Effect Known Before Cause

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Effect Known Before Cause

Wisdom about Beginnings · Roads in Our Knowledge

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EFFECT KNOWN BEFORE CAUSE

Aristotle, Parts of Animals, Book One, Chapter One, 639b 7-12:

And there is a further question which has not been determined: should the naturalist follow the example of the mathematicians when they show things in astronomy; that is, ought the naturalist first to consider the phenomena which occur in animals and their parts and then, having done this, go on to say the why and give the causes, or should he proceed in some other way.

Aristotle, Parts of Animals, Book Two, Chapter One, 646a 8-12:

What and how many are the parts of which the various animals are composed has been shown in some detail in our investigations about animals. Now we should consider the causes by which each animal is as described there.

Aristotle, Progression of Animals, Chapter One, 704b 8-10:

We ought to examine the causes of all these things and of such other things as are the same in kind. That these things happen in this way is clear from our natural history, but why they are so must now be examined.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book One, Chapter Four, 1095a 30-1095b 8:

It should not remain hidden to us that arguments from the beginning and arguments to the beginnings are not the same. For Plato well doubted and sought to find out whether the road is from the beginnings or to the beginnings, just as there is a difference in the race-course between the way to the goal and the way back again.

One ought to begin from the things that are known, but these are of two kinds: some to us and others simply or without qualification. Probably one ought to being from the things that are known to us.

Therefore, it is necessary for the one who is going to be sufficiently prepared to listen to lectures on the noble and just and all other political matters, to have been brought up in good habits. For the starting-point is that it is so; and if this appears sufficiently, one has no need of the why because such a man has or will easily acquire the beginnings.

Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Book One of the Nicomachean Ethics, Lectio IV, nn. 51-52:

...and here he shows in what order we should reason about these opinions and, in general, about all moral matters.

And he assigns a difference in the process of reasoning. There are certain arguments which proceed from beginnings; that is, which go from causes to effects, as demonstrations propter quid (showing the why). Others conversely, go from effects to causes or beginnings; and these do not show the why, but only that it is so.

Plato also had made this distinction before when he investigated whether one ought to proceed from the beginnings or to the beginnings. And he gives an example from the race-course where there are certain starting-points for the runners and these are at the beginning of the race-course. Sometimes the athletes begin to run from these posts to a goal and sometimes from the goal back to the starting-posts. Thus, there are also two orders in the process of reasoning.

If we want to learn the order in which we should proceed in any matter, we should consider that it is necessary to begin from the things that are more known because through these we arrive at the unknown. But things are more known in two ways: some to us, as composite and sensible things, and others without qualification and by nature, namely simple and understandable things. And because we acquire knowledge by reasoning, it is necessary that we proceed from the things which are more known to us.

If the same things are more known to us and more known without qualification, then reason proceeds from the beginnings as in mathematics.

But if the things which are more known to us are other than the things which are more known without qualification, then one ought to proceed in the reverse way, as in natural things and moral matters.

Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, Principle LXXV, Philosophical Works of Descartes, Dover ed., Vol. I, p. 252:

A summary of all that has to be observed in order to philosophize correctly...if we desire to philosophize seriously, and apply ourselves to the research of all the truths we are capable of knowing, we must, in the first place, rid ourselves of our prejudices, and must take great care sedulously to set aside all the opinions which we formerly accepted, until, on applying to them further examination, we discover them to be true. We should afterwards hold an orderly review of the conceptions which we have within us, and accept as true those and only those which present themselves to our apprehension as clear and distinct. In this way we shall know first of all that we exist, inasmuch as our nature is to think, and at the same time that there is a God on whom we depend; and after having considered His attributes, we shall be in a position to inquire into the truth of all other things, since God is their cause.

Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), The Rationalists, Dolphin Books, Doubleday & Co., pp. 120 & 180:

Part I, Axiom IV - The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of a cause.

Part II, Prop. VII - The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.

Werner Heisenberg, "On the Unity of the Scientific Outlook on Nature", in the collection of Heisenberg papers Philosophic Problems of Nuclear Science, Fawcett Publications, Inc., p. 106:

When we talk about reality, we never start at the beginning.

C. F. Von Weizsacker & J. Juilfs, Contemporary Physics, George Braziller Publ., Chapter 2, p. 14:

We must advance to the uttermost limit of the unknown in order to understand the structure of any known field. This is no paradox. It is an old truth that what is known immediately is not, in itself, simple. Aristotle had already distinguished between what comes first "for us" and what comes first "objectively,"

Thus, in any representation of physics, the same must hold true as in the reading of a book: the actual significance of the beginning can only be grasped when one has read through the whole. In our understanding of nature, it is probable that we have not even learned to write the proper ending of the book at all. The great number of elementary particles is probably to be understood from some common root which has so far eluded us.

C. F. Von Weizsacker & J. Juilfs, Contemporary Physics, George Braziller Publ., Chapter 12, p. 131:

Our line of approach so far has gone from the more known to the less known, from the visible to the hidden, from the extended body to the elementary particles. Atomic physics, if correct, should enable us to reverse the problem. How, if we assume the presence of elementary particles, can we explain the properties of extended bodies? We should now be able to deduce from atomic physics the great number of empirical facts which emerged from our study of chemistry and classical physics, and which paved the way for our inductive advances in atomic physics.