Fallacy of the Accident

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Fallacy of the Accident

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From his file: FallacyOfTheAccident.pdf.

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Fallacy of the Accident Duane H. Berquist

One because of what happens

The fallacy Albert the Great, Commentaria in libris Elenchorum Sophisticorum Aristotelis, Liber I, Tractatus III, Caput II, p. 51a Fallacia autem accidentis omnibus prior est in ordine fallaciarum ut fallaciae sunt, quia plus habet de virtute decipiendi.

⁂ In XI Metaphysicorum, Lectio VIII, n. 2275 …no science that is truly a science and attains certainty is concerned with accidental being. Only sophistry deals with it; and it uses the accidental as though it were something of itself in order to deceive. From this there arises the fallacy of accident, which is most effective in deceiving even those who are wise, as is stated in Book I of the Sophistical Refutations.

…nulla scientia, quae est vere scientia, et certitudinem habet, considerat de ente per accidens. Sed sola sophistica circa ipsum negociatur, et ad decipiendum utitur eo quod est per accidens, ac si per se esset. Unde fit fallacia accidentis, quae est efficacissima ad decipiendum etiam sapientem, ut dicitur in primo Elenchorum.

⁂ If we reason thus: “the singular is understood and what is understood is universal. Therefore the singular is universal”, we mistake by the accident. For the (material) singular as such is not understood.

fallacy of the accident Albert the Great, In I Elenchorum, Tractatus III, Caput III, Doyon edition, p. 54a Ex his patet quare fallacia accidentis dicatur fallacia medii. Si autem alterum deberet dici, competentius diceretur fallacia medii, quam fallacia praedicati. Ex hoc iterum patet, quare non dicitur fallacia subjecti et accidentis: eo scilicet quod non denominatur ab accidente quod opponitur subjecto, quia nunquam hoc subjicitur in propositione; sed dicitur ab accidente quod est accidentaliter se habere medium ad extremum in comparando medium ad inferendum alterum, quod utrique et acccidenti et medio inesse assignatur.

In the fallacy of the accident, the middle term is not connected with one of the extremes in the same way, or insofar as, it is connected with the other extreme. For example: Socrates is a man and man is a species; therefore, Socrates is a species. Socrates is not a man insofar as man is something universal in reason. Socrates is a man by reason of what man signifies (an animal with reason). To be a species happens to man insofar as man is said of Socrates. What belongs to man insofar as man is in reason (where it is universal and more precisely, a species) happens to man insofar as man is said of Socrates. Since man signifies in general what Socrates is (an animal with reason), it is said of Socrates by reason of what Socrates is — for it signifies this in general. It is not said of Socrates by reason of what happens to it in reason. De Fallaciis Ad quosdam Nobiles Artistas, Caput 12 Dicendum est ergo primo de fallacia accidentis. Ubi sciendum quod accidens hic accipitur prout distinguitur contra per se. Per se autem dicitur inesse aliquid alicui, quod inest ei secundum rationem propriae definitionis; praeter hoc autem quicquid inest alicui, dicitur inesse per accidens; unde ad hoc quod est inesse per se aut per accidens, tripliciter aliquid potest se habere. Quaedam enim sunt quae omni modo sunt eadem secundum substantiae rationem, ut vestis et indumentum; et in his est solum per se, et nullo modo per accidens. Quaedam sunt, quorum unum est omnino extraneum a ratione alterius, ut album et homo; et in istis est solummodo per accidens, et nullo modo per se. Quaedam vero sunt, quorum unum ad alterius rationem aliquo modo pertinet, licet non sint omnino eadem secundum definitionem, sicut se habet superius et inferius: nam superius ponitur in definitione inferioris, tamen non est omnino eadem definitio inferioris et superioris, ut animalis et hominis, cum definitio inferioris addat super definitionem superioris. Et simile est de proprio et de specie: nam species ponitur in definitione proprii, non tamen species et proprium sunt omnino idem in definitione. Et in his est quodammodo per se et quodammodo per accidens, inquantum partim secundum definitionem conveniunt, et partim differunt. In his ergo quae primo modo se habent, necesse est quod quicquid verum de uno sit, sit etiam verum de alio, eo quod talia sunt penitus eadem secundum rem et differunt secundum nomen solum; unde in his non contingit esse fallaciam accidentis.

Sed in omnibus aliis non est necessarium quod quicquid est verum de uno, sit etiam verum de altero. Et ideo si ex hoc quod aliquid est de uno verum, concludatur esse verum de altero, est fallacia accidentis. Contingit autem quandoque ut quod est verum de uno, concludatur esse verum de altero, scilicet quando aliquid attribuitur uni secundum quod est idem alteri; tunc enim quod inest uni, et alteri inerit. Si vero attribuitur uni secundum quod est ab altero divisum, non inerit alteri; si autem ut non diversum ab altero, erit et alterius: sicut si album attribuatur animali inquantum est idem homini, oportet quod conveniat homini; si autem animali ut est divisum ab homine, non oportet quod conveniat homini, et si concludatur inesse, erit fallacia accidentis, sicut si dicatur: animal est quadrupes. Homo est animal: igitur homo est quadrupes. Quadrupes enim non praedicatur de animali ut animal est homo, sed secundum quod est ab homine diversum. Unde patet quod in praedicto argumento medium diversimode accipitur: nam primo accipiebatur secundum quod erat diversum ab homine, sed in secundo secundum quod est idem homini. Et ideo quando est fallacia accidentis, semper est diversa acceptio medii. Dico autem diversam acceptionem medii esse, quando medium secundum quod convenit cum una extremitatum, est diversum ab alia. Fallacia vero accidentis est deceptio proveniens ex eo quod aliquid significatur simile utrique eorum quae sunt aliqualiter per accidens unum. Ex quo patet quod in fallacia accidentis semper inveniuntur tres termini, sicut in syllogismo: quorum duo per accidens aliquo modo coniunguntur, qui quidem se habent sicut medium et minor extremitas; tertium vero quod assignatur utrique inesse, est maior extremitas. causa vero apparentiae in hac fallacia est unitas quaedam et identitas eorum quae per accidens quodammodo coniunguntur; causa vero non existentiae est diversitas eorumdem: nam sicut dicit philosophus in primo elenchor., fallacia accidentis fit ex eo quod aliquis non potest iudicare idem et diversum, unum et multa. We must be careful when saying something is per accidens. (the same could be said of simpliciter. Is first philosophy wisdom simpliciter? compared to natural philosophy or political philosophy? or compared to wisdom of God?) De Potentia, Q. 3, Art 1, Ad 16 …if from connotes causality, a thing is not made from its opposite except accidentally, that is by reason of the subject. If however it connotes order, a thing is made from its opposite even per se: hence privation is said to be the principle of a thing’s becoming but not of its being. It is in this sense … that a thing is said to be made from nothing.

…si ly ex nominet causam, not fit aliquid ex opposito nisi per accidens, ratione scilicet subiecti. Si vero nominet ordinem, tunc fit aliquid ex opposito etiam per se; unde et privatio dicitur principium esse fiendi, sed non essendi. Hoc autem modo dicitur aliquid fieri ex nihilo…. ⁂ See also first book of Natural Hearing.

The species or modes De Fallaciis Ad quosdam Nobiles Artistas, Caput 12 Sunt autem tres modi huius fallaciae. Primus modus provenit ex eo quod proceditur ab accidente ad subiectum, vel e converso; sicut hic: cognosco Coriscum. Coriscus est veniens. Igitur cognosco venientem. Non sequitur: quia veniens et Coriscus sunt unum per accidens, et non per se. Unde non sequitur quod quicquid est verum de uno sit verum de alio. Hoc enim fallit quando aliquid est verum de uno secundum quod est diversum ab altero, sicut hic: cognosco Coriscum. Coriscus enim non subiacet cognitioni secundum quod est idem venienti. Unde patet quod est diversificatio medii, et sic est fallacia accidentis. Similiter hic: iste canis est tuus, et est pater. Igitur est tuus pater. Canis enim et pater sunt unum per accidens. Unde non sequitur quod quicquid est verum de uno, sit verum de alio: secundum enim quod canis est pater, non convenit ei esse tuum. Secundus modus est quando illud quod convenit superiori concluditur in inferiori, vel e converso, sicut hic: homo est animal, et animal est genus: igitur homo est genus. Non sequitur: superius enim et inferius aliquo modo sunt unum per accidens, licet alio modo sint unum per se. Unde ex dictis patet quod si idem verificatur de uno eorum secundum quod idem est alteri, necesse est de altero verificari. Et secundum hoc sumuntur argumenta dialectica a genere et specie, sive a superiori et inferiori. Quod autem verificatur de uno eorum secundum quod differt ab altero, non oportet de altero verificari. Tunc autem est variatio medii et fallacia accidentis, sicut est in proposito: nam esse genus non praedicatur de animali secundum quod est idem homini, sed secundum quod ab eo differt sicut superius ab inferiori. Similiter est hic: triangulus est figura. Sed proprietas trianguli est habere tres angulos. Igitur est proprietas figurae. Non sequitur: quia triangulus et figura non sunt omnibus modis idem. Unde non oportet quod verificatur de uno, de altero verificari. Similiter est hic: Socrates est alius ab homine. Ipse autem est homo: igitur est alius a se. Tertius modus provenit quando proceditur a specie ad proprium, vel e converso, sicut hic: homo est risibilis. Sed risibile est proprium: igitur homo est proprium. vel sic: homo est species: risibile est homo; ergo risibile est species. Non sequitur: quia risibile et homo non sunt omnino idem secundum definitionem, et ideo aliquo modo unum se habet ad alterum per accidens et extraneum, et propter hoc non est necesse quod quidquid verificatur de uno, verificetur de altero. Et est sciendum quod non est inconveniens si in aliquibus praedictorum paralogismorum sint assignatae duae fallaciae, scilicet figurae dictionis et accidentis, quia secundum quod provenit deceptio ex similitudine dictionis, est fallacia figurae dictionis; secundum vero quod provenit ex convenientia rerum, fallacia accidentis est. Homo enim et Socrates quantum ad rem conveniunt, et quantum ad nomen similitudinem habent. Sciendum est etiam quod sicut fit paralogismus accidentis ex propositionibus categoricis, ita ex hypotheticis, ex eo quod medium diversimode sumitur. Prout scilicet comparatur ad unam extremitatem, est diversum ab alia, sicut hic: si nullum tempus est, dies non est, per locum a toto in quantitate: et si dies non est, nox est, per locum

ab oppositis. Ergo si nullum tempus est, nox est. Sed si nox est, aliquod tempus est. Igitur si nullum tempus est, aliquod tempus est. Patet ergo quod illud medium, quod est diem non esse, est diversum ab eo quod est noctem esse, secundum quod sequitur ad hoc quod est nullum tempus esse. Ex hoc enim quod est diem non esse, non sequitur noctem esse nisi supposito tempore, secundum quod sequitur ad hoc quod est nullum tempus esse, sicut ex hoc quod est videntem non esse, sequitur caecum esse, supposito animali quod est natum videre. The following example is like that in the text of the De Fallaciis. (This dog is a father and this dog is yours. Therefore, this dog is your father.) Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum, Distinctio XVIII, Quaest. I, Art V, 4 & Ad 4 4. Praeterea, quidquid datur nobis, est nostrum. Sed Filius datus est nobis. Ergo est Filius noster. Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis Filius datus sit nobis, non tamen est datus nobis in filium, sed in doctorem vel salvatorem; et ideo potest dici salvator noster, sed non filius noster. Et si objiciatur: est Filius et est noster; ergo est Filius noster, patet quod est fallacia accidentis. ⁂ Examples 1. Every dog is an animal. But animal is said of cat. Therefore, dog is said of cat. 2. When I think about something, it is on my mind. But the mind cannot be on itself (for nothing can be on itself ). Hence, I cannot think about my mind. 3. Everything I know is in my mind. But what is in something cannot be outside of it. Hence, I only know what is in my mind. Therefore, I know nothing outside of my mind. 4. Socrates is a man. Man is a universal. Therefore, Socrates is a universal. 5. What is hard cannot be soft for this is a contradiction. But something cannot become or come to be what it cannot be. Therefore, the hard can never become soft. Hence, what is hard will always be hard. And for the same reason what is cold will always be cold and what is dark will always be dark. Hence, there is no change in the weather. Other examples like that in the De Fallaciis and in the text of Aristotle. 1. Do you know who is knocking at the door? No. But it is your mother knocking at the door. Therefore, you do not know your mother. 2. Do you know who murdered Sir Charles? No. But do you know the butler? Yes. But it was the butler who murdered Sir Charles. Therefore, you know who murdered Sir Charles.

fallacy of the accident In III De Anima, Lectio VII, n. 693

Sed manifestum est, quod auctor huius positionis deceptus fuit per fallaciam accidentis, quasi sic arguens. Phantasmata sunt quodammodo unum cum specie intelligibili: species autem intelligibilis est unum cum intellectu possibili: ergo intellectus possibilis unitur phantasmatibus. Manifestum est autem quod hic incidit fallacia accidentis: quia species intelligibilis secundum quod est unum cum intellectu possibili, est abstracta a phantasmatibus, ut dictum est.

And obviously the upholder of this view was led astray by a fallacia accidentis. For his argument comes to this: phantasms are somehow united to intelligible ideas, and these to the potential intellect; and therefore the latter is united to the phantasms. But, as I say, it is clear that, in the degree that the intelligible idea is one with the intellectual power, it is abstracted from phantasms.

⁂ In I Physicorum, Lectio I, n. 10 Deinde … ponit aliud signum de toto integrali intelligibili. Definitum enim se habet ad definientia quodammodo ut totum integrale, inquantum actu sunt definientia in definito; sed tamen qui apprehendit nomen, ut puta hominem aut circulum, non statim distinguit principia definientia; unde nomen est sicut quoddam totum et indistinctum, sed definitio dividit in singularia, idest distincte ponit principia definiti. Videtur autem hoc esse contrarium ei quod supra dixit; nam definientia videntur esse universaliora, quae dixit prius esse nota nobis. Item si definitum esset notius nobis quam definientia, non notificaretur nobis definitum per definitionem: nihil enim notificatur nobis nisi ex magis notis nobis.

Sed dicendum quod definientia secundum se sunt prius nota nobis quam definitum; sed prius est notum nobis definitum, quam quod talia sint definientia ipsius: sicut prius sunt nota nobis animal et rationale quam homo; sed prius est nobis notus homo

Next … he gives another example taken from the integral intelligible whole. For that which is defined is related to the things defining it as a kind of integral whole, insofar as the things defining it are in act in that which is defined. But he who apprehends a name, for example, man or circle, does not at once distinguish the defining principles. Whence it is that the name is, as it were, a sort of whole and is indistinct, whereas the definition divides into singulars, i.e., distinctly sets forth the principles of that which is defined. This, however, seems to be contrary to what he said above. For the things which define would seem to be more universal, and these, he said, were first known by us. Furthermore, if that which is defined were better known to us than the things which define, we would not grasp that which is defined through the definition, for we grasp nothing except through that which is better known to us. But it must be said that the things which define are in themselves known to us before that which is defined, but we know the thing which is defined before we know that these are the things which define it. Thus we know animal and rational before we know man. But

duane h. berquist confuse, quam quod animal et rationale sint definientia ipsius.

man is known confusedly before we know that animal and rational are the things which define man. ⁂

[Could the above also involve the mistake of mixing up what is so simply and what is so in some way?] In I Physicorum, Lectio XIV, nn. 121, 124–127 Primi qui secundum philosophiam inquisierunt veritatem et naturam rerum, diverterunt in quandam aliam viam a via veritatis et a via naturali: quod accidit eis propter infirmitatem intellectus eorum. Dixerunt enim quod nihil neque generatur neque corrumpitur: quod est et contra veritatem et contra naturam. Et ad hoc ponendum eos infirmitas intellectus coegit; quia nescierunt hanc rationem solvere, per quam videbatur probari quod ens non generatur. Quia si ens fit, aut fit ex ente vel ex non ente: et utrumque horum videtur esse impossibile, scilicet quod ens fiat ex ente et quod fiat ex non ente. Quod enim ex ente aliquid fieri sit impossibile, ex hoc manifestum est, quia id quod est non fit; nihil enim est antequam fiat: et ens iam est; ergo non fit. Quod etiam ex non ente aliquid fieri sit impossibile, ex hoc manifestum est, quia semper oportet aliquid subiici ei quod fit, ut supra ostensum est, et ex nihilo nihil fit. Et ex hoc concludebatur quod entis non est generatio neque corruptio.

Sed nos etiam ipsi dicimus quod ex non ente nihil fit simpliciter et per se, sed solum secundum accidens: quia quod est, idest ens, per se quidem non est ex privatione. Et hoc ideo, quia privatio non intrat essentiam rei

The first ones who philosophically sought the truth and the nature of things were diverted into a path other than the way of truth and the way of nature. This happened to them because of the weakness of their understanding. For they said that nothing is either generated or corrupted. This is contrary to truth and contrary to nature. The weakness of their understanding forced them to hold this position because they did not know how to resolve the following argument, according to which it seemed to be proven that being is not generated. If being comes to be, it comes to be either from being or from non-being. And each of these seems to be impossible, i.e., that being comes to be from being or that it comes to be from non-being. It is clearly impossible for something to come to be from being, because that which is does not come to be, for nothing is before it comes to be. And being already is, hence it does not come to be. It is also clearly impossible for something to come to be from non-being. For it is always necessary that there be a subject for that which comes to be, as was shown above. From nothing, nothing comes to be. And from this it was concluded that there is neither generation nor corruption of being. And we also say that nothing comes to be from non-being simply and per se, but only per accidens. For that which is, i.e., being, is not from privation per se. And this is so because privation does not enter into the essence of the

factae; ex hoc enim aliquid fit per se, quod inest rei postquam iam facta est; sicut figuratum fit ex infigurato non per se, sed per accidens, quia postquam iam est figuratum, infiguratum non inest ei. Sed iste est mirabilis modus fiendi aliquid ex non ente, et qui videtur impossibilis antiquis philosophis. Sic igitur patet quod ex non ente fit aliquid non per se, sed per accidens.

Similiter si quaeratur utrum ex ente fiat aliquid, dicendum est quod ex ente fit aliquid per accidens, sed non per se. Et hoc manifestat per tale exemplum. Ponamus enim quod ex equo generetur aliquis canis: quo posito, manifestum est quod ex quodam animali fiat quoddam animal; et sic ex animali fiet animal. Non tamen fiet animal ex animali per se, sed per accidens: non enim fit inquantum est animal, sed inquantum est hoc animal; quia animal iam est antequam fiat canis, quia est equus, sed non est hoc animal quod est canis. Unde per se hoc animal quod est canis, fit ex non hoc animali, idest ex non cane. Sed si fieret animal per se et non per accidens, oporteret quod fieret ex non animali. Sic etiam est de ente: fit enim ens aliquod ex non ente hoc, sed accidit ei quod non est hoc quod fit ens. Unde non fit aliquid per se ex ente, neque per se ex non ente: hoc enim per se significat aliquid fieri ex non ente, si fiat ex non ente inquantum est non ens, ut dictum est. Et sicut cum hoc animal fit ex hoc animali, vel hoc corpus ex hoc corpore, non removetur omne corpus nec omne non corpus, nec omne animal vel non animal, ab eo ex quo aliquid fit; sic non removetur ab eo ex quo fit hoc ens, neque omne esse neque omne non esse: quid id ex quo fit hoc ens quod est ignis, habet aliquod esse, quia est aër, et aliquod non esse, quia non est ignis.

thing made. Rather a thing comes to be per se from that which is in the thing after it has already been made. Thus the shaped comes to be from. the unshaped, not per se, but per accidens, because once it already has been shaped, the unshaped is not in it. But this is a remarkable way for a thing to come to be from nonbeing, and seemed impossible to the ancient philosophers. Therefore, it is clear that a thing comes to be from non-being not per se but per accidens. In like manner, if it is asked whether a thing comes to be from being, we must say that a thing comes to be from being per accidens, but not per se. He shows this by the following example. Let us suppose that a dog is generated from a horse. Granting this, it is clear that a certain animal comes to be from a certain animal, and thus animal would come to be from animal. However, animal would not come to be from animal per se, but per accidens. For it does not come to be insofar as it is animal, but insofar as it is this animal. For animal already is before the dog comes to be. For the horse already is, but is not a dog. Hence the dog comes to be per se from that which is not a dog. And if animal were to come to be per se, and not per accidens, it would be necessary for it to come to be from non-animal. And the same is true of being. For a being comes to be from that non-being which is not that which the being comes to be. Hence a thing does not come to be per se from being or per se from non-being. For this expression per se signifies that a thing comes to be from nonbeing in the sense that it comes to be from non-being insofar as it is non-being, as was said. And thus when this animal comes to be from this animal, or when this body comes to be from this body, not all animal or nonanimal, nor all body or non-body, is removed from that from which the thing comes to be. And likewise not all being nor all non-being is removed from that from which this being

comes to be. For ,that from which fire comes to be has some being, because it is air, and, also has some non-being, because it is not fire. This, then, is one way of resolving the problem raised above. But this approach is not sufficient. For if being comes to be per accidens both from being and from non-being, it is necessary to posit something from which being comes to be per se. For every thing which is per accidens is reduced to that which is per se. He says that the same thing can be explained in terms of potency and act, as is clearly indicated in another place, i.e., in IX Metaphysics. Thus a thing comes to be per se from being in potency; but a thing comes to be per accidens from being in act or from nonbeing. He says this because matter, which is being in potency, is that from which a thing comes to be per se. For matter enters into the substance of the thing which is made. But from privation or from the preceding form, a thing comes to be per accidens insofar as the matter, from which the thing comes to be per se, happened to be under such a form or under such a privation. Thus a statue comes to be per se from bronze; but the statue comes to be per accidens both from that which does not have such a shape and from that which has another shape.

Iste est igitur unus modus solvendi praedictam dubitationem. Sed iste modus solvendi insufficiens est: si enim ens fit per accidens et ex ente et ex non ente, oportet ponere aliquid ex quo fiat ens per se; quia omne quod est per accidens, reducitur ad id quod est per se. Et dicit quod contingit aliqua eadem dicere secundum potentiam et secundum actum, ut certius determinatum est in aliis, scilicet in IX Metaphys. Ex ente igitur in potentia fit aliquid per se; ex ente autem in actu, vel ex non ente, fit aliquid per accidens. Hoc autem dicit quia materia, quae est ens in potentia, est id ex quo fit aliquid per se: haec est enim quae intrat substantiam rei factae. Sed ex privatione vel forma praecedente fit aliquid per accidens, inquantum materia ex qua fit aliquid per se, conveniebat esse sub tali forma vel sub tali privatione; sicut statua ex aere fit per se, sed ex non habente talem figuram et ex habente aliam figuram, fit statua per accidens.

⁂ Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia, Q. III, Art. 1, Obj. 16 & Ad 16 16. Praeterea, omne quod est per accidens, reducitur ad per se. Sed ex opposito fit aliquid per accidens, ex subiecto autem per se; sicut statua ex infigurato fit per accidens, ex aere autem per se, quia aeri accidit esse infiguratum. Si ergo aliquid fiat ex non ente, hoc erit per accidens. Ergo oportet quod fiat per se ex aliquo subecto; et ita non fit ex nihilo.

16. Whatsoever accidentally is originates in that which is essential. From that which is opposite a thing is made accidentally, and from a subject a thing is made essentially: thus a statue is made accidentally from that which is shapeless, but from bronze essentially, since shapelessness is accidental to the bronze. If, then, a thing is made from nothing, this will be accidentally: and thus it follows that it will

fallacy of the accident need to be made from a subject, and therefore not from nothing. To the sixteenth it should be said that, if from connotes causality, a thing is not made from its opposite except accidentally, that is by reason of the subject. If however it connotes order, a thing is made from its opposite even per se: hence privation is said to be the principle of a thing’s becoming but not of its being. It is in this sense, as stated above, that a thing is said to be made from nothing.

Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod si ly ex nominet causam, non fit aliquid ex opposito nisi per accidens, ratione scilicet subiecti. Si vero nominet ordinem, tunc fit aliquid ex opposito etiam per se; unde et privatio dicitur principium esse fiendi, sed non essendi. Hoc autem modo dicitur aliquid fieri ex nihilo, ut prius dictum est in corp. art.

⁂ Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia, Q. III, Art. 1, Obj. 4 & Ad 4 4. Praeterea Philosophus dicit [in I de Gen., comm. 48], quod omnifariam dissimile, non agit in omnifariam dissimile; oportet enim quod agens et patiens conveniant in genere et in materia. Sed non ens simpliciter et Deus in nullo conveniunt. Ergo Deus non potest agere in non ens simpliciter, et ita non potest facere aliquid ex nihilo. Ad quartum dicendum, quod cum fit aliquid ex nihilo, non esse, sive nihil, non se habet per modum patientis nisi per accidens, sed magis per modum oppositi ad id quod fit per actionem. Nec etiam in naturalibus oppositum se habet per modum patientis nisi per accidens, sed magis subiectum.

4. The Philosopher says (de Gen. i, 7) that things utterly dissimilar do not act on one another: because there must be common genus and matter in agent and patient. Now absolute non-entity and God are utterly dissimilar. Therefore God cannot act on absolute nonentity: and consequently he cannot make a thing out of nothing. To the fourth it should be said that when a thing is made from nothing, non-being or nothing does not hold the position of patient, save accidentally, but rather that of the opposite to the thing made by the action. Nor again is the opposite in the position of patient in the action of nature, except accidentally; but the subject is this. ⁂

Plato’s confusion of matter and lack of form considered in first book of Natural Hearing is like the mistake about ability to know and ignorance; Sartre makes like mistake about freedom or ability to choose and indetermination of will before choice; Hegel perhaps makes this mistake universal when he speaks of the “portentous power of the negative”. Summa Contra Gentiles, Liber III, Caput 43 Praeterea. Intellectus agens secundum alium ordinem comparatur ad intellecta speculativa, quorum est factivus; et ad substantias

Moreover, the agent intellect is related to the objects of speculative understanding, which it makes to be so, in a different way

duane h. berquist separatas, quarum non est factivus, sed cognoscitivus tantum, secundum eius positionem. Non igitur oportet, si copuletur nobis per hoc quod est factivus intellectorum speculativorum, quod copuletur nobis secundum quod est cognoscitivus substantiarum separatarum: sed in tali processu est deceptio manifeste secundum accidens.

from its relation to separate substances, which it does not make, but only knows, according to this theory. So, there is no necessity for it to be joined to us in its function as knower of separate substances, even if it is joined to us in its function as maker of the objects of speculative understanding. Rather, there is clearly a fallacy of accident in reasoning such as his. ⁂

Quaestio Disputata de Spiritualibus Creaturis, Art. 9. Ad 131 …res intellecta non individuatur nec multiplicatur nisi ex parte operationis intellectualis. Non est autem inconveniens quod a re intellecta, inquantum est intellecta, adhuc abstrahitur res intellecta simpliciter: sicut ab hoc intelligente abstrahitur intellectus simpliciter. Nec hoc praeiudicat rationi universalitatis. Accidit enim homini aut intentioni speciei, quod intelligatur a me. Unde non oportet quod de intellectu hominis aut intentione speciei sit quod intelligatur a me vel ab illo.

…a thing that is understood is not individuated nor multiplied except from the standpoint of intellectual activity. Now it is not incongruous that from a thing that is understood, insofar as it is understood, there is still abstracted a thing that is understood in an absolute sense, just as from “this particular understanding being”, for instance, is abstracted “understanding” in an absolute sense. Nor does this militate against the character of universality. For it is accidental to man or to the concept “species”, that it is understood by me; hence it is not essential to the understanding of man or the concept “species” that it be understood by me or by someone else. ⁂

Quaestio Disputata de Spiritualibus Creaturis, Art. 10. Ad 14 …universale quod facit intellectus agens, est unum in omnibus a quibus ipsum abstrahatur; unde intellectus agens non diversificatur secundum eorum diversitatem. Diversificatur autem secundum diversitatem intellectuum: quia et universale non ex ea parte habet unitatem qua est a me et te intellectum; intelligi a me et a te accidit universali. Unde diversitas intellectuum non impedit unitatem universalis.

…the universal, which the agent intellect causes, is one thing in all the beings from which it is abstracted; and hence the agent intellect is not diversified on the basis of their diversification. However, it is diversified on the basis of a diversity of intellects: because even the universal does not derive its oneness from the standpoint of its being understood by me and by you; for it is accidental to the universal that it is understood by me and by

1 This text is useful for understanding the mistake of Berkeley about esse est percipi.

fallacy of the accident you. And hence the diversity of intellects does not affect the oneness of the universal. ⁂ Quaestio Disputata de Spiritualibus Creaturis, Art 9, Ad 13

Accidit enim homini aut intentioni speciei, quod intelligatur a me. Unde non oportet quod de intellectu hominis aut intentione speciei sit quod intelligatur a me vel ab illo.

For it is accidental to man or to the concept “species”, that it is understood by me; hence it is not essential to the understanding of man or the concept “species” that it be understood by me or by someone else. ⁂

Quaestio Disputata de Spiritualibus Creaturis, Art. 10. Ad 12 …sic est una ratio numerorum in omnibus mentibus, sicut et una ratio lapidis; quae quidem est una ex parte rei intellectae, non autem ex parte actus intelligendi, quod non est de ratione rei intellectae: non enim est de ratione lapidis quod intelligatur. Unde talis unitas rationis numerorum vel lapidum vel cuiuscumque rei, nihil facit ad unitatem intellectus possibilis vel agentis, ut supra magis expositum est. [Art. 9, Ad 6]

…there is one essence of numbers in all minds, just as there is also one essence of a stone; and this essence is one on the part of the thing that is understood, but not on the part of the act of understanding, which is not essential to the thing that is understood; for it is not essential to a stone that it be understood. And hence this sort of unity of the essence of numbers or of stones or of anything whatever does not make for a unity of the possible or of the agent intellect, as was explained more fully above. ⁂

In Boetii de Trinitate, Lectio II, q. I, Art. 2, Responsio (Utrum Naturalis Philosophia sit de his quae sunt in motu et materia) Dicendum, quod propter difficultatem huius quaestionis coactus fuit Plato ponere ideas. Cum enim, ut dicit Philosophus in I Metaphys., crederet omnia sensibilia semper in fluxu esse secundum opinionem Cratuli et Eracliti, et ita aestimaverit scientiam de ipsis non posse, posuit quasdam substantias a sensibilibus separatas, de quibus essent scientiae et darentur definitiones. Sed hic defectus accidit ex eo, quod non distinxit quod est per se ab eo quod est secundum per accidens, et ideo secundum accidens falluntur plerumque etiam sapientes, ut dicitur I Elenchorum (Cap. 6)

Ut autem probatur in VII Metaphys., cum in substantia sensibili inveniatur et ipsum integrum, idest compositum et ratio, idest forma eius, per se quidem generatur et corrumpitur compositum, non autem ratio sive forma, sed solum per accidens. Non enim fit domum esse, sed hanc domum, ut ibi dicitur. Unumquodque autem potest considerari sine omnibus his quae ei non per se comparantur, et ideo formae et rationes rerum, quamvis in motu existentium, prout in se considerantur, sine motu sunt; et sic de eis sunt scientiae et definitiones, ut ibidem Philosophus dicit (Lib. VII, Caput 15) ⁂ Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Q. 16, Art. 5, Obj, 3 & Ad 3 3. Praeterea, quidquid dicitur de Deo, dicitur de eo ut de prima causa omnium: sicut esse Dei est causa omnis esse, et bonitas eius est causa omnis boni. Si ergo in Deo sit veritas, ergo omne verum erit ab ipso. Sed aliquem peccare est verum. Ergo hoc erit a Deo. Quod patet esse falsum.

3. Further, whatever is said of God, is said of him as of the first cause of all things; thus the being of God is the cause of all being; and his goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is truth in God, all truth will be from Him. But it is true that someone sins. Therefore this will be from God; which is evidently false. To the third it should be said that nonbeing and privation have no truth of themselves, but only in the apprehension of the intellect. Now all apprehension of the intellect is from God. Hence all the truth that exists in the statement — “that a person commits fornication is true” — is entirely from God. But to argue, “Therefore that this person fornicates is from God”, is a fallacy of accident.

Ad tertium dicendum quod non ens et privationes non habent ex seipsis veritatem, sed solum ex apprehensione intellectus. Omnis autem apprehensio intellectus a Deo est: unde quidquid est veritatis in hoc quod dico, istum fornicari est verum, totum est a Deo. Sed si arguatur, ergo istum fornicari est a Deo, est fallacia Accidentis.

⁂ De Veritate, Q. I, Art 8, Ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod cum sic arguitur: Omne verum est a Deo; istum fornicari est verum; incidit fallacia accidentis, ut enim ex iam dictis patere potest. Cum enim dicimus: istum fornicari est verum; non hoc dicimus quasi ipse defectus in actu fornicationis implicatus includatur in ratione veritatis: sed verum praedicat tantum adaequationem huius ad intellectum. Unde non debet

To the first it should be said that the argument — “Every true thing is from God. But to fornicate is true. Therefore.” — falls into the fallacy of accident. For, as is evident from our discussion above, when we say that fornicating is true, we do not imply that the defect involved in the act of fornication is included in the notion of truth. True predicates merely the conformity of that act to an intellect. Hence,

concludi: Istum fornicari est a Deo; sed quod veritas eius sit a Deo.

one cannot conclude that fornicating is from God, but merely that its truth is from God. ⁂

The following text is one to help us understand the above fallacy. De Veritate, Q. I, Art. 10, c. Res autem comparatur ad intellectum divinum et humanum, ut supra dictum est; intellectui auem divino comparatur sicut mensuratum mensurae, quantum ad ea quae in rebus positive dicuntur vel inveniuntur, quia omnia huiusmodi ab arte divini intellectus proveniunt; alio modo sicut cognitum ad cognoscens; et sic etiam negationes et defectus divino intellectui adaequantur, quia omnia huiusmodi Deus cognoscit, quamvis ea non causet.

A thing is related to divine and human intellects. In regard to everything that is positively predicated of things or found in them, it is related to the divine in one way as the measured to its measure; for all such things come from the divine intellect’s art. A thing is related in another way to the divine intellect: as a thing known is related to the knower. In this way even negations and defects are equated to the divine intellect, since God knows all these even though He does not cause them. ⁂

Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum, Distinctio XLVI, Quaest. I, Art. III, Obj 1 & Ad 1 1. Videtur quod mala fieri sit bonum. Verum enim et bonum convertuntur. Sed mala fieri est verum. Ergo est bonum. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est [Dist. XIX, q. V, art. 2], veritas est de his quorum ratio completur per operationem animae et fundamentum habent in re. Non est autem inconveniens quod de re mala sit operatio animae bona, et quod rei malae ratio sit in anima bona; sicut etiam non ens in re, dicitur ens in anima ratiocinante, ut negationes et privationes, sicut patet ex IV Metaph., text 2. secundum Commentatorem. Unde si procedatur a bonitate veritatis secundum quod completur in operatione animae, ad bonitatem ejus quod est in re, erit fallacia accidentis; hoc enim quod est mala esse, accidit huic quod est intelligibile, vel significabile sicut est in re, in quo consistit ratio veri, ut scilicet significetur, vel intelligatur aliquid sicut est in re. Unde nihil prohibet dicere quod mala esse est verum; sed haec veritas, qua vere dicitur vel significatur mala esse, est bonum, quamvis mala esse sit malum. ⁂

In I Sententiarum, Dist 46, Art 2, Obj. 1 & Ad 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mala fieri sit bonum. Verum enim et bonum convertuntur. Sed mala fieri est verum. Ergo est bonum. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, dist. 19, quaest., 5, art. 2, veritas est de his quorum ratio completur per operationem animae et fundamentum habent in re. Non est autem inconveniens quod de re mala sit operatio animae bona, et quod rei malae ratio sit in anima bona; sicut etiam non ens in re dicitur ens in anima ratiocinante, ut negationes et privationes, sicut patet ex 4 Metaphys., secundum Commentatorem. Unde si procedatur a bonitate veritatis secundum quod completur in operatione animae, ad bonitatem ejus quod est in re, erit fallacia accidentis: hoc enim quod est mala esse, accidit huic quod est in re, in quo consistit ratio veri, ut scilicet significetur vel intelligatur aliquid sicut est in re. Unde nihil prohibet dicere, quod mala esse est verum; sed haec veritas, qua vere dicitur vel significatur mala esse, est bonum, quamvis mala esse sit malum. ⁂ Summa Contra Gentiles, Liber III, Caput 6 Ex quo patet quod, licet malum praeter intentionem sit, est tamen voluntarium, ut secunda ratio proponit, licet non per se, sed per accidens. Intentio enim est ultimi finis, quem quis propter se vult: voluntas autem est eius etiam quod quis vult propter aliud, etiam si simpliciter non vellet; sicut qui proiicit merces in mari causa salutis, non intendit proiectionem mercium, sed salutem, proiectionem autem vult non simpliciter, sed causa salutis. Similiter propter aliquod bonum sensibile consequendum aliquis vult facere inordinatam actionem, non intendens inordinationem, neque volens eam simpliciter, sed propter hoc. Et ideo hoc modo malitia et peccatum dicuntur esse voluntaria, sicut proiectio mercium in mari.

Eodem autem modo patet solutio ad tertiam obiectionem. Nunquam enim invenitur mutatio corruptionis sine mutatione genera-

From this it is evident that, though evil be apart from intention, it is nonetheless voluntary, as the second argument suggests, though not essentially but accidentally so. For intention is directed to an ultimate end which a person wills for its own sake, but the will may also be directed to that which a person wills for the sake of something else, even if he would not will it simply for itself. In the example of the man who throws his merchandise into the sea in order to save himself [cf. Ethics III, 1: 1110a 8–29], he does not intend the throwing away of the merchandise but his own safety; yet he wills the throwing not for itself but for the sake of safety. Likewise, a person wills to do a disorderly action for the sake of some sensory good to be attained; he does not intend the disorder, nor does he will it simply for itself, but for the sake of this result. And so, evil consequences and sins are called voluntary in this way, just as is the casting of merchandise into the sea. The answer to the third difficulty is similarly evident. Indeed, the change of corruption is never found without the change of gen-

tionis: et per consequens nec finis corruptionis sine fine generationis. Natura ergo non intendit finem corruptionis seorsum a fine generationis, sed simul utrumque. Non enim est de intentione naturae absoluta quod non sit aqua, sed quod sit aer, quo existente non est aqua. Hoc ergo quod est esse aerem, intendit natura secundum se: quod vero est non esse aquam, non intendit nisi inquantum est coniunctum ei quod est esse aerem. Sic igitur privationes a natura non sunt secundum se intentae, sed secundum accidens: formae vero secundum se.

eration; neither, as a consequence, is the end of corruption found without the end of generation. So, nature does not intend the end of corruption as separated from the end of generation, but both at once. It is not the unqualified intention of nature that water should not exist, but that there should be air, and while a thing is so existing it is not water. So, nature directly intends that this existing thing be air; it does not intend that this thing should not exist as water, except as a concomitant of the fact that it is to be air. Thus, privations are not intended by nature in themselves, but only accidentally; forms, however, are intended in themselves. It is clear, then, from the foregoing that what is evil in an unqualified sense is completely apart from intention in the workings of nature, as in the birth of monsters; on the other hand, that which is not evil in the unqualified sense, but evil in relation to some definite thing, is not directly intended by nature but only accidentally.

Patet ergo ex praemissis quod illud quod est simpliciter malum, omnino est praeter intentionem in operibus naturae, sicut partus monstruosi: quod vero non est simpliciter, sed alicui malum, non est intentum a natura secundum se, sed secundum accidens.

⁂ Summa contra Gentiles, Liber III, Caput 8 & 9 Adhuc. Omne quod agit, est res aliqua. Malum autem agit inquantum malum: repugnat enim bono et corrumpit ipsum. Malum igitur, inquantum malum, est res aliqua… Has autem rationes non difficile est solvere. Per hoc etiam patet qualiter malum repugnat bono, ex quo quarta ratio procedebat. Secundum enim quod formae et fini, quae habent rationem boni, et sunt agendi vera principia, est adiuncta privatio contrariae formae et finis contrarii, actio quae sequitur ex tali forma et tali fine, attribuitur privationi et malo: per accidens quidem, nam privatio, secundum quod huiusmodi, non est alicuius actionis principium. Propter quod bene in iv cap. de Div. Nom., dicit Dionysius, quod ma-

Moreover, everything that acts is a real thing. Now, evil does act precisely as evil, for it attacks the good and corrupts it. So, evil precisely as evil is a real thing. It is not difficult to answer these arguments. In this way it also becomes apparent how evil is opposed to the good, which is the starting point of the fourth argument. According as there is added a privation of a contrary form, and a contrary end, to a form and an end (which have the rational character of good and are true principles of action) the action that results from such a form and end is attributed to the privation and the evil. Yet, this attribution is accidental, for privation, as such, is not the principle of any action. Hence,

duane h. berquist lum non pugnat contra bonum nisi virtute boni, secundum se vero est impotens et infirmum, quasi nullius actionis principium.

Dionysius says, quite properly, in the fourth chapter of On the Divine Names, that “evil does not fight against good, except through the power of the good; in itself, indeed, it is powerless and weak,” the principle of no action, as it were. ⁂

Summa Contra Gentiles, Liber I, Caput 67 Patet igitur ex dictis quomodo obiectio cognitionem contingentium in Deo impugnans sit repellenda… Rursus, cum dicitur, Deus scit, vel scivit, hoc futurum medium quoddam accipitur inter divinam scientiam et rem scitam, scilicet tempus in quo est locutio, respectu cuius illud quod a Deo scitum dicitur est futurum.

Non autem est futurum respectu divinae scientiae, quae, in momento aeternitatis existens, ad omnia praesentialiter se habet. Respectu cuius, si tempus locutionis de medio subtrahatur, non est dicere hoc esse cognitum quasi non existens, ut locum habeat quaestio qua quaeritur an possit non esse: sed sic cognitum dicetur a Deo ut iam in sua existentia visum. Quo posito, non remanet praedictae quaestioni locus: quia quod iam est, non potest, quantum ad illud instans, non esse.

Deceptio igitur accidit ex hoc quod tempus in quo loquimur, coexistit aeternitati, vel etiam tempus praeteritum (quod designatur cum dicimus, Deus scivit): unde habitudo temporis praeteriti vel praesentis ad futurum aeternitati attribuitur, quae omnino ei non competit. Et ex hoc accidit secundum accidens falli.

From what has been said, it is therefore clear bow the objection impugning a knowledge of contingents in God is to be repulsed. Again, when it is said that God knows or knew this future thing, a certain intermediate point between the divine knowledge and the thing known is assumed. This is the time when the above words are spoken, in relation to which time that which is known by God is said to be future. But this is not future with reference to the divine knowledge, which, abiding in the moment of eternity, is related to all things as present to them. If with respect to the divine knowledge we remove from its intermediate position the time when the words are spoken, we cannot say that this is known by God as non-existent, so as to leave room for the question whether it can not-be; rather, it will be said to be known by God in such a way that it is seen by Him already in its own existence. On this basis there is no room for the preceding question. For that which already is cannot, with respect to that moment of time, not be. We are therefore deceived by the fact that the time in which we are speaking is present to eternity, as is likewise past time (designated by the words God knew). Hence, the relation of past or present time to the future is attributed to eternity, to which such a relation does not belong. And from this, according to the accident it happens we are deceived.

fallacy of the accident ⁂ Quaestiones Disputatae De Potentia, Q. 5, Art. 1, corpus

Secundum hoc ergo esse rei factae dependet a causa efficiente secundum quod dependet ab ipsa forma rei factae. Est autem aliquod efficiens a quo forma rei factae non dependet per se et secundum rationem formae, sed solum per accidens: sicut forma ignis generati ab igne generante, per se quidem, et secundum rationem suae speciei non dependet, cum in ordine rerum eumdem gradum teneat, nec forma ignis aliter sit in generato quam in generante: sed distinguitur ab ea solum divisione materiali, prout scilicet est in alia materia. Unde cum igni generato sua forma sit ab aliqua causa oportet ipsam formam dependere ab altiori principio, quod sit causa ipsius formae per se et secundum propriam speciei rationem.

Accordingly the existence of a thing made depends on its efficient cause inasmuch as it depends on the form of the thing made. Now there can be an efficient cause on which the form of the thing made does not depend directly and considered as a form, but only indirectly: thus the form of a generated fire does not depend on the generating fire directly and by reason of its species, seeing that it occupies the same degree in the order of things, and the form of fire is in the same way in both the generated and in the generating fire, and is distinguished therefrom only by a material distinction, through being seated in another matter. Hence since the generated fire has its form from some cause, this same form must depend on some higher principle, that is the cause of that form directly and in respect of its very species. ⁂

Quaestiones Disputatae De Potentia, Q. 5, Art. 1, Ad 2 …Deus non alia operatione producit res in esse et eas in esse conservat. Ipsum enim esse rerum permanenium non est divisibile nisi per accidens, prout alicui motui subiacet; secundum se autem est in instanti. Unde operatio Dei quae est per se causa quod res sit, non est alia secundum quod facit principium essendi et essendi continuationem.

God does not create things by one action and preserve them by another. The existence of permanent things is not divisible except accidentally In so far as it is subject to some kind of movement: and in itself is in an instant. Hence God’s action which is the direct cause of a thing’s existence is not distinct as the principle of its being and as the principle of its continuance in being.

Although Thomas does not say that this objection involves the fallacy of the accident, does it? Compare this with Protagoras’ attempted refutation of Socrates in the Protagoras which seems to be the fallacy of ignorance of refutation, but also to involve being and becoming. Compare also Descartes’ rejection of the usefuless of dialectic to get to the beginnings of reasoned out knowledge. The dialectical argument is not the per se cause of our knowing the beginnings.

Quaestiones Disputatae De Potentia, Q. 5, Art. 1, Obj. 4 & Ad 4 4. Praeterea, Deus est causa rerum sicut efficiens. Sed cessante actione causae efficientis, remanet effectus; sicut cessante actione aedificatoris, remanet domus, et cessante actione ignis generantis, adhuc remanet ignis generatus. Ergo et cessante omni Dei actione, adhuc possunt creaturae in esse remanere. Ad quartum dicendum, quod huiusmodi inferiora agentia sunt causa rerum quantum ad earum fieri, non quantum ad esse rerum per se loquendo. Deus autem per se est causa essendi: et ideo non est simile. Unde Augustinus dicit [lib. IV super Genesim ad litteram, cap xii]: Non enim sicut structuram cum fabricaverit quis abscedit atque illo cessante et abscedente stat opus eius; ita mundus vel in ictu oculi stare non poterit, si ei Deus regimen suum subtraxerit.

4. God is the efficient cause of things. Now the effect remains when the action of the efficient cause ceases: thus the builder ceases to act yet the house remains; the flame that caused the fire may cease to bum yet the fire caused by it continues. Therefore even if God’s actions cease altogether, creatures can continue to exist. These lower agents cause a thing as to its becoming, but not as to its existence properly speaking: whereas God is the direct cause of existence: wherefore the comparison fails. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12): “When a man is building a house and goes away, the building remains after he has ceased to work and gone: whereas the world would not stand for a single instant if God withdrew his support.”

And what about the modern error of denying that reason naturally is determined to some truth and that the will naturally wills something. The will as will is free and so it seems per se to the will that it cannot be determined to will any object. Many or most moderns, especially since Kant, think that we can only talk about things as they are known by us and therefore as they are in our senses or in our mind. If we can only talk about things we know in some way, it might seem that we can only talk about things as known by us. And thus we cannot talk about things in themselves But this would seem to make per se what is per accidens. As such and per se mean about the same. Perhaps a similar deception by the accidental is found in Averroes’ making one possible understanding for all men and one agent understanding for all men. Contra Pestiferam Doctrinam Retrahentium Homines a Religionis Ingressu, Caput 14, Obj. 4, n. 833; Caput 16, n. 853 4) Dicunt insuper, quod Christus ordinem discipulorum instituit, quibus succedunt Episcopi et clerici possessiones habentes; ordines autem religiosorum absque possessionibus in paupertate viventium postea ab aliis sunt instituti. Quod autem Christus instituit, perfectius est. Perfectius igitur esse videtur communes possessiones habere, quam absque possessionibus vivere.

It is also argued that Christ Himself instituted the order of His disciples, whose successors, the bishops, and clerics, have property. Religious orders, on the other hand, whose members live in poverty without possessions, were formed by men. Now what Christ has instituted must be most perfect. Therefore it is more perfect to hold goods in common than to live without property.

Quod vero quarto inducitur, quod Dominus non instituit ordinem non habentium possessiones, sed ordinem praelatorum, qui possessiones habent; in altero quidem est apertum mendacium. Cum enim Dominus discipulos instituit, quod nec argentum nec aurum possideant, et quod corda eorum non graventur curis huius mundi, et dimittentibus agros et domos propter nomen suum praemia repromittit non solum in futuro, sed in hoc saeculo; ut scilicet sint cum Apostolis, nihil in hoc mundo habentes, et omnia possidentes; manifestum est quod omnes quicumque hanc regulam secuti fuerint, institutionem Christi sequuntur. Nec enm illi qui sanctos sequuuntur, per quos sunt ordines instituti, ad ipsos accedunt, sed ad Christum, cuius documenta proponunt: quia nec illi se ipsos praedicaverunt, sed cum Apostolo Iesum Christum, eius documenta proponentes. In altero falluntur, vel fallere volunt per fallaciam accidentis.

The fourth assertion, viz. that our Lord did not establish an order of men possessing nothing, but an order of prelates who owned certain property, is a distinct falsehood. For when our Lord taught His disciples to possess neither gold nor silver, lest their hearts should be weighed down by temporal anxieties; and when He promised to those who, for His sake should renounce lands and houses, a reward not only in the next world but in this life also, so that they should resemble the Apostles in “having nothing yet possessing all things,” He made it clear that all who should hereafter follow this rule would be obeying His ordinance. Those who follow the saints who have founded various orders are, in reality, imitating not those holy founders, but Christ, whose precepts they preach.

Our adversaries are either deceived on another point, or else they try to deceive us by the fallacy of the accident. Christ did not establish an order of bishops, or other clerics who were to own property, either in common or individually. He established such an order, indeed, but established it in perfect poverty. Later on, however, possessions were accepted by the Church in order, as we have seen, to be distributed by her.

Instituit enim Christus Episcoporum ordinem, et aliorum clericorum qui possessiones communes habent, vel proprias. Sed hoc Christus in eis non instituit, sed magis instituit eorum ordinem in perfecta paupertate, sicut ex praedictis apparet. Postmodum vero dispensative sunt in ecclesia communes possessiones acceptae propter rationem praedictam. ⁂

Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum, Dist. XLVI, Q. unica, Art. 2. Obj. 1 & Ad 1 Verum enim et bonum convertuntur. Sed mala fieri est verum. Ergo est bonum. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, dist. 19, quaest., 5, art. 2, veritas est de his quorum ratio completur per operationem animae et fundamentum habent in re. Non est autem inconveniens quod de re mala sit operatio animae bona, et quod rei malae ratio sit in anima bona; sicut etiam non ens in re dicitur ens in anima ratiocinante, ut negationes et privationes, sicut patet ex 4 Metaphys., secundum Commentatorem. Unde si procedatur a bonitate veritatis secundum quod completur in operatione animae, ad bonitatem ejus “quod est in re, erit fallacia accidentis: hoc enim quod est mala esse, accidit huic quod est in re, in quo consistit ratio

veri, ut scilicet significetur vel intelligatur aliquid sicut est in re. Unde nihil prohibet dicere, quod mala esse est verum; sed haec veritas, qua vere dicitur vel significatur mala esse, est bonum, quamvis mala esse sit malum.

⁂ Scriptum super Lib. I Sententiarum, Dist XXXIII, Q. I, Art. I, 2 & Ad 2: Utrum relationes divinae sunt essentia divina 2. Praeterea, quaecumque sunt idem secundum rem, in quocumque est unum, et alterum, nec potest instantia fieri. Sed non in quocumque est essentia divina, est paternitas; quia essentia divina est in Filio, in quo paternitas non est. Ergo essentia divina non est idem quod paternitas; et eadem ratione nec idem quod alia proprietas. Ad secundum dicendum, quod si aliqua duo sunt idem, secundum id quod idem sunt, in quocumque est unum, et alterum. Paternitas autem et essentia divina sunt idem secundum esse: et ideo sicut in Filio est esse essentiae, ita et in Filio est esse paternitatis, quia in divinis non et nisi unum esse. Sed paternitas habet aliquid in quo non unitur cum essentia, scilicet rationem paternitatis, quae est alia a ratione essentiae; unde secundum illam rationem respectus potest esse in Patre et non in Filio, scilicet distinguere Patrem a Filio; unde in processu incidit fallacia accidentis. Neque oportet in his aliquid simile inquiri; quia in nulla re creata invenitur aliquid simile divinae simplicitati, ut habens sit id quod habetur; omnia enim similia quae possent induci vel de punctis vel de differentiis existentibus in genere, plus habent de dissimilitudine quam de similitudine; et ideo magis abducunt a veritate quam in verum intellectum inducant. Sicut enim dicit Boetius, lib. De Trin., C. 11, col 1250, t. 2, in his quae sine materia sunt, oportet non ad imaginationem deduci: quia hoc plurimum deficit in divinis.

⁂ Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia, Q. 8, Art. 2, Obj. 6 & Ad 6 6. Praeterea, quidquid praedicatur de praedicato, praedicatur de subiecto. Sed si relatio est ipsa essentia divina, haec praedicatio erit vera: Essentia divina est paternitas; et pari ratione ista: Filiatio est divina essentia. Ergo sequetur quod filiatio est paternitas. Ad sextum dicendum, quod ratio illa tenet in praedicabilibus per se.

6. Whatsoever is said of the predicate may be said of the subject. But if relation is God’s very essence, it will be true to say: The divine essence is Paternity, and with equal reason: Filiation is the divine essence: and thus it would follow that Filiation is Paternity. This argument applies to the per se predicables.

Per se autem praedicatur aliquid de aliquo, quod praedicatur de eo secundum propriam rationem; quod vero non secundum propriam rationem praedicatur, sed propter rei identitatem, non etiam praedicatur per se. Cum ergo dicitur: Essentia divina est paternitas, non praedicatur paternitas de essentia divina per identitatem rationis, sed propter identitatem rei; et similiter nec essentia de paternitate, ut iam dictum est, quia alia est ratio essentiae et relationis. Et ideo in praedicto processu incidit fallacia accidentis:… …licet enim in Deo nullum sit accidens, est tamen quaedam similitudo accidentis, in quantum ea quae de se invicem praedicantur secundum accidens et differunt ratione, sunt unum subiecto.

Now a thing is predicated per se of something when the predication regards the proper nature of that thing; whereas if the predication arises not from the proper nature but from identity, it is not per se predication. Hence when it is said, The divine essence is Paternity, Paternity is predicated of the divine essence on account not of a logical but of a real identity: and the same applies if essence be predicated of Paternity, as already stated; because essence and relation differ logically. Wherefore this argument falls into the fallacy of accident:… …because although there is no accident in God, there is a certain likeness to an accident, inasmuch as things which are predicated of one another in respect of an accident while differing logically have but one subject. ⁂

In I Sententiarum, Dist 46, Art 2, Obj. 1 & Ad 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mala fieri sit bonum. Verum enim et bonum convertuntur. Sed mala fieri est verum. Ergo est bonum. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, dist. 19, quaest., 5, art. 2, veritas est de his quorum ratio completur per operationem animae et fundamentum habent in re. Non est autem inconveniens quod de re mala sit operatio animae bona, et quod rei malae ratio sit in anima bona; sicut etiam non ens in re dicitur ens in anima ratiocinante, ut negationes et privationes, sicut patet ex 4 Metaphys., secundum Commentatorem. Unde si procedatur a bonitate veritatis secundum quod completur in operatione animae, ad bonitatem ejus quod est in re, erit fallacia accidentis: hoc enim quod est mala esse, accidit huic quod est in re, in quo consistit ratio veri, ut scilicet significetur vel intelligatur aliquid sicut est in re. Unde nihil prohibet dicere, quod mala esse est verum; sed haec veritas, qua vere dicitur vel significatur mala esse, est bonum, quamvis mala esse sit malum.

Universal and Fundamental Importance of the Distinction Corresponding to this Kind of Mistake In logic • reasoned out knowledge and its cause (demonstration) are about the as such or through itself • the fallacy of the accident

duane h. berquist In natural philosophy • The limits of change as such • In the opposite becoming the opposite • In the distinction between nature and chance, reason and luck • In the distinction between movement per se and per accidens • Is the mover moved per se? In ethics • The bad is not desired as such • In the distinction between the kinds of friendship In wisdom • In the distinction between causes as such and accidental cause • In the distinction between the one as such and the accidentally one • In the distinction between being as such and accidental being