Descartes on Definition of Motion

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Descartes on Definition of Motion

Natural Philosophy · Physics Book 3

Not Berquist’s writing; a text he kept. By Rene Descartes. From his file: DESCARTES-DEF. OF MOTION, PLACE.doc.

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DESCARTES ON DEFINITION OF MOTION

Rene Descartes: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Dover Edition of the Philosophical Works of Descartes, Vol. I, p. 46:

the learned have a way of being so clever as to contrive to render themselves blind to things that are in their own nature evident, and known by the simplest peasant. This happens when they try to explain by something more evident those things that are self-evident. For what they do is either to explain something else, or nothing at all. Who, for instance, does not perfectly see what that is, whatsoever it may be, in respect of which alteration occurs when we change place? But is there anyone who would grasp that very thing when he was told that place is the surface of the body surrounding us? This would be strange seeing that that surface can change though I stay still and do not change my place, or that, on the contrary, it can so move along with me that, although it continues to surround me, I am nevertheless no longer in the same place. Do not these people really seem to use magic words which have a hidden force that eludes the grasp of human apprehension? They define motion, a fact with which everyone is quite familiar, as the actualization of what exists in potentiality, in so far as it is potential! Now who understands these words? And who at the same time does not know what motion is? Will not everyone admit that those philosophers have been trying to find a knot in a bulrush? We must therefore maintain that no definitions are to be used in explaining things of this kind lest we should take what is complex in place of what is simple. We must be content to isolate them from each other, and to give them, each of us, our individual attention, studying them with that degree of mental illumination which each of us possesses.

Rene Descartes: The Principles of Philosophy, Principles XXIV and XXV, Dover Edition of the Philosophical Works of Descartes, Vol. I, pp. 265-266:

Principle XXIV - What motion is in common parlance.

But motion (i.e. local motion, for I can conceive no other kind, and do not consider that we ought to conceive any other in nature), in the vulgar sense, is nothing more than the action by which any body passes from one place to another And just as we have remarked above that the same thing may be said to change and not to change its place at the same time, we can say that it moves and does not move at the same time. For he who is seated in a ship setting sail, thinks he is moving when he looks on the shore he has left, and considers it as fixed, but not if he regards the vessel he is on, because he does not change his position in reference to is parts. Likewise, because we are accustomed to think that there is no motion without action and that in rest there is cessation of action, the person thus seated may more properly be said to be in repose than in motion, since he is not conscious of any action in himself.

Principle XXV - What movement properly speaking is

But if, looking not to popular usage, but to the truth of the matter, let us consider what ought to be understood by motion according to the truth of the thing; we may say, in order to attribute a determinate nature to it, that it is the transference of one part of matter or one body from the vicinity of those bodies that are in immediate contact with it, and which we regard as in repose, into the vicinity of others. By one body or by a part of matter I understand all that which is transported together, although it may be composed of many parts which in themselves have other motions. And I say that it is the transportation and not either the force or the action which transport, in order to show that motion is always in the mobile thing, not in that which moves; for these two do not seem to me to be accurately enough distinguished. Further, I understand that it is a mode of the mobile thing and not a substance, just as figure is a mode of the figured thing, and repose of that which is at rest.