Dionne - Instrument or Tool in Logic
Logic as a Whole · Subject of Logic
From his file: NOTES WITH DIONNE.doc.
DIONNE - INSTRUMENT OR TOOL IN LOGIC
Dionne: absolutely necessary for a course in logic, for the manuductio
Dionne: Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 90, Art. 1; De Veritate, Q. 22, Art. 1
Themistius - dans une oeuvre de la logique - instrument
MANDUCTIO BY LIKENESS FOR FORMATIO IN THREE ACTS OF REASON
1. Exterior acts - building and the built
2. imagination - remembering, reading a work of fiction, doing mathematics (See imaginatio per intellectum in THOMAS)
3. practical reason - for making - a recipe, rules of an art
4. practical reason - for doing - a law or a prayer
Looking reason makes (a definition or argument) for knowing
TOOLS ARE MATTER OF LOGIC: De Veritate, Q. 22, Art. 7
rationalists lack a tool (enthymeme, example, induction); empiricists lack a tool (syllogism) - orbatus like a man lacking an arm.
enthymeme (sign), example, induction all proceed from sense as distinguished from syllogism - reason for explaining the above in this order in previous course
By reason of matter, induction can lead to certain truth, as in per se nota. Likewise, insoluble enthymemes are so by matter. Examples of necessary sign in first figure are taken from nature
From sign to signified directly; like metaphor rather than simile On sign: De Caelo, n. 3; N. Ethics II, Lectio 1
In rhetoric, one begins with sign, but in philosophy sign follows demonstration.
Middle term in syllogism is defined by power to unite
Text on definition: Scriptum super Lib. IV Sententiarum, Dist 3, Art. 1: on baptism
LOGIC, GEOMETRY AND MEDICINE
Logic is like geometry in being a liberal art and like medicine in being an art that helps nature.
Logic is however, an art and a science in a different way than is geometry. Geometry makes its subject and the making enters into the very demonstrations, as can be seen in the ninth book of the Metaphysics. But logic cannot be said to make its subject, It finds certain relations that belong to things understood in the very state of being understood. The subject of logic is these relations and the logician demonstrates certain things about them, But logic does not make these relations. They result from our way of understanding which is to proceed from ability to act, from the known to the unknown, and by abstraction from singular representations in the phantasms. From the fact that we understand by abstraction, the things understood directly will be universal and have a certain relation in that state of being understood by us to the singulars from which it is abstracted.
Logic is the tool of the other sciences insofar as it prescribes the relations which the things we understand in the other sciences must have in the state of being understood if we are to acquire or possess that other science. The natural scientist, for example, is trying to find the natural things understood by us which have the relations in the state of being understood that the logician prescribes. The natural scientist as such does not want to know these relations (indeed they are in a way extrinsic to what he wants to know), but he cannot know what he wants to know without finding things that do have certain relations in the state of being understood. Neither the logician, nor the natural scientist makes these relations or things understood to have these relations.
"Making" divisions, definitions or enunciations or syllogisms is a problem of finding among the things we know or understand already those which have certain definite logical relations. Logic specifies the exact relations which those things must have in the state of being understood.
Logic co-operates with nature as does medicine, but it does not make as medicine does.
OK (Dionnne?) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ What is meant by intentional being and the intentional order?
"Ce qui est forme par intelligence, consequuntur modo intelligendi, parce que forme par intelligence"
See Scriptum super Lib. I Sententiarum, Dist. 2, Q. 1, Art III (111)
Laval Theologique et Philosophique, Vol. VI, 1950, N. 2 "L'entitatif et l'intentionnel"
Show that the intentional order can be divided exhaustively into first and second intentions.