cannot argue, until some one has conceded that something is probable. The concession, however, is not a questioning, but an answer. But consider the following text of St Thomas:

...cum propositio accipiat alteram partem enunciationis, dialectica indifferenter accipit quancunque earum. Habet enim viam ad utranque partem contradictionis, eo quod ex probabilibus procedit. Unde etiam et in proponendo accipit utramlibet partem contradictionis et quaerendo proponit. Demonstrativa autem propositio accipit alteram partem determinate, quia nunquam habet demonstrator viam, nisi ad verum demonstrandum. Unde etiam semper proponendo accipit veram partem contradictionis. Propter hoc etiam non interrogat, sed sumit, qui demonstrat quasi notum. (104)

St Thomas does not say "proponit responsum", but "quaerendo proponit" for the dialectician. The demonstrator, however, proposes "determinate" the true part of a contradiction. Thus a dialectical proposition seems to be inbetween the indetermination of the mind with respect to both parts of a contradiction in a question and the determination of the mind to one half in the premise of a demonstration.

Yet the dialectical proposition is closer to a question than to a demonstrative premise:

Dialecticus enim nam procedit ex aliquibus principiis demonstrativis, neque assumit alteram partem contradictionis tantum, sed se habet ad utramque (contingit enim utramque quandoque vel probabilem esse, vel ex probabilibus ostendi, quae accipit dialecticus). Demonstrator autem non interrogat, quia non se habet ad opposita. (105)

A dialectical proposition is not, simpliciter loquendo, accepted by the intellect. The judgment of the answerer in dialectic does not bear upon the truth or falsity of the proposition, but merely upon its probability. The dialectician does not judge whether it is so, but whether it seems so to all men, or most men, or to all or most or the most famous of wise men. If the dialectician accepted the proposition simply, he would be able to assume only one part of the contradiction. We cannot understand the nature of a dialectical proposition without understanding the question that gives rise to it; just as we cannot understand our own intelligere without understanding the quoddam pati that gives rise to it.

A dialectical problem is a consideration striving either towards choice or avoidance, or towards truth and knowledge, either in themselves or as an aid to them. A dialectical problem always concerns something doubtful in regard to either human action (choice or avoidance), or the nature of things (truth and knowledge), or the tool of science--logic (an aid to the others). There is a "striving towards" rather than a resolution, because dialectic proceeds from probable opinions which conflict with each other and which cannot resolve a question. Resolution pertains to demonstration, just as judgment does.

Next we should consider the four instruments or tools of dialectic by which we may abound in dialectical syllogisms. The first tool of dialectic is to know how to take probable propositions or premises; the second, to be able to divide a word or distinguish how many senses it has; the third, to be able to find or discover differences; and the fourth, the consideration of likenesses. The last three also give one probable premises. If, for example, it be granted that good is desired, then, by the second tool, it can be said that the useful, the pleasant, and the noble are desired for these are all senses of the word good.

The first tool of dialectic consists in knowing the various ways of gathering probable propositions. First, we can look towards that which all or most men hold on the subject, or that which all or most or the most illustrious of learned men hold on that subject. Second, we can look towards those propositions about whose probability we would have a judgment similar to the ones we admit already as probable; or, in particular, towards those propositions which differ from the ones we admit as probable by having a contrary subject or predicate. If we admit as probable one of them, we must admit also as probable the other, provided one is affirmative and the other negative. For example, if it is probable that virtue is good, then, a proposition, changing either the subject or the predicate to its contrary, will also be probable, provided we make it negative. For the person who admits that virtue is good will also agree that vice is not good or that virtue is not evil. Or, again, if one proposition is admitted as probable, then another proposition, having both a contrary subject and a contrary predicate, will also be probable. For, if it is probable that vice is bad, it will also be probable that virtue is good. A third way of taking probable propositions is to gather the conclusions of the accepted arts and sciences. A fourth way is to gather those propositions which seem to be probable in all or most cases and about which we do not see exceptions. A fifth way is to list the opinions of different well-known authors. All of these probable propositions should be listed according to different subjects and arranged from the more universal to the less universal. This facilitates their memory and use.

The second tool of dialectic enables us to divide a word into its senses. This can be done in many ways. One way is through contraries. If a word has many contraries, either in words or just in meanings, then, it must have a separate sense or meaning for each; or, or, if one use of the word has a contrary, but another does not. Another way is to look at what is between the contraries. If these differ in quality or number, or if one use of contraries has a middle while another not, then the words signifying contraries have many senses. A third way is to see if the contradictory has many senses. A fourth way is to look at the privation or, in the case of a privation, at its habitus. A fifth way is to look at other words differing only in their ending and see if these have many meanings. If justly has many meanings, then justice has many meanings. A sixth way is to see if the word is said according to diverse genera or categories. The word good, for example, is said according to many categories. A seventh way, close to this, is to see if the word is said of things in diverse genera, one of which is not under the other. An eighth way is to examine this same thing in regard to the word's contrary. A ninth way is to define the word in combination with others, subtract what pertains to the other, and see if the definition remains the same. For example, the word odd has many meanings, for an odd number is a number which has a middle while an odd man is a man of strange habits. One can also investigate the parts of the definition to see if they are also said in many ways. A tenth way is to see if the word can be said more or less in its different uses. For example, news is not said to be more or less hot than boiling water. Hence, hot has more than one sense. An eleventh way is to see if differences under the word belong to genera that are not one under the other. Or a twelfth way, closely related, is to see if the word has diverse differences in different things of which it is said or in its diverse uses. The last way is to see if the word is used to signify both a species and a difference.

The third tool of dialectic is to discover or find the differences between things in the same genus or in genera not far apart. As the things whose differences we are trying to discover are closer, so our mind is exercised more in using this tool.

The fourth tool of dialectic is to consider the likeness of things in different genera, which likeness is between proportions (as X is to Y, so A is to B); or even the likeness of things in the same genus. As the things whose likeness we are considering are further apart, so our mind is exercised more in using this tool.

Next, we should consider the uses of the last three tools (the use of the first tool is quite clear). The tool of distinguishing the senses of a word is useful for clearness in a discussion and so the questioner and answerer will have in mind the same thing and not just the same word. Thirdly, it is useful to avoid sophisms, many of which are based on the multiplicity of words.

The tool of finding differences is useful for syllogisms about what is the same or other (these are subordinated to the problem of definition), and for knowing what each thing is since the ultimate part of a definition is a difference.

The tool of considering or finding likenesses is useful for inductions (which dialectic makes as well as syllogisms), for hypothetical syllogisms, and for definitions. One cannot progress towards the universal from singulars whose likeness one has not seen. Since there is the same judgments about things that are alike (insofar as they are alike), we can get the major premise of a hypothetical syllogism through seeing a likeness of proportions. For example, if what is more desired by us is less desirable in itself, then what is more known by us is less knowable in itself. This tool is also useful for the genus, or what is like a genus, in a definition, because every genus is something in which many species are alike. However, even a likeness of proportions is useful for getting the first part of a definition, as when we see a likeness of proportions between the soul in relation to a natural body equipped with tools and the power of sight in relation to the eye. Just, then, as the power of sight is the first act of the eye (while seeing is its second act), so the soul is the first act of a natural body equipped with tools.

The last thing to be considered in this section is the notion of a dialectical place. The greek word for places has been given as the name of Aristotle's work on dialectic; and, in fact, the six middle books of the eight books of the Topics give one the places in which the four just described tools are useful to construct dialectical syllogisms in regard to the four main problems (accident, genus, property, definition) and the other problems subordinated to them. Since the word place is carried over to dialectic (and rhetoric) from corporeal things, we must first discover the likeness which is at the basis of this transfer.

We say that bodies are in place and by place we understand, after a long discourse in Book Four of the Physics (Chs. 1-4), the unmoveable surface first surrounding a body. We say surrounding to distinguish place from the surface of the body contained in the place. Place is the surface of the container. First designates the proper place, which is no greater than the body contained, rather than a common place which also contains other bodies. Unmoveable should be taken formally, in reference to the entire universe, rather than materially; i.e., according to the body which is the subject of the surface. For example, a boat anchored in a river remains in the same place because the surface surrounding it is always situated in the same way with respect to the shore, even though that surface is always different in subject according to the different water flowing by.

The word place is carried over into dialectic and rhetoric and applied to a certain kind of proposition which is to the subject about which it helps us to conclude something, as is the place in nature to the body it contains. How are these two proportions alike?

First, just as the place in nature is outside the body it contains; so a dialectical place or rhetorical place is a proposition which is outside any particular subject it might help us to conclude something about. To take Aristotle's example in the Rhetoric, the following proposition is a place: if a predicate is said of the subject it is less apt to belong to, then it is also said of the subject it is more apt to belong to. This proposition pertains no more to the subject of one science than another. We could use it just as well in regard to the subject of natural science as to that of moral science or any other science. If a man thought it probable that the souls of brute animals were immortal, he would also admit this about the human soul for this latter is more thought to be immortal. Or, in moral science, if he thought that fornication was a sin, he would also agree that adultery was a sin since adultery is thought to be worse than fornication. Notice that the place is insufficient, by itself, for concluding something about any subject--one must take with it something else which is peculiar or proper to that subject. The four tools supply the propositions which are peculiar to a given subject. As in our examples, one might ask whether it did not seem to all or most men that adultery was worse than fornication, or whether most men did not think that man is more likely to have an immortal part in him than the other animals.

There is a second likeness to the place in nature that we can observe in the logical place. Just as bodies have a certain order or position among themselves according to the places they occupy; so the things in our intellect have a certain order among themselves according to the relations which the intellect attributes to them in their state of being understood. Thus we carry over words that first apply to the position or order of bodies in place to the order or position of things understood in the mind. For example, in the Categories, we speak of higher and lower genera, and in regard to the syllogism, we speak of before and after. This order in the intellect is based on the relations which the intellect attributes to things understood in their state of being understood, such as genus, species etc. And the dialectical places are based upon these common intentions. For example, there is the following place based on the intentions of genus and species: if a genus is said of a subject, then one of the species of that genus must also be said of that subject. Or, the former example we gave of place was based on the intentions of predicate and subject. This also agrees with what was said in regard to the first likeness since these intentions are extrinsic to the subjects considered:

Dialecticus autem procedit...ex intentionibus rationis, quae sunt extranea a natura rerum. Et ideo dicitur, quod dialecticus est tentativa, quia tentare proprium est ex principiis extraneis procedere. (106)

It might be good to investigate this more fully in light of the purpose of logic. The purpose of logic is to help us to come to a knowledge of what is unknown to us. But there are two ways of coming to a knowledge of what is unknown to us: one is to discover it by ourselves and the other is to acquire or learn it from another, from a teacher. The second way, although more common, presupposes the first and, in fact, imitates it. Let us start with the second which is more known to us. Since it is not by chance that the students learn something that was unknown to them from the teacher, there must be some determinate means whereby the teacher succeeds in bringing the students to a knowledge of what was unknown to them. What is common to every teacher is that he uses words to teach the student. Words seem to be a necessary tool which the teacher uses to communicate new knowledge. But how can words communicate knowledge of what is unknown to us? If we know the meanings of the words spoken to us, we already know anything the teacher can say. If the meanings of the words are unknown to us, the teacher again communicates nothing; just as if he were speaking in a foreign language not known to us.

If we take the first half of this dilemma which is more reasonable (for no one thinks that a teacher communicates anything if his words do not signify anything to the students); it follows that the teacher makes use only of what is known already to his students. Thus it must be that the teacher leads them to a knowledge of what is unknown to them through what is known to them. But, if the student comes to a knowledge of what is unknown to him through what he knows already, why does he need a teacher at all? What does the teacher add to the things the student knows already?

The words of the teacher not only signify things the student knows already, but also an order the student can put into his own knowledge. If the student could put that order into the things he knows without having some one else point it out to him, he would have no need of the teacher. This is, in fact, what that man does who discovers, by himself, something unknown to him. This is also why we said that learning imitates the process a man would go through in coming to know something by himself.

But, there is something more fundamental than the order which is put into the things we know so that we can come to a knowledge of the unknown. Man could not derive the unknown from the known unless they had some order or relation to each other. If there were no order or relation of the known to the unknown, it would be impossible to proceed by art (i.e., through determinate means) from one to the other. And, in fact, the order of things known to each other is for the sake of the order of things known to things unknown; just as the order of the parts of a chair to each other is for the sake of the order of the whole chair to sitting.

But, there are two kinds of order or relation that things known can have to things unknown. One is the order or relation that belongs to the things known, or the things unknown, considered in themselves, apart from any knowledge we may have of them. For example, smoke has a certain relation to fire apart from any knowledge we may have of them. Or, quantities equal to a third quantity have a certain relation to each other, and this relation belongs to them apart from any knowledge we may have of them. Or, any cause has a certain relation to its effect and vice-versa, and this is so apart form any knowledge we may have of them.

There is a second kind of relation or order that things known can have to things unknown and vice-versa. This is an order or relation that belongs to them in the state of being understood. And, since a thing is singular when sensed in nature and universal when understood, those relations which presuppose universality are relations that belong to things in their state of being understood. For example, the order or relation of habit to virtue and vice, or of these latter to habit, is one that belongs to them in the state of being understood. We name these relations genus and species, respectively. Or, to be a major or minor or middle term in a syllogism is to have a relation in the state of being understood.

Since logic directs us from a knowledge of the known to a knowledge of the unknown, it must be concerned with directing us on the basis of both of these kinds of relation that the known can have to the unknown. For it is possible to proceed by art from the known to the unknown on the basis of either of these kinds of relation or order.

This, however, seems to be contrary to the common opinion among those learned in logic; to wit, that the subject of logic is only the second kind of relation or order. It is said that the subject of logic is second intentions and, by second intentions, is meant those relations that belong to things understood in the very state of being understood.

We answer that the subject of logic is, indeed, second intentions. But, this does not prohibit logic from directing us from the known to the unknown on the basis of an order or relation which these things have to each other in reality. This does not mean, however, that logic has that relation as its subject. Rather the subject of logic is some relation that the thing known can have to the thing unknown in the state of being understood, which relation, however, presupposes a relation in reality itself. For example, because an effect has a relation to its proper cause in reality, we can use the effect (if it is known) as a middle term for concluding the existence of the cause (if this is unknown). To be a middle term, or that through which something else is made known, is a relation that belongs to the effect in the state of being understood. And to be a conclusion is something that belongs to the existence of the cause in the state of being understood. Now the effect could not be a middle term for manifesting the existence of its cause unless it had a real relation to its cause in reality. Hence, in showing us that an effect can be a middle term for manifesting the existence of its cause (or that a cause, made explicit in the definition of a subject, can be a middle term for manifesting why a property belongs to that subject in the conclusion), logic is showing us how to proceed by our reason from the known to the unknown on the basis of a real relation or order which they have to each other in reality, apart from any consideration we make of them.

All parts of logic, however, do not do this. This can be seen, for our purposes, in the part of logic concerning the complex unknown. In this part, we find both demonstration and dialectic. In demonstration, we proceed from the known to the unknown on the basis of a certain order or relation which they have to each other in reality, or in their proper natures, apart from their being understood. Thus, in geometry, we demonstrate that the triangle has its interior angles equal to two right angles (which was unknown to us before the demonstration) and we do so on the basis of the known relation of the exterior angle to the two interior and opposite angles which is one of equality (a relation based on the natures of the things; that is, upon their quantity) and also upon the known relation of quantities which are the results of adding equal quantities to the same quantity, which relation is also one of equality (if equals are added to results are equal, the results are equal: these relations of equality follow upon the very nature of quantity in itself and not upon its being understood). Or, in natural science, we demonstrate the existence of an unmoved mover (which is unknown) through the dependence in reality of motion (which is known) upon a mover and, ultimately, upon such a mover. Or, we demonstrate the nature of the soul (which is unknown) through those (known) operations which have in reality (even apart from our knowing it) a certain relation to, or order to, or dependence upon, the nature of the soul. Thus, in demonstration, we proceed from the known to the unknown on the basis of a certain order or relation which they have to each other in themselves; and the relations which belong to them in the state of being understood are something secondary, although such relations are the subject of the demonstrative part of logic. This is why there is no demonstrativa utens. The use of the demonstrative part of logic does not consist in proceeding from the second intentions studied there to demonstrate something about what is found in reality; rather it consists in proceeding from the causes or effects known in a particular science to demonstrate something about the effect or property or cause as the case may be.

The part of logic called dialectic also has as its subject relations that belong to things understood in the state of being understood. But, unlike the demonstrative part, it directs us in proceeding from the known to the unknown on the basis of the order or relation which they have to each other in the state of being understood. For example: every virtue is either moral or intellectual. But, human faith is neither a moral virtue nor is it an intellectual virtue. The unknown (human faith is not a virtue) has a certain order or relation to what is known (every virtue is either moral or intellectual, and human faith is not a moral virtue and human faith is not an intellectual virtue) which order is based on the relations of genus to species and of species to genus. Because of the relation of genus to species, we must attribute some species under a genus to whatever we wish to place under that genus. The relations of genus to species and vice-versa are relations that belong to the known and the unknown in the state of being understood. This is why there is a dialectica utens. One can proceed from the second intentions studied in the Topics to conclude something probable in the sciences.

From these things, we can see why the dialectical syllogism is said to be based on places. When we arrange things in place, there is a certain order or relation of them to each other. But this order or relation is not based necessarily upon anything intrinsic to them. Similarly, in dialectic, the order or relation is something extrinsic to the known and the unknown since the order which belongs to things in the state of being understood by us is extrinsic to them. However, this order may in some way touch upon an order which they have in themselves; just as the ancients thought that bodies were arranged in place according to something intrinsic to them.

A third likeness can also be observed. Just as our eyes look in various places for a body that is hidden to them; so our intellect considers various dialectical places to find what is unknown to it. If, for example, it were unknown to the intellect whether government was good for society, it might look at the opposite, anarchy, and see if it was bad for society. One knows where to look in this case through this dialectical place: if one member of a pair of contraries belongs to one member of another pair, then the remainder belongs to the remainder. This fits in with the fact that dialectic is in the pars inventiva of logic. Here, again we can see that the place is not sufficient without the tools--unless one had the proposition that anarchy is bad for society, one could not find anything in the place.

This notion of a dialectical place corresponds to the nature of a dialectical proposition or problem. A dialectical proposition is in the form of "do you think X is said of Y as an accident (or genus or property or definition)?" while a dialectical problem proposes to investigate "whether X is said of Y as an accident (or genus or property or definition)?" Now outside the intellect, one thing is not said of, or predicated of another. When we say that two is half of four, we make a statement about the way things are in themselves. But when we say that half of four is said of two as a property, we are first saying something about two as it is in our intellect. For something is said of, or predicated of two only in the intellect. Hence dialectic can proceed from second intentions which are relations that belong to things in their state of being understood. Thus the dialectician can argue that if a man admits that virtue is said of courage as a genus, he must also admit that the genera above virtue are also said of courage as remote genera. This follows from the very order of things in our mind as genera.

From these things, we can see how far dialectical arguments are from demonstrations in their principles and conclusions. The effect of demonstration is scire which St Thomas speaks about thus:

scire aliquid est perfecte cognoscere ipsum, hoc autem est perfecte apprehendere veritatem ipsius: eadem enim sunt principia esse rei et veritatis ipsius, ut patet ex II Metaphysicae. Oportet igitur scientem, si est perfecte cognoscens, quod cognoscit causam rei scitae. (107)

However, we must also avoid the opposite error of thinking that dialectic has nothing to do with the way things are. Something will not seem to be so to all men or most men, or to all or most learned men, or the most famous of them unless it has some element or appearance of the truth. And, the intentions, upon which the places are based, result from a way of truly understanding something outside the intellect. They are, thus, not arbitrary or fictitious. This is also why there can be a science about them although we cannot have science by arguing from them in other sciences. Moreover, when a man is led by dialectical arguments to contradict himself, this shows that he has not attained things as they are.

Let these things suffice, then, for a glimpse at the nature of the art of dialectic. Next, in the last section of this part, we shall answer the objections drawn from Descartes against dialectic.

Section Five: An Answer to Descartes' Objections Against Dialectic

It is now time to answer the objections which have been drawn from Descartes against dialectic in the second section of this Part. We shall first answer the particular objections against the uses of dialectic since from this will become clear the answer to the general objections.

The first argument against the use of dialectic to exercise the mind is that such exercise must be bad, for it produces a bad habit--scepticism. The construction of arguments leading to opposite conclusions on every subject makes the mind think that truth is unattainable by us.

We answer that dialectical arguments must be regulated by art and every art aims at the mean. A moderate use of dialectical arguments does not produce scepticism, but makes the intellect more able to distinguish, compare, and avoid error. The mean in dialectical arguments, both as to their number and their difficulty, must be considered, not only in relation to a subject, but especially in regard to the student. They should be neither too many nor too difficult for the student at his stage of development. Dialectical arguments should not be separated from an eventual solution of the doubt generated by them, and they should not be multiplied so much that the student despairs of reaching the truth. Scepticism is a kind of despair and despair, like its opposite, hope, concerns a bonum arduum. But the doubts or difficulties generated by dialectical arguments are a bonum arduum. When those difficulties are excessively multiplied and no solutions are given, the student loses hope of achieving the difficult good--truth--and despairs. This despair is the substance of scepticism. Descartes probably experienced an unregulated use of dialectical arguments which easily produces the despair of scepticism.

The second argument against the use of dialectic as an exercise for the intellect is that dialectical arguments against the truth leave our mind disposed against the truth. This disposition is bad and, hence, the exercise that produces it is bad.

We answer that it is proper to dialectic to argue on both sides of a question and, thus, the mind is not left with a strong disposition against the truth. Besides, dialectical arguments are not capable of generating a habit, i.e., a quality difficult to change, unless they are thought to be demonstrative. But this latter is due to an ignorance of the art of dialectic. Moreover, any disposition left in the mind by dialectical arguments against the truth (unless they are excessive) is a per accidens help in coming to a fuller knowledge of the truth. For the mind attempts with much greater intensity to know the truth when trying to overcome that disposition, or solve those dialectical arguments, than it would have if it simply tended towards the truth without facing any impediments.

The third argument against the use of dialectic as an exercise is that dialectical arguments may lead us by custom or repetition to think that we have really attained certitude.

To this we can give again the first two answers that we gave above to the second argument. The art of dialectic constructs arguments on both sides so that we are not convinced merely because we have heard only one side. Again, if we have the art of dialectic, we will recognize dialectical arguments for what they are. Moreover, the person who has not exercised his mind on both sides of a difficult question is much more apt to be deceived into thinking that some probable or sophistical argument is a demonstration; for, he sees nothing in opposition to his probable or sophistical argument which would lead him to examine that argument more carefully.

The following argument was raised against the second use of dialectic in regard to meeting an opponent with his own opinions: a good argument should be convincing to all. Thus, we use the same scientific reason with others that we used to convince ourselves. The geometer, for example, uses the same demonstration with his class that before convinced him. Hence, there can be no valid logic to construct arguments that are not convincing for all.

We answer that every good argument proceeds from the more known, but one cannot say that the more known is in every way the same for all men. That which approaches more closely to what men know naturally is more known to them. But natural here can mean two things. If we are referring to the nature of man which is common to all men, then the same things are more known to all men; e.g., the things they can sense are more known to men than the non-sensible or immaterial things. But, if we are referring to what is sometimes called second nature--the habits, customs and traditions a man acquires or is a part of--then, it is clear that the same things are not more known or accepted by all men. All men have not had the same teachers, or been in the same schools, or heard the same opinions repeated throughout their lives. Hence, since men tend to proceed from the more known in the second sense as much as, if not more than, they do from the more known in the first sense (the reason for this is that habit is a more proximate and determinate principle), it is often necessary to start with them where they are, even though this is different from your starting-point. But to start with the other person's opinions is to proceed dialectically. Through his true opinions (he has them, since nature in the first sense is never entirely corrupted by bad habits), we lead a man to contradict his false opinions, and thus we shall lead him back to the nature which is common to all men.

Again, people make errors. But the person who is in error thinks himself to know. Hence, he is in a different position with regard to the truth than is a man who is merely ignorant. The latter merely lacks the truth while the former has a positive or real disposition against, or contrary to, the truth. But, the second use of dialectic does not communicate science or truth; rather, it eliminates a disposition contrary to the truth. Hence, it is not strange that its arguments are different from those of science which is the same for all. Truth is one, but there are an infinity of errors against it. Although truth is the same for all, the errors which men make against truth are not always the same. Hence, the dialectical arguments, which help to remove their errors, are not the same.

The argument against the third use of dialectic was as follows: in science where one gets necessary knowledge (as in geometry), a proposition is either obvious (as the principles) or shown through ones that are obvious (as the conclusions). But in neither of these two cases is there a need for making something clearer by arguing to opposites. What is obvious needs no manifestation, and why argue to its opposite which is manifestly false? The conclusions are made known by being deduced necessarily from the principles, not by arguing to opposites. Hence, we find no arguing to opposites in Euclid when he draws his conclusions necessarily. Hence, dialectic is useless for making the truth appear better in a science.

We answer that dialectic is useful to those wanting to investigate truth more than to those who already have the truth. We will see that this is so concerning the principles in the answer to the next objection. But, even after one has the principles, it does not follow that one sees everything to which the power of those principles extends. Otherwise, as soon as one had acquired the principles of a science, he would possess the whole science. But this is not so as we can see in the case of a student who has just acquired the proper principles of geometry. He still needs to be instructed about the various conclusions that can be deduced from those principles. But, in geometry (or arithmetic), once a man has deduced conclusions from the principles, he can demonstrate those same conclusions to another man without using dialectic. Why cannot this be done without dialectic in the other sciences, like natural science or metaphysics?

When we examine the subjects of these other sciences (natural science and metaphysics), we see that they are difficult for our intellect to understand for reasons that do not apply to the subject of geometry. But the subjects of natural science and metaphysics are difficult to know for different reasons. The things studied in natural science (like matter, motion, time etc.) are difficult to know on account of their lack of being and, hence, lack of knowability, while the things studied in metaphysics (like the separated substances) are difficult to know on account of the weakness of our intellect--even though they are in themselves the most knowable. But the things studied in geometry (like triangles and squares) do not lack being, as mobile things, nor are they above the capacity of our intellect. We find something similar to this in the case of our eyes. My eyes have no difficulty in seeing the printed page before me now with the light there is. But it is difficult for my eyes to look at the sun, or to see something in the dark. The reason for the difficulty in seeing is not the same in each case. The sun is difficult to look at, not because it lacks visibility, but because our eye is too weak, the sun being too bright for it. The difficulty in the other case is due to the object which lacks visibility; i.e., lacks light whence things are visible. Sciences like natural science have a difficulty analogous to the eye's difficulty in seeing things in the dark. Things like motion and time are difficult to know because they barely exist. When Shakespeare compares time to the waves, he is giving time an existence it does not have. Our minutes, unlike the waves, do not exist together. Sciences like metaphysics or theology have a difficulty analogous to the eye's difficulty in looking at an object that is too bright for it. But the subject of geometry is analogous to something that is not difficult for the eyes to see.

Thus, the proper principles of the mathematical sciences are easy to grasp while those of the non-mathematical sciences are grasped with difficulty and imperfectly. Then, since one must grasp a principle in itself before seeing what its power extends to, it follows that there is in the non-mathematical sciences a special difficulty of seeing what the power of their principles extends to. As we grasp their principles only imperfectly, we cannot immediately see what follows from them even when the order of them to certain conclusions is proposed by the teacher. But, this is not so in geometry. There we see immediately that the principles involve a certain conclusion once the order of the former to the latter has been proposed by the teacher. This is why we have no need of dialectic in geometry. But, how does dialectic help us to see what follows from the proper principles of the other sciences?

Dialectic constructs probable arguments about the conclusions of a science. These probable arguments generate a doubt or problem about the conclusion. The intellect is forced to resolve that doubt. The resolution of this doubt about the conclusion is made only by extending the power of the principles to that conclusion. We see by experience in these non-mathematical sciences that the student cannot well see how the power of the principles extends to new conclusions until he has tried to resolve the doubts about those conclusions.

We can also consider this difficulty about extending the power of the principles in the non-mathematical sciences in regard to what they are extended to. We often deuce properties, or something like a property, in the sciences. But, the properties of mathematical things are not difficult to know as far as their quid nominis is concerned; e.g., although many demonstrations are required before the intellect sees that the triangle must have its interior angles equal to two right angles, there is no difficulty in seeing what it is to have interior angles equal to two right angles. But this is not so in the non-mathematical sciences. It is not easy to see what those things are which follow upon mobile being, the subject of natural science. Motion, place, and time are obscure. Similarly in theology, it is not easy to go from one attribute of God to another, but there are difficulties even in regard to what the attributes are; e.g., eternity is not only difficult to prove of God, but it is also difficult to know what eternity is. Hence there is also a need for dialectic because our intellect sees what the property is in an imperfect way. From these things, one can begin to see that the deductions in the non-mathematical sciences have a need for dialectic because of our necessarily imperfect and difficultly acquired knowledge of both the principles and the properties to be deduced from them.

The next objection is against the particular use of dialectic with respect to the principles of the non-mathematical sciences: if dialectic is used to arrive at the principles of a science, you would come to know the principles from opinions. But, opinions are not certain. Hence, the principles would not be certain either, and this is contrary to the notion of principle of a science. Hence, dialectic is useless for knowing the principles of a science.

We answer that the principles do not depend upon the dialectical arguments in being understood, but in coming-to-be understood. These two things are not the same at all. Something can depend upon something else in order to come into existence and still not depend upon that other thing once it exists. A house depends upon the man building it in order to come into existence. But, once it exists, the house does not require the man who built it. He can die and the house will continue to exist.

Now we do not have need of dialectic even to come to understand the principles of geometry since these latter have no special difficulty for our intellect. But in the non-mathematical sciences, as we have seen, there are special difficulties, not met with in the case of the mathematical sciences. Their principles are hidden to us because, unlike quantity as quantity, they are not per se represented in our phantasms or images which are to our intellect as exterior colors are to our eyes. But, they can be pointed out with the help of dialectic. This process of pointing them out does not make the principles depend upon the dialectical arguments in order to be understood in themselves once we have come upon them. This is similar to what happens in the case of the eyes when something in the distance is pointed out to them. We direct a person's eyes to something in the distance that he did not notice through other things that his eyes cannot miss. But, once his eyes come upon the object unnoticed before, he can see it by itself without any dependence on the objects which led him to it. Now the conflict of opinions on difficult questions is something the human intellect does not easily miss. When these are developed into dialectical arguments, there is pointed out to the intellect where there is something difficult to see or understand. The intellect concentrates itself there and may eventually unravel the difficulty, hitting upon the principle difficult to see or understand.

Let us take an example of this process. The first thing to be considered in the science of logic is the universal; yet most men do not know distinctly what a universal is, since it transcends our senses and imagination whence our intellectual knowledge is derived. This, then, is an example of a principle which the human intellect does not easily grasp. How, then, could it be pointed out to those who founded the science of logic? Let us look at the following example of dialectical discussion from the Parmenides of Plato. Parmenides is questioning Socrates:

"But I should like to know whether you mean that there are certain ideas of which all other things partake, and from which they derive their names; that similars, for example, become similar, because they partake of similarity, and great things become great because they partake of greatness; and that just and beautiful things become just and beautiful, because they partake of justice and beauty?"

"Yes, certainly," said Socrates, "that is my meaning."

"Then each individual partakes either of the whole of the idea or else of a part of the idea? Can there be any other mode of participation?"

"There cannot be," he said.

"Then do you think that the whole idea is one, and yet, being one, is in each one of the many?"

"Why not, Parmenides?" said Socrates.

"Because one and the same thing will exist as a whole at the same time in many separate individuals, and will therefore be in a state of separation from itself."

"Nay, but the idea may be like the day which is one and the same in may places at once, and yet continuous with itself, in this way each idea may be one and the same in all at the same time."

"I like your way, Socrates, of making one in many places at once. You mean to say, that if I were to spread out a sail and cover a number of men, there would be one whole including many--is not that your meaning?"

"I think so."

"And would you say that the whole sail includes each man, or a part of it only, and different parts different men?"

"The latter."

"Then, Socrates, the ideas themselves will be divisible, and things which participate in them will have a part of them only and not the whole idea existing in each of them."

"That seems to follow." (108)

Socrates' dilemma is due to his ignorance of something difficult to see or understand: the universal whole. Such a whole does not fall directly under our senses and imagination like the sensible integral whole. Hence, while the latter is easy to understand, the former is not. In speaking about the universal whole, which is said to be a whole according to a later universal sense of the word, Socrates, quite naturally, falls back upon the primary meaning of whole which is the integral one coming under his senses and imagination. Hence, he falls into doubt, and his doubt is a sign of there being something difficult to see in the matter. When our intellect concentrates on this difficulty, it sees the necessity of extending the word whole, with a new imposition, to the universal. When this has been done, a principle of logic has been discovered. But that principle would never have been gotten out of the phantasms or images (where only the prime analogue of whole is represented) unless one had gone through this dialectical process or one similar to it.

Difficulties similar to this are also found in metaphysics and theology where we must also transcend our imagination. There seems to be a very close connection between the logical doctrine of analogy and the use of dialectic to bring the principles into our intellect from the phantasms or images which are to our intellect, something like exterior colors are to our eyes. We can also see this close connection in natural science where the difficulty is due to the dimness of the object we are trying to know. In book one of the Physics, we find the difficulties of Anaxagoras who came the closest to understanding prime matter. Anaxagoras cannot quite reach an understanding of the way things are in prime matter. Like Socrates, he falls back upon a prior sense of the word. He thinks of things as being in prime matter as they are in a box or as parts are in a whole. Hence, like Socrates, he falls into all kinds of difficulties as Aristotle shows there. Our senses and imagination in some way attain directly to those first meanings of in, but only the intellect can extend the word in, with a new imposition, to being in the potentiality of matter. The intellect would never do this, however, except in the face of difficulties like those confronting Anaxagoras' position. We do not have these difficulties, however, in the case of the principles of geometry since these things fall directly under the imagination whence our intellectual knowledge begins.

After these things, it is not difficult to answer the general objections against dialectic. The first general objection was that dialectic can give us no certitude since it proceeds from probable opinions. Hence, it can be of no use in the speculative intellect which desires certitude.

We answer that, although dialectic cannot give us certitude, it can be most useful in preparing the way for a certain knowledge both of the principles and of the conclusions of the non-mathematical sciences. Moreover, it is not possible for the speculative intellect to have certitude everywhere and a probable knowledge is better than complete ignorance.

The second general objection against dialectic was as follows: the opinions of men disagree. Hence, falsehood is found in them. But, from false premises, you will probably eventually get false conclusions. And, in fact, some conclusions must be false since they are opposed (in fact, to lead to opposite conclusions is proper to dialectic and rhetoric). But, we desire to attain truth and avoid error by our reasoning. Therefore, dialectic is useless.

We answer that dialectic does not proceed from just any opinions, but from the probable. The probable has some element of truth in it, and that element of truth is what we want, not the element of falsehood. No man gets the whole truth by himself, but each one seizes some part of it. Dialectic enables us to collect these parts. Thus, dialectic is similar to listening to the advice of many men before making up our mind. We do not, however, swallow the advice of every man or everything a man may say. Moreover, if we proceed according to the art of dialectic, there is no error in concluding something which is false. The error would consist in assenting to that false conclusion as if it were true in itself. But, the dialectician, as we have seen above, does not assent absolutely to his conclusion. He merely shows that it follows from what is admitted as probable.

The third general objection against dialectic was this: since you argue to opposite conclusions with dialectic, you will contradict yourself. This contradiction or inconsistency is a sign of poor reasoning. Hence, dialectic is useless.

We answer that there is no contradiction in the person who says, for example, that it is probable that happiness is sense pleasure and that happiness is not sense pleasure. The affirmation is probable because it seems so to most men. The negation is probable because it seems so to wise men like Aristotle. But, if a person himself were made to assent to both of these through different arguments starting from opinions he had admitted as being true, such a man would be inconsistent. But to discover this inconsistency is not bad for it reveals an error which can then be eliminated.

This concludes Part Two. In the next Part, we shall look at something even more fundamental.

PART THREE

Section One: Some Elements of the Mode of Proceeding of the Human Intellect

In this Part, we shall do three things. In Section One, we shall recall certain elements of the mode of proceeding which is in conformity with the human intellect, the mode of proceeding which should be observed in human intellectual knowledge. Then, in Section Two, we shall show how Descartes erred about these elements. And, in Section Three, we shall show how Descartes' errors about the diversity of the sciences, their proper modes or methods, and dialectic were influenced by, or in accordance with, his more fundamental errors on the mode of proceeding which is in conformity with the human intellect.

In Section One, we shall do two things: first, we shall touch upon eight things required for, or involved in, human intellectual knowledge. Second, in the light of those eight things, we shall distinguish about fifteen things pertaining to the mode of proceeding in conformity with the human intellect.

Three of the things required for human intellectual knowledge are given in the following text of St Thomas: "ad cognitionem intellectivam tria requiruntur: scilicet potentia intellectus, lumen quo intelligit et similitudo rei per quam cognitio rei determinatur." (109) A fourth thing is required to understand fully the nature of the human intellect. This is the human soul since the human intellect is a power of that soul, and a proper accident must be defined in reference to its proper subject.

A fifth thing required for any knowledge is touched upon by St Thomas in these words: "Requiritur autem ad quamlibet cognitionem determinata proportio cognoscentis ad cognoscibilis." (110)

The sixth and seventh things involved in human intellectual knowledge are reception and judgment: "Circa cognitionem autem humanae mentis duo oportet considerare: scilicet acceptionem sive repraesentationem rerum; et iudicium de rebus praesentatis." (111)

Besides these seven things, one might also consider the role of the will in the intellectual life of man since the will applies the intellect to some end whether speculative or practical:

conjunctio intellectus ad voluntatem non facit intellectum practicum, sed ordinatio ad opus; quia voluntas enim est finis. Sed finis invenitur in speculativo et practico intellectu. (112)

Let us recall (per modum fidei) a bit of the doctrine of Aristotle and St Thomas on each of these eight things (beginning with the soul) so that we can see better what belongs to the mode of proceeding in conformity with the human intellect.

After a long dialectical investigation of the nature of the soul in book one of the De Anima, we are prepared for the process of division in the beginning of book two that enables us to establish the definition of the soul as the first act of a natural body equipped with tools. The soul is act or form in the genus of substance. The human soul, although it is an act of a body, is not entirely grasped or absorbed by the body, as is shown by the fact that it has a power--the human intellect--that does not have a bodily organ. This latter is shown in book three of the De Anima, after a long approach through the external senses and then the internal senses from which, at long last, the intellect is distinguished.

It is shown by a subtle argument (113) that the human intellect is not the same as the human soul, but is only a power of it. Since potency is said in reference to act, the human soul (which is in potency to existence) and the human intellect (which is in potency to understanding) cannot be the same because their proper acts are not the same. That our understanding is not the same as our existence is clear from the fact that we are not always understanding when we exist. From the fact that we are sometimes understanding only in potency and, later, in act, it can be seen that our intellect is a passive power.

In the Prima Pars (114), St Thomas shows that the human soul understands, by its intellect, corporeal things through similitudes or likenesses of them abstracted from the phantasms or images derived from sensation, rather than through innate ideas. It is the agent intellect, another power of the soul, that makes the phantasms taken from the senses intelligible in act through a certain abstraction. (115) Because of this role, the agent intellect can be called a light by analogy to the light which makes things visible to the eyes. But this light of our agent intellect is quite unlike that found in the angels:

lumen intellectuale...est purum...in angelis...in nobis autem lumen huiusmodi est obumbratum per coniunctionem ad corpus et ad vires corporeas. (116)

The fifth thing to be considered is the proportion of our intellect to its object:

potentia cognoscitiva proportionatur cognoscibili. Unde intellectus angelici, qui est totaliter a corpore separatus, obiectum proprium est substantia intelligibilis a corpore separata...Intellectus autem humani, qui est coniunctus corpori, proprium obiectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens; et per huiusmodi naturas visibilium rerum etiam in invisibilium rerum aliqualem cognitionem ascendit. De ratione autem huius naturae est, quod in aliquo individuo existat, quod non est absque materia corporali: sicut de ratione naturae lapidis est quod sit in hoc lapide, et de ratione naturae equi quod sit in hoc equo, et sic de aliis. Unde natura lapidis, vel cuiuscumque materialis rei, cognosci non potest complete et vere, nisi secundum quod cognoscitur ut in particulari existens. Particulare autem apprehendimus per sensum et imaginationem. Et ideo necesse est ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat suum obiectum proprium, quod convertat se ad phantasmata, ut speculetur naturam universalem in particulari existentem. (117)

This is why the mathematical sciences are so well proportioned to our intellect. For these sciences study an object that is directly or per se represented in the phantasms.

Next, we must distinguish between reception and judgment in our intellectual knowledge. These are not the same. One sign of their difference is that reception is more perfect in sleep than when awake, but the reverse is true for judgment:

in cognitio duo est considerare: scilicet receptionem, et iudicium de receptis. Quantum igitur ad iudicium de receptis, potior est vigilantis cognitio quam dormientis; quia iudicium vigilantis est liberum, sed iudicium dormientis ligatum...sed quantum ad receptionem, cognitio dormientis est potior, quia quiescentibus sensibus ab exterioribus motibus interiores impressiones magis recipiuntur. (118)

A second sign of their distinction is that the certitude of judgment is had more in our confused knowledge than in our distinct knowledge; just as more errors can be, and are, made in trying to know a thing distinctly than in trying to know it confusedly. But there is more perfect representation or reception of something in our distinct knowledge. This also appears in the sense from which our intellectual knowledge is derived. The sense of touch gives us a greater certitude (which is sought in judgment), than the sense of sight, as appears in the doubting Apostle, Thomas. Yet, the sense of sight receives things more clearly and distinctly.

A third sign is that it is not the same to receive or grasp what another man is saying and to judge its truth or falsity. Often men have the first while being unable to judge. At other times, they judge something other than what the man has said.

A fourth sign is that it is by judgment in the strict sense that the intellect goes most beyond the reception or grasping that is common to it and the senses:

verum . . . . secundum sui primam rationem est in intellectu. Cum autem omnis res sit vera secundum quod habet propriam formam natura suae, necesse est quod intellectus, inquantum est cognoscens, sit verus inquantum habet similitudinem rei cognitae, quae est forma eius inquantum est cognoscens. Et propter hoc per conformitatem intellectus et rei veritas definitur. Unde conformitatem istam cognoscere, est cognoscere veritatem. Hanc autem nullo modo sensus cognoscit; licet enim visus habeat similitudinem visibilis, non tamen cognoscat comparationem quae est inter rem visam et id quod ipse apprehendit de ea. Intellectus autem conformitatem sui ad rem intelligibilem cognoscere potest: sed tamen non apprehendit eam secundum quod cogniscit de aliquo quod quid est, sed quando iudicat rem ita se habere sicut est forma quam de re apprehendit, tunc primo cognoscit et dicit verum. Et hoc facit componendo et dividendo...

Veritas quidem igitur potest esse in sensu, vel in intellectu cognoscente quod quid est, ut in quadam re vera: non autem ut cognitum in cognoscente quod importat nomen veri; perfectio enim intellectus est verum ut cognitum. Et ideo, proprie loquendo, veritas est in intellectu componente et dividente. (119)

By a reception of the likeness of the thing known, the intellect and senses are only said to be true things. The intellect, however, has an act with respect to the truth that the senses do not have. In this act, judgment, it is said to know the truth. Judgment, then, is distinct from reception since the latter is found in the senses as well as the intellect while judgment, in this strict sense, is found only in the intellect.

The distinction between reception and judgment also becomes clear when we see that the judgment of our intellect requires, for its perfection, something in addition to reception:

iudicium non dependet tantum a receptione speciei, sed ex hoc quod ea de quibus iudicatur, examinatur ad aliquod principium cognitionis, sicut de conclusionibus iudicamus eas in principia resolvendo...Sed quia primum principium nostrae cognitionis est sensus, oportet ad sensum quodammodo resolvere omnia de quibus iudicamus; unde Philosophus dicit in III Caeli et Mundi, quod complementum artis et naturae est res sensibilis visibilis, ex qua debemus de aliis iudicare; et similiter dicit in VI Ethicorum quod sensus sunt extremi sicut intellectus principiorum, extrema appellans illa in quae fit resolutio iudicantis. (120)

We can also consider the distinction between reception and judgment in reference to the intelligible species and the light of the intellect. The similitude or likeness of the thing is received in the intellect where it may be called the intelligible species, and, by it, the intellect is capable of forming a thought in which the thing is represented. But the intelligible species do not determine the judgment:

Species etiam intelligibiles non determinant ad cognitionem veram aut falsam, ad assensum vel dissensum; sed solum habent repraesentare objectum, circa quod possunt plures actus exerceri. (121)

The perfection of judgment is more attributed to the light of the intellect.

If some one did not separate the reception in knowing (reception of the form of another as other while retaining one's own) from material reception, he would not be apt to distinguish judgment (the perfection of knowledge) from the reception involved in knowing. One judges that he has received the form of another as other; one judges the conformity of his mind to things.

The will has a very important role in the intellectual life of man because it moves the intellect to its act, as every agent moves what is subject to it. The intellect is subject to the will as an agent, because the object of the will is the good or end in general under which the intellect and its act and object fall as particular goods or ends.

* * * * *

After these things, we can see better some of the things which are included in the mode of proceeding which is in conformity with the human intellect. We do not intend to treat of this mode exhaustively; rather, we shall distinguish some elements that are relevant to our consideration of Descartes.

The first element is that all our intellectual knowledge proceeds, or is derived, from sensible things. This is because our intellect, although an immaterial power, is a power of the human soul which is an act or form of a body:

Cum anima humana...secundum naturam est actus corporis, eius autem intellectiva potentia non est actus organi corporalis, ita habet naturalem aptitudinem ad cognoscendum corporalium et sensibilium veritatem, quae sunt minus cognoscibilia secundum suam naturam propter eorum materialitatem, sed tamen cognisci possunt per abstractionem sensibilium a phantasmatibus. Et quia hic modus cognoscendi veritatem convenit naturae humanae animae secundum quod est forma talis corporis; quae autem sunt naturalia semper manent; impossibile est, quod anima humana huiusmodi corpori unita cognoscat de veritate rerum, nisi quantum potest elevari per ea quae abstrahendo a phantasmatibus intelligit. (122)

Since sensation (which is of singulars) precedes intellectual knowledge in man, we can also say that singulars precede universals in the whole of human knowledge.

The second thing we can note in the mode of proceeding to be observed in man's intellectual knowledge is that our intellect proceeds from potency to act. Our intellect is a passive power--sometimes understanding only in potency, and, at other times, in act. Hence, it must proceed from potency to act. This corresponds to its starting point, sensible things represented in our phantasms which are intelligible only in potency, but are made intelligible in act by the agent intellect.

The third thing to be observed is that our intellect proceeds from what is more known to us to what is more knowable. That is more knowable which has more being, or is more in act, because each thing is knowable insofar as it has being or is in act (as is shown in the ninth book of the Metaphysics). But, what is more known to us is not these things because our intellect proceeds from potency to act and starts from sensible things which are intelligible only in potency. Hence, it is necessary for us to begin with things that are less knowable because they are more known to us.

A fourth thing to be noted in the mode of proceeding which is in conformity with the human intellect is that the confused comes before the distinct in our knowledge and is also more certain for us. This is true because, as we saw above, our intellect proceeds from potency to act:

confusa...dicuntur quae continent in se aliqua in potentia et indistincte. Et quia cognoscere aliquid indistincte, medium est inter potentiam et actum perfectum, ideo dum intellectus noster procedit de potentia in actum primo occurit sibi confusam quam distinctum. (123)

Since what is more known to us is also more certain for us, there is an inverse ratio for us between certitude and clarity or distinction. Our more certain knowledge is less distinct (more confused) while our more distinct knowledge is less certain. Since the more universal is more confused than the less universal, our intellect also proceeds from the more universal to the less universal.

Since man's intellect proceeds from potency to act, it has a likeness to things that are generated slowly in nature. This is the fifth thing we can note--our intellect comes to a perfect knowledge gradually, step by step, or bit by bit:

oportet quod aliquid prius figuraliter dicatur, id est secundum quandam similitudinarium et extrinsecam quodammodo descriptionem; et deinde oportet ut manifestatis quibusdam aliis resumatur illud quod fuit prius figuraliter determinatum, et sic iterato plenius describatur...ad naturam cuiuslibet hominis pertinere videtur, ut ea quae bene continent descriptionem alicuius rei perducat de imperfecto ad perfectum particulatim disponendo. Primo scilicet unam partem, et postea aliam investigando. Ad hominis enim naturam pertinet ratione uti ad veritatis cognitionem. Rationis autem proprium est non statim apprehendere veritatem: et ideo ad hominem pertinet paulatim in cognitione vertitatis proficere. Substantiae vero separatae, quae intellectuales dicuntur, statim absque inquisitione notitiam vertitatis habent. (124)

This gradual process takes time, not only as far as one individual is concerned, but also as far as the human race is concerned. In time, an individual may see something that he did not see before, and one man may add to what his predecessors found.

Not only does man proceed gradually to the truth in science, but he must have many sciences to acquire the truth of which he is capable. This division of the sciences is the sixth thing we are considering in the mode of proceeding which is in conformity with the human intellect. The necessity of many sciences for man is ultimately found in the lack of universality in the similitudes drawn from the phantasms and in the dimness of our intellectual light:

Divisio autem in diversis rebus cognoscendis contingit in nobis ex hoc quod formae intelligibiles in nobis sunt minime universales. Unde oportet quod diversas res per diversas species cognoscamus. Et diversae species secundum genus faciunt diversos habitus scientiarum...non omnis diversitas rerum facit diversas scientias, sed diversitas quae requirit diversam rationem cognoscendi; sicut naturalia distinguuntur a mathematicis...non quaelibet specierum diversitas facit diversum habitum--alias oportet quod quot sunt res, tot essent scientiae--sed diversitas specierum quae non reducuntur ad eumdem modum cognitionis secundum genus: quae quidem diversitas contingit ex hoc quod lumen intellectus nostri est perturbatum (particulatum) et debile. (125)

The reason for the weakness of our intellectual light was given above. The lack of universality in our similitudes or intelligible species is seen by the fact that we require a separate thought for each thing we wish to know distinctly.

The seventh thing to be considered is the difficulty in our intellectual knowledge due to the lack of perfect proportion between our intellect and its objects. Since all knowledge requires a proportion of the knower to the known, this difficulty can result from one of two causes:

in omnibus, quae consistunt in quaedam habitudine unius ad alterum, potest impedimentum dupliciter vel ex uno vel ex alio accidere: sicut si lignum non comburatur, hoc contingit vel quia ignis est debilis, vel quia lignum non est bene combustibilis; et similiter oculus impeditur a visione alicuius visibilis aut quia est debilis aut quia visibile est tenebrosum. Sic igitur potest contingere quod veritas sit difficilis ad cognoscendus, vel propter defectum qui est in ipsis rebus, vel propter defectum qui est in intellectu nostro. (126)

The difficulty in knowing due to things themselves is especially noticeable in man's intellectual knowledge because our knowledge is derived from sensible things which lack knowability on account of their deficient and imperfect being; as can be seen, for example, in matter, motion, time etc.

However, man has even greater difficulty in trying to know the things which are most knowable--the things which are most in act; i.e., the separated substances. Since man's intellectual knowledge is derived from sensible things which are intelligible only in potency, and because man's intellect proceeds from potency to act, he is apt to know last the things which are most in act and intelligible in act. Since these latter, however, are most knowable, it can be seen that the chief difficulty in man's intellectual knowledge is due to the weakness of his intellect. This also is in accord with what was seen above; to wit, that what is more known to us is really less knowable.

On account of these difficulties especially, one man has need of the help of others to attain truth sufficiently:

adjuvatur enim unus ab altero ad considerationem veritatis dupliciter. Uno modo directe. Alio modo indirecte. Directe quidem juvatur ab his qui veritatem invenerunt; quia...dum unusquisque praecedentium aliquid de veritate invenit, simul in unum collectum, posteriores introducit ad magnam veritatis cognitionem. Indirecte vero, inquantum priores errantes circa veritatem, posterioribus exercitii occasionem dederunt, ut diligenti discussione habita, veritas limpidius appareret. (127)

This eighth item in the mode of proceeding in conformity with the human intellect agrees with what was said above; to wit, it is necessary for man to arrive at the truth bit by bit.

The difficulty in our knowing illustrates well that knowledge requires some proportion of the knower to the known. This is also why custom plays so great a role in the intellectual life of man. This is the ninth element to be considered. Custom generates a habit which gives us a proportion to one thing rather than another. Hence, custom can make one thing seem more known than another. Likewise, one's individual innate dispositions (which are peculiar to one rather than following upon human nature as such) give one a proportion to this rather than that so that the same things do not seem more known to all men. These two things (innate individual dispositions and acquired habits) are the causes why men can agree that we should begin from the more known and, yet, begin in different places.

A difficulty might be raised here: if what seems more known to us according to our innate individual dispositions or acquired habits is different from what is more known according to human nature, which should be followed? (These things can be different as we see in the case of Descartes. He acquired a habit of mind whereby he thought that intelligible things were more known to his intellect than sensible things although the reverse is true when we consider human nature.) If the former, each man would have his own private road to knowledge. This does not agree with the common opinion that the road to knowledge should be objective; i.e., the same for all. Experimental science, for example, requires experiments that could be performed or verified by all scientists. On the other hand, if men always begin with what is more known according to human nature, they would seem to be hypocritical, not beginning with what seemed most known to them.

Since we should seek to acquire habits in accordance with our human nature, and since human nature is formal with respect to what is individual in a man and matter is for the sake of form, it is necessary for every man, as far as possible, to make what is more known according to human nature also seem more known to him. If a man's intellect is not in this disposition, we may truly say that he has a diseased mind which must be cured or restored to a disposition which is in agreement with human nature. The same is done for a sense organ that is infected.

Since custom and individual inclinations are often a source of error when men proceed according to them in the sciences, it is necessary that a man be first instructed in logic (the common mode of proceeding in all the sciences) and, then, in the beginning of each science, in the proper mode of proceeding in that science. This tenth element is summarized by St Thomas:

quia diversi secundum diversos modos veritatem inquirunt; ideo oportet quod homo instruatur per quem modum in singularis scientiis sint recipienda ea quae dicuntur. Et quia non est facile quod homo simul duo capiat, sed dum ad duo attendit, neutrum capere potest; absurdum est quod homo simul quaerat scientiam et modum qui convenit scientiae. Et propter hoc debet prius addiscere logicam quam alias scientias, quia logica tradit communem modum procedendi in omnibus aliis scientiis. Modus autem proprius singularum scientiarum, in scientiis singulis circa principium tradi debet. (128)

The eleventh element to be observed is the order in human knowledge and the sciences in particular. Since every order involves before and after, and these are said in reference to what is first (the beginning or starting-point), it is necessary to know what is first in our intellectual knowledge before knowing the natural order to be observed in that knowledge. The starting-point for our intellectual knowledge is sensation. We sense things before we know anything else. Certain traces of the things we sense are left in our memory. From these memories, we collect an experience. From our experience, we separate out the common element. This common element or universal is the proximate starting-point for the rest of our intellectual knowledge although sense knowledge remains the foundation of all. Hence, those sciences, which are closer to sensation, or which require less experience, come before others. This can be seen in the order which Aristotle and St Thomas assign:

Erit ergo congruus ordo addiscendi ut primo pueri logicalibus instruantur, quia logica docet modum totius philosophiae. Secundo autem instruendi sunt in mathematicis quae nec experientia indigent, nec imaginationem transcendunt. Tertio autem in naturalibus; quae etsi non excedunt sensum et imaginationem, requirunt tamen experientiam. Quarto in moralibus quae requirunt experientiam et animum a passionibus liberum...Quinto autem in sapientalibus et divinis quae transcendunt imaginationem et requirunt validum intellectum. (129)

It can be seen that, in this order, we go, in general, from the easier to the more difficult--the easier being what is closer to our sense powers or what requires less experience. The exception is logic whose subject is more abstract than those of mathematics, natural science, and moral science. Likewise, the subject of logic is more difficult to know. Hence, if logic comes where it does in the order of the sciences, there must be some special reason. We have already seen that reason and St Thomas recalls it here when he says that "logica docet modum totius philosophiae". However, since logic comes where it does, we must be especially careful to employ all those tools of manuductio touched upon in Part One. Otherwise, we shall do a kind of violence to our intellect.

It should not be thought that logic comes altogether first. Nothing prevents the young from learning some mathematics before logic even though they cannot acquire mathematics in a fully scientific way until they know logic. In fact, some knowledge of geometry and arithmetic would seem necessary as a manuductio for the part of logic concerned with demonstration (as can be seen in Aristotle's use of mathematical examples in the Posterior Analytics). Moreover, geometry and arithmetic and, especially, the middle sciences subordinated to them, have an important role in first arousing the wonder of the young beginner, and this wonder is the starting-point of the speculative life. Again, geometry and arithmetic exercise the imagination in an orderly way, making that imagination an apt tool to assist the intellect in grasping things. Moreover, geometry and arithmetic purify the intellect so that it develops some capacity to judge before beginning the other sciences, like logic, where judgment is often most difficult. There are other disciplines which also come before logic and the speculative life as such: grammar, the study of imitations (especially those using words and music) and rhetoric. It is not hard to see that grammar should come before logic. A person who could not speak or read or write correctly could not learn logic or any other science. Grammar, also, makes us attentive to one kind of proper use of words which play so necessary and important a role in our whole speculative life.

Likewise, it seems that some knowledge of imitations, especially music and those having words as a means of imitation, and a knowledge of rhetorical speeches should come before logic. The imitative arts and rhetoric, or rather their products, prepare us for the speculative life in a remote way by disposing us towards the moral virtues which leave a man tranquil so he can contemplate. The imitative arts do so by moving our emotions in accord with reason and providing suitable representations of the differences between good and bad actions and good and bad habits. Rhetoric can dispose us for moral virtue in that part of rhetoric which is concerned with praise or blame; as in that magnificent speech of Daniel Webster praising George Washington and holding him up as a model for all.

But, in a more proximate way, the poetic arts and rhetoric prepare us for the speculative life in five ways. First, they develop our wonder which is the beginning of the speculative life; e.g., the plots and metaphors of a great poet strike us with wonder, and the ability of a great speaker to hit upon the right words to stir his listeners and arouse them to action fills us with wonder about how he succeeds in doing this. Secondly, the poet develops our powers of imagination, of comparing things and seeing the likenesses of things that are far apart. The rhetorician does this also with his invented examples etc. This is an introduction to the finding of likenesses in the speculative sciences which helps us to grasp many things. Thirdly, the judgment we make about the plots, metaphors, choice of words etc. in the works of these arts dispose us for the most important act of the speculative life--judgment. We are exercised in judgments according to the way which is most connatural to us, that of resolving to sense, and in regard to objects which are pleasant for us to consider from almost the beginning of our life. Fourthly, the works of these arts provide us with many tools of manuductio--rhetoric especially with regard to dialectic and the syllogism, and the poetic arts for moral science in particular although we can draw things out of them for the other sciences, too. Fifthly, they make us attentive to the power and importance of words whose proper use is so important for growth in the speculative life.

It is interesting that all of these arts (grammar, poetry, rhetoric, the mathematical sciences) make a sensible or imaginable object. That is why they are so well proportioned to us. For all our intellectual knowledge starts from the sensible or imaginable, and what we make ourselves, we seem to know best.

The twelfth thing to be considered (for our purposes) in the mode of proceeding of the human intellect is the need for manuductio. It is not enough for the teacher to lead the student from the known to the unknown in a science by proposing the order of principles to conclusions, by giving the demonstrations which are the substance of a science. He must also, according to St Thomas, lead him from the unknown "proponendo ei aliqua auxilia vel instrumenta, quibus intellectus eius utatur ad scientiam acquirendam: puta cum proponit ei aliquas propositiones minus universales, quas tamen ex praecognitis discipulus diiudicare potest; vel cum proponit ei aliqua sensibilia exempla, vel similia, vel opposita, vel aliqua huiusmodi ex quibus intellectus addiscentis manuducitur in cognitionem veritatis ignotae." (130) Why does the human intellect require manuductio? St Thomas gives us a hint when he is speaking of one of the ways in which a superior angel manifests his knowledge to an inferior angel:

superior enim angelus notitiam veritatis accipit in universali quadam conceptione, ad quam capiendam inferioris angeli intellectus non est sufficiens, sed est ei connaturale ut magis particulariter veritatem accipiat. Superior ergo angelus veritatem quam universaliter concipit, quodammodo distinguit, ut ab inferiori capi possit; et sic eam cognoscendum illi proponit. Sicut etiam apud nos, doctores, quod in summa capiunt, multipliciter distinguunt, providentes capacitati aliorum. (131)

But the words of St Thomas--"est ei connaturale ut magis particulariter veritatem accipiat"--apply to man much more than to any other intellectual substance. For, it is natural for man to derive his intellectual knowledge from sensible singular things which are intelligible only in potency, and, for each thing he wants to know distinctly, man must have a separate thought. Hence, man most of all needs to have universal truths divided up for him so that he can grasp and, ultimately, judge them. This is why the teacher, in the words of St Thomas above, "proponit ei aliquas propositiones minus universales, quas tamen ex praecognitis discipulus diiudicare potest." This is also why the teacher uses "sensibilia exempla" for these are more proportioned than universal truths to the student's mind which starts from the sensible singular. Just as the human intellect (or reason) collects a simple and universal truth from many particular ones or from many sensible examples; so, too, it gathers one simple or universal truth from the likeness which it has to many things that are known already, or it sees an abstract truth from the likeness which it has to some truth that more falls under our senses or imagination. Or man's reason is gradually led in to grasp some simple, but profound truth through trying to resolve the many difficulties that surround it. A profound truth is not well seen by man to begin with, but the various opposed positions and arguments contain some element or other of that profound truth. Man is led in to that profound truth, that is not proportioned to him, by those various opposed positions and arguments which stand out to him.

Although judgment is perfected in the sciences by proposing the order of principles to conclusions, it presupposes that the intellect can grasp the principles, conclusions and their connection. This latter cannot be done in the non-mathematical sciences without a long and careful manuductio. Thus we see by experience that, without manuductio in these sciences, a student can state in words the order of principles to conclusions without grasping at all what he is saying. St Thomas mentions manuductio before the proposing of the order of principles to conclusions (132) because grasping is presupposed to judgment which is the perfection of knowledge.

We must now make a long approach to our thirteenth element. It is natural for man to proceed from one thing to another in his intellectual life because he cannot know all things at once distinctly. He cannot know all things distinctly, at once, because of the weakness of his intellect and its light, and the corresponding division and lack of universality in the likenesses separated from the phantasms. By lack of universality, we here mean not representing many things distinctly by one likeness. Our intellect must have a separate likeness for each thing we want to know distinctly. This is one reason why the certitude proper to the human intellect is less than that found in any other intellect. Just as the science which proceeds from fewer principles is more certain than other sciences; so the intellect whose likenesses represent more universally has more certitude.

Man proceeds from one thing to another in his intellectual knowledge, not only because he cannot think of all things at once distinctly, but also because from something known he can come to a knowledge of something unknown. When this latter happens, we can say that what comes after in our knowledge depends upon what came before. But here arises a most basic question: should what comes before in our knowledge in no way depend for being known upon what comes after? It is very difficult to overestimate the importance of the answer to this question. That answer influences, in a radical way, the whole of our speculative life.

What comes before in our knowledge cannot depend upon what comes after in our knowledge in the same way that the latter depends on the former. Diverse things cannot be the cause of each other in the same way, but nothing prevents two things from being the cause of each other in diverse ways. Walking, for example, is the cause of health in one way, and health is the cause of walking in another way. Hence, nothing prevents what comes before in our knowledge from depending in some way upon what comes after in our knowledge. But, what is more, the human intellect cannot avoid having what comes before in our knowledge depend in some way upon what comes after in our knowledge. This is because our intellect derives its knowledge from sensible things and proceeds from potency to act, from the more known to the more knowable, and from the confused to the distinct.

Because our intellect derives its knowledge from sensible things, these latter are known by it before anything else. But a perfect knowledge (insofar as this is possible) of sensible things (studied in natural science) and of imaginable things (studied in mathematics) can not be had until after we know how to direct our thinking by logic. Logic is dependent upon some prior, but imperfect, knowledge of natural and mathematical things, and a perfect knowledge of these latter depends upon logic. These things do not depend upon each other in the same way. Natural science and mathematics depend upon logic because logic shows us the common mode of proceeding in all the sciences. Logic depends upon some knowledge (but not a scientific one) of natural and mathematical things because one must understand some things before one can discover the relations that belong to things understood in the state of being understood (which relations are studied by logic).

Likewise, one must have some knowledge of natural and mathematical things before one can know the proper modes of proceeding in natural science and mathematics, even though these latter can not be acquired well before knowing their proper modes of proceeding. But these two do not depend upon each other in the same way. The proper mode of proceeding in a science depends, not upon a scientific knowledge of the subject (for this presupposes the mode), but upon an elementary or general acquaintance with the subject (since the proper mode must be proportioned to the subject of the science).

Again, logic, the common mode of proceeding in all the sciences, presupposes, or depends upon, the mode of proceeding which is in conformity with the human intellect. Yet, this latter, as its description indicates, depends upon a knowledge of what our intellect is. But, one cannot know what our intellect is except by proceeding logically from sensible things. Does this involve us in a circle?

There is no circle because these things depend upon each other in a diverse way. The mode of proceeding, which is in conformity with the human intellect, is not a proposition used to prove the nature of the human intellect or a proposition entering into the demonstration of the nature of the soul of which the intellect is a power. Whoever arrives successfully at the nature of the human intellect or at the nature of the human soul will, however, observe this most universal mode of proceeding. This can be seen in natural science where we first come to a knowledge of the nature of the human intellect and of the nature of the human soul. In natural science, we first learn about the reception which is in matter as such. This is more known to us than the reception which is proper to knowing. When we come to study living things, we realize that sensation also involves a reception. After a while, we learn that, although our senses can receive in the same way as matter in that they have material organs, sensation involves a reception that is quite different from that found in matter. The shape of a man is received in my senses much differently than it is in clay or in some other matter. After we distinguish our internal senses from our external ones, we are ready to ask the question whether our intellect is some internal sense. If we succeed in showing that our intellect is different from our imagination, then we should investigate the difference, trying to find out how the reception in understanding differs from that in sensation to which we compare it. In this long way, merely touched upon here, we could arrive at knowing what our intellect is and, hence, something about the difference of our soul to those souls that do not have an intellect.

In this long procedure, we do not use (as a proposition entering into our demonstrations) the mode of proceeding which is in conformity to the human intellect. Yet we observe something pertaining to this mode; to wit, all our intellectual knowledge is derived from sensible things. This is clear in the procedure outlined above. We did not begin with our soul or intellect, but with the kind of reception found in material things which fall under our senses. From there we gradually proceed to find the difference of the reception found in the external senses. From there, we reason to the internal senses which are further from sensible things. We must, then, argue to the distinction of the intellect from the internal senses. The intellect is even further away from our starting-point--sensible things. Once we know the nature of our intellect and the nature of the soul, we can begin to render the cause of this element in the mode of proceeding which is that our intellect should proceed with order from sensible things. We can observe this element without knowing why it is true, either from a natural ability to recognize what is more known, or, also, by faith in a teacher who proposes it to us before we can know why it must be so.

Since the human intellect proceeds from potency to act, from the more known to the more knowable, from the confused to the distinct, it is necessary that what comes before in its knowledge depends, in some way, upon what comes after. This can be shown in both demonstrations and definitions. Let us consider this first in regard to definitions. Since the confused is more known to us than the distinct, we know the more universal before the less universal. Thus, for example, animal is more known to us than man. But, since we know man, also, confusedly before we have a distinct knowledge of him by definition, we know man before we know animal as a part of his definition. Thus, although animal is, simply speaking, more known to us than man, we know man first in a confused way before we know animal as his genus. There is no circle because animal is known before and after man in diverse ways.

In demonstrations, it also happens that what comes before in our knowledge may depend in some way upon what comes after. This is because our intellect proceeds from the more known to the more knowable. An effect is less knowable than its cause in that the effect is what it is on account of its cause and not vice-versa. Yet the effect is usually more known. Hence, it is necessary for us to proceed from the existence of the effect to that of the cause although, when we then know the cause, it (the cause) can manifest something about why the effect is the way we know it to be. For example, we know the existence of substantial change before the existence of prime matter and substantial form although these latter must be known before we know why substantial change is possible. Or, the existence of order in nature is known before the existence of an intellect that caused it although this Intellect must be known before we know why there is order in nature. Or, we know our thinking before our intellect, and our intellect before our soul, and our soul before God although the latter is in each case a cause of the former. If our intellect could begin with what was more knowable--the cause--there would not be the necessity of what comes first in our knowledge depending in some way upon what comes after.

The thirteenth element (what comes before in our knowledge in some way depends upon what comes after) in the mode of proceeding which is in conformity with the human intellect concludes what we need for our purposes in this mode considered on the part of the intellect. It remains to touch upon two things that pertain to the mode considered on the part of the appetite.

The first thing we shall consider in regard to this most universal mode on the part of the appetite is the necessity of faith for the learner. We can discover a few things without faith by ourselves, but these are hardly enough to begin to satisfy our desire to know. Hence, we desire to learn from another. But, why is faith necessary to learn from another? We can begin to investigate this question by first asking what is the object of this faith.

Since a man does not see what he accepts on faith, his acceptance must be due to his desire to know. The man, who desires to know, accepts something on faith because he thinks that through this he may arrive at what he wants to know. Hence, the object of faith is always some principle, some proposition from which other things are apt to follow.

Faith is sometimes required to accept both the truth of a principle and that it is a principle. Sometimes faith is required only to accept the principle as a principle. If the teacher leads the student from things the latter knows to be true already, then the student need accept on faith only that these things are that from which he will come to know what he desires to know. This is true whether the teacher is demonstrating or using manuductio. The student cannot see perfectly the principle as a principle to begin with since this would mean that he already saw what followed from it and, hence, had no need of a teacher.

This agrees with what we saw above: what comes before in our knowledge depends in some way upon what comes after. One can know the truth of the principles of geometry before seeing that the triangle has its interior angles equal to two right angles. But one must demonstrate the latter from the former before one knows the former as the principles of that conclusion. Likewise, in manuductio the end towards which the teacher leads the student is not clear to begin with to the student. If it were, there would be no need for manuductio. Once the end is reached, however, the student can then see the tools of manuductio as the starting-point for the acquisition of this end; just as the teacher discovers those tools in light of that end.

Faith is required even more for the student when he does not see the truth of the principle. This seems very strange at first. If the truth of a principle is accepted on faith, then any conclusions drawn from it would also be known by faith or by something weaker than faith. Hence, the student would not learn; i.e., he would not acquire a science. Thus, his faith would be useless as far as the acquisition of a science. This can be answered by pointing out that such principles (whose truth we accept on faith) are not used to prove the propositions from which the truth of those principles will be ultimately established. This would obviously involve us in a circle. Such principles can be shown in another science which proceeds from propositions that are not proven by those principles. The geometer, for example, assumes that one can draw a line between any two points or that two points cannot touch each other. This is shown in the sixth book of the Physics from propositions that were not derived from that principle.

Sometimes the principles whose truth is accepted on faith are shown to be true, not through propositions proven by them, but through arguments in which one is directed by those principles, although those principles do not enter into those arguments as premises. For example, we saw above that the principles involved in the mode of proceeding in conformity with the human intellect can be manifested by knowing the nature of the human intellect, and that this latter is made known by a process of argument which observes the mode of proceeding of the human intellect. This involves no circle, as we saw above, because the mode of proceeding conformed to our intellect is not a premise in those syllogisms that establish the nature of the human intellect and soul. The more a man's natural ability, the more he will observe this most universal mode even before considering explicitly that he is doing so. The teacher, who should know the truth of the principles involved in this mode, and who should also see them as principles, proposes the mode to guide the student more surely along the road that nature inclines us to. When the student takes that road, he will eventually see that it is the road or must be the road. Here, also, it is not hard to see that faith is required because what comes before in our knowledge in some way depends upon what comes after.

The faith which a student has in a teacher can be compared to that of a man who asks what road to take to get to his destination. Such a man accepts on faith that a certain road is the way to his destination. If he has put his faith in one who really knows, then he will arrive at his destination. When he has arrived, however, his faith will come to an end. He then knows that the road he took on faith is, in fact, the road to his destination. There is no circle in the knowledge of such a man. Similarly, the student commits no circle when he accepts some principle on faith and later sees it as the principle or even, in the case of some principles, that it is true.

The second thing to be considered on the part of the appetite is our desire for certitude. Our intellect naturally desires certitude. A sign of this is that our intellect does not come completely to rest of its own accord until it is certain. This desire must be rectified by reason because we see some men who do not desire certitude enough in some subjects while others desire more certitude than the subject admits. However, the difficulty in rectifying this desire, in hitting the mean, consists more in moderating it or restraining it since, as was said above, man has a natural desire for certitude on account of his intellect. It may be that most men do not seek certitude enough, but this is due to some other cause, such as laziness or presumption. A man can err, not only by desiring more certitude in a particular science than its subject admits, but also by desiring more certitude than is possible for the human intellect. This is the worst error.

Section Two: Descartes' Position on the Mode of Proceeding of the Human Intellect

Descartes is aware that his position on the geometrical method is influenced by a more fundamental position:

...no more useful inquiry can be proposed than that which seeks to determine the nature and scope of human knowledge...This investigation should be undertaken once at least in his life by anyone who has the slightest regard for truth, since in pursuing it the true instruments of knowledge and the whole method of inquiry come to light. (133)

Let us examine this more fundamental position of Descartes, observing the same order as in Section One. We are supposing the truth of what we have recalled in the last section from Aristotle and St Thomas. By following the same order, we shall see how Descartes deviated from the truth about the mode of proceeding in conformity with the human intellect. Then, in the next and last section, we shall see how these more fundamental errors of Descartes lead on to his more particular errors that we discussed in the first two parts of our thesis.

Descartes is unable to see that the human soul is the first act, or substantial form, of a body. The reason for this is that, besides having no notion of prime matter and substantial form, he identifies the human intellect or mind with the human soul; just as he identified material substance with extension in quantity. ("I consider the mind not as a part of the soul, but as the whole of that soul which thinks.") (134) Since he rightly holds that the human intellect is immaterial or has no bodily organ (and hence is not a form in matter), he will never be able to see how the soul and body are joined together. They become two complete substances joined together in a way that Descartes could never succeed in explaining.

Let us examine this position of Descartes' a bit more. Descartes' basic principle for the distinction of substances is as follows: "from the mere fact that I apprehend one substance clearly and distinctly apart from another, I am sure that the one excludes the other...No one who perceives two substances by means of two diverse concepts ever doubts that they are really distinct." (135) This principle (which implies or reveals a certain ignorance of the five predicables, especially genus and difference) is then applied to the distinction of the body and soul or mind:

...I understand in a complete manner what body is, merely by thinking that it is extended, has figure, can move, etc., and by denying everything of it which belongs to the nature of the mind. Conversely also I understand that mind is something complete which doubts, knows, wishes, etc., although I deny that any thing belongs to it which is contained in the idea of body. But this could not be unless there were a real distinction between mind and body. (136)

Descartes, thus, ends up with two complete substances, the body and the soul or mind. But, how then is man formed of body and soul? A mere association of these two substances does not seem to be enough to explain our internal experience that it is the same one that feels in his body and understands in his soul. Descartes is aware of this internal experience, and he knows that it requires some intimate union of body and soul. But, with his notion of the latter, he can never explain the cause of this internal experience:

Nature also teaches me by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst, etc., that I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel, but that I am very closely united to it, and so to speak so intermingled with it that I seem to compose with it one whole. For if that were not the case, when my body is hurt, I, who am merely a thinking thing, should not feel pain, for I should perceive this wound by the understanding only, just as the sailor perceives by sight when something is damaged in his vessel; and when my body has need of food or drink, I should clearly understand the fact without being warned of it by confused feelings of hunger and thirst. (137)

This internal experience shows that something is wrong with Descartes' notion of the soul and body. But, Descartes never was able to show why we have this internal experience, nor could he, having no notion of matter and form in substance and identifying the intellect with the soul.

The human intellect or mind is, then, for Descartes, not a power of a soul which is the first act or substantial form of a body. Consequently, our intellect would have no need of material things as its proper object:

I deny that the thing that thinks needs any object other than itself in order to exercise its activity, though it can also reach out to material things when it examines them. (138)

The human intellect, thus, need not consider its object in the phantasms contained in the brain. The brain is not required for the mind or intellect either as an organ of thought or as that in which it contemplates its object:

mind can act independently of the brain; for certainly the brain can be of no use in pure thought; its only use is for imagining and perceiving. (139)

The intellect of man can consider many ideas in itself without turning to the phantasms:

...if some body existed with which my mind is conjoined and united in such a way that it can apply itself to consider it when it pleases, it may be that by this means it can imagine corporeal objects; so that this mode of thinking differs from pure intellection only inasmuch as mind in its intellectual activity in some manner turns on itself, and considers some of the ideas which it possesses in itself; while in imagining it turns toward the body, and there beholds in it something conformable to the idea which it has either conceived by itself or perceived by the senses. (140)

Along with these things, Descartes does not think that it is necessary for the similitudes or likenesses in our intellect to be derived from our phantasms by abstraction. He does not say that all ideas are innate: "among these simple ideas, some appear to me to be innate, some adventitious, and others to be formed by myself." (141) But, he insists upon the importance of the innate ones:

it is my habit to study nothing so much as the scrutiny of certain very [simple] truths, which being innate in our minds, are such that, when they are laid before anyone else, he believes that he has never been ignorant of them. (142)

Descartes compares the light of our intellect to the sun: "human wisdom...always remains one and the same, however applied to different subjects, and suffers no more differentiation proceeding from them than the light of the sun experiences from the variety of the things which it illuminates." (143) Thus, the light of the human intellect extends everywhere equally so that one kind of knowledge cannot be more obscure than another. We do not find that one kind of knowledge is more obscure than another because of the weakness of our intellect (due to its being the power of a form in matter) or the lack of intelligibility inherent in sensible things (from which we derive our knowledge):

we must not fancy that one kind of knowledge is more obscure than another, since all knowledge is of the same nature throughout, and consists solely in combining what is self-evident. This is a fact recognized by very few. (144)

We cannot say that there is a lack of proportion between our intellect and some objects either because of the weakness of our intellect or the dimness of the objects.

Descartes does not understand what judgment adds to reception or representation in our intellect. This is seen first because he attributes the certitude of having truth (which certitude is a perfection of judgment) to what is in fact a perfection of representation or reception:

Certainly in this first knowledge [the Cogito] there is nothing that assures me of its truth, accept the clear and distinct reception of that which I state, which would not indeed suffice to assure me that what I say is true, if it could ever happen that a thing which I conceived so clearly and distinctly could be false; and accordingly it seems to me that already I can establish as a general rule that all things which I perceive very clearly and very distinctly are true. (145)

Clarity and distinction are not perfections of judgment as such, but of reception or representation. This same position of Descartes can be also seen from his position on the opposite of truth: falsity. If the man attributes the perfection of truth to representation or reception, he would be apt to make the corresponding error of thinking that falsity or error in the intellect is not a contrary, but a privation:

I, who by falsity understand only the privation of truth, am convinced that it is an absolute contradiction that the understanding should apprehend the false under the guise of the truth. (146)

Reception in the intellect has no contrary, as can be seen from the fact that there is the same science of opposites. What is opposed to the reception or possession of a form in the intellect is the privation of that form. But one judgment can be contrary to another; as are the judgments that contradictory propositions are true. And this is the way that truth and falsity or error are opposed; to wit, as contraries.

Descartes tries to cover the grossness of his error by having God guarantee the truth of what we apprehend clearly and distinctly:

commonly we judge that all things stand to each other in respect to their actual relations in the same way as they are related in our consciousness. But...one of those hyperbolical doubts adduced in the First Meditation went so far as to prevent me from being sure of this very fact (viz., that things are in their true nature exactly as we perceive them to be), so long as I supposed that I had no knowledge of the author of my being. (147)

God, being good, would not make our intellect capable of being deceived in those things which it clearly and distinctly conceives. But this, even if it were true, would not get Descartes out of his difficulty since he knows God and his goodness only from the "clear and distinct" ideas which he has of them.

Descartes is at the beginning of a long line of modern philosophers who do not want to resolve man's intellectual knowledge to sense. The senses are not, for Descartes, an ultimate term to which all our judgments must in some way resolve:

it is the understanding solely which corrects the error of sense; and no case can ever be adduced in which error results from our trusting the operation of the mind more than sense. (148)

We find a striking example of Descartes' ignorance of judgment when he is speaking about it in regard to natural science to which resolution to sense is most proper:

we must allow that corporeal things exist. However, they are perhaps not exactly what we perceive by the senses, since this comprehension by the senses is in many instances very obscure and confused; but we must at least admit that all things which I conceive in them clearly and distinctly, that is to say, all things which, speaking generally, are comprehended in the object of pure mathematics, are truly to be recognized as external objects. (149)

This becomes even more clear when Descartes is answering an objection to this procedure in a letter to Clerselier. The objection is stated by Descartes thus:

the mathematical extension, which I take as the basal principle of my Physics, is nothing but my thought, and that it has and can have no substance outside of my mind, being merely an abstraction that I form from a physical body; that consequently the whole of my Physics is but imaginary and fictitious... (150)

Descartes' answer is as follows:

Here we have the objection of objections, and the sum of the whole doctrine of these men of great acumen who are here brought into evidence. Everything that we are able to understand and conceive is, according to their story, but imagination--the fictitious creation of our mind, and can have no real subsistence: whence it follows that nothing exists which we can comprehend, conceive, or imagine, or admit as true, and that we must close the door against reason...For, if the things which we conceive must be esteemed to be false merely because we can conceive them, what is there left for us but to accept as true the things we do not conceive, and to make our system of belief out of them. (151)

Descartes really misses the point of the objection which is not that what we clearly and distinctly conceive must be false. What the objection is really saying is that something is not true merely because we can conceive it clearly and distinctly. Or, in short, one must not identify the perfection of representation--clarity and distinction--with the perfection of judgment.

Corresponding to Descartes' ignorance of judgment, the ultimate perfection of knowledge, is an ignorance of what knowledge itself is. This is seen when he speaks of sensation where we first distinguish the reception in knowing from that in matter:

all our external senses...perceive in virtue of passivity alone, just in the way that wax receives an impression from a seal. And it should not be thought that all we mean to assert is an analogy between the two. We ought to believe that the way is entirely the same in which the exterior figure of the sentient body is really modified by the object, as that in which the shape of the surface of the wax is altered by the seal. (152)

The role which Descartes attributes to the will in man's speculative life is connected with his most unhappy error about judgment. All that is left in the intellect of judgment is the reception or representation proposed to it. But what is proper to judgment now belongs to the will: "judging or refraining from judgment is an act of the will." (153) Error, thus, is an act of the will and cannot be attributed to the intellect as such:

no error is properly speaking found in the understanding provided the word error is taken in its proper signification...for since I understand nothing but by the power which God has given me for understanding, there is no doubt that all I understand, I understand as I ought, and it is not possible that I err in this...it is in the misuse of the freewill that the privation which constitutes the characteristic nature of error is not met with. (154)

* * * * *

Descartes' first error about the mode of proceeding which is in conformity with the human intellect is his denial that all our intellectual knowledge proceeds from sensible things or is derived from the senses. He does not see why this is so because he has made errors about the nature of the human soul and its power, the human intellect. He denies that it is so because he finds certain ideas in his intellect which, he thinks, could not be derived from the senses in any way. When Descartes came to contemplate the ideas of God and of the human soul, he could not find them in his sensation. And the reason, according to Descartes, why many have difficulty in knowing the existence of God or the nature of their soul is that they try to use their senses or imagination to know them:

it is at least as certain that God...exists, as any demonstration of geometry can possibly be. What causes many, however, to persuade themselves that there is difficulty in knowing this truth, and even in knowing the nature of their soul, is the fact that they never raise their minds above the things of sense, or that they are so accustomed to consider nothing excepting by imagining it, which is a mode of thought especially adapted to material objects, that all that is not capable of being imagined appears to them not to be intelligible at all. This is manifest enough from the fact that even the philosophers in the schools hold it as a maxim that there is nothing in the understanding which has not first of all been in the senses, in which there is certainly no doubt that the ideas of God and of the soul have never been. And it seems to me that those who desire to make use of their imagination in order to understand these ideas, act in the same way as if, to hear sounds or smell odours, they should wish to make use of their eyes. (155)

There is certainly an element of truth in what Descartes says--neither God nor a soul can be imagined or sensed. But, can one conclude from this fact (as Descartes does) that the senses and the imagination play no role in the knowledge we have of God and our soul, and that the ideas we have of God and our soul can in no way be derived from the senses?

Since Descartes cannot see how these ideas can be derived in any way from the senses, he holds that the idea of God "is innate in me, just as the idea of myself is innate in me...God...has placed his image and similitude upon me, and...I perceive this similitude (in which the idea of God is contained) by means of the same faculty by which I perceive myself--that is to say, when I reflect on myself." (156)

Descartes not only says that the ideas of incorporeal things, like God and the Soul, are not derived from the senses, but also that mathematical ideas are innate or, at least, not derived from the senses:

I do not admit that the ideas of these figures have at any time entered our minds through the senses...we already possess within us the idea of a true triangle, and it can be more easily conceived by our mind than...the triangle drawn on paper. (157)

The reason he gives is that we do not find such things as perfectly straight lines etc. in sensible things. But, perhaps, we construct these mathematical objects in something that has been derived, or abstracted, from the phantasms which are a result of sensation.

But, doesn't Descartes contradict himself when he says that, "For the recollection of the thoughts which the mind has had during the period of its union with the body, it is necessary for certain traces of them to be impressed on the brain; and turning and applying itself to these, the mind remembers." (158) If all our intellectual knowledge was not derived from the phantasms (so that the intellect's object was the what-it-is of something in the phantasm), there would be no reason for the intellect to turn to the images in order to think every thought. It could use its innate ideas without reference to the phantasms. And, if our intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible singulars, why do we come to the universal from singulars as Descartes admits?

...it is certain that in order to discover the truth we should always start with particular notions, in order to arrive at general conceptions...Thus, in teaching a child the elements of geometry, we shall certainly not make him understand the general truth that "when equals are taken from equals, the remainders are equal" or that "the whole is greater than its parts", unless by showing him examples in particular cases. (159)

Descartes would seem to have fallen into error about the derivation of our intellectual knowledge from sensible things because he could not see how certain ideas could have been derived from the senses or imagination:

if the understanding deal with matters in which there is nothing corporeal or similar to the corporeal, it cannot be helped by those faculties, but that, on the contrary, to prevent their hampering it, the senses must be banished and the imagination as far as possible divested of every distinct impression. But if the understanding proposes to examine something that can be referred to the body, we must form the idea of that thing as distinctly as possible in the imagination. (160)

But, is it true that God and the soul are not understood in reference to bodies? When the ideas of God or the soul involve negations of something sensible or imaginable (as incorporeal, immobile etc.) or some relation to sensible things (as a cause of them), then they are referred to bodies and their ideas could be derived from the senses.

Moreover, is it true that there is nothing in corporeal and sensible things which is similar to God or the soul so that the word signifying it could be extended, by analogy, to God or to the soul? This is what Descartes writes:

Nothing that we attribute to God can come from external objects as a copy proceeds from its exemplar, because in God there is nothing similar to what is found in external things; i.e., in corporeal objects. (161)

It would take us long to show here the likeness of material and sensible things to immaterial and intelligible ones. Let it suffice for our purposes that Descartes can not find that likeness.

Another reason for Descartes' difficulty is that he thought that what our intellect knows from the senses must be first known by the senses; for the effect cannot exceed the cause. But, this does not follow unless it be admitted that the phantasms (derived from the senses) are the complete cause of intellectual knowledge. The phantasms, however, are more a tool of the agent intellect which is the principal cause of our intellectual knowledge, and nothing prevents a tool, insofar as it is moved by the principal cause, from causing more than its proper power could alone. Moreover, since the possible intellect is superior to the senses and imagination, what is received in it will be a more powerful principle of knowing (162). Enough of these things, however, for we are assuming the truth of those things which Aristotle and St Thomas attribute to the mode of proceeding in conformity with the human intellect and of those things which that mode is based on.

Descartes does not entirely deny that our intellect proceeds from potency to act, but his understanding of that proposition is weak because he has posited some innate ideas. In fact, when answering the objections of Gassendi, Descartes writes, "You have a difficulty, however, you say, as to whether I think that the soul always thinks. But why should it not always think, when it is a thinking substance? Why is it strange that we do not remember the thoughts it has had when in the womb or in a stupor, when we do not even remember the most of those we know we have had when grown up, in good health, and awake?" (163)

Descartes does not see at all that what is more known to us and what is more knowable are not the same, and that we must proceed from the former to the latter. This follows from his ignorance of the two previous propositions. What is more knowable (more in act) is less known to us because our intellectual knowledge starts from sensible things that are material and intelligible only in potency, and because our intellect proceeds from potency to act.

Descartes' ignorance of the last two propositions is the cause of his not seeing that our intellect should proceed from the confused to the distinct. But, he goes further and says that we should begin with the distinct: "We should...hold an orderly review of the conceptions which we have within us, and accept as true those and only those which present themselves to our apprehension as clear and distinct." (164) In this way, according to Descartes, we shall avoid error: "it is certain that we shall never take the false as the true if we only give our assent to things that we perceive clearly and distinctly...And even if this truth could not be rationally demonstrated, we are by nature so disposed to give our assent to things that we clearly perceive, that we cannot possibly doubt of their truth." (165)

Descartes arrived at his position as a result of a generalization from the Cogito:

After this I considered generally what in a proposition is required in order to be true and certain; for since I had just discovered one which I knew to be such, I thought that I ought also to know in what this certainty consisted. And having remarked that there was nothing at all in the statement "I think, therefore I am" which assures me of having thereby made a true assertion, excepting that I see very clearly that to think it is necessary to be, I came to the conclusion that I might assume, as a general rule, that the things which we conceive clearly and distinctly are all true. (166)

Since the certain is more known and the distinct is, according to Descartes, certain, he concludes that we should begin with the distinct. How far away this is from the natural mode of proceeding of the human intellect can be seen from a loving consideration of the first chapter of book one of the Physics.

How could Descartes have missed the fact that the confused comes before the distinct in our knowledge? The answer is that he does not. Descartes does realize that our first thoughts are confused, but he thinks that such thoughts must be eliminated before we can begin well in philosophy:

it is manifest that these concepts which we possessed in childhood were not clear and distinct; and that hence, unless they are deposed from their place, they will render obscure and confused any that we subsequently acquire. (167)

Our confused thoughts are, for Descartes, like errors in that they must be eliminated before our mind can attain truth with distinct ideas. Descartes does not see that the confused is a natural step when our intellect goes from potency to act. The man who knows something confusedly is midway between pure potency and the perfect act of distinct knowledge.

After this error, Descartes sees imperfectly the necessity of our intellect proceeding gradually to the truth. If confused knowledge is an impediment to distinct knowledge, our intellect will have to come to the latter suddenly.

Not only does the human intellect come to the truth gradually in one science, but it also proceeds slowly to the truth from one science to another. But, for Descartes, there is only one science. The light of our intellect need not be divided up into various sciences:

since the sciences taken all together are identical with human wisdom, which always remains one and the same, however applied to different subjects, and suffers no more differentiation proceeding from them than the light of the sun experiences from the variety of the things which it illumines, there is no need for minds to be confined at all within limits...all the sciences are so inter-connected, that it is much easier to study them altogether than to isolate one from the others. (168)

Descartes does not see any difficulty in our knowing due to the lack of proportion between our intellect and things. Our knowledge of natural things does not share in their obscurity (which he does not see), but in the clarity of the mathematical sciences. Nor is there a difficulty due to the weakness of our intellect in respect to the things which are most knowable:

...as regards God, if my mind were not pre-occupied with prejudices, and if my thought did not find itself on all hands diverted by the continual pressure of sensible things, there would be nothing which I could know more immediately and more easily than Him. (169)

Since our intellectual knowledge is not primarily derived from sensible things, it does not share in their obscurity in a notable way. And, since our intellect does not proceed from potency to act, it does not experience particular difficulty in knowing those things which are intelligible in act in their own natures. Descartes sometimes says that, if we know a thing, we know it as much as it can be known:

...having but one truth to discover in respect to each matter, whoever succeeds in finding it known in its regard as much as can be known. It is the same as with a child, for instance, who has been instructed in Arithmetic and has made an addition according to the rule prescribed; he may be sure of having found as regards the sum of figures given to him all the human mind can know." (170)

Having underestimated the difficulty in knowing for the human intellect, Descartes does not see very well the need which each man has for help from others in the pursuit of truth: "My design has never extended beyond trying to reform my own opinion and to build on a foundation which is entirely my own." (171) How did Descartes arrive at such a position? We can discover this from a diligent reading of his autobiographical sketch in the first two parts of the Discourse on Method:

I have been nourished on letters since my childhood, and since I was given to believe that by their means a clear and certain knowledge could be obtained of all that is useful in life, I had an extreme desire to acquire instruction. But so soon as I had achieved the entire course of study at the close of which one is usually received into the ranks of the learned, I entirely changed my opinion. For I found myself embarrassed with so many doubts and errors that it seemed to me that the effort to instruct myself had no effect other than the increasing discovery of my own ignorance. And yet I was studying at one of the most celebrated Schools in Europe, where I thought that there must be men of learning if they were to be found anywhere in the world. (172)

Thus, Descartes speaks of "coming to the conclusion that there was no learning in the world such as I was formerly led to believe." (173) Having found such a diversity of opinions among the philosophers, and being unable to choose one of them as better than the others, Descartes temporarily despaired. A long time after this despair, his desire to know prompted him to undertake all by himself the pursuit of the truth: "I could not, however, put my finger on a single person whose opinions seemed preferable to those of others, and I found that I was, so to speak, constrained myself to undertake the direction of my procedure." (174)

Descartes was aware of the role of custom in the intellectual life of man: "it is much more custom and example that persuade us than any certain knowledge." (175) And, "the custom of hearing what we know to be false produces the habit of believing those things to be true." (176) It is strange, then, that he did not look out for it in his own case. And, although he saw that there was need of method to direct man's thought, custom not being sufficient, he thought it (method) must be kept to a minimum "because nothing can be added to the pure light of reason which does not in some way obscure it." (177) Descartes saw that a knowledge of method precedes the acquisition of science, but he never succeeded in distinguishing the common mode of proceeding in all the sciences from their proper modes.

Since Descartes did not distinguish the sciences from one another, he could not establish the order in which they should be learned. However, in assigning the order of the parts of his one science, Descartes goes far away from the truth. For, as we saw in Part One, he compares his science to a tree whose roots are metaphysics--one begins with God and the human soul which are taken by Descartes to be most known.

Descartes indicates in many places that he does not see the necessity of manuductio. In the Prima Pars (178), St Thomas shows that the teacher helps the student to science by manuductio and by proposing the order of principles to conclusions. Descartes thinks that only the second is necessary:

no science is acquired except by mental intuition or deduction. There is besides no question of extending it further in order to show how these said operations ought to be effected, because they are the most simple and primary of all...nothing can be added to the pure light of reason which does not in some way obscure it. (179)

in the proper observance of...systems of order consists the whole of human sagacity. (180)

We must further realize that while the discovery of an order is no light task...yet once this order has been discovered, there is no difficulty at all in knowing it. (181)

As we saw above, Descartes does not see the lack of proportion between our intellect and most of its objects. Nor does he see that what is more knowable is less known to us and that all our intellectual knowledge is derived from sensible things or from the phantasms of those sensible things. Hence, he does not see the necessity of manuductio for knowing those objects that are not proportioned to our intellect either because of their lack of knowability or because of the weakness of our intellect. He does not see the necessity of manuductio on account of the weakness of our intellect with respect to the objects which are most knowable. And, he does not see the necessity of manuductio for those objects that are not immediately represented in the phantasms, but are hidden to our intellect which naturally starts from the sensible.

Descartes comes close to asserting that what comes before in our knowledge should in no way depend on what comes after:

The order consists merely in putting forward those things first that should be known without the aid of what comes subsequently, and arranging all other matters so that their proof depends solely on what precedes them. I certainly tried to follow this order as accurately as possible in my Meditations... (182)

Descartes tended towards this position because of his ignorance of those things which show that what comes before in our knowledge must depend in some way upon what comes after, and because (as we shall see) of his excessive desire for certitude.

Since Descartes thought that what comes first in our knowledge should in no way depend upon what comes after (with the exception of seeing the universal extent of his principles), we can see why he minimized, or rather ignored, the necessity of faith in human learning.

The last thing to be considered in regard to Descartes' position on the mode of proceeding in conformity with the human intellect is his desire for certitude. This desire for certitude led to his famous doubt:

...Because we desire to apply ourselves only to the search after truth, we shall in the first place doubt if, of all sensible things, or things which we have imagined, there are any that really exist: in the first place because we know that our senses have before deceived us, and that prudence directs us not to trust too much in what has even once deceived us: in the second place because in sleep we continually seem to feel or imagine innumerable things which have no existence...We shall also doubt of all the other things which have formerly seemed to us quite certain, even of the demonstrations of mathematics and of its principles which we formerly thought self-evident. One reason is that those who have fallen into error in reasoning on such matters, have held as perfectly certain and self-evident what we see to be false, but yet a more important reason is that . . . God . . . may . . . have desired to create us in such a way that we shall always be deceived, even in the things that we believe ourselves to know best. (183)

There are many things in this passage which indicate that Descartes' desire for certitude is not moderated in accordance with reason. He rejects the certitude which is in conformity with the human intellect whose judgments ultimately resolve to sense; just as our intellectual knowledge starts there. Descartes insists upon this rejection:

My statement that the entire testimony of the senses must be considered to be uncertain, nay, even false, is quite serious and so necessary for the comprehension of my meditations, that he who will not or cannot admit that, is unfit to urge any objection to them that merits a reply. (184)

If Descartes rejects the starting-point for man, that which is most certain for man, what does he propose to substitute? He thinks we can be more certain of our thought than of the material world:

this notion of thought precedes that of all corporeal things and is most certain; since we still doubt whether there are any other things in the world, while we already perceive that we think. (185)

Descartes ends up, in fact, by making the human intellect like the intellect of an angel whose substance and power and thought are known first and immediately:

I have no doubt that the mind begins to think at the moment that it is infused into the body of an infant, and is at the same time conscious of its own thought... (186)

Here, Descartes is trying to make possible for the human intellect a certitude which is suitable to an angelic or divine intellect. (In Part One, we criticized Descartes for not seeking the certitude suitable to each science. But, here, he is making a prior error concerning the certitude in conformity with the human intellect.) When man considers his primary and proper object--the what-it-is of a natural or mathematical thing--he cannot at the same time know the nature of his soul or intellect or intelligible species or act or of logic which directs those acts. The reason is that these latter do not form anything one with the proper object of our intellect so that they could be understood together. In the angel, however, this is not true. Since the primary object of the angel is his own substance, and his intellect and thought are perfections of that substance, the angel can know his primary object and that by which he knows it at once. In God, the unity is even more perfect, or most perfect, since, in God, the thing understood, the one who understands, and that by which he understands are completely identical. Hence, God's certitude is most perfect. The angelic intellect is next in certitude. But, our intellect falls off greatly.

Since our intellect and thought are not perfections of what we understand first, we can come to know the former and our soul and logic only after a long time. But many errors are possible to those who do not know that by which they know and logic. Man, however, cannot avoid this lesser certitude. Descartes, nevertheless, is trying to overcome this lesser certitude by imagining that the human intellect can first know itself and its thought.

Descartes goes even further than this. We must not only know the nature of our soul and intellect and thought to begin with, but we must also have a certitude about them in the light of their creator before we try to know anything else:

...being still ignorant, or rather supposing myself to be ignorant, of the author of my being, I saw nothing to prevent me from having been so constituted by nature that I might be deceived even in matters which seemed to me to be most certain. (187)

Hence, in that first intuition of his soul or intellect and thought, Descartes must also see his creator.

The certitude of seeing things in their first cause is not the certitude with which the human intellect begins. In fact, it would be difficult, or impossible, to imagine an intellect which begins further away from this certitude than the human intellect. Descartes is thus seeking a certitude which is in conformity with an angelic or divine intellect, but which goes beyond what is reasonable for man to desire by nature. When he has started on this path, Descartes wants to go beyond even the certitude of mathematics: "I always remained firm in the resolution...to accept nothing as true which did not appear to be more clear and certain than the demonstrations of the geometricians had formerly seemed." (188)

Descartes would seem to go astray, not only from the truth, but also from his own opinions, in giving the reasons for his doubt. Descartes gives examples to manifest his first reason for doubting sensible things:

In matters perceived by sense alone, however clearly, certainty does not exist, because we have often noted that error can occur in sensation, as in the thirst of the dropsical man, or when one who is jaundiced sees snow as yellow; for he sees it thus with no less clearness and distinctness than we see it as white. If, then, any certitude does exist, it remains that it must be found only in the clear perceptions of the intellect. (189)

Descartes' argument is weak here because he bases himself on examples drawn from organs which are diseased, or otherwise not disposed according to nature. But, his argument also goes against his own opinion. For, if clarity and distinction in sensation do not make it true, neither do clarity and distinction in intellectual knowledge suffice to make it true or certain.

Descartes meets the objection that we are not always deceived by dreams or sensation thus:

...you seem wholly to fail...in your argument, to show that the trustworthiness of the senses ought not to be impugned by me; you say that although at times, when not using the eye, I appeared to have experiences that do not occur without the eye coming into play, yet so to err was not my universal experience. You seem to imagine that we have not a sufficient cause for doubt if at any time we detect an error; and again you seem to think that we might always note the error each time that we fall into it, when, on the contrary, the error consists in the very fact that it is not recognized by us as an error. (190)

Unless we were certain of the way some things are by our senses, we could never be certain that we had been in error about other things. Besides, if we must reject sensation altogether because it sometimes leads us into error, then, we must also reject our intellect since it has also deceived us. Moreover, the errors we make in dreams are to be attributed to our intellect as subject. But, what leads our intellect out of the errors it makes when we are dreaming? It is the awakening of our exterior senses that enables us to correct the errors of our intellect. Hence, the arguments of Descartes for rejecting sensation also apply to the intellect, and the argument for rejecting sensation on account of the deception in dreams is not (as Descartes thinks) a reason for rejecting sensation, but for rejecting, if anything, our intellect. If Descartes was consistent, then, in applying the principle he uses to reject sensation, he would have to reject also his intellect and return to the state of the plant. But, it is absurd to use reason to show that we should not use our reason.

Descartes' reason for rejecting even the truths of mathematics (temporarily) also get him into difficulty:

I must inquire whether there is a God as soon as the occasion presents itself; and if I find that there is a God, I must also inquire whether he may be a deceiver; for, without a knowledge of these two truths, I do not see that I can ever be certain of anything. (191)

If we must know the nature of our intellect and its maker, his existence and nature, before we can know anything with certitude, then, we could never begin the intellectual life, let alone arrive at the nature of our intellect and its maker. We would again have used reason to show that we should not use reason.

These difficulties show that something is wrong with Descartes' desire for certitude. He is seeking a certitude which no human intellect can naturally have.

Let these things suffice as a sketch of Descartes' position on the mode of proceeding in conformity with the human intellect. Next, we should examine how this position leads on to his errors about the diversity of the sciences (which we have already partly considered), their proper modes, and dialectic.

Section Three: How Descartes' Positions on the Diversity of the Sciences, Their Proper Modes, and Dialectic Follow from his Position on the Mode of our Intellect

In this third section, we shall consider how Descartes' position on the mode of proceeding in conformity with the human intellect enters into his errors about the multiplicity of the sciences, their proper modes and dialectic. First, we shall speak about the multiplicity of the sciences.

Descartes' position on the multiplicity of the sciences is consonant with his errors about the nature of the light of our intellect and its likenesses. The light of our intellect is compared to the light of the sun by Descartes while a more just comparison would be to the eclipse of the sun. The light of our intellect can only illuminate the phantasms which are not intelligible in act. The light of our intellect is thus shown to be obscure by its union to the body; as a light in the corporeal world is obscured by an object placed between it and us. Similarly, our likenesses, abstracted from the singular representations in the phantasms, do not have that universality which Descartes thinks we have in that innate idea of ourselves in which we see first the cause from which we can proceed to know the entire universe. Descartes is attributing to the human intellect something which is proper to the divine intellect, which can be had by us in a very weak and distant participation in that science of theology which proceeds from revealed principles, but which cannot be had in our natural knowledge at all, not even in metaphysics. St Thomas explains this briefly when speaking of theology:

aliquam cognitio quanto altior est, tanto est magis unita et ad plura se extendit: unde intellectus Dei, qui est altissimus, per unum quod est ipse Deus, omnium rerum cognitionem habet distincte. Ita et cum ista scientia sit altissima et per ipsum lumen inspirationis divinae efficaciam habens, ipsa unita manens, non multiplicata, diversarum rerum considerationem habet, nec tantum in communi, sicut metaphysica, quae considerat omnia inquantum sunt entia, non descendens ad propriam cognitionem moralium vel naturalium. Ratio enim entis, cum sit diversificata in diversis, non est sufficiens ad specialem rerum cognitionem; ad quorum manifestationem divinum lumen in se unum manens...efficaciam habet. (192)

Descartes is, thus, assimilating the natural light of the human intellect to the light of the divine intellect. If the more knowable was more known to us so that God, the most knowable, was most known to us by a kind of intuitive knowledge as Descartes held, then our intellect could have one science in the natural order; just as theology is one science. But our intellect proceeds from potency to act and from sensible things which are intelligible in potency so that what is more knowable (more in act) is less known to us. Descartes, however, did not see this.

The second source of Descartes' error about the multiplicity of the sciences is found in his more fundamental position about reception or representation and judgment. Descartes attributes reception or representation to the intellect and judgment to our will. The judgment of our will should await clear and distinct representation in the intellect. But, the distinction of the sciences is more due to a diversity in their ways of judging than to a diversity of the reception or representation involved in each. Hence, Descartes, seeing only reception or representation on the part of the intellect, does not see the necessity of many habits to perfect the intellect in regard to judgment.

The third source of Descartes' difficulty about the diversity of the sciences is his error about the nature of knowledge. Like all the modern philosophers, Descartes never succeeded in understanding what knowledge is. The only object which can be known without an argument, or inference of some sort, is the object as existing in the knower. This is the way Descartes speaks of the objects apprehended by the senses:

But what did I clearly perceive in them? Nothing more than that the ideas or thoughts of these things were presented to my mind...But there was yet another thing which I affirmed, and which, owing to the habit which I had formed of believing it, I thought I perceived very clearly, although in truth I did not perceive it at all, to wit, that there were objects outside of me from which these ideas proceeded, and to which they were entirely similar. And it was in this that I erred, or, if perchance my judgment was correct, this was not due to any knowledge arising from my perception. (193)

What is received in the knower is always something of the knower according to Descartes--it is in no way something of another although we may suspect or try to prove that it is like another. Hence, all knowledge is at first reflective:

...before examining whether any such objects as I conceive exist outside of me, I must consider the ideas of them insofar as they are in my thought, and see which of them are distinct and which confused. (194)

Descartes never would have gotten out of his intellect if he had not "found" an innate idea of God's nature whence he knew that God existed and had benevolently established agreement between what else he found in his intellect to be clear and distinct and the outside world:

...commonly we judge that all things stand to each other in respect to their actual relations in the same way as they are related in our consciousness. But...one of those hyperbolical doubts adduced in the First Meditation went so far as to prevent me from being sure of this very fact (viz. that things are in their true nature exactly as we perceive them to be), so long as I supposed that I had no knowledge of the author of my being. (195)

How Descartes knew that his idea of God was the likeness of something outside of his intellect is a difficulty he never faced. From these things, we can see how Descartes could have come to think that there is one science. If all knowledge is a reflection of the mind upon what is found in it, and if all objects to be known share in the same manner of existence in the mind, then, there will be one science of all things; just as dialectic, which proceeds from relations that belong to things understood in the state of being understood, is one for all sciences.

The fourth source of Descartes' error about the multiplicity of the sciences is his identification of certitude with clarity and distinction. If we are certain of all the principles that we hold by the habit of principles, then, according to Descartes' axiom, we must also have a clear and distinct knowledge of them. But, this is the kind of knowledge that enables us to deduce conclusions from them. Hence, since there is one habit of principles, there is also one habit of conclusions, one science.

Next, we shall consider the source of Descartes' position on the proper modes of proceeding in the sciences. The first source of Descartes' error of extending the geometrical or mathematical method everywhere is his belief that there is the same proportion between our intellect and all objects. One cannot, according to Descartes, know one object more than another except in the sense that one knows more things about it. This is why, he argues, that we know our soul more than anything else. For each thing we know about something else, there is a corresponding thing we know about the soul--to wit, that the soul knows that. Hence, no object is less certain for us than the objects studied in geometry, except in having more things to be known about it, or before knowing it. But, this does not impede the same method for even in geometry one thing is more certain than another in this way; e.g., the first demonstrations are more certain than the second, the second than the third, etc. The whole process of Descartes' argument is in the following passage which we have partly quoted before:

...having but one truth to discover in respect to each matter, whoever succeeds in finding it knows in its regard as much as can be known. It is the same as with a child, for instance, who has been instructed in Arithmetic and has made an addition according to the rule prescribed; he may be sure of having found as regards the sum of figures given to him all the human mind can know. For, in conclusion, the method which teaches us to follow the true order and enumerate exactly every term in the matter under investigation contains everything which gives certainty to the rules of Arithmetic. (196)

The only comment this passage requires now is to point out that the phrase "as much as can be known" can be referred to the knower or to the object known. What Descartes says is true on the part of the object, but not on the part of the knower. These two are not the same as can be seen when the same conclusion is known by a necessary middle term and by a probable middle term. The object known is not more in one case than in the other--one does not know more things. It is the same conclusion known by both middle terms. Yet, this same conclusion is known more by the man who has a necessary middle term than the man who has only a probable middle term.

The second source of Descartes' error about the geometrical method is his, at least, implied position that what comes before in our knowledge should in no way depend upon what comes after. The man who adopts this position will be led to extend the mathematic al method everywhere since only in that method do we seem to proceed thus. Hence, if we accept the position that what comes before in our knowledge should in no way depend upon what comes after, we will end up by making philosophy into a system in the pejorative sense of the word.

The third source, close to the second, is his excessive desire for certitude. This had its origin in the bad instruction he received as a student which left him in the state where he could exclaim, "I found myself embarrassed with so many doubts and errors that it seemed to me that the effort to instruct myself had no effect other than the increasing discovery of my own ignorance." (197) The only relief from this general incertitude that Descartes could find was in mathematics:

of all those who have hitherto sought for the truth in the Sciences, it has been the mathematicians alone who have been able to succeed in making any demonstrations, that is to say producing reasons which are evident and certain..." (198)

Being accustomed to certitude only in mathematics, Descartes thought that certitude of any degree could not be found elsewhere, except by observing the mathematical mode. Hence, he tried to extend the mathematical mode everywhere.

Next, we shall consider the sources of Descartes' rejection or neglect of dialectic in general and, then, in particular with reference to each of the uses of dialectic.

Dialectic is tied to the very nature of the human intellect. St Thomas makes this point incidentally when speaking of something similar in the will of man:

in homine peccatum expiabile esse potest: eo quod eius electio non immobiliter fertur in aliquid, sed a bono potest perverti in malum, et a malo reduci inbonum: sicut etiam in hominis ratione contingit, quae, quia ex sensibilibus et per signa quaedam colligit veritatem, viam habet ad utrumque oppositorum. (199)

Since Descartes has not seen, or has not sufficiently considered, these things which pertain to the nature of the human intellect, he also does not see the necessity of dialectic. This can be considered in the light of something more universal. Descartes' errors about the nature of the human intellect are involved in his neglect of manuductio in the intellectual life of man. But dialectic is an important part of manuductio which leads us to the unknown by similia et opposita. Hence, an ignorance of manuductio in general, as we find in Descartes, contributes to an ignorance of dialectic in particular.

Another general reason for Descartes' neglect of dialectic is his experience of a bad use of dialectic (if we can take his account of it):

And I certainly never remarked that by some means of disputations employed by the Schools any truth has been discovered of which we were formerly ignorant. And so long as each side attempts to vanquish his opponent, there is a much more serious attempt to establish probability than to weigh the reasons on either side; and those who have for long been excellent pleaders are not for that reason the best judges. (200)

This reminds one of Plato's rejection of rhetoric on account of his experience of the misuse of it. Yet, one should not reject something, just because it is misused--even if it is misused for the most part. For some of the most necessary things are of this sort. Here again, in Descartes and Plato, we see the role of custom in the intellectual life of man. Just as an experience of a good use of a method can be the occasion for our extending it too far; so an experience of a bad use of a method can lead one to ignore it altogether.

Moreover, we can bring in the reasons that led Descartes to over-extend the geometrical method. Geometry does not require dialectic; so, if we could extend the geometrical method everywhere, there would be no need for dialectic.

Next, we should consider how Descartes' position on the most universal mode leads on to errors about the necessity of the three uses of dialectic in particular. The first use of dialectic, as an exercise, is important, especially, on account of the weakness of the human intellect in the beginning, "propter imbecillitatem intellectus humani a principio." (201) Our intellect is especially weak in the beginning because it proceeds from potency to act. Hence, since perfection is based upon act, our intellect is most imperfect to begin with. It is, in the order of intellects, analogous to prime matter in sensible things which is most imperfect. Hence, as it is impossible for there to be something more imperfect in sensible things than prime matter; so, also, it is impossible for there to be an intellect more imperfect than our own. Hence, our intellect has great need to be exercised in the beginning. Moreover, our intellect is so weak in the beginning that it is not capable of dialectical exercise until it has spent much time with disciplines somewhat extraneous to reason, as poetry and rhetoric. Descartes, however, thinks that our intellect is in act to begin with, knowing itself and our thought.

The importance of the second use of dialectic is seen especially from the role of custom in man's intellectual life. The second use of dialectic is to meet an opponent on his own grounds or with his own opinions. This is necessary to remove the errors a man may have made against the truth. Custom tends to be stronger than truth itself, and this is why customary errors are not removed by a mere statement of the truth. If we wish to remove customary errors from another man, we must use something equally strong--to wit, other opinions that he customarily or naturally holds. If custom did not have this force in our intellectual life, a simple proposal of the truth would be sufficient to lead a man out of his errors.

It may seem strange to the reader that Descartes should have missed this second use of dialectic. For, does not Descartes in many places insist upon the great care that must be taken to root out long-standing errors which custom has made to be stronger than the truth itself? The solution of this difficulty is found in Descartes' position of judgment which he seems to make an act of the will. Hence, error, which is a bad judgment, will also be primarily an act of the will. Thus, the removal of errors does not require something within the intellect itself, as dialectical arguments, but something primarily in the will. This can be seen in Descartes' universal doubt which he supposes will free him from all previous errors. This universal doubt is based upon something in the will, as we have seen: to wit, an excessive desire for certitude. But, although a man may say in words that he has placed all his former beliefs in doubt, this does not mean that his intellect is actually in agreement with those words. If the human intellect can not have the certitude which Descartes desires, then it (the human intellect) must either give up the search for truth or be satisfied with the possibility of error and, hence, the need for dialectic.

In regard to the third use of dialectic, Descartes has ignorance because he did not consider sufficiently that a man should progress in the knowledge of the truth bit by bit. In using dialectic, we are in agreement with this way of arriving at the truth. No man gets the whole truth by himself, but many catch some part of it. Since dialectic proceeds from probable opinions, and a probable opinion is apt to include or resemble some element of the truth (otherwise it would not be probable), we can use dialectical arguments on both sides of a question to gather the elements or parts of truth which may be on both sides: the weaker parts of both sides tend to go down and the stronger to remain. In this way, dialectic helps us to move towards the truth, bit by bit, in accordance with the nature of our reason.

Descartes, however, does not see well the necessity for our intellect, or reason, of coming gradually, or bit by bit, to the truth. This is seen already when he insists upon beginning with distinct ideas. We also find this in the first two principles of his work The Principles of Philosophy:

Principle I: That in order to examine into the truth, it is necessary once in one's life to doubt of all things, so far as this is possible . . . Principle II: That we ought to consider as false all these things of which we may doubt. (202)

If we consider probable opinions, which may be doubted, as false, we would also regard them as not contributing to the truth in any positive way. Probable indicates an element or, at least, appearance of truth, but the false is something entirely outside the truth. Thus, Descartes will attempt to seize the whole truth immediately about those difficult problems where we find opposed probable opinions.

Descartes did not see the use of dialectic with respect to the principles of a science because he did not realize the difficulty of bringing some principles out of the phantasms into the intellect and because he did not see that the human intellect should go from the confused to the distinct. Let us take each of these separately.

Descartes did not see the difficulty of bringing some principles out of the phantasms into the intellect because he did not admit that all our intellectual knowledge begins from the phantasms. Hence, when some principles were not immediately represented in the phantasms, Descartes assumed they were innate and not derived from the phantasms in any way. Thus, he never faced the difficulty of bringing the more abstract principles into the intellect and, hence, he never saw the use of dialectic in this regard. His error about the mode of the human intellect determined his ignorance about dialectic.

We can see the use of dialectic in this regard from a consideration of what is a probable opinion; for dialectic proceeds from probable opinions. A probable opinion, as we saw in Part Two, is the opinion of all or most men or of all or most or the most famous of wise men. The conflict of the opinions of most men and of the wise men (especially the most famous) is often due to the fact that the former are more tied to their sense knowledge (which is the starting-point for man) while the latter go farther or penetrate more to what exceeds the senses and imagination. But, the human intellect does this latter imperfectly to begin with. Hence, one can be led to contradict himself by proceeding from these diverse probable opinions. This contradiction forces the intellect to make distinct its passage from the sensible to the intelligible.

A good example of this is found in the passage from the Parmenides that we quoted in Part Two. Socrates, a wise man, has penetrated, in a vague way, to something intelligible that exceeds the senses and imagination--namely, the universal whole. But, he knows the universal whole only in a very imperfect way, as is seen by the fact that he cannot avoid confusing it with the integral whole that falls under the senses and imagination. The difficulty he is led into makes us realize that his notion of a universal whole is, in some way, derived from that of the integral whole which is in the phantasms immediately and directly. This is why Socrates falls back upon the sensible integral whole when trying to answer questions about the universal whole; as if he had only imperfectly separated the latter from the former. This imperfect separation is not sufficient to have the universal as a starting-point for logic. But, this difficulty cannot be solved unless we separate more precisely the universal whole from the integral whole. The solution, then, of the knot created by the dialectical arguments does nothing other than to bring the universal whole into the intellect so we can begin logic.

The connection of dialectic and the analogy of words with the process of bringing principles out of the phantasms shows that they are an important part of manuductio. Manuductio is ordered immediately to the likenesses, not the light, required in intellectual knowledge; and the phantasms supply the likenesses, not the light which comes from the agent intellect. One reason, then, why Descartes did not see the use of dialectic to get to the principles of a science is that he was ignorant, or in error, about the role of the phantasm in man's intellectual life.

Descartes' error about the proceeding of the human intellect from the confused to the distinct leads him into errors about definition and, hence, into an ignorance of the role of dialectic which is especially ordered to the problem of definition. For Descartes, the human intellect is not perfected by going from the confused to the distinct; rather, the confused is an impediment, an obstacle to the acquisition of distinct knowledge. Thus, for Descartes, a definition composed of genus and difference cannot make something to be known distinctly since the genus is more confused than the species or the defined. Nothing can be defined that cannot be analyzed into other things more distinctly known:

we...shall call those only simple, the cognition of which is so clear and distinct that they cannot be analyzed by the mind into others more distinctly known. Such are figure, extension, motion, etc.; all others we conceive to be in some way compounded out of these. (203)

This is why Descartes in his uncompleted dialogue, The Search After Truth, makes fun of the method of arriving at a definition by dividing a genus (204). One would try to make known distinctly something, but he would do so through things which were more and more confused than it. The genus is more confused than the species, and the genus above that genus (which is used to make it, and, ultimately, the original species) is even more confused. Thus, for example, animal is more confused than man, and body, than animal. Hence, thinks Descartes, it is absurd to come to a distinct knowledge of man through animal, which is more confused, and of animal (and eventually man) through body, which is even more confused than animal.

Descartes has not sufficiently considered that the genus alone does not make the definition. But, his ultimate difficulty is that he does not see that it is natural for the human intellect to go from the confused to the distinct.

There is another way in which Descartes' position on distinct knowledge leads him into error about definition. Since he identifies certitude with distinction, Descartes mistakes the certitude of the quid nominis for the distinction of the quid rei:

according to the laws of true logic, the question "does a thing exist" must never be asked unless we already understand what the thing is... (205)

Thus, for example, Descartes thought it was absurd to try to define motion since everybody already knows what motion is.

From these things, we can see why Descartes did not see the use of dialectic for coming to know the principles of a science. Definitions are principles of science, and dialectic helps us to definitions by constructing arguments for the problems of genus, definition etc.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aristotle

Oxford University Press edition Topica (Ross), Oxford, 1958 Physica (Ross), Oxford, 1950 Ethica Nicomachea (Bywater), Oxford, 1954

Loeb Classical Library edition Posterior Analytics (Tredennick), London, 1960 Rhetoric (Freese), London, 1947 Metaphysics (Tredennick), London, 1956

Descartes

Oeuvres et Lettres (Bridoux), Paris, Bibliotheque de La Pleiade, 1952

The Philosophical Works of Descartes, in two volumes (translated by Haldane and Ross), New York, Dover edition, 1955

Plato

The Dialogues of Plato (Jowett translation), New York, Random House (Oxford University Press, III edition)

Salmanticenses Carmelitarum Discalceatorum

Cursus Theologicus, T. 18, Parisiis, Libraria S. Congregationis De Propaganda Fide, 1870

St Thomas Aquinas

Summa Theologiae (Caramello), Taurini, Marietti, 1952 Summa Contra Gentiles (Leonine edition), Taurini, Marietti, 1934 Scriptum Super Sententiis (Moos) Paris, Lethielleux, 1956 In Librum Boetii de Trinitate Expositio (Calcaterra), Taurini, Marietti, 1954 Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate (Spiazzi), Taurini, Marietti, 1953 Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia (Bazzi et al.), Taurini, Marietti, 1953 In Aristotelis libros Peri Hermeneias et Posteriorum Analyticorum Expositio (Spiazzi), Taurini, Marietti, 1955

In octos libros Physicorum Aristotelis Expositio (Maggiolo), Taurini, Marietti, 1954 In Aristotelis libros de Caelo et Mundo Expositio (Spiazzi), Taurini, Marietti, 1952 In Aristotelis librum de Anima (Pirotta), Taurini, Marietti, 1948 In decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum (Spiazzi), Taurini, Marietti, 1955 In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis (Cathala - Spiazzi), Taurini, Marietti, 1950

ENDNOTES

1. In I Ethicorum, Lect. 11, n. 138

2. In I De Caelo et Mundo, Lect. IX, n. 97

3. Letter to the translator of his Principles of Philosophy into French. Dover ed., Vol. I, p. 49

4. Rule IV, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 49

5. St Thomas Aquinas, In III de Anima, Lect. IV, n. 624

6. Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rule II, Dover ed., Vol. 1, p. 3

7. Ibid., p. 4

8. Ibid., p. 5

9. Discourses on Method, Part II, Dover ed., Vol. I, p. 92

10. Ibid., p. 94

11. Ibid., Part III, Dover ed., Vol. I, p. 99

12. Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rule XII, Dover ed., Vol. I, p. 45

13. Ibid., Rule III, Dover ed., Vol. I, p. 7

14. Ibid., Rule III, Dover ed., Vol. I, p. 8

15. Descartes' Letter to the translator of The Principles of Philosophy into French (Claude Picot), Dover ed., Vol. I, p. 204

16. Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rule V, Dover ed., Vol. I, p. 14

17. Discourse on Method, Part Two, Dover ed., Vol. I, p. 92

18. Reply to the Second Objections to the Meditations, Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 48

19. Discourse on Method, Part Two, Dover ed., Vol. I, p. 91

20. Descartes' Letter to the translator of the Principles of Philosophy into French (Claude Picot), Dover ed., Vol. I, p. 206 21. Principles of Philosophy, Part One, Prin. LXXV, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 252

22. Descartes' Letter to the translator of the Principles of Philosophy into French (Claude Picot), Dover ed., Vol. I, p. 211

23. Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rule i, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 2

24. Ibid., pp. 1-2

25. Discourses On Method, Part IV, Dover ed., Vol. I, p. 104

26. Meditations on First Philosophy, Med. V, Dov. ed., Vol. I, pp. 180-181

27. Reply to the First Objections to the Meditations, Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 12

28. Discourse on Method, Part IV, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 101

29. Ibid., Part V, Dover ed., Vol, pp. 107-108

30. Principles of Philosophy, Second Part, Prin. IV, Dov. ed., Vol. I, pp. 255-256

31. Letter to Clerselier, Jan. 12, 1646, Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 131

32. Principles of Phil., Part Two, Prin. LXIV, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 269

33. Ibid., Prin. III, Dover ed., Vol. I, p. 255

34. Ibid., Prin. XX, Dover ed., Vol. I, p. 264

35. Principles of Philosophy, Part Two, Principle XXI, Dover ed., Vol. I, pp. 264-265

36. Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rule II, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 5

37. Discourse on Method, Part VI, Dov. ed., Vol. I, pp. 120-121

38. Prin. of Phil., Part IV, Prin. CCIV, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 300

39. Reply to First Objections to Med., Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 20

40. Ibid., Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 18

41. Ibid., Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 17

42. Reply to Fourth Objections to Meditations, Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 99

43. Rules for the Direction of the Mind. Rule II, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 3

44. Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rule X, Dov. ed., Vol. I, pp. 32-33

45. St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IaIIae, q. 57, a. 2, c.

46. Ibid., q. 57, a. 2, ad 2

47. St Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, IaIIae, q. 66, a. 5, ad 4

48. St Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate, q. 12, a. 3, c.

49. St Thomas Aquinas, In I Ethicorum, Lect. 11, n. 137

50. St Thomas Aquinas, In boetii De Trin., Lect. 2, q. 2, a. 2

51. In I Ethicorum, Lect. 11, n. 138

52. In I Post. Anal., Lect. 41, n. 367

53. In I Physicorum, Lect. 1, n. 1

54. In I Physicorum, Lect. 1, nn. 2-3

55. St Thomas Aquinas, De Potentia, q. 7, a. 11, c.

56. De Potentia, q. 7, a. 11, c.

57. In I Ethicorum, Lect. 1, n. 1

58. In I Post. Anal., Lect. 1, nn. 1-2

59. St Thomas aquinas, In I Post. Anal., Lect. 18, nn. 154-155

60. In I Post. Anal., Lect. 18, n. 156

61. St Thomas Aquinas, In I Post. Anal., Lect. 18, n. 154

62. In I Post. Anal., Lect. 41, n. 367

63. St Thomas Aquinas, III Sent., d. 14, a. 3, scl. 4

64. St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 117, a. 1, c.

65. St Thomas Aquinas, In I Ethicorum, Lect. 4, n. 53

66. In Boetii De Trinitate, Lect. 2, q. 2, a. 1

67. St Thomas Aquinas, In I Ethicorum, Lect. 3, n. 35

68. Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rule II, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 5

69. Ibid., Rule III, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 5

70. Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rule IV, Dov. ed., Vol. I, pp. 9-10

71. Letter to Father Dinet, Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 371

72. Discourse on Method, Part IV, Dov. ed., Vol. I, pp. 100-101

73. Reply to the Seventh Objections to the Meditations Dover ed., Vol. II, p. 266 II

74. Meditation on First Philosophy, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 149

75. Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 3

76. Discourse on Method, Part One, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 86

77. Reply to the Seventh Objections, Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 307

78. Discourse on Method, Part Two, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 91

79. Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rule II, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 480.

80. Reply to the Second Objections to the Meditations, Dover ed., Vol. II, p. 50

81. Descartes' Letter to the translator of his Principles of Philosophy into French, Vol. I, p. 206, Dov. ed.

82. Descartes' Preface to the Reader of his Meditations, Dover ed., Vol. I, p. 139

83. Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rule III, Dov. ed., Vol. I, pp. 7-8

84. Reply to the Second objections to the meditations, Dov. ed., Vol. II, pp. 50-51

85. Descartes' Letter to the translator of his Principles of Philosophy into French, Dov. ed., Vol I, p. 207

86. Descartes' Letter to the translator of his Prin. of Phil., Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 211

87. Discourse on Method, Part III, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 99

88. Synopsis of the Six Meditations on First Phil., Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 141

89. Discourse on method, Part IV, Vol. I, p. 102

90. Reply to the Second Objections to the Meditations, Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 46

91. Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rule II, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 4

92. Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rule III, Dov. ed., Vol. I, pp. 5-6

93. I Meditation on First Philosophy, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 148

94. Reply to the Fifth Objections to the Meditations, Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 205

95. Meditation V on First Philosophy, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p.183

96. Rules for the Direction of the Mind, rule IX, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 28

97. Reply to the Second Objections to the Meditations, Dov. ed., Vol. II, pp. 49-50

98. Discourse on Method, Part VI, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 123

99. Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rule XIII, Dov. ed., Vol. I, pp. 53-54

100. Ibid., Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 52

101. St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book I, Chap. 4

102. St Thomas Aquinas, In II Metaphysicorum, Lect. 1, án. 287

l03. Plato, Meno, Jowett Translation of Plato's Dialogues, Oxford Univ., III ed., n. 84

104. In Post. Anal., Lect. 5, n. 47

105. St Thomas Aquinas, In I Post. Anal., Lect. 20, n. 6

106. St Thomas Aquinas, In IV Metaphysicorum, Lect. 4, n. 574

107. In I Post. Anal., Lect. 4, n. 32

108. Dialogues of Plato, Parmenides, Jowett Trans., Random House, N.Y., Vol. II, pp. 91-92, n. 131

109. III Sent., d. 14, a. 3, s. 2

110. In II Metaphysicorum, Lect. 5, n. 332

111. St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IIaIIae, q. 173, a. 2

112. St Thomas Aquinas, III Sent., d. 23, q.11, a. 3, s. 2, ad 3

113. St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 79, a. 1

114. Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 84

115. St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 84, a. 6

116. St Thomas Aquinas, In Boetii de Trinitate, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4

117. St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 84, a. 7

118. St Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate, q. 12, a. 3, ad 1

119. St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 16, a. 2, c.

120. St Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate, q. 12, a. 3, ad 2

121. Curs. Theol. Salmanticenses, T. 18, Disp. 3, dub. 2, n. 7

122. St Thomas Aquinas, In II Metaphysicorum,

123. St Thomas Aquinas, In I Physicorum, Lect. 1, n. 7

124. St Thomas Aquinas, In I Ethicorum, Lect. 11, nn. 131-132

125. St Thomas Aquinas, III Sent., d. 14, a. 3, s. 4

126. St Thomas Aquinas, In II Metaphysicorum, L. 1, n. 279

127. St Thomas Aquinas, In II Metaphysicorum, L. 1 n. 287

128. In II Metaphysicorum, Lect. 5, n. 335

129. St Thomas Aquinas, In VI Ethicorum, Lect. 7, n. 1211

130. Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 117, a. 1, c.

131. Summa theologiae, Ia., q. 106, a. 1, c.

132. Summa Theologiae, Ia., q. 117, a. 1, c.

133. Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rule VIII, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 26

134. Reply to V Objections to Meditations, Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 210

135. Reply to IV Objections to Meditations, Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 101

136. Reply to I Objections to Meditations, Dov. ed., Vol. II, pp. 22-23

137. Meditation VI on First Philosophy, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 192

138. Letter from Descartes to Clerselier (Jan. 12, 1646), Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 128

139. Reply to V Objections to Meditations, Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 212

140. Meditation VI on First Philosophy, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 186

141. Meditation III on First Philosophy, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 160

142. Reply to VII Objections to Meditations, Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 269

143. Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rule I, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 1

144. Ibid., Rule XII, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 47

145. Meditation III on First Philosophy, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 158

146. Reply to V Objections to Meditations, Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 225

147. Reply to IV Objections to Meditations, Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 101

148. Reply to VI Objections to Meditations, Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 253

149. Meditation VI on First Philosophy, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 191

150. Letter of 12th Jan., 1646, Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 131

151. Letter from Descartes to Clerselier, Jan. 12, 1646, Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 131

152. Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rule XII, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 36

153. Letter from Descartes to Clerselier, Jan. 12, 1646, Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 126

154. Meditation IV on First Philosophy, Dov. ed., Vol. I, pp. 174, 175, 177

155. Discourse on Method, Part IV, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 104

156. Meditation III on First Philosophy, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 170

157. Reply to V Objections to Meditations, Dov. ed., Vol. II, pp. 227-228

158. Ibid., Dov. ed., Vol. II, pp. 210-211

159. Letter from Descartes to Clerselier, Jan. 12, 1646, Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 127

160. Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rule XII, Dov. ed., Vol. I, pp. 39-40

161. Reply to III Objections to Meditations, Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 73

162. St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 84, a. 6; De Ver. q. 10, a. 6

163. Reply to V Objections to Meditations, Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 210

164. Principles of Philosophy, Part I, Prin. 75, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 252

165. Ibid., Prin. 43, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 236

166. Discourse on Method, Part IV, Dov. ed., Vol. I, pp. 101-102

167. Reply to VII Objections to Meditations, Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 312

168. Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rule I, Dov. ed., Vol. I, pp. 1-2

169. Meditation V on First Philosophy, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 183

170. Discourse on Method, Part II, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 94

171. Ibid., Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 90

172. Ibid., Part I, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 83

173. Discourse on Method, Part I, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 84

174. Ibid., Part II, Dov. ed., Vol. p. 91

175. Ibid., p. 91

176. Reply to VII Objections to Meditations, Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 317

177. Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rule IV, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 10

178. Summa Theologiae, Ia., q. 117, a. 1, c.

179. Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rule IV, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 10

180. Ibid., Rule X, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 31

181. Ibid., Rule XIV, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 64

182. Reply to II Objections to Meditations, Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 48

183. Principles of Philosophy, Part I, Principles IV and V, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 220

184. Reply to V Objections to Meditations, Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 206

185. Prin. of Phil., Part I, Prin. VIII, Dov. ed., Vol. I p. 221

186. Reply to IV Objections to Meditations, Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 115

187. Meditation VI on First Philosophy, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 189

188. Discourse on method, Part V, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 106

189. Reply to II Objections to Meditations, Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 42

190. Reply to V Objections to Meditations, Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 209

191. Meditation III on first Philosophy, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 159

192. I Sent., Prologus, q. 1, a. 2, s.

193. Meditation III on First Philosophy, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 158

194. Meditation V on First Philosophy, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 179

195. Reply to IV Objections to Meditations, Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 101

196. Discourse on Method, Part II, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 94

197. Discourse on method, Part I, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 83

198. Discourse on Method, Part II, Dov. ed., Vol. I, pp. 92-93

199. Summa Contra Gentiles, Lib. IV, Cap. 55

200. Discourse on Method, Part VI, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 124

201. St Thomas Aquinas, In Boetii De Trinitate, Lect. 1, q. 1, a. 1, c.

202. Principles of Philosophy, Part I, Prins. I and II, Dov. ed., Vol. I, p. 219

203. Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rule XII, Dov. ed., Vol. I, pp. 40-41

204. Dover ed., Vol. I, pp. 317-318

205. Reply to I Objections to Meditations, Dov. ed., Vol. II, p. 13