Fallacies of Equivocation and Amphiboly
Intro & Logic · Order of Topics for Class 2016
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Fallacies of Equivocation and Amphiboly Duane H. Berquist
Fallacy of Equivocation The fallacy De Fallaciis Ad quosdam Nobiles Artistas, Caput 6 Primo igitur est dicendum de aequivocatione. Est autem aequivocatio unius et eiusdem nominis diversa significatio; fallacia autem aequivocationis est deceptio proveniens ex eo quod unum nomen plura significat. Principium autem motivum huius fallaciae, sive causa apparentiae in aequivocatione est unitas dictionis eiusdem simpliciter; quod dicitur ad differentiam accentus, in quo non est dictio una simpliciter, sed solum in potentia. Principium autem motivum non existentiae, sive defectus, est diversitas rerum significatarum. ⁂ The species or modes Albert takes κυρίως in Aristotle’s first τρόπος as opposed to secondarily, but the author of the De Fallaciis as opposed to metaphorically. I am inclined more to agree with he author of the De Fallaciis. Aristotle’s word custom. We are accustomed to call a glutton a pig. And κυρίως is opposed to metaphor and others in the book About the Poetic Art. Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish between the word equivocal by chance (which is not so apt to deceive) and the word equivocal by reason (which is most apt to deceive, especially in meanings close to one another). Metaphors also deceive, as in Scripture. See recent article in the American Catholic Quarterly. Question put to Dionne: What is the difference between the first two modes of both equivocation and amphiboly in the On Sophistical Refutations (166a 15–21) Answer: first analogous, second metaphor (?) 4th Sent.: Institution, imposition De Fallaciis Ad quosdam Nobiles Artistas, Caput 6 Species autem sive modi aequivocationis sunt tres. Prima species est quando una dictio principaliter plura significat: ut hoc nomen canis principaliter significat latrabile animal et marinam belluam et caeleste sidus; et formatur sic paralogismus, idest apparens syllogismus: omnis canis est latrabilis.
fallacies of equivocation and amphiboly Caeleste sidus est canis. Igitur caeleste sidus est latrabile. Sed non sequitur: quia hoc nomen canis aliud significat in prima et aliud in secunda, secundum quod utraque accipitur vera; et sic non est verus syllogismus, cum non sit idem terminus medius. Si autem accipiatur ut idem significans in utraque, sic altera praemissarum est falsa. Sicut autem oportet in syllogismo idem medium bis sumi in praemissis, ita oportet duas extremitates bis sumi in syllogismo, in praemissis scilicet semel, et semel in conclusione: unde eadem ratione potest fieri paralogismus, si sit aequivocatio in altera extremitatum, ut: grammatici discunt. Et grammatici sunt scientes. Igitur scientes discunt; discere enim aequivocum est. Nam uno modo discere idem est quod intelligere docentem; et sic, scientes discunt. Alio modo idem est quod accipere scientiam ab aliquo; et sic scientes non discunt. Secunda species est quando unum nomen principaliter unum significat, et aliud metaphorice sive transumptive: sicut hoc verbum ridere principaliter significat actum hominis proprium; metaphorice autem sive transumptive significat prati floritionem. Et formatur sic paralogismus: quidquid ridet, habet os. Pratum ridet. Ergo pratum habet os; vel sic: quidquid currit, habet pedes. Tiber currit. Igitur Tiber habet pedes. Non sequitur: quia ridet et currit primo sumuntur proprie, et postea transumptive. Et ad hanc speciem reducitur multiplicitas nominum analogorum quae dicuntur de pluribus secundum prius et posterius: sicut sanum dicitur aliquando de animali, urina et diaeta. Et formatur paralogismus sic: omne sanum habet vitam. Sed urina est sana. Ergo urina habet vitam. Non sequitur: quia sanum primo sumitur pro eo quod principaliter significat, scilicet habere sanitatem, secundo pro eo quod posterius significat, scilicet pro signante sanitatem. Ad hanc etiam speciem reducitur multiplicitas praepositionum: quia praepositio unam habet habitudinem per prius, et aliam per posterius. et formatur sic paralogismus: in quocumque est sanitas, illud est animal. Sed sanitas est in humorum adaequatione. Ergo humorum adaequatio est animal. Non sequitur: quia haec praepositio in primo designabat habitudinem accidentis ad subiectum, secundo habitudinem effectus ad causam. Tertia species est quae provenit ex diversa consignificatione, quae quidem attenditur circa accidentia partium orationis sicut secundum tempus, numerum, genus, personam et similia. Et sic formatur paralogismus: quicumque surgebat, stat. Sedens surgebat. Ergo sedens stat. Non sequitur: quia sedens in minori propositione sumebatur ut est praeteriti temporis imperfecti, in conclusione secundum quod est temporis praesentis. Quicumque sanabitur, sanus est. Laborans sanabitur. Igitur laborans sanus est. Minor et conclusio sunt duplices: quia hoc participium laborans significat tempus praesens et praeteritum imperfectum; unde significat laborantem tunc, et nunc laborantem; et ideo si teneretur pro laborante, tunc minor est falsa, quia simul esset sanus et laborans, quod falsum est. Si autem teneatur pro laborante nunc, vera est, quia potest esse nunc laborans, et tunc poterat esse sanus: et e converso de conclusione. ⁂
Summa Contra Gentiles, Liber I, Caput XXX Quodcumque vero nomen huiusmodi perfectiones exprimit cum modo proprio creaturis, de Deo dici non potest nisi per similitudinem et metaphoram, per quam quae sunt unius rei alteri solent adaptari, sicut aliquis homo dicitur lapis propter duritiam intellectus. Huiusmodi autem sunt omnia nomina imposita ad designandum speciem rei creatae, sicut homo et lapis: Nam cuilibet speciei debetur proprius modus perfectionis et esse. Similiter etiam quaecumque nomina proprietates rerum designant quae ex propriis principiis specierum causatur. Unde de Deo dici non possunt nisi metaphorice.
But when any name expresses such perfections along with a mode that is proper to a creature, it can be said of God only according to likeness and metaphor. According to metaphor, what belongs to one thing is transferred to another, as when we say that a man is a stone because of the hardness of his intellect. Such names are used to designate the species of a created thing, for example, man and stone: for to each species belongs its own mode of perfection and being. The same is true of whatever names designate the properties of things, which are caused by the proper principles of their species. Hence, they can be said of God only metaphorically. ⁂
Examples 1. Chianti is a dry wine. But what is dry is not wet. Therefore, Chianti is not wet. 2. Roger Maris hits 61 homeruns with a bat. But a bat is a flying rodent. Therefore, Roger Maris hit 61 homeruns with a flying rodent. 3. Happiness is the end of human life. But the end of human life is death. Therefore, happiness is death. 4. Aristotle reasons that the confused is before the distinct in our knowledge and the general is to the particular as the confused is to the distinct. Therefore, the general is before the particular in our knowledge. But this is contradicted by what he admits elsewhere. He says that the senses are before reason in our knowledge. But the senses know the particular and reason, the general (for example, I see and shake the hand of a particular man, but reason knows man in general). Hence, the particular is before the general in our knowledge. 5. A man is not just an animal, but an animal with reason. Hence, animal is only a part of what man is. But this part, animal, includes not only man but also dog, cat horse and many other animals. Therefore, a part can be greater than its whole. 6. The man who doesn’t see is blind. The man who is asleep doesn’t see. Therefore, the man who is asleep is blind. 7. If nature acts for an end, all things in the natural world would come to an end. But natural things continue to exist (they do not come to an end). Therefore, nature does not act for an end.
fallacies of equivocation and amphiboly 8. The sick are cured. The cured are healthy. Therefore, the sick are healthy. 9. The ignorant have learned. Those who have learned know. The ignorant know. 10. Men sitting stand up. Those who stand up are standing. Therfore, men sitting are standing. 11. The one who is at rest begins to move. The one who begins to move is in motion. Therefore, the one who is at rest is in motion. In I Physicorum, Lectio V, n. 33
…improbat praedictam rationem quantum ad illam illationem: Non habet principium, ergo est infinitum.
…he disproves the argument under discussion with reference to the inference that if something has no beginning, then it is infinite. For beginning may be taken in two ways. In one way we speak of a beginning of time and of generation. And this meaning of beginning is taken when it is said that what is made has a beginning or what is not made has no beginning. In another sense, beginning is the beginning of a thing or a magnitude. And in this sense it would follow that if a thing has no beginning, then it is infinite. Whence it is clear that Melissus uses the term beginning as if it had one meaning only. Hence Aristotle says that it is absurd to say that every case of beginning is the beginning of a thing, that is, of a magnitude, so that the beginning of time and of generation is not another meaning of the term.
Principium enim dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo dicitur principium temporis et generationis; et sic accipitur principium cum dicitur: quod factum est habet principium, vel quod non est factum non habet principium. Alio modo est principium rei vel magnitudinis, et sic sequeretur: si non habet principium est infinitum. Unde patet quod accipit nomen principii ac si esset uno modo dictum. Et hoc est quod dicit, quod inconveniens est dicere quod principium omnis, idest cuiuscumque habentis principium, sit principium rei, idest magnitudinis; et quod non sit alio modo dictum principium temporis et generationis. ⁂
Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Q. 42, Art. 2, Obj. 2 & Ad 2 Praeterea, omne quod est ex altero, habet principium. Sed nullum aeternum habet principium. Ergo Filius non est aeternus, neque Spiritus Sanctus. Ad secundum dicendum quod aeternitas excludit principium durationis, sed non principium originis.
Further, everything that comes from another has a principle. But nothing eternal has a principle. Therefore the Son is not eternal; nor is the Holy Ghost. Eternity excludes the principle of duration, but not the principle of origin. ⁂
In I Physicorum, Lectio IV, nn. 25 & 27 Erraverunt enim Parmenides et Melissus eo quod nesciverunt distinguere unum: unde quae aliquo modo sunt unum, simpliciter esse unum enunciabant. Posteriores autem philosophi, nescientes distinguere unum, pro inconvenienti reputabant quod idem aliquo modo sit unum et multa….
Parmenides and Melissus erred because they did not know how to distinguish the uses of the term ‘one’. Thus, what is one in a certain respect, they said was one simply. But the later philosophers, also not knowing how to distinguish the uses of the term ‘one’, thought it absurd that one and the same thing should be in some way one and many…. But this is false, For that which is one in one respect can be many in some other respect, as what is one in subject can be many in definition [ratio]. Thus the white and the musical are the same in subject but many in definition [ratio]…. This may happen also in another way. That which is actually one as a whole may be many according to a division of parts. Whence the whole is one in its totality, but it has multiplicity of parts…. For the one in act and the many in act are opposed, but the one in act and the many in potency are not opposed. And because of this he adds that ‘one’ is said in many ways, i.e., one in potency and one in act. And so nothing prohibits the same thing from being one in act and many in potency, as is clear with regard to the whole and the parts.
Sed hoc est falsum, quia id quod et unum uno modo, potest esse multa alio modo: sicut quod est unum subiecto, potest esse multa ratione, sicut album et musicum idem sunt subiecto, sed ratione multa…. Alio etiam modo contingit quod id quod est unum toto et actu, sit multa secundum partium divisionem: unde totum est unum in sua totalitate, sed habet partium multitudinem…. Unum enim in actu et multa in actu opponuntur; sed unum in actu et multa in potentia non sunt opposita. Et propter hoc subdit quod unum dicitur multipliciter, scilicet unum in potentia et unum in actu: et sic idem nihil prohibet esse unum in actu et multa in potentia, sicut patet de toto et partibus. ⁂
In X Metaphysicorum, Lectio III, nn. 1981–1982 Avicenna posuit quod unum et ens sunt praedicata accidentalia, et quod significant naturam aliquam additam supra ea de quibus dicuntur. Deceptus enim fuit ex aequivocatione unius. Quod quidem secundum quod est principium numeri habens rationem mensurae in genere quantitatis, significat quamdam naturam additam his de quibus dicitur, cum sit in genere accidentis. Sed unum quod convertitur cum ente circuit omnia entia. Unde non significat aliquam naturam
Avicenna, who did not take this into account, claimed that unity and being are accidental predicates, and that they signify a nature added to the things of which they are predicated. For he was deceived by the equivocal use of the term one, because the unity which is the principle of number and has the role of a measure in the genus of quantity signifies a nature added to the things of which it is predicated, since it belongs to a class of accident. But the unity which is interchangeable
determinatam ad aliquod genus.
with being extends to everything that is, and therefore it does not signify a nature which is limited to one category. He was also deceived by the equivocal use of the term being; for being as signifying the composition of a proposition is predicated accidentally, since composition is made by the intellect with regard to a definite time. Now to exist at this or at that particular time is to be an accidental predicate. But being as divided by the ten categories signifies the very nature of the ten categories insofar as they are actual or potential.
Similiter etiam deceptus est ex aequivocatione entis. Nam ens quod significat compositionem propositionis est praedicatum accidentale, quia compositio fit per intellectum secundum determinatum tempus. Esse autem in hoc tempore vel in illo est accidentale praedicatum. Sed ens quod dividitur per decem praedicamenta, significat ipsas naturas decem generum. secundum quod sunt actu vel potentia. ⁂
Did God exist before he made time? See Augustine and Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, p. 124). De Potentia, Q. 3, Art 1. Obj. 2 & Ad 2 Praeterea, omne quod fit, antequam esset, possibile erat esse: si enim erat impossibile esse, non erat possibile fieri: nihil enim mutatur ad id quod est impossibile. Sed potentia qua aliquid potest esse, non potest esse nisi in aliquo subiecto; nisi forte ipsamet sit subiectum; nam accidens absque subiecto esse non potest. Ergo omne quod fit, fit ex materia vel subiecto. Impossibile est ergo ex nihilo aliquid fieri. Ad secundum, dicendum quod antequam mundus esset, possibile erat mundum esse, in qua potentia fundaretur. Dicitur enim in V Metaphys., aliquid aliquando dici possibile, non secundum aliquam potentiam, sed quia in terminis ipsius enuntiabilis non est aliqua repugnantia, secundum quod possibile opponitur impossibili. Sic ergo dicitur, antequam mundus esset, possibile mundus fieri, quia non erat repugnantia inter praedicatum enuntiabilis et subiectum.
Vel potest dici, quod erat possibile propter potentiam activam agentis, non propter
Whatever is made was possible before it was made for if it could not be, it could not be made, since the impossible cannot be the term of a change. Now the potentiality by virtue of which a thing is possible, cannot be otherwise than in a subject, unless it be itself a subject: because an accident cannot exist but in a subject. Therefore whatever is made, is produced from matter or a subject. Therefore nothing can be made out of nothing. To the second it should be said that before the world was, it was possible for the world to be: but it does not follow that there was need of matter as the base of that possibility. For it is stated in Metaph. V, 12, that sometimes a thing is said to be possible, not in respect of some potentiality, but because it involves no contradiction of terms, in which sense the possible is opposed to the impossible. Accordingly it is said that before the world was it was possible for the world to be made, because the statement involved no contradiction between subject and predicate. We may also reply that it was possible by reason of the active power of the agent, but
duane h. berquist aliquam potentiam passivam materiae.
not on account of any passive power of matter. ⁂
Fallacy of equivocation: The false is what-is-not. But what-is-not is not. Therefore the false is not. Quaestiones Disputatae de Anima, Art. 6, corpus Quidam dicunt quod anima, et omnino omnis substantia praeter Deum, est composita ex materia et forma. Cuius quidem positionis primus auctor invenitur Avicebron auctor libri Fontis vitae. Huius autem ratio est, quae etiam in obiiciendo est tacta, quod oportet in quocumque inveniuntur proprietates materiae, inveniri materiam. Unde cum in anima inveniantur proprietates materiae, quae sunt recipere, subiici, esse in potentia, et alia huiusmodi; arbitratur esse necessarium quod in anima sit materia. Sed haec ratio frivola est…. Debilitas autem huius rationis apparet ex hoc, quod recipere et subiici et alia huiusmodi non secundum eamdem rationem conveniunt animae et materiae primae. Nam materia prima recipit aliquid cum transmutatione et motu. Et quia omnis transmutatio et motus reducitur ad motum localem, sicut ad primum et communiorem, ut probatur in VIII Physic.; relinquitur quod materia in illis tantum invenitur in quibus est potentia ad ubi. Huiusmodi autem sunt solum corporalia, quae loco circumscribuntur. Unde materia non invenitur nisi in rebus corporalibus, secundum quod philosophi de materia sunt locuti; nisi aliquis materiam sumere velit aequivoce. Anima autem non recipit cum motu et transmutatione, immo per separatione a motu et a rebus mobilibus: secundum quod dicitur in VII Physic, quod in quiescendo fit anima sciens et prudens. Unde etiam Philosophus dicit, III de Anima, quod intelligere dicitur pati alio modo quam sit in rebus corporalibus passio.
Some say that the soul and, indeed, every substance, with the exception of God, is composed of matter and form. The first to maintain this position is Avicebron, the author of the book Fons vitae. The reason for this position, which is also mentioned in one of the objections (Obj. 6), is this: that matter is found wherever the properties of matter exist. Wherefore, since the properties of matter are found in the soul, namely, to receive, to be in potency, and other things of this kind, Avicebron is of the opinion that there must be matter in the soul. But this argument is silly…. Now the weakness of this argument become’s apparent if we consider that to receive, to be a subject, and other things of this sort, are not found in the soul and in prime matter in the same specific way. For prime matter is actuated by means of change and motion, and since every change and motion may be reduced to local motion, as the primary and most universal type of motion, as is proved in the Physics [VIII, 7, 260b 6], it follows that matter is present only in those things in which there is potency to place (ab ubi). Moreover, things of this kind, which are circumscribed by place alone, are corporeal. Hence, in accordance with the way in which the philosophers have spoken about matter, matter is present only in corporeal things; unless, of course, someone wishes to employ matter in an equivocal sense. The soul, however, does not receive something by means of motion and change, but, on the contrary, by being separated from motion and from movable things. Accordingly, it is said in
fallacies of equivocation and amphiboly the Physics [VII, 3, 247b 10] that the soul becomes cognitive and possesses prudence when at rest. Wherefore the Philosopher also states, in the De anima [III, 4, 429a 30] that intellection is referred to as a passion, but is a passion of a different nature from that present in corporeal things. Therefore, if anyone wishes to conclude that the soul is composed of matter because it is receptive or is acted upon, he is clearly deceived by an equivocation. Consequently it is evident that the aforesaid argument is foolish.
Si quis ergo concludere velit animam esse ex materia compositam per hoc quod recipit vel patitur, manifeste ex aequivocatione decipitur. Sic ergo manifestum est rationem praedictam esse frivolam. ⁂
Quaestiones Disputatae de Anima, Art. 6, Obj. 5 & Ad 5 Praeterea, forma est principium actionis, materia vero principium patiendi. In quocumque ergo est actio et passio, ibi est compositio formae et materiae. Sed in ipsa anima est actio et passio, nam operatio intellectus possibilis est in patiendo; propter quod dicit Philosophus, quod intelligere est quoddam pati; operatio autem intellectus agentis est in agendo, facit enim intelligibilia in potentia intelligibilia in actu, ut dicitur in III De Anima. Ergo in anima est compositio formae et materiae.
Ad quintum dicendum quod passio quae est in anima, quae attribuitur intellectui possibili, non est de genere passionum quae attribuuntur materiae; sed aequivoce dicitur passio utrobique, ut patet per Philosophum in III de Anima; cum passio intellectus possibilis consistat in receptione, secundum quod recipit aliquid immaterialiter.
Et similiter actio intellectus agentis, non est eiusdem modi cum actione formarum naturalium. Nam actio intellectus agentis consi-
Further, a form is a principle of action, and matter, the principle of undergoing. Therefore anything in which there is action and passion is composed of matter and form. But action and passion are found in the soul itself, because the operation of the possible intellect consists in undergoing, and for this reason the Philosopher says [De Anima, III, 4, 429b 32] that to understand is to undergo something. The operation of the agent intellect, on the other hand, consists in acting, for it makes the potentially intelligible, actually intelligible, as is said in the De anima [III, 5, 430a 14]. Consequently the soul is composed of form and matter. To the fifth it should be said that the sort of undergoing which is in the soul, and which is attributed to the possible intellect, does not belong to the same genus as the passions attributed to matter; for in these two cases matter is spoken of equivocally, as is evident from what the Philosopher says in the De anima [III, 4, 430a 3] because the undergoing of the possible intellect consists in a reception inasmuch as it receives something immaterially. In like manner, the action of the agent intellect is not of the same mode as the action of natural forms, for the action of the agent intel-
duane h. berquist stit in abstrahendo a materia, actio vero agentium naturalium in imprimendo formas in materia. Unde ex huiusmodi actione et passione quae invenitur in anima non sequitur quod anima sit composita ex materia et forma.
lect consists in abstracting forms from matter, whereas the action of natural agents consists in impressing forms on matter. Consequently it does not follow, from the kind of action and passion present in the soul, that the soul is composed of matter and form. ⁂
Quaestiones Disputatae de Anima, Art. 6, Obj. 6 & Ad 6 Praeterea, in quocumque inveniuntur proprietates materiae, illud oportet esse ex materia compositum. Sed in anima inveniuntur proprietates materiae, scilicet esse in potentia, recipere, subiici, et alia huiusmodi. Ergo anima est composita ex materia et forma.
Further, matter must enter into the composition of anything in which the properties of matter are found to exist. But the properties of matter are present in the soul, namely, to be in potency, to receive, to be a subject, and other things of this kind. Therefore the soul is composed of matter and form. To the sixth it should be said that to receive, to be a subject, and other things of this kind, are proper to the soul in a different way from the way they are to prime matter. Therefore it does not follow that the properties of matter are found in the soul.
Ad sextum dicendum quod recipere et subiici, et alia huiusmodi, alio modo animae conveniunt quam materiae primae; unde non sequitur quod proprietates materiae in anima inveniantur. ⁂
Argument against whole is larger than part for animal (a part of he definition of man) includes more than man. Argument against general before particular because senses know only particulars. De Veritate, Q. 8, Art. 6, Obj. 6 & Ad 6 Praeterea, si angelus intelligit se per essentiam suam, oportet quod essentia sua sit in intellectu suo. Sed hoc esse non potest; quinnimo intellectus est in essentia: non enim potest esse aliquid in altero et e converso. Ergo angelus non cognoscit se per essentiam suam. Ad sextum dicendum, quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse in altero et illud in eo diveris modis, sicut totum in partibus, et e converso. Et similiter est in proposito: essentia auem angeli est in intellectu eius sicut intelligibile in intelligente, intellectus autem in essentia sicut
If an angel understands himself through his own essence, his essence must be in his intellect. This, however, is impossible; for, as a matter of fact, his intellect is in his essence, and if one thing is in another, this other cannot be in it. Consequently, an angel does not know himself by means of his own essence. There is no reason why one thing cannot be in a second and the second in the first if this is in different ways, such as the ways in which a whole is in its parts and the parts are in the whole. The same is true here: the essence of the angel is in his intellect as an intelligible is in a
potentia in substantia.
knower, and his intellect is in his essence as a power is in a substance. ⁂
Quaestio Disputata de Spiritualibus Substantiis, Art 8 & Ad 8 …magis et minus dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo secundum diversum modum participationis unius et eiusdem formae, sicut magis album dicitur magis clarum quam minus album; et sic magis et minus non diversificant speciem.
…more and less is taken in two senses. In one sense, with reference to a different manner of participating in one and the same form, just as a more white thing is said to be more bright than a less white thing, and in this sense more and less do not constitute a specific difference. In another sense, more and less is used with reference to a degree of different forms; thus, for instance, something white is said to be more bright than red or green; and in this sense more and less do constitute a specific difference; and in this way angels differ in natural spiritual gifts on a basis of more and less.
Alio modo dicitur magis et minus secundum gradum diversarum formarum, sicut album dicitur magis clarum quam rubeum aut viride; et sic magis et minus diversificant speciem; et hoc modo angeli differunt in donis naturalibus secundum magis et minus. ⁂
Man is an animal. An animal has sense. Hence, man has sense. Man is an animal. Animal is a noun. Therefore, man is a noun. (or equivocation) Man is an animal. Animal is a sound. Therefore, man is a sound.
Universal and Fundamental Importance of the Distinction Corresponding to this Kind of Mistake In logic Substance in the Categories. The post-predicaments: opposite, before, together, motion, to have. True and false in the definition of statement.
Fallacy of Amphiboly The fallacy De Fallaciis Ad quosdam Nobiles Artistas, Caput 7 Sequitur videre de amphibologia. sicut autem aequivocatio provenit ex eo quod dictio penitus eadem plura significat, sic amphibologia ex eo quod una oratio penitus eadem plura significat, unde dicitur amphibologia ab amphi quod est dubium, et bole
duane h. berquist quod est sententia, et logos quod est sermo, quasi dubia sententia sermonis. Fallacia autem amphibologiae est deceptio proveniens ex eo quod una oratio penitus eadem plura significat: et dico penitus eadem ad differentiam orationis quae composita et divisa plura significat. Causa apparentiae sive principium motivum amphibologiae est unitas orationis plura significantis; causa vero non existentiae sive principium defectus est diversitas significationis.
The species or modes De Fallaciis Ad quosdam Nobiles Artistas, Caput 7 Species autem amphibologiae sunt tres. Prima species provenit ex eo quod una oratio principaliter plura significat manente eadem constructione, propter diversam habitudinem constructorum: sicut haec oratio liber Aristotelis plura significat, si semper istae duae dictiones construantur eodem modo; sed tamen propter diversam habitudinem diversa significant. Potest autem intelligi secundum habitudinem effectus ad causam, vel possessi ad possidentem, et formatur sic paralogismus: quidquid est Aristotelis, possidetur ab Aristotele. Iste liber est Aristotelis. Ergo possidetur ab Aristotele. non sequitur, quia primo construebatur nominativus cum genitivo in habitudine possessionis ad possidentem, secundo in habitudine effectus ad causam. Secunda species provenit ex eo quod una oratio plura significat propter diversam ordinationem partium, ex eo quod aliqua dictio potest construi cum alia transitive vel intransitive, sicut hic: quidquid videt aliquis, hoc videt. Sed columnam videt. Ergo columna videt. non sequitur, quia haec dictio hoc construitur cum hoc verbo, videt, transitive, et est accusativi casus; et sic est vera, et est sensus: qui videt rem aliquam, est videns eam. Alio modo potest construi intransitive, et tunc est nominativi casus, et tunc est falsa, et est sensus: qui videt rem unam, illa res videt: et sic procedit conclusio. Et similiter hic: quoscumque volo me accipere, volo quod ipsi recipiant me. Sed pugnantes volo me accipere. Ergo volo quod ipsi recipiant me. Non sequitur: quia me potest construi cum hoc verbo accipere transitive et intransitive; et in uno sensu est vera, et in alio falsa. Similiter hic: quicumque sunt episcopi, sunt sacerdotes. Isti asini sunt episcopi. Ergo isti asini sunt sacerdotes. Non sequitur: quia minor est duplex, ex eo quod episcopi potest esse nominativi casus et construi intransitive, et sic est falsa; vel potest construi transitive, et sic est genitivi casus et est vera. Et est attendendum quod diversitas casuum pertinet ad fallaciam amphibologiae, quia casus accidunt dictioni secundum quod construitur cum alia dictione; diversitas vero aliorum accidentium pertinet ad aequivocationem, quia alia accidentia accidunt dictioni secundum quod in se consideratur. Tertia species est quando una oratio principaliter significat unum, et aliud metaphorice sive transumptive, sicut haec oratio: littus aratur, principaliter significat littoris scissuram, transumptive vero operis amissionem. Et formatur sic paralogismus: quandocumque littus aratur, tunc terra scinditur. Sed quando indocibilis docetur, littus aratur: ergo quando indocibilis docetur, terra scinditur. Non sequitur propter multiplicitatem praedictam.
Examples 1. He speaks well of you. Hence, he must praise you. 2. He is a good speaker. But a good speaker speaks well. But he spoke of you. Hence, he spoke well of you. Hence, he praised you. 3. If I heard truly, then the way I heard it is the way it is. Qaestiones Disputatae de Potentia, Q. 3, Art. 1, Ad 7 Praeterea, si ex nihilo aliquid fiat, haec praepositio ex aut notat causam, aut ordinem. Causam autem non videtur notare nisi efficientem, vel materialem. Nihil autem neque efficiens causa entis esse potest, neque materia; et sic in proposito non denotat causam; similiter nec ordinem, quia, ut dicit Boetius, entis ad non ens non est aliquis ordo. Ergo nullo modo ex nihilo potest aliquid fieri.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod cum dicitur aliquid fieri ex nihil, duplex st sensus, ut patet per Anselmum in suo Monologio. Nam negatio importata in nihilo potest negare praepositionem ex, vel potest includi sub praepositione. Si autem neget praepositionem, adhuc potest esse duplex sensus: unus ut negatio feratur ad totum, et negetur non solum praepositio, sed etiam verbum, ut si dicatur aliquid ex nihilo fieri quia non fit, sicut de tacente possumus dicere quod de nihilo dicitur: et sic de Deo possumus dicere quod de nihilo fit, quia omnino non fit; quamvis iste modus loquendi non sit consuetus.
Alius sensus est, ut verbum remaneat affirmatum, sed negatio feratur solum ad praepositionem; et ideo dicatur aliquid ex nihilo fieri, quia fit quidem, sed non praeexistit aliquid ex quo fiat; sicut dicimus aliquem tristari ex ni-
If a thing is made from nothing, this preposition from connotes either cause or order. And apparently if it connotes a cause it will be either the efficient or the material cause. But nothing cannot be the efficient cause of being, nor can it be the material cause, so that as regards the point at issue ‘from’ does not denote a cause. Nor can it denote order, because as Boethius says there is no order between non-being and being. Therefore in no sense can a thing be made from nothing. To the seventh it should be said that when a thing is said to be made from nothing, the sense is twofold, as Anselm says (Monolog. v, viii). The negative implied in the word nothing may bear directly on the preposition from, or it may be included in that preposition. If it bears directly on the preposition, again a twofold sense is possible: one that the negation bears on the whole so that the negative extends not only to the preposition but also to the verb; in this sense we might say that a thing is made from nothing because it is not made: thus it could be said of a silent man that he speaks of nothing. In this sense we may say of God that he is made from nothing, because he is utterly not made: but this manner of speaking is not customary. In another sense the verb remains affirmed, and the negative bears on the preposition only: and then we say that a thing is made from nothing, because it is made indeed, but there is no preexisting thing from which it is
duane h. berquist hilo, quia non habet tristitiae suae causam: et hoc modo per creationem dicitur aliquid ex nihilo fieri.
made: thus we say that so-and-so grieves for nothing, because he has no cause for grieving: it is in this sense that a thing is said to be made from nothing by creation. If, however, the preposition includes the negation, then again the sense is twofold, one true, one false. It is false if the preposition connotes causality (since in no way can non-being be the cause of being); it is true if it implies mere order, so that to make a thing from nothing, is to make a thing whereas before there was nothing, and this is true of creation. The statement of Boethius that there is no order between non-being and being, refers to the order of definite proportion, or of real relation; such order, says Avicenna (Metaph. iii) cannot be between being and non-being.
Si vero praepositio includit negationem, tunc est duplex sensus: unus verus et unus falsus. Falsus quidem, si praepositio importet habitudinem causae (non ens enim esse nullo modo potest causa entis); verus autem, si importet ordinem tantum, ut dicatur aliquid fieri ex nihilo quia fit post nihilum, quod etiam verum est in creatione. Quod autem Boetius dicit, quod non entis ad ens non est ordo, intelligendum est de ordine determinatae proportionis, vel de ordine qui sit realis relatio quae inter ens et non ens esse non potest, ut Avicenna dicit [lib. III Metaphys.] ⁂
Summa contra Gentiles, Liber I, Caput XI Ad quintam etiam de facili patet solutio. Nam Deus est quidem quo omnia cognoscuntur, non ita quod alia non cognoscantur nisi eo cognito, sicut in principiis per se notis accidit: sed quia per eius influentiam omnis causatur in nobis cognitio.
So, too, with the fifth argument, an easy solution is available. For God is indeed that by which all things are known, not in the sense that they are not known unless He is known (as obtains among self-evident principles), but because all our knowledge is caused in us through His influence. ⁂
Reason knows the theorems of geometry by the axioms and postulates. Hence, it knows more the axioms and postulates than the theorems. But it knows square and circle by reason. Hence, it knows reason more than square and circle. The Word of God is about the Word of God. The wisdom of nature is about the wisdom of nature. Wisdom is the knowledge of God. The definition of the soul is a knowledge of the soul. The definition of reason is a knowledge of reason. The definition of definition is not a definition of the definition of definition.
fallacies of equivocation and amphiboly The Tragedy of Coriolanus, Act I, Sc. 6 Enter a Messenger COMINIUS
Thy news?
MESSENGER
The citizens of Corioli have issued, And given to Lartius and to Marcius battle; I saw our party to their trenches driven, And then I came away.
COMINIUS
Though thou speak’st truth, Methinks thou speak’st not well. ⁂
Compare with Socrates and speaking well in Phaedo and Symposium. When is one speaking well? To speak truly or to speak persuasively or to speak in a pleasant way or to say good things about someone or to speak in accord with the grammar of some language? Summa contra Gentiles, Liber I, Caput LVII The solution of those difficulties that seem to introduce discursiveness into the divine knowledge is likewise at hand. First, because God knows other things through His essence. For it was shown that this does not take place discursively, since God’s essence is related to other things, not as a principle to conclusions, but as a species to things known. Secondly, because some might think it unbefitting if God were not able to syllogize. For God possesses the knowledge of syllogizing as one judging, and not as one proceeding by syllogizing.
Patet etiam solutio eorum quae discursum in divinam scientiam inducere videntur. Tum ex hoc quod per essentiam suam alia novit. Quod quidem ostensum est non fieri discursive: cum eius essentia se habeat ad alia non sicut principium ad conclusiones, sed sicut species ad res cognitas. Tum ex hoc quod inconveniens forte aliquibus videretur si Deus syllogizare non posset. Habet enim syllogizandi scientiam tanquam iudicans, et non sicut syllogizando discurrens.
⁂ [Is this amphiboly or equivocation of per?]