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Distinctions Between Nature, Reason and Will and Between Reason as a Nature & Reason as Reason and Between Will as a Nature & Will as Will
Wisdom about Beginnings · Nature, Reason, Will
From his file: REASON & WILL AS A NAT&AS. SUCH.doc.
Read from in 5 classes
- De Anima — 127. Imagination in God's service, 'one' and being, and Q.82 a.1: Does the will will anything by necessity?
- Wisdom (2006, Colorado) — 6. Metaphysics IX, Lectio 2: Natural vs. Rational Ability, and Nature vs. Will
- Wisdom (2006, Colorado) — 7. Reason and Will as Natures: Thomas's Two Solutions and the Man/Animal Analogy
- Prima Pars — 139. Aquinas on the Trinity: Does the Father Generate the Son by Will or by Nature? Nature, Will, and the Senses of 'Necessary'
- Prima Secundae — 36. Summa I-II, Question 10, Articles 1–2: Does the Will Will Anything Naturally, and Is It Moved Necessarily by Its Object?
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN NATURE, REASON AND WILL AND BETWEEN REASON AS A NATURE & REASON AS REASON AND BETWEEN WILL AS A NATURE & WILL AS WILL
Aristotle considers the distinction between a natural ability and a reasonable ability or an ability with reason (either reason itself or the will) in the ninth book of the Metaphysics. A natural ability is determined to one, but a reasonable ability is for opposites.[1] This distinction is important for our understanding of ability, but it is also a beginning for understanding many other things. Thomas speaks of this distinction when contrasting will and nature:
...will and nature differ in causing in this way: nature is determined to one, but the will is not determined to one. The reason for this is that an effect is likened to the form through which the agent acts. But it is manifest that there is but one natural form of a thing by which that thing has existence. Whence, such as it is, so does it act. But the form by which the will acts is not only one, but there are many, insofar as there are many reasons understood. Whence what is done by will is not such as is the agent, but such as the agent wills and understands. Will then is a beginning of those things which are able to be thus or otherwise. But nature is a beginning of those things which can only be thus.[2]
This distinction, however, is often misunderstood. Only when it is correctly understood does it become a beginning for understanding these other things.
Our aim is to understand correctly this distinction and then use it to understand some other things. What are these?
A true understanding of the distinction between a natural ability and a rational ability leads to the understanding of two other distinctions: the distinction between reason as reason and reason as a nature, and the proportional distinction between the will as will and the will as a nature. We must also correctly understand these two distinctions. And after seeing these distinctions, it is important to consider which is more known to us: reason as reason or reason as a nature, and the will as will or the will as a nature. The denial of reason as a nature and the will as a nature[3] would seem to point to reason as reason and the will as will as being more known to us. When these distinctions have been understood, many other things can be understood better.
First, we can understand better what is being defined by the first definition of reason in Shakespeare's Exhortation to Use Reason and what we are being urged to use therein. Perhaps, there could also be a first definition of the will proportional to this.
Second, we can understand better the reason which is directed by logic and logistic and what is the second road in our looking knowledge (after the natural road from the senses into reason). And proportional to this, we can see the will which is directed (in a remote way) by ethics, domestics and political philosophy.
Third, we can understand better the order in which Aristotle distinguishes reason from the senses and the imagination in the third book About the Soul (the De Anima) and also to some extent how the will is first distinguished from sense desire therein.
Fourth, we can understand better the division and order in which Aristotle considers the five virtues of reason in the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics. And we can consider how the virtues of the will are to will as will and will as a nature.
Fifth, these distinctions are important for theology in understanding God and the Trinity.
A MISUNDERSTOOD DISTINCTION
When Aristotle distinguishes the rational or reasonable powers or abilities from the natural ones in the ninth book of the Metaphysics, he does so by pointing out that a natural ability is determined to one[4] while a rational ability is open to opposites. The fire will always burn what is placed before it. But the doctor can heal or make sick by his art.
Since there is the same knowledge of opposites, one is able by the same art to do opposite things. But the natural form is in matter and excludes its opposite. Since the art is open to opposites, but one cannot do both opposites at the same time, the rational ability does not, like the natural one, go automatically into act in the presence of its material. Rather, there is need of desire to determine which opposite will be done.
Since the above distinction between a natural ability or power and a reasonable one seems to determine the fundamental division of movers, there is significance in the examples Aristotle gives when distinguishing the four kinds of causes. In the second book of Natural Hearing, the Physics, and in the fifth book of the Metaphysics, Aristotle gives as examples of the mover, one from nature and the other from reason. The father or seed is given as an example of a natural cause and the doctor or the advisor as a cause by reason.
The division also appears exhaustive because it is by opposites. An active ability is either determined to one of two opposites or it is not. It is either capable of both opposites or it is not. Reason by dialectic and rhetoric can argue to opposite conclusions And men often come by their reason to opposite conclusions and even the same man sometimes goes from affirming to denying or vice-versa. The will, like reason, is capable of opposites for we can will to do or not do, to do in this way or even in an opposite way.
Some thinkers understand this distinction between nature on the one hand and reason or the will on the other hand such that there is no part or side of any contradiction (neither the affirmative, nor the negative) which reason must assent to and cannot agree to its opposite; and likewise that there is nothing that the will must will and cannot will its opposite. John Stuart Mill, for example, in his defense of liberty of thought sees such liberty as respecting reason which is nowhere determined necessarily to one side of a contradiction. And Jean Paul Sartre sees man's will with no determination to any object. There are, of course, many others who share these positions. Indeed, the many who think, in accord with scientific customs, that every thought is an hypothesis to be tested by its consequences (as Claude Bernard taught) would hold this position, especially when it is realized that even the confirmation of an hypothesis does not force reason to accept the hypothesis. (One cannot affirm necessarily the antecedent because the consequent has been affirmed.) And these positions would at first sight seem to agree with the above distinction of a natural and a rational ability going back to Aristotle, if not before. Indeed, it seems to be a case of the excluded middle. Either an ability is determined to one of the opposites or it is not.
The problem of the distinction of nature and reason, or nature and will, as causes, arises in those texts of Thomas where he maintains that reason knows or understands some things naturally and cannot think the opposite and where he maintains that the will naturally wills something and cannot will its opposite. The will naturally wills happiness and cannot will its opposite, misery or wretchedness. The will can will something only if it is good in some way. The reason naturally knows and assents to the axioms, especially the statements about contradiction. Having distinguished between nature and reason and between nature and will, how can one assert that reason knows some things, or assents to them, naturally and the will wills something naturally.?
There are two ways in which Thomas explains how this is possible. The first way is given in response to an objection:
1. A natural agent is divided against a voluntary agent, as is clear in the second book of the Physics. The will, therefore, is not moved naturally to anything.
It should be said to the first that the will is divided against nature, as one cause againt another: some things come to be naturally and some things come to be voluntarily. There is another way of causing proper to the will, which is mistress of its act, besides the way which belongs to nature which is determined to one. But because the will has a foundation in some nature, it is necessary that the motion proper to nature be shared in the will to some extent, as what belongs to the cause before is shared by the cause which comes after. For in each thing, existence which is by its nature is before willing which is by its will. And hence it is that the will naturally wills something. [5]
In this text, Thomas says the will is founded in some nature, the nature of man or the soul, and that it partakes of the proper motion of this cause which is before, as any cause which comes after another partakes of the motion of that cause which is before. The same could be said of reason. In this solution, neither reason nor the will is said to be a nature because they know or will something naturally. Rather they do so insofar as they partake of the motion of nature as a cause before them.
This solution could be compared to and manifested by the way that reason is moved by the will or the will by reason. Reason can be moved by the will as well as by nature:
nothing prevents some power to be commanded by the will to some act and to be inclined to another by nature; as our understanding is inclined to believing by the will and is led to understanding the first beginnings by nature. [6]
One would not say that reason is a will because it is moved by the will. Hence, likewise, one should not say that reason is a nature because it is moved by nature. One could also say that, when the will is moved by reason or partakes of the order which is proper to reason, it is not a reason. Hence, it should not be called a nature when it wills something naturally, being moved by nature. When the reason knows something naturally, it is not a nature although it partakes of the movement proper to nature because nature is a prior cause. And when the will wills something naturally, it is not a nature, but partakes of the movement proper to nature, as a second cause partakes of the motion of the first. In this way, one can maintain that both reason and the will do something naturally, in which they are determined to one as is nature, without denying that nature and reason, or nature and will, are distinct causes.
There is a difficulty with this first way of solving the problem that will lead us into Thomas' second solution and a more complete understanding of the distinction between these kinds of cause.
The difficulty in Thomas' first solution is that, in maintaining the opposite ways in which these causes work (nature being determined to one and the reason and will being open to opposites), the way in which reason is determined to one in assenting to the axioms, or the will to one in willing happiness, seems to be a violent or forced necessity. But Thomas speaks of this determination to one as being natural necessity, not a violent or forced necessity. Why would not this determination to one of reason and will be not more like St. Paul's description of faith where reason is led captive by the will rather than be a natural necessity. Indeed, the modern revolt against Christian belief is followed by the modern revolt against natural understanding. Freedom, the supreme good for many modern thinkers, leads them to revolt both against Christian belief and against nature.
A second solution of Thomas involves seeing that reason is a nature and the will is a nature. Here one understands nature in the broadest sense where everything that is has a nature. Thomas touches upon this broad sense in many places:
As Boethius says in the book about the Two Natures and the Philosopher in the fifth book of the Metaphysics, nature is said in many ways. Sometimes it names the beginning within movable things. And such a nature is either matter or a material form, as is clear in the second book of the Physics. In another way, each substance or even any thing, is called a nature. And according to this, that is said to be natural to a thing which belongs to it by its substance. And this is what is in the thing through itself. Everywhere, however, those things which do not exist in a thing through itself are reduced to something as a beginning that is in it through itself. And therefore it is necessary that, taking nature in this way, always the beginning of what belongs to a thing is natural. And this clearly appears in the understanding. For the beginnings of the understanding's knowledge are naturally understood. Likewise, the beginning of the motions of the will must be something naturally willed.[7]
Nature in this second and broadest sense means what a thing is. But what a thing is is first said in substance and then extended to the other Categories. Hence, Thomas says "quaelibet substantia vel etiam quodlibet ens." So general is this sense of nature that even grace can be called a nature.[8]
Every power or ability of the soul is a nature in this sense as Thomas explains when speaking of the natural desire or inclination of a power:
....to desire by animal appetite belongs to only the concupiscible appetite; but to desire by natural appetite belongs to every power: for every power of the soul is a particular nature, and is naturally inclined to something[9]
And this is said of the will in particular:
...the will is a particular nature and has a natural order to something[10]
Nature in this broad sense is what a thing is. Every thing is what it is and what a thing is is one. Hence, every thing has a determination to one
Hence, in this solution, the will or reason can be determined to one insofar as each is a nature. Thomas gives and replies to the common objection from the distinction of abilities in the Metaphysics thus:
5. Moreover, rational powers are for opposites according to the Philosopher. But the will is a rational power for it is in reason, as is said in the second book of the De Anima. Therefore, it is open to opposites; and thus it not by necessity determined to anything.
It should be said to the fifth that the will, insofar as it is rational, is for opposites; for this is to consider what is peculiar to it. But insofar as it is a particular nature, nothing prevents it from being determined to one. [11]
Thus, the will naturally desires existence, life and happiness, as Thomas often notes. Thomas also points out another way in which determination to one from the nature of the will is understood to be compatible with a known indetermination of the will in replying to the standard objection:
3. Moreover, nature is determined to one. But the will is open to opposites. Therefore, the will wills nothing naturally.
It should be said to the third that something one always corresponds to nature, but proportioned to the nature. To the generic nature corresponds something one in genus, and to nature taken in the species corresponds something one in species and to the individual nature corresponds some individual one.
Since the will therefore is a particular immaterial power, just as the understanding, there corresponds naturally something one that is common, namely, the good; just as also to the understanding some common one, either true, or being, or the what it is. But many particular goods are contained under good in general to none of which the will is determined.[12]
But there would seem to be a greater problem with this second solution than with the first. If reason is a nature and the will is also a nature, what happens to the distinction between a natural ability and a rational one, between nature and reason or nature and will.
Thomas explains the distinction more fully in another giving of, and replying to, the common objection:
6. Moreover, what is necessarily determined to something, is naturally determined to it. But the will is divided against natural desire. Therefore, the will does not will anything necessarily.
It should be said to the sixth, that the will is divided against natural desire taken with exactness, that is, what is natural only, as man against that which is animal only. It is not however divided againt natural desire absolutely, but includes it, as man includes animal.[13]
When reason is divided against nature. or will against nature, it is divided against what is nature only or nature cum praecisione sumptum, just as man is divided against animal. Another text that touches upon this is the following:
...in ordered things it is necessary that the first way be included in the second, and there be found in the second, not only what belongs to it by reason of itself, but also what belongs by reason of the first; as it belongs to man, not only to use reason, which belongs to him by his own difference which is reasonable, but to use sense or food which belongs to him by his genus which is animal or living.
And likewise we see in sensing things that, since touch is as the foundation of the other senses; in the organ of each sense is found, not only what is the property of that sense, but also what is the property of touch: as the organ of the sense of sight not only senses white and black insofar as it is the organ of sight, but it also senses hot and cold, and is corrupted by their excess as it is the organ of touch.
Nature however and will are ordered in this way, so that the will is a particular nature because everything found in things is said to be a particular nature. And therefore it is necessary to find in the will, not only that which belongs to will, but also what belongs to nature.
But it belongs to every created nature to be ordered by God to the good, naturally desiring it. Whence also in the will there is a natural desire for the good suitable to it. And besides this, it desires something according to its own determination, not by necessity, which belongs to it in so far as it is a will.
As is the order of nature to will, so also is the order of those things which the will naturally wills to those things to which the will is determined by itself, and not from nature. And therefore, as nature is the foundation of will, so the desirable which is naturally desired is the beginning and foundation of other things desired.
In desirable things however the end is the foundation and beginning of those things which are for it; since those things which are for the end are not desired except by reason of the end. And therefore what the will necessarily wills, as determined by a natural inclination in it, is the last end, as beatitude and those things which are included in it, as is the knowledge of truth and other things of this kind. To other things it is not necessarily determined by a natural inclination, but by its own disposition without necessity.[14]
Although we distinguish the sense of touch from the other senses, it is included in the organs of the other senses.
Now it may seem strange that an ability to do something in a non-natural way is also an ability naturally determined to do something. But we can see the reason for this, and we can see from things more known to us that this is so. The general reason is given by Thomas following Aristotle:
In every order, what is through itself is before that which is through another and its beginning[15]
Natural necessity is not opposed to the will or to reason:
...nor is natural necessity repugnant to the will. Nay rather it is necessary that, just as the understanding necessarily adhere to the first beginnings, so the will necessarily adheres to the last end which is beatitude. For the end is in things to be done, as the beginning is in things to be looked at, as is said in the second book of the Physics.
For it is necessary that what belongs to something naturally and immovably, be the foundation and beginning of all other things because nature is first in each thing and all motion proceeds from something immovable.[16]
Knowledge of the (first) beginnings is natural and reasoned out knowledge is acquired by them.
If knowledge of conclusions were natural to the soul as is the knowledge of the beginnings, there would be the same judgment about conclusions among all, as there is about the beginnings. For the things which are natural are the same among all. But there is not the same judgment among all about conclusions, but only about the beginnings. It is clear therefore that the knowledge of beginnings is natural in us, but not the knowledge of conclusions.
What is not natural in us we acquire through what is natural; just as also in exterior things, we begin all artificial things through our hands. Therefore, there is no knowledge of conclusions in us except what is acquired from the beginnings.[17]
Philosophers have long distinguished between nature and custom, between what is by nature and what is by custom. We speak, for example, a particular language in our country, not by nature, but by custom. But common customs arise by imitation and man is by nature the most imitative of the animals. Children imitate the language spoken by their parents and others around them. Here, again we acquire what is not natural but by custom through our natural tendency to imitate. The fashionable arises in the same way, from man being by nature the most imitative of animals.
The two solutions of Thomas, as we have called them, are not unconnected. The nature of our reason and the nature of our will are both a natural result of the nature of our soul.
***************************************************** To understand why something of nature must be found in reason and the will, it is good to recall some truths. First, since a thing cannot be without being what it is, what is first in each thing is its nature:
What is first in each thing is its nature or essence.[18]
A thing must be what it is before it can be anything else. A second thing to recall is that the first is always saved in the second:
It is always necessary that the first be saved in the second[19]
I think this is to be understood in the second or "fifth" sense of first.[20] Thomas speaks of nature as being first in each thing and therefore being a beginning and exemplifies in reference to reason and the will in this text:
Always what pertains to the before has reason to be a beginning. Whence, since nature is what is first in each thing, it is necessary that what pertains to nature be the beginning in each thing.
And this can be seen in man, both in regard to the understanding and in regard to the will. For the understanding knows the beginnings naturally. And from this knowledge is caused in man the reasoned out knowledge of conclusions which are not known naturally but by discovery or teaching.
Likewise, in the will, the end is in the same way as the beginning in the understanding, as is said in the second book of the Physics. Whence the will naturally tends toward the last end. For every man naturally wills beatitude. And from this natural willing are caused all other willings since whatever man wills, he wills for the sake of the end. The love therefore of the good which man naturally wills as the end is a natural love. But the love derived fom this, which is of a good that is loved for the sake of the end, is a chosen love.[21]
Thus, in every order of acts, the natural act is before:
In every order of acts, the natural act is before. Thus in understanding, the first beginnings are first understood, and through them other things are understood. And in willing likewise, we first will the last perfecion and the last end, the desire for which is naturally in us, and we desire other things for it.[22]
Some understandables are known naturally while the others are known by reasoning and study:
For our understanding knows some things naturally, as the first beginnings of understandables of which the understandable thoughts, which are called the inward words, naturally exist in it and proceed from it.
There are also some understandables which our understanding does not know naturally, but comes to a knowledge of them by reasoning. And the thoughts of these do not exist naturally in our understanding, but are sought with study.[23]
The natural beginnings of reasoned out knowledge and the virtues in reason are as seeds by which man can get into act.
But in reason itself, there naturally preexist some seeds and beginnings of reasoned out knowledge and the virtues by the power of which man is able somewhat to go into the act of reasoned out knowledge and virtue.[24]
Positive laws as well as the virtues should proceed from something natural
It is necessary that laws laid down proceed from a natural instinct if they are human: just as also in the demonstrative sciences all human discovery takes its origin from beginnings naturally known.[25]
The will (and the understanding or reason) is first determined to one which natural act is before all the rest of its acts.
The will of a reasonable creature is determined to one in what it is moved to naturally, as every man naturally wills to be and to live and beatitude. And these are things to which the creature is first moved naturally, either in understanding or willing, because always the natural action is presupposed to other actions.[26]
Thomas speaks of the will as will as being free, but with regard to its first and natural act it is not.
The will, insofar as it is a will, since it is free, has itself to either one. For the will is able to act or not act, to make thus or thus, to will and not will
And if this does not belong to the will with respect to something, this happens to the will, not insofar as it is a will, but from the natural inclination which it has to something, as to the last end which it is not able not to will; just as the human will is not able to not will beatitude, nor is it able to will misery.
...the will, although it has itself to either with respect to some things, nevertheless with respect to the last end it has a natural inclination; and likewise, the understanding has a certain natural motion with regard to a knowledge of the first beginnings.[27]
Two Connected Distinctions
The distinction of reason from nature (and the similar distinction of will from nature) is before the distinction between reason as reason and reason as a particular nature (and the similar distinction between will as will and will as a particular nature). But they are not the same kind of distinction.
The Distinction of Reason as a Nature and as Reason
Thomas gives two ways of understanding the distinction between reason as reason and reason as a nature:
..the distinction by reason as reason. and reason as a nature can be understood in two ways.
In one way thus that reason as it is something of the nature of a reasonable creature, is called reason as a nature, insofar as founded in the essence of the soul and gives to the body its natural existence. But it is called reason as reason by that which is proper to reason insofar as it is reason. And this is its act because powers are defined through their acts.
In another way the foresaid distinction can be understood, as when we say that reason as a nature should be understood according as reason is compared to those things which it naturally knows or desires; and reason as reason according as by some bringing together it is ordered to knowing or desiring something in that it it characteristic of reason to bring together. [28]
It is the second way, of course, that we are interested in here. In the second way here, Thomas seems to touch upon both the distinction of reason as reason and reason as nature, and the distinction of will as will and the will as a nature. For the will is sometimes said to be in reason; that is, in the rational part of the soul.
Thomas also explains that this second distinction is not one of two abilities or powers of the soul, but of two ways of considering the same ability or power:
...reason as reason does not name some power distinct from reason as a nature, but it names a particular way of considering this power. [29]
The same, of course, can be said of the will as will and the will as a nature. These do not name two powers of the soul, but two ways of considering the same power.
The distinction between reason as reason and reason as a nature and Shakespeare's Exhortation to Use Reason
In his Exhortation to Use Reason, Shakespeare has defined reason as the ability for large discourse, looking before and after. We have defended elsewhere this definition as the first definition of reason, both in that it is by what is most known to us about reason and that it is a beginning of the whole use of reason.
But now in the light of the above distinction, it can be seen that Shakespeare has defined reason as reason. For discourse is coming to know something unknown through things already known and this is clearly an act of reason as reason. If reason as reason is more known to us than reason as a nature (as we have hinted at before and will see more fully later), we can see more perfectly that Shakespeare has indeed given us the first definition of reason; that is, the definition by what is most known to us about reason.
If one were to define reason as a nature first, one would run the risk of confusing reason with the understanding of an angel or God. For they understand without discourse. And one can reason more from the existence of reasoned out understanding in a creature to the existence of some natural understanding in that creature than the reverse. For if we understood nothing before reasoning, we would have nothing to reason from. Hence, something must be naturally understood before we begin to reason. But if one can understand without discourse, it does not follow that one must understand also as a result of some discourse. For God and the angels, without discourse, understand much more than we do.
Someone might say that a definition of reason should include both reason as reason and reason as a nature. Perhaps, though, we should not demand of a first definition of reason that it give us a complete knowlege of reason. It is enough if it brings out what is most known to us about what reason is and is a beginning for the further use of reason both in knowing itself better and in knowing other things. Further, it could be reasoned that even our natural understanding is not without some kind of discourse in that it depends upon some experience, as Aristotle notes at the end of the Posterior Analytics.
Shakespeare also gives us the elements of the first definition of man as an animal with reason for he tells us that man without reason would be no more than a beast. Man is not just an animal as the beast, but an animal with reason. But when man is defined as a reasonable or rational animal, the difference in the definition is taken from reason as it signifies discursive knowledge:
...rationale est differentia animalis, secundum quod ratio, a qua sumitur, significat cognitionem discursivam, qualis est in hominibus non autem in Angelis nec in Deo.[30]
But the Exhortation is also urging us to use reason and it is reason as reason that we especially need to be urged to use since nature ensures that we will have the perfection of reason as a nature.
Thus, the Exhortation defines reason as reason, and uses reason as reason to distinguish man from the beast, and urges us to use reason as reason.
Perhaps, the will should first be defined as will. If one defined the will first in a way proportional to Shakespeare's way of defining reason, it would be defined more as the ability to choose than as the ability to desire existence, life and happiness.
Should the first definition of will be a definition of will as will? Do we first see the difference between the will and sense desire by the will's being an ability to choose rather than the will being the ability to desire happiness. People at first have a hard time distinguishing happiness from pleasure. And notice Thomas' use of the word dilectio to name the love of the will in the Summa Theologiae.[31]
The distinction between reason as reason and reason as a nature and the second road in our knowledge and logic and logistic.
Logic (the art of defining and reasoning) and logistic (in its Greek sense, the art of counting and calculating) are both named from reason for they direct reason. But after the distinction, we can see that they direct reason as reason, not reason as a nature. Defining, reasoning and calculating are discourses of reason in which it comes to know something unknown through things already known. And discourse is an act of reason as reason.
When we distinguish the private roads and ways of going forward in reasoned out knowledge from the common road and way of going forward in reasoned out knowledge, the distinction is based on the diverse matters of the forms of reasoned out knowledge and their common use of reason. We use reason in each reasoned out knowledge, but in a different matter. Thus there is something common to all reasoned out knowledge which is the use of reason. Each is a work of reason. And this is why there is a common road and and common way of going foward. But since the matter of each reasoned out knowledge is different, there is also a private road for each reasoned out knowledge. Now, although this helps us to distinguish the road studied in logic from those studied at the beginning of each reasoned out knowledge by the basis for these roads, it runs the risk of confusing the road studied in logic with the first road in our knowledge. The first road in our knowledge is the natural road from the senses into reason. It is based on the nature of man as an animal with reason and on the nature of his senses and the nature of his reason. If the second road in our knowledge (the common road of reasoned out knowledge), which is studied in logic, is also based on reason, it might be confused with the natural road which is also in part based on reason. But the second road is based on reason as reason while it is reason as a nature which is a part of the natural road.
This is why Albert the Great can rightly say that logic is named from reason as it is defined by Isaac as a discursive power.[32]
The definition of reason as reason is a beginning for understanding the second road in our knowledge. This is the road from reasonable guesses to reasoned out knowledge. And since logic is about the second road, it is also a beginning for understanding logic (as is especially clear in Plato's and Albert's division of logic).
We say that logic directs reason. Logic directs reason as reason.
It is also a beginning for understanding reasoned out knowledge. For reasoned out knowledge is the perfection of reason as reason. It is also the work of reason as reason (an opus rationis). νους, or natural understanding, is the perfection of reason as a particular nature and is an opus naturae. Wisdom is the highest perfection of both reason as nature and reason as reason.
It is a beginning for understanding the proemia to reasoned out knowledge. For reasoned out knowledge is anordered knowledge of order. Consider Thomas' proemia to the Nicomachean Ethics and to the four books About the Universe .
Thomas Aquinas, In Libros Aristotelis De Caelo et Mundo Expositio, Proemium, nn.1-2:
Philosophus ostendit in scientiis esse processum ordinatum... Et hoc est rationabile: nam processus scientiarum est opus rationis, cuius proprium est ordinare; unde in omni opere rationis ordo aliquid invenitur, secundum quem proceditur ab uno in aliud.
Et hoc patet, tam in ratione practica, cuius consideratio est circa ea quae nos facimus, quam in ratione speculativa, cuius consideratio est circa ea quae sunt aliunde facta.
Invenitur autem processus de priori ad posterius in consideratione practicae rationis secundum quadruplicem ordinem....Similiter etiam invenitur quadruplex ordo in consideratione rationis speculativae.
In approaching any reasoned out knowledge, we need to know the order it considers and the order in which it is considered.
As logic directs reason as reason, so does ethics direct us most of all in our choices? (What do logic and ethics direct? What is in need of being directed and this is reason as reason and the will as will.)
2. Moreover, the act of the will is not able to be bad, because the power itself of the will is good nor is a good tree able to produce bad fruits, as is said in Matth. VII, v. 18. Therefore, sin does not consist chiefly in the act of the will.
It should be said to the second that the will by its nature is good, whence its natural act is always good.
And I call the natural act of the will, insofar as man wills naturally happiness, existence, life and beatitude.
If however we speak of moral good, thus the will considered by itself is neither good nor bad, but has itself in potency to good or bad.[33]
The distinction between reason as reason and reason as a nature and the order in the consideration and determination of reason in the study of the soul
When Aristotle first enumerates the genera of powers of the soul in the second book About the Soul, he calls reason the διανοητικόν power.[34] The word διανοητικόν clearly refers to reason as reason as can be seen from its use in the beginning of the Posterior Analytics for the knowledge which comes from pre-existent knowledge.[35] The etymology of the word also points to reason as reason.
And when Aristotle first distinguishes reason from the imagination, he does so by an act of reason as reason.[36] I am free to imagine something good or bad, such as having won the sweepstakes or having a terrorist outside the room with a gun. But I cannot think I have won, or that there is a terrorist, without having some reason to think so.
When Aristotle distinguishes the will or higher desire from the sense desiring powers, he does so by the will being deliberative desire in the third book About the Soul:
The sensible image, as has been said, is also found in the other animals, but the deliberative image in those having reason. For whether one does this or that is already a work of reason. And it is necessary to measure by something one. For one seeks the better. Thus it is able to make something one from many images. And this is the cause of not seeming to have opinion, because it does not have the image from a syllogism. (But the reasonable does.) Whence it does not have deliberative desire. This overcomes sometimes and moves that, and sometimes the other it, as sphere moves sphere so desire moves desire, whenever lack of self-control comes about. But by nature the higher desire is always chief and moves [the lower].[37]
Thomas' commentary on this passage is as follows
Dicit ergo primo, quod phantasia sensibilis, ut ex dictis patet, est etiam in aliis animalibus; sed illa, quae est per deliberationem, est tantum in rationalibus; quia considerare utrum hoc sit agendum, aut hoc quod est deliberare, opus est rationis. Et in tali consideratione necesse est accipere aliquam unam regulam, vel finem, vel aliquid huiusmodi, ad quod mensuretur quid sit magis agendum. Manifestum est enim quod homo, "imitatur", idest desiderat, id quod est magis in bonitate, et id quod est melius: melius autem semper diiudicamus aliqua mensura: et ideo oportet accipere aliquam mensuram in deliberando quid magis sit agendum. Et hoc est medium ex quo ratio practica syllogizat quid sit eligendum. Unde manifestum est quod ratio deliberans potest ex pluribus phantasmatibus unum facere, scilicet ex tribus, quorum unum praeeligitur alteri, et tertium est quasi mensura, quae praeelegit.
He says therefore first that the sensible image, as is clear from what has been said, is also in the other animals. But that which is by deliberation is only in those having reason because to consider whether this or that should be done is to deliberate which is a work of reason. And in such a consideration it is necessary to take one rule, or end, or something of this sort, by which is measured what more should be done. For it is clear tha man "imitates", that is desires, that which is more in goodness, and that which is better. Et haec est causa, quare animalia non habent opinionem. licet habeant phantasiam; quia non possunt uti syllogismo, per quam unum praeeligant alteri. Sed deliberatio rationis habet illam, scilicet opinionem, alias non faceret ex pluribus phantasmatibus unum. Et inde est, quod appetitus inferior, qui sequitur phantasiam, non habet deliberationem, sed absque deliberatione movetur ad concupiscendum vel irascendum, quia scilicet sequitur phantasiam sensibilem.
Deinde...ostendit quomodo deliberatio rationis vincatur ab appetitu inferiori; et dicit quod appetitus inferior, qui est sine deliberatione, vincit deliberationem, et removet hominem ab eo quod deliberavit. Aliquando e converso appetitus movet appetitum, scilicet superior, qui est rationis deliberantis, eum qui est phantasiae sensibilis, sicut in corporibus caelestibus, sphaera superior movet inferiorem; quod accidit cum aliquis continens fuerit. Continentis enim est, per deliberationem rationis vincere passiones.
Et iste est naturalis ordo, ut superior appetitus moveat inferiorem; quia etiam in corporibus caelestibus naturaliter sphaera superior principalior est et movet inferiorem...Et similiter appetitus inferior, etsi aliquid de motu proprio retineat, movetur tamen naturali ordine, motu appetitus superioris, et motu rationis deliberantis. Si autem e converso accidit, quod appetitus superior transmoveatur ab inferiori, hoc est praeter ordinem naturalem.[38]
What is clear from this text is that Aristotle is distinguishing will from sense desire by the will having deliberative desire. But this desire is choice. Hence, the will is first known as will, as the ability to choose, rather than as a nature in willing something by natural or inborn necessity.
When Thomas Aquinas distinguishes the will from sense desire in the De Veritate apart from their distinction based on the distinction of reason and sense,[39] he does so in this way:
Dicendum, quod voluntas est alia potentia ab appetitu sensitivo. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod sicut appetitus sensitivus distinguitur ab appetitu naturali propter perfectiorem modum appetendi; ita appetitus rationalis ab appetitu sensitivo.
Quanto enim aliqua natura est Deo propinquior, tanto expressior in ea divinae dignitatis similitudo invenitur. Hoc autem ad divinam dignitatem pertinet ut omnia moveat et inclinet et dirigat, ipse a nullo alio motus vel inclinatus vel directus. Unde, quanto aliqua natura est Deo vicinior, tanto minus ab alio inclinatur et magis nata est seipsam inclinare.
Natura igitur insensibilis, quae ratione suae materialitatis est maxime a Deo remota, inclinatur quidem in aliquem finem, non tamen est in ea aliquid inclinans, sed solummodo inclinationis principium...
Natura autem sensitiva ut Deo propinquior, in seipsa habet aliquid inclinans, scilicet appetibile apprehensum; sed tamen inclinatio ipsa non est in potestate ipsius animalis quod inclinatur, sed est ei aliunde determinata. Animal enim ad aspectum delectabilis non potest non concupiscere illud; quia illa animalia non habent dominium suae inclinationis; unde non agunt, sed magis aguntur, secundum Damascenum; et hoc ideo quia vis appetitiva habet organum corporale et ideo vicinatur dispositionibus materiae et rerum corporalium, ut moveatur magis quam moveat.
It should be said that the will is another power from sense desire. In evidence of this, it should be known that just as sense desire is distinguished from natural desire because of a more perfect way of desiring, so reasonable desire [is distinguished] from sense desire.
For the closer some nature is to God, the more express is found the likeness of the divine dignity in it. It pertains however to the divine dignity that he moves and inclines and directs all things, while he himself is not moved or inclined or directed by anyone else. Whence to the extent some nature is closer to God, to that extent it is less inclined by another and more apt to incline itself.
The non-sensing nature, therefore, which by reason of its materiality is most remote from God, is inclined to some end, but there is not in it something inclining, but only a beginning of the inclination...
Sed natura rationalis, quae est Deo vicinissima, non solum habet inclinationem in aliquid sicut habent inanimata, nec solum movens hanc inclinationem quasi aliunde eis determinatam, sicut natura sensibilis; sed ultra hoc habet in potestate ipsam inclinationem, ut non sit ei necessarium inclinari ad appetibile apprehensum, sed possit inclinari vel non inclinari. Et sic ipsa inclinatio non determinatur ei ab alio, sed a seipsa.
The sensing nature, however, as closer to God, has in itself something inclining, namely the desirable grasped. But nevertheless the inclination itself is not in the power of the animal itself which is inclined, but it is determined for it from elsewhere. For an animal is not able not to desire the pleasant when it is seen because those animals do not have dominion over their inclination. Whence they do not act, but more are acted upon, according to Damascene. And this is because the desiring power has a bodily organ and therefore is close to the dispositions of matter and bodily things, so that it is more moved than a mover.
But the reasonable nature, which is closest to God, does not only have an inclination to something as have non-living things, nor only something moving this inclination as determined for them from elsewhere, as the sensing nature. But beyond this, it has the inclination itself in its power so that it is not necessary for it to be inclined to the desirable apprehended, but it is able to be inclined or not be inclined. And thus its inclination is not determined for it by another, but by itself.
Et hoc quidem competit ei in quantum non utitur organo corporali: et sic recedens a natura mobilis, accedit ad naturam moventis et agentis.
Quod autem aliquid determinet sibi inclinationem in finem, non potest contingere nisi cognoscat finem, et habitudinem finis in ea quae sunt ad finem: quod est tantum rationis.
Et ideo talis appetitus non determinatus ex aliquo alio de necessitate, sequitur apprehensionem rationis; unde appetitus rationalis, qui voluntas dicitur, est alia potentia ab appetitu sensibili.[40]
When Thomas distinguishes will from sense desire here, he is distinguishing the will as will from sense desire. The will as a nature, for example, does not determine its own inclination to happiness rather than to misery, but it wills happiness rather than misery by a natural necessity. Thus even in this very subtle distinction of will from sense desire it is the will as will which is distinguished from sense desire.
The distinction between reason as reason and reason as a nature and the distinction and order of the virtues of reason
The virtues of reason as reason (reasoned out understanding, art and foresight) are considered before the virtue of reason as a nature (natural understanding). And the virtue which perfects both, wisdom, is considered last. Wisdom perfects both reasoned out understanding and natural understanding and therefore both reason as reason and reason as a nature. This order is reasonable if reason as reason is more known to us than reason as a nature.
This also helps us to understand why there are more virtues in the first part than the latter and also why the first three virtues are not lowest species like the last two.
In the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle considers five virtues of reason, five virtues which are in reason (rather than in the will or emotions as are the moral virtues which he had considered before).
In the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle first considers the three virtues which are from beginnings (ἐπιστήμη, reasoned out understanding or reasoned out knowledge; τέχνη, art or right reason about making; and φρόνησίς, foresight, or right reason about doing) and then the two virtues which are about beginnings (νοῦς or natural understanding; and σοφία or wisdom).[41] After we have seen the division of reason underlying this division of the virtues of reason, we will see that we could also see Aristotle as dividing the virtues of reason into three with νοῦς or natural understanding being the second part, and σοφία or wisdom being the third part. But what is the division or distinction of reason corresponding to Aristotle's distinction of the virtues of reason?
But what is the division or distinction of reason underlying Aristotle's division of the virtues of reason? Aristotle does not make it explicit.
Now it is this distinction or division of reason into reason as reason and reason as a nature which corresponds to Aristotle's division of the virtues of reason in the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics. For he considers first the three virtues of reason as reason which are reasoned out understanding or ἐπιστήμη and art or τέχνη and foresight or φρόνησίς. Then he considers the virtue of reason as a nature which is natural understanding or νοῦς. And last, he considers wisdom or σοφία which is a perfection both of ἐπιστήμη and of νοῦς and therefore of both reason as reason and reason as nature.[42]
But in considering the virtues of reason as reason before the virtue of reason as a nature and last the virtue which perfects both reason as reason and reason as a nature, Aristotle is considering the more known before the less known.[43] Just as reason as reason is more known to us than reason as a nature, so likewise, the virtues of reason as reason are more known to us than the virtue of reason as a nature and the virtue that perfects both. Wisdom is least known and presupposes a knowledge of both νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη.
But it is necessary to consider more that reason as reason is more known to us than reason as a nature and that the virtues of reason as reason are more known to us than the virtue of reason as a nature. Both of these can be seen somewhat by themselves, but the harmony of the two orders is a further sign of the truth of both orders. For with the truth, all things harmonize.
One sign that reason as reason is more known to us than reason as a nature is that the act named from reason, reasoning, is an act of reason as reason. And logic, the art that directs reason, is often called the art of reasoning.
Another sign that reason as reason is more known to us is that Shakespeare has defined reason as reason in his exhortation to use reason.[44]
Another sign is the mistake of those who can only see reason as reason and not reason as a nature. Thus, Mill, for example, in the Essay on Liberty sees reason as capable of only an unending dialectical conversation.[45]
We can also consider that the virtues of reason as reason are more known to us than the virtue of reason as a nature.
When Aristotle gives the natural order of different kinds of knowing in the Proemium to Wisdom at the beginning of the Meta Ta Phusika,[46] he begins with sensing which gives rise to memory. And from many memories of the same, we gather one experience. And then from experience, we separate out the universal which is the beginning of art or science. He does not bring out νοῦς or natural understanding and its place in the genesis of our knowledge, but goes immediately from experience to τέχνη or art and ἐπιστήμη or reasoned out understanding.
And in the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle begins, as we have seen, with teaching and learning from something known already, as he begins his consideration of demonstration and reasoned out knowledge. And it is only at the end of Book Two[47] that Aristotle considers how νοῦς or natural understanding arises in us from experience.
If we consider the order of νοῦς or natural understanding and ἐπιστήμη or reasoned out understanding, it is clear that νοῦς is before ἐπιστήμη in the first, second and fourth senses of before. νοῦς is before ἐπιστήμη in time and generation. Likewise, νοῦς is before ἐπιστήμη in being for it can be without ἐπιστήμη, but not vice-versa. Moreover, νοῦς is better than ἐπιστήμη which depends upon it.[48] But in the third sense of before, which is in the discourse of reason, we seem to understand reasoned out understanding before natural understanding. [49]
This order in the discourse of reason can be seen a little in the following way. We understand statement before premiss and conclusion. And we understand that the same statement can be both a premiss and a conclusion (but not to the same) before we ask whether every premiss is a conclusion. And when we understand why there must be premisses that are not conclusions or statements known through themselves (in the sense of not known through other statements), we have arrived at the object of νοῦς. Hence, we know what νοῦς is after we know what ἐπιστήμη is.
Thus, Aristotle's division of the virtues of reason enables us to proceed from the more known to the less known in our consideration of the virtues of reason.
Aristotle's division and order should perhaps be followed first since it proceeds from the more known to us to the less known to us.
If choice is in the definition of moral virtue, does this mean that there are virtues only in the will as will (in the natural order)? If so, why is there a virtue of reason as a nature and no virtue of the will as a nature?
De Veritate, Q. 24, Ad 9:
...duplici ratione aliqua potentia habitu indiget.
Primo quidem, quia operatio quae est per potentiam educenda, excedit vim potentiae, quamvis non excedat vim totius naturae humanae. Alio modo quia totius naturae vim excedit.
Et hoc secundo modo habitibus indigent omnes animae potentiae, quibus actus meritorii eliciuntur, sive sint affectivae, sive intellectivae; quia in huiusmodi actus non possunt nisi habitus gratiae superaddantur.
Primo autem modo indiget habitu intellectus; eo quod intelligere aliquid non potest nisi assimiletur ei per speciem intelligibilem. Unde oportet species intelligibiles superaddi, quibus in actum exeat intellectus: specierum autem aliqualis ordinatio habitum efficit.
Et eadem ratione appetitivae inferiores, scilicet irascibilis et concupiscibilis, habitibus indigent, unde perficiuntur virtutibus moralibus. Quod enim actus eorum moderati sint, non excedit naturam humanam, sed excedit vim dictarum potentiarum. Unde oportet quod id quod est superioris potentiae, scilicet rationis, eis imprimatur; et ipsa sigillatio rationis inferioribus viribus formaliter perficit virtutes morales.
Affectiva autem superior non indiget hoc modo aliquo habitu, quia naturaliter tendit in bonum sibi connaturale sicut in proprium obiectum. Unde ad hoc quod velit bonum, non requiritur nisi quod ostendatur sibi per vim cognitivam. Et ideo philosophi in voluntate non posuerunt aliquem habitum nec naturalem nec acquisitum.
Sed ad dirigendum in operativis posuerunt prudentiam in ratione, et temperantiam et fortitudinem et alias virtutes morales in irascibili et concupiscibili. Sed secundum theologos in voluntate ponitur habitus caritatis propter actus meritorios.
De Virtutibus in Communi, Art. 5, Corpus:
Dicendum, quod per habitum virtutis potentia quae ei subicitur, respectu sui actus complementum acquirit. Unde ad id ad quod potentia aliqua se extendit ex ipsa ratione potentiae, non est necessarius habitus virtutis. Virtus autem ordinat potentias ad bonum; ipsa enim est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit.
Voluntas autem hoc quod virtus facit circa alia potentias habet ex ipsa ratione sua potentiae: nam eius obiectum est bonum.. Unde tendere in bonum hoc modo se habet ad voluntatem sicut tendere in delectabile ad concupiscibilem, et sicut ordinari ad sonum se habet ad auditum. Unde voluntas non indiget aliquo habitu virtutis inclinante ipsam ad bonum quod est sibi proportionatum, quia in hoc ex ipsa ratione potentiae tendit; sed ad bonum quod transcendit proportionem potentiae, indiget habitu virtutis.
Cum autem uniuscuisque appetitus tendat in proprium bonum appetentis; dupliciter aliquod bonum potest excedere voluntatis proportionem. Uno modo ratione speciei; alio modo ratione individui.
Ratione quidem speciei, ut voluntas elevetur ad aliquod bonum quod excedit limites humani boni: et dico humanum id quod ex viribus naturae homo potest. Sed supra humanum bonum est bonum divinum, in quod voluntatem hominis caritas elevat, et similiter spes.
Ratione autem individui, hoc modo quod aliquis quaerat id quod est alterius bonum, licet voluntas extra limites boni humani non feratur; et sic voluntatem perficit iustitia, et omnes virtutes in aliud tendentes, ut liberalitas et alia huiusmodi Nam iustitia est alterius bonum, ut Philosophus dicit in V Ethic.
Sic ergo duae virtutes sunt in voluntate sicut in subiecto scilicet caritas et iustitia...
Perhaps the last statement requires us to understand justice to include those virtues like liberality which have the mode of justice. But what about those virtues which have the mode of temperance, such as studiositas and humility? Are not these virtues in the will? And is not wonder natural and also the desire for excellence? Is Thomas only explaining the virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics? Someone could say that humility does in some way regard another. For by humility we place ourselves under God and others insofar as they are godlike. And studiositas requires us to moderate our desire to know other things insofar as they are necessary or useful for knowing God. If we pursue knowledge of things which are not necessary to know in order to know God, to the neglect of those things which must be known before God can be known, our desire to know is disordered and unmeasured. Or if we pursue those things which are useless or less useful for knowing God before those which are more useful for knowing God, our desire to know is disordered and unmeasured, unless we are forced to such knowledge by necessity, as Albert says.
Thomas explains why there is a habit perfecting reason in regard to what it naturally knows, but there is no such habit perfecting the will in regard to what it naturally wills.
De Virtutibus in Communi, Art. 5, Ad 3:
...cognitio fit per aliquam speciem; nec ad cognoscendum potentia intellectus sufficit per seipsam, nisi species a sensibilibus accipiat. Et ideo oportet in his etiam quae naturaliter cognoscimus, esse quemdam habitum, qui etiam quodammodo principium a sensibus sumit, ut dicitur in fine Poster.
Sed voluntas ad volendum non indiget aliqua specie; unde non est simile.
Use of the Distinctions in Theology
Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Q. 41, Art. 2, Ad 4:
...etiam in conceptionibus intellectualibus fit reductio ad prima, quae naturaliter intelliguntur.
Deus autem naturaliter intelligit seipsum. Et secundum hoc, conceptio Verbi divini est naturalis.
Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Q. 41, Art. 2, Ad 3:
....etiam voluntas, inquantum est natura quaedam, aliquid naturaliter vult; sicut voluntas hominis naturaliter tendit ad beatitudinem.
Et similiter Deus naturaliter vult et amat seipsum. Sed circa alia a se, voluntas Dei se habet ad utrumque quodammodo, ut dictum est.
Spiritus autem Sanctus procedit ut Amor, inquantum Deus amat seipsum. Unde naturaliter procedit, quamvis per modum voluntatis procedat.
----------------------- [1]Metaphysic, 1046b 4-7: "καὶ αἱ μὲν μετὰ λόγου πᾶσαι τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ αὐταί, αἱ δὲ ἄλογοι μία ἑνός, οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ θερμαίνειν μόνον ἡ δὲ ἰατρικὴ νόσου καὶ ὑγιείας"
[2]Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Q. 41, Art. 2, corpus: "...voluntas et natura secundum hoc differunt in causando, quia natura determinata est ad unum; sed voluntas non est determinata ad unum. Cuius ratio est, quia effectus assimilatur formae agentis per quam agit. Manifestum est autem quod unius rei non est nisi una forma naturalis, per quam res habet esse: unde quale ipsum est, tale facit. Sed forma per quam voluntas agit, non est una tantum, sed sunt plures, secundum quod sunt plures rationes intellectae: unde quod voluntate agitur, non est tale quale est agens, sed quale vult et intelligit illud esse agens. Eorum igitur voluntas principium est, quae possunt sic vel aliter esse. Eorum autem quae non possunt nisi sic esse, principium natura est"
[3]A house divided against itself cannot stand. In modern times, reason as reason has denied reason as a nature. Hence, reason is a divided house and cannot stand. Thus, the negation or denial of reason has become characteristic of our age. Perhaps the root of this denial is reason as reason denying reason as a nature. Reason without wisdom misses the distinction.
[4]Shakespeare also touches upon this in the words of Aufidius as to the possible causes of Coriolanus' intransigence and downfall (Coriolanus, Act IV, Sc. 7):
.........................................................First he was A noble servant to them, but he could not Carry his honours even; whether ‘twas pride, Which out of daily fortune ever taints The happy man; whether defect of judgment, To fail in the disposing of those chances Which he was lord of; or whether nature, Not to be other than one thing, not moving From the casque to the cushion, but commanding peace Even with the same austerity and garb As he controll’d the war....................................
[5]Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. X, Art. 1, Obj. 1 & Ad 1: "1. Agens enim naturale dividitur contra agens voluntarium, ut patet in principio II Physic. Non ergo voluntas ad aliquid naturaliter movetur.”
"Ad primum ergo dicendum quod voluntas dividitur contra naturam, sicut una causa contra aliam: quaedam fiunt naturaliter, et quaedam fiunt voluntarie. Est enim alius modus causandi proprius voluntati, quae est domina sui actus, praeter modum qui convenit naturae, quae est determinata ad unum. Sed quia voluntas in aliquid natura fundatur, necesse est quod motus proprius naturae, quantum ad aliquid, participetur in voluntate; sicut quod est prioris causae, participatur a posteriori. Est enim prius in unaquaque re ipsum esse, quod est per naturam, quam velle, quod est per voluntatem. Et inde est quod voluntas naturaliter aliquid vult." [6]Thomas Aquinas, De Potentia, Q. 2, Art 6, Ad1: "nihil prohibet aliquam potentiam ad aliquem actum imperari a voluntate et ad alium inclinari a natura. Sicut intellectus noster ad credendum inclinatur a voluntate, et ad intelligendum prima principia ducitur ex natura" [7]Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. X, Art. 1, c: "Sicut Boethius dicit in libro de Duabus Naturis et Philosophus in V Metaph., natura dicitur multipliciter. Quandoque enim dicitur principium intrinsecum in rebus mobilibus. Et talis natura est vel materia vel forma materialis, ut patet ex II Physic. - Alio modo dicitur natura quaelibet substantia vel etiam quodlibet ens. Et secundum hoc, illud dicitur esse naturale rei quod convenit ei secundum suam substantiam. Et hoc est quod per se inest rei. In omnibus autem ea quae non per se insunt, reducuntur in aliquid quod per se inest, sicut in principium. Et ideo necesse est quod, hoc modo accipiendo naturam, semper principium in his quae conveniunt rei, est naturale. Et hoc manifeste apparet in intellectu: nam principia intellectualis cognitionis sunt naturaliter nota. Similiter etiam principium motuum voluntariorum oportet esse aliquid naturaliter volitum." [8]Scriptum super Lib I Sententiarum, Dist XVII, Q. I, Art. 1, Ad 8: "natura dicitur multipliciter, secundum Boetium de Duabus Naturis: Dicitur enim uno modo natura omne quod est vel substantia vel accidens; et hoc modo gratia est natura quaedam. Alio modo dicitur natura quod est principium motus et quietis ipsius in quo est." [9]De Veritate, Q. 25, Art. 2, Ad 8: "...concupiscere appetitu animali, ad solum concupisciblem pertinet; sed concupiscere appetitu naturali, pertinet ad quamlibet potentiam: nam quaelibet potentia animae natura quaedam est, et naturaliter in aliquid inclinatur" [10]De Veritate, Q. 23, Art. 4, c: "...voluntas natura quaedam est, et naturalem ordinem ad aliquid habet" [11]De Veritate, Q. 22, Art. 5, Sed Contra 5 & Ad 5: "5. Praeterea, potestates rationales se habent ad opposita, secundum Philosophum. Sed voluntas, rationalis est potentia; est enim in ratione, ut dicitur in II de Anima. Ergo se habet ad opposita; et ita non de necessitate determinatur ad aliquid.
Ad quintum dicendum quod voluntas, in quantum est rationalis, ad opposita se habet: hoc enim est considerare ipsam secundum hoc quod est ei proprium; sed prout est natura quaedam, nihil prohibet eam determinari ad unum." [12]Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. X, Art. 1, Obj 3 and Ad 3: "3. Praeterea, natura est determinata ad unum. Sed voluntas se habet ad opposita. Ergo voluntas nihil naturaliter vult.
"Ad tertium dicendum quod naturae semper respondet unum, proportionatum tamen naturae. Naturae enim in genere, respondet aliquid unum in genere, et naturae in specie acceptae, respondet unum in specie; naturae autem individuatae respondet aliquid unum individuale. Cum igitur voluntas sit quaedam vis immaterialis, sicut et intellectus, respondet sibi naturaliter aliquod unum commune, scilicet bonum: sicut etiam intellectui aliquod unum commune, scilicet verum, vel ens, vel quod quid est. Sub bono autem communi multa particularia bona continentur, ad quarum nullum voluntas determinatur." [13]De Veritate, Q. 22, Art. 5, Sed Contra 6 & Ad 6: "6. Praeterea, quod de necessitate determinatur ad aliquid, naturaliter est determinatum ad illud. Sed voluntas contra naturalem appetitum dividitur. Ergo voluntas non de necessitate aliquid vult.
"Ad sextum dicendum, quod voluntas dividitur contra appetitum naturalem cum praecisione sumptum, id est qui est naturalis tantum, sicut homo contra id quod est animal tantum; non autem dividitur contra appetitum naturalem absolute, sed includit ipsum, sicut homo includit animal." [14]De Veritate, Q. 22, Art. 5, c.: "...in rebus ordinatis oportet primum modum includi in secundo, et in secundo inveniri non solum id quod sibi competit secundum rationem propriam, sed quod competit secundum rationem primi; sicut homini convenit non solum ratione uti, quod ei competit secundum propriam differentiam, quae est rationale, sed uti sensu vel alimento, quod ei competit secundum genus suum, quod est animal vel vivum.
"Et similiter videmus in sensibilibus; quod cum tactus sit quasi fundamentum aliorum sensuum; in organo uniuscuisque sensus non solum invenitur proprietas illius sensus cuius est organum proprium, sed etiam proprietas tactus: sicut organum sensus visus non solum sentit album et nigrum, inquantum est organum visus, sed sentit calidum et frigidum, et corrumpitur ab eorum excellentiis, secundum quod est organum tactus.
"Natura autem et voluntas hoc modo ordinata sunt, ut ipsa voluntas quaedam natura sit; quia omne quod in rebus invenitur, natura quaedam dicitur. Et ideo in voluntate oportet invenire non solum id quod voluntatis est, sed etiam quod naturae est.
"Hoc autem est cuiuslibet naturae creatae, ut a Deo sit ordinata in bonum, naturaliter appetens illud. Unde et voluntati ipsi inest naturalis quidem appetitus sibi convenientis boni. Et praeter hoc habet appetere aliquid secundum propriam determinationem, non ex necessitate; quod ei competit in quantum voluntas est.
"Sicut autem est ordo naturae ad voluntatem, ita se habet ordo eorum quae naturaliter vult voluntas, ad ea respectu quorum a seipsa determinatur, non ex natura. Et ideo, sicut natura est voluntatis fundamentum, ita appetibile quod naturaliter appetitur, est aliorum appetibilium principium et fundamentum.
"In appetibilibus autem finis est fundamentum et principium eorum quae sunt ad finem; cum quae sunt propter finem, non appetantur nisi ratione finis. Et ideo, quod voluntas de necessitate vult quasi naturali inclinatione in ipsum determinata, est finis ultimus, ut beatitudo, et ea quae in ipso includuntur, ut est cognitio veritatis, et alia huiusmodi; ad alia vero non de necessitate determinatur naturali inclinatione, sed propria dispositione absque necessitate." [15]Summa Contra Gentiles, III, Caput 46: "In quolibet ordine, quod est per se est prius eo quod est per aliud, et principium eius [VIII Phys.,V, 7, 257A]" [16]Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Q. 82, Art. 1, c: "nec necessitas naturalis repugnat voluntati. Quinimmo necesse est quod, sicut intellectus ex necessitate inhaeret primis principiis, ita voluntas ex necessitate inhaereat ultimi fini, qui est beatitudo: finis enim se habet in operativis sicut principium in speculativis, ut dicitur in II Physic. Oportet enim quod illud quod naturaliter alicui convenit et immobiliter, sit fundamentum et principium omnium aliorum: quia natura est primum in unoquoque et omnis motus procedit ab aliquo immobili." [17]Summa Contra Gentiles, II, Caput 83: "Si ita esset animae naturalis cognitio conclusionum sicut principiorum, eadem esset sententia apud omnes de conclusionibus, sicut de principiis: quia quae sunt naturalia, sunt eadem apud omnes. Non est autem apud omnes eadem sententia de conclusionibus, sed solum de principiis. Patet igitur quod cognitio principiorum est nobis naturalis, non autem conclusionum. Quod autem non est naturalis nobis acquirmus per id quod est naturale; sicut etiam in exterioribus per manus instituimus omnia artificialia. Non ergo conclusionum scientia est in nobis nisi ex principiis acquisita." [18]Summa Contra Gentiles, III, Caput 107: "Primum autem in unoquoque est eius natura vel essentia." [19]Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Q. 62, Art. 7, c: "Semper autem oportet salvari primum in secundo." [20]Since first is defined by before, it has as many meaning as before. The second sense of before in the Categories is what can be without another, but not vice-versa. The fifth sense to be given there, which I do not think is fifth in order but in some way like the second, is the sense in which the cause is before the effect. [21]Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Q. 60, Art. 2, c: "semper id quod pertinet ad prius habet rationem principii; unde, cum natura sit primum quod est in unoquoque, oportet quod id quod ad naturam pertinet, sit principium in quolibet. Et hoc apparet in homine et quantum ad intellectum et quantum ad voluntatem. Intellectus enim cognoscit principia naturaliter: et ex hac cognitione causatur in homine scientia conclusionum, quae non cognoscuntur naturaliter ab homine, sed per inventionem vel doctrinam. Similiter in voluntate finis hoc modo se habet, sicut principium in intellectu, ut dicitur in II Physic. Unde voluntas naturaliter tendit in suum finem ultimum: omnis enim homo naturaliter vult beatitudinem. Et ex hac naturali voluntate causantur omnes aliae voluntates: cum quidquid homo vult, velit propter finem. Dilectio igitur boni quod homo naturaliter vult sicut finem, est dilectio naturalis: dilectio autem ab hac derivata, quae est boni quod diligitur propter finem, est dilectio electiva."
[22]Super Ioannem, VIII, Lectio VI, n. 1246: "In quolibet autem ordine actuum prius est actus naturalis; sicut in intelligendo, primo intelliguntur prima principia, et per ipsa intelliguntur alia, et in volendo similiter, primo volumus ultimam perfectionem et ultimum finem, cuius appetitus naturaliter nobis inest, et propter ipsum appetimus alia."
[23]Summa Contra Gentiles, IV, Caput 11: "Intellectus enim noster aliqua naturaliter cognoscit: sicut prima intelligibilium principia, quorum intelligibiles conceptiones, quae verba interiora dicuntur, naturaliter in ipso existunt et ex eo procedunt Sunt etiam quaedam intelligibilia quae non naturaliter intellectus noster cognoscit, sed in eorum cognitionem ratiocinando pertingit: et horum conceptiones in intellectu nostro naturaliter non existunt, sed cum studio quaeruntur. "
[24]In IX Metaphysicorum, Lectio VII, n. 1855: "Sed et in ipsa ratione, naturaliter praeinsunt quaedam semina et principia scientiarum et virtutum, virtute quorum potest homo aliqualiter exire in scientiae et virtutis actum..."
[25]Summa Contra Gentiles, III, Caput 123: "Leges autem positae oportet quod ex naturali instinctu procedant, si humanae sunt: sicut etiam in scientiis demonstrativis omnis humana inventio ex principiis naturaliter cognitis initium sumit."
[26]De Malo, Q. 16, Art 4, Ad 5: "...voluntas rationalis creaturae determinata est ad unum, in quod naturaliter movetur; sicut omnis homo naturaliter vult esse, et vivere, et beatitudinem. Et ista sunt ad quae primo movetur naturaliter creatura vel intelligenda vel volenda, quia semper actio naturalis praesupponitur aliis actionibus." [27]De Potentia, Q. 2, Art. 3, c.: "Voluntas, inquantum voluntas, cum sit libera, ad utrumlibet se habet. Potest enim voluntas agere vel non agere, sic vel sic facere, velle et non velle. Et si respectu alicuius hoc voluntati non conveniat, hoc accidet voluntati non in quantum voluntas est, sed ex inclinatione naturali quam habet ad aliquid, sicut ad finem ultimum, quem non potest non velle; sicut voluntas humana non potest non velle beatitudinem, nec potest velle miseriam....voluntas licet respectu aliquorum ad utrumlibet se habeat, tamen respectu finis ultimi naturalem inclinationem habet; et similiter intellectus respectu cognitionis principiorum primorum, naturalem quemdam motum habet."
[28]Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate (et Bonitate), Q. 26, Art. 9, First Objections, Ad 7: "...distinctio illa qua distinguitur ratio ut ratio, et ratio ut natura, dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo ita quod ratio ut natura dicatur ratio secundum quod est naturae creaturae rationalis, prout scilicet fundata in essentia animae dat esse naturale corpori: ratio vero ut ratio dicatur secundum id quod est proprium rationis in quantum est ratio; et hoc est actus eius, quia potentiae definiuntur per actus...Alio modo potest intelligi praedicta distinctio, ut dicamus rationem ut naturam intelligi secundum quod ratio comparatur ad ea quae naturaliter cognoscit vel appetit; rationem vero ut rationem, secundum quod per quamdam collationem ordinatur ad aliquid cognoscendum vel appetendum, eo quod rationis est proprium conferre."
[29]Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate (et Bonitate), Q. 26, Art. 9, Second Objections, Ad 4: "...ratio ut ratio non nominat aliquam potentiam distinctam a ratione ut natura est, sed nominat quemdam modum considerandi ipsam potentiam." [30]Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia, Q. 9, Art. 2, Ad 10:
[31]Summa Theologiae,Prima Secundae, Q. 26, Art. 3, c.: "Addit enim dilectio supra amorem, electionem praecedentem, ut ipsum nomen sonat. Unde dilectio non est in concupiscibili, sed in voluntate tantum, et est in sola rationali natura." [32]Albert the Great, Commentaria in Libris Elenchorum Sophisticorum Aristotelis, Doyon edition from Vives, Tractatus I, Caput I, p. 1a: "In hoc Elenchorum Sophisticorum libro, de syllogismo litigatorio agendum est ad completionem logicae scientiae, secundum quod logica dicitur a λόγος quod est ratio, et non a λόγος quod est sermo. Dicit enim Isaac, quod ratio est virtus collativa faciens coire causam in causatum, secundum quod causa sumitur in communi pro causa consequentiae et non pro causa consequentis, sicut causa est quae causat decursum syllogisticum per dici de omni et dici de nullo: sic enim logica est de ratione argumentativa. Sed quia omnis argumentatio ad syllogism reducitur, erit logica hoc modo dicta de syllogismo, cujus quidem principia remota (quae sunt praedicata et subjecta) in libris de Universalibus et Praedicamentis et Sex Principiis jam determinata sunt ex antecedentibus et diffinitionibus eorum secundum potestatem ipsorum, et per consequentia sint determinata in libro Divisionum. Principia vero propinqua syllogismi et ingredientia substantiam ipsius, in libro Peri Hermeneias jam determinata sunt....." [33]Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo, Q. 2, Art. 3, Obj. 2 & Ad 2: "2. Praeterea, actus voluntatis non potest esse mala, quia ipsa potentia voluntatis bona est, nec potest arbor bona fructus malos facere, ut dicitur Matth. VII, v. 18. Ergo peccatum non consistit principaliter in actu voluntatis. Ad secundum dicendum, quod voluntas secundum suam naturam est bona, unde et actus eius naturalis semper est bonus; et dico actum naturalem voluntatis, prout homo vult felicitatem naturaliter, esse, vivere, et beatitudinem. Si autem loquamur de bono morali, sic voluntas secundum se considerata nec est bona nec mala, sed se habet in potentia ad bonum vel malum." [34]De Anima, Book Two, Chapter 3, 414a 31-32: "δυνάμεις δ’ εἴπομεν θρεπτικόν, αἰσθητικόν, ὀρεκτικόν, κινητικὸν κατὰ τόπον, διανοητικόν" [35]Posterior Analytics, Book One, 71a 1-2: "Πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως." [36]Thomas Aquinas, In III De Anima, Lectio IV, Marietii ed., n. 633: "Probat quod non sit idem opinio et phantasia, duabus rationibus; quarum prima talis est. Passio phantasiae est in nobis cum volumus, quia in potestate nostra est formare aliquid, quasi apparens ante oculos nostros, ut montes aureos, vel quicquid volumus, sicut patet de illis qui recordantur, et formant sibi idola eorum quae sibi videntur ad votum. Sed opinari non est in potestate nostra; quia necesse et, quod opinans habeat rationem, per quam opinetur, vel verum vel falsum; ergo opinio non est idem quod phantasia." [37]De Anima, 434a 5-15: "] μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις z/οις ὑπάρχει, ἡ δὲ βουλευτικὴ ἐν τοῖς λογιστικοῖς (πότερον γὰρ πράξει τόδε ἢ τόδε, λογισμοῦ \dh ἐστὶν ἔργον· καὶ ἀνάγκη ἑνὶ μετρεῖν· τὸ μεῖζον γὰρ διώκει· ὥστε δύναται έν ἐκ πλειόνων φαντασμάτων ποιεῖν). καὶ αἴτιον τοῦτο τοῦ δόξαν μὴ δοκεῖν ἔχειν, ὅτι τὴν ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ οὐκ ἔχει [αὕτη δὲ ἐκείνην]. διὸ τὸ βουλευτικὸν οὐκ ἔχει ἡ ὄρεξις: nik$ ἐνίοτε καὶ κινεῖ ὁτὲ μὲν αὕτη ἐκείνην, ὁτὲ δ’ ἐκείνη ταύτην, ὥσπερ σφαῖρα σφαῖραν, ἡ ὄρεξις τὴν ὄρεξιν, ὅταν ἀκρασία γένηται· φύσει δὲ ἀεὶ ἡ ἄνω ἀρχικωτέρα καὶ κινεῖ:" [38]Thomas Aquinas, In III De Anima, Lectio XVI, nn. 840-844: "Dicit ergo primo, quod phantasia sensibilis, ut ex dictis patet, est etiam in aliis animalibus; sed illa, quae est per deliberationem, est tantum in rationalibus; quia considerare utrum hoc sit agendum, aut hoc quod est deliberare, opus est rationis. Et in tali consideratione necesse est accipere aliquam unam regulam, vel finem, vel aliquid huiusmodi, ad quod mensuretur quid sit magis agendum. Manifestum est enim quod homo, "imitatur", idest desiderat, id quod est magis in bonitate, et id quod est melius: melius autem semper diiudicamus aliqua mensura: et ideo oportet accipere aliquam mensuram in deliberando quid magis sit agendum. Et hoc est medium ex quo ratio practica syllogizat quid sit eligendum. Unde manifestum est quod ratio deliberans potest ex pluribus phantasmatibus unum facere, scilicet ex tribus, quorum unum praeeligitur alteri, et tertium est quasi mensura, quae praeelegit. Et haec est causa, quare animalia non habent opinionem. licet habeant phantasiam; quia non possunt uti syllogismo, per quam unum praeeligant alteri. Sed deliberatio rationis habet illam, scilicet opinionem, alias non faceret ex pluribus phantasmatibus unum. Et inde est, quod appetitus inferior, qui sequitur phantasiam, non habet deliberationem, sed absque deliberatione movetur ad concupiscendum vel irascendum, quia scilicet sequitur phantasiam sensibilem. Deinde...ostendit quomodo deliberatio rationis vincatur ab appetitu inferiori; et dicit quod appetitus inferior, qui est sine deliberatione, vincit deliberationem, et removet hominem ab eo quod deliberavit. Aliquando e converso appetitus movet appetitum, scilicet superior, qui est rationis deliberantis, eum qui est phantasiae sensibilis, sicut in corporibus caelestibus, sphaera superior movet inferiorem; quod accidit cum aliquis continens fuerit. Continentis enim est, per deliberationem rationis vincere passiones. Et iste est naturalis ordo, ut superior appetitus moveat inferiorem; quia etiam in corporibus caelestibus naturaliter sphaera superior principalior est et movet inferiorem...Et similiter appetitus inferior, etsi aliquid de motu proprio retineat, movetur tamen naturali ordine, motu appetitus superioris, et motu rationis deliberantis. Si autem e converso accidit, quod appetitus superior transmoveatur ab inferiori, hoc est praeter ordinem naturalem."
[39]Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate (et Bonitate), Q. 22, Art. 4, Ad 1: "...voluntas ab appetitu sensibili non distinguitur directe per hoc quod est sequi apprehensionem hanc vel illam; sed ex hoc quod est determinare sibi inclinationem, vel habere inclinationem determinatam ab alio: quae duo exigunt potentiam non unius modi. Sed talis diversitas requirit diversitatem apprehensionum....Unde quasi ex consequenti accipitur distinctio appetitivarum virium penes distinctionem apprehensivarum, et non principaliter. [40]Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate (et Bonitate), Q. 22, Art. 4, c.: "" [41]Thomas Aquinas, In VI N. Ethicorum, Lectio III, Maretti ed., n. 1144: "Primo determinat de virtutibus intellectualibus perficientibus intellectum circa ea quae sunt ex principiis. Secundo determinat de habitibus intellectualibus perficientibus intellectum circa prima principia" [42]Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book Six, 1141a 16-20: "...δήλον ὅτι ἀκριβεστάτη ἂν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴη ἡ σοφία. δεῖ ἄρα τὸν σοφὸν μὴ μόνον τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀληθεύειν. ὥστ’ εἴη ἂν ἡ σοφία νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν τιμιωτάτων."
[43]Thomas gives as one of the reasons for Aristotle's considering the moral virtues before the virtues of reason that the former are more known than the latter. In II N. Ethicorum, Lectio I, Marietti ed. n. 245: "In prima determinat de virtutibus moralibus. In secunda de intellectualibus in sexto libro...Et ratio ordinis est, quia virtutes morales sunt magis notae, et per eas disponimur ad intellectuales." [44]This is the exhortation found in Hamlet, Act IV, Sc. 4. It is the best short exhortation to use reason that we have. [45]In a proportionally alike mistake, Sartre can only see the will as will and not as a nature. [46]Metaphysics, Chapter 1, 980a 27 - 981b 13 [47]Posterior Analytics, Book Two, Chapter 19 [48]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 57, Art. 2, Ad 2: "Unde, si quis recte consideret, istae tres virtutes non ex aequo distinguuntur ab invicem, sed ordine quodam; sicut accidit in totis potentialibus, quorum una pars est perfectior altera, sicut anima rationalis est perfectior quam sensibilis, et sensibilis quam vegetabilis. Hoc enim modo, scientia dependet ab intellectu sicut a principaliori. Et utrumque dependet a sapientia sicut a principalissimo, quae sub se continet et intellectum et scientiam, ut de conclusionibus scientiarum diiudicans, et de principiis earundem." [49]noûß and ἐπιστήμη are before σοφία in time, and in being and in the order in which reason discusses them, but σοφία is better than them and a cause of their greatest perfection