Foreword to Roads in Our Knowledge

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Foreword to Roads in Our Knowledge

Wisdom about Beginnings · Roads in Our Knowledge

From his file: FOREWORD TO ROADS IN KNOWLEDGE.doc.

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FOREWORD TO ROADS IN OUR KNOWLEDGE

Since reason looks before and after, reason can look for roads in our knowledge. For a road is an order and order is a before and after.

Reason wanders before it knows the road to follow. This statement seems almost obvious once we define wandering and road in our knowledge. Wandering is a disordered movement of our reason. Since the true is one and the false many or infinite, when reason wanders it is apt to end up in error. Hence, the Latin word error comes from the Latin verb meaning to wander.

Moreover, reason should look for the roads in our knowledge. For the man who knows the road to follow can go forward orderly, with ease or less difficulty and avoid wandering into errors through ignorance of the road.

In our experience, order is made by nature and by reason. Are the roads in our knowledge made by nature or by reason or by both?

It would seem by both nature and reason. Since man is by nature an animal with reason, there is a natural road in human knowledge. This is the road from the senses into reason. Reason is not responsible for the fact that we sense before we understand or that we first reason about what we sense. Likewise reason is not responsible for the fact that we sense before we remember what we have sensed. But there are also roads made by reason in our reasoned-out knowledge and in our reasonable discussions.

Since the nature of a thing is what it is and what is first in a thing is what it is, nature or the natural is what is first in a thing. Hence, the natural road in our knowledge is the first road in our knowledge. It is first not only in time but also in being. The natural road can be without the roads made by reason but not vice-versa. Likewise it seems to be first in our knowledge for we acquire what is not natural through what is. And the natural road is the reason for many things that we find in the roads well-made by reason.

Every reasoned out knowledge has its own matter and its own way of going forward which should fit its own matter. As the matter of each reasoned out knowledge is different from that of another, so the way of going forward that fits its matter must be different.

This can be made known by likeness to three things that come before reasoned out knowledge on the natural road.

First, different senses fit different objects; for example, the eyes, color. and the ears, sound.

Second, in the practical arts different tools and ways of making fit different matters. The carpenter does not roll out his matter like the baker. Needle and thread do not fit making out of wood. The tailor does not use saw and hammer. The carpenter does not heat his matter like the metalworker before shaping it.

Third, in the arts that are meant to please us, we should not look for the same pleasure from each, but that which is appropriate to each. One should not seek the pleasure of comedy from tragedy, nor the pleasure of ice cream from steak.

But there are two things common to all forms of reasoned out knowledge. Each is a perfection of reason and each is a work of reason. Hence, there is a way of going forward common to all forms of reasoned out knowledge based on reason. This is studied in logic which is named from reason.

It is important to see that this common way of going forward based on reason is not to the private ways of going forward based on the respective matters of the different forms of reasoned out knowledge as a genus is to its species. For the diverse matters of reasoned out knowledge are not species making differences of reason.

The natural way of going forward is towards wisdom for the natural road is the road to wisdom. Wisdom is the common good of reason. The order of the forms of reasoned out knowledge among themselves is on account of their order to wisdom and on account of the road to wisdom. Hence, the natural road enters into both the common road of reasoned out knowledge and the private roads of reasoned out knowledge.

Wisdom extends to all forms of reasoned out knowledge (other than itself) more as a universale in causando than does logic. Logic is not the end of all reasoned out knowledge as is wisdom. Wisdom is also a more universal mover than logic.

The end of reasoned out knowledge is truth and the consideration of truth belongs chiefly to the wise man as the philosopher shows in the second book of the Metaphysics.

********************************************************** Reasoned out knowledge is not only a result of thinking out conclusions, but before this, it is necessary to think out beginnings. We think out definitions and divisions in geometry with Euclid before we think out conclusions.

Logic is the art of thinking out things. Logic helps us to think out definitions and divisions of things and to think out conclusions about them. Thinking out here has three or four meanings just as out and in here have three or four meanings. It is strange to note how we sometimes think out in the same order as the senses of out and in. We think out the division of a composed whole before thinking out its definition. And if it is a genus, we think out its definition before we think out the division of it into species? And after these three thinking outs, we think out conclusions about them. [Are there other senses of thinking out besides these three? Do we think out distinctions that are not divisions? Do we think out the meanings or, at least, the order of the meanings of a word equivocal by reason? Do we think out axioms and postulates? Do we think out a proportion?]

Wisdom, or the truth which wisdom is about, is the common good of looking reason. Does Thomas say in the Proemium to the Metaphysics that all the sciences are ordered to the consideration of God by the habit of wisdom?

Since wisdom is about the common good of looking reason, it is not surprising, but to be expected, that wisdom directs the whole of looking reason.

Wisdom most of all directs the whole of looking reason insofar as it most of all knows the natural road and insofar as it considers how man is towards knowing truth and insofar as it knows distinctly and defends the axioms and insofar as it determines how the private road of each reasoned out knowledge should or should not be determined and insofar as it judges the conclusions of the particular forms of reasoned out knowledge.

Both wisdom and logic direct all reasoned out knowledge. But what is their difference?

Wisdom is the head of natural understanding as well as of reasoned out understanding or reasoned out knowledge. Logic is about the common road of reasoned out knowledge and is not the head of natural understanding. But as regards reasoned out knowledge, how do they differ?

Logic is more about what is common by predication to all reasoned out knowledge while wisdom is more about what is common by causality to all. And since the order of things among themselves is on account of their order to their common end, wisdom orders the forms along the road to wisdom which logic cannot do. This harmonizes with the wise man ordering all by his knowledge of the natural road (which is the road to wisdom) while the logician orders by his knowledge of the common road of reasoned out knowledge.

Thomas, De Memoria et Reminscentia, n. 317:

operatio proportionatur virtuti et essentiae:

intellectivum autem hominis est in sensitivo...Et ideo propria operatio eius est intelligere intelligibilia in phantasmatibus,

sicut intellectus substantiae separatae operatio est intelligere res secundum se intellectas;

et ideo huius est causa reddenda a metaphysico, ad quem pertinet considerare diversos gradus intellectuum.

There is before and after in our ability to know and in our knowledge and in things as known by us. And these before and afters more or less correspond. For example: we are able to know square before we are able to know cube. Our knowledge of square comes before our knowledge of cube. And square is known (by us) before cube.

TEXTS ON TRUTH AND KNOWING TRUTH

Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Q. 16, Art. 1, c. :

...sicut bonum nominat id in quod tendit appetitus, ita verum nominat id in quod tendit intellectus. Hoc autem distat inter appetitum et intellectum, sive quamcumque cognitionem, quia cognitio est secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente: appetitus autem et secundum quod appetens inclinatur in ipsam rem appetitivam. Et sic terminus appetitus quod est bonum, et in re appetibili: sed terminus cognitionis, quod est verum, est in ipso intellectu.

De Veritate, Q. 1, Art. 1, c.:

Convenientiam vero entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen verum. Omnis autem cognitio perficitur per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam, ita quod assimilatio dicta est causa cognitionis: sicut visus per hoc quod disponitur per speciem coloris, cognoscit colorem. Prima ergo comparatio entis ad intellectum est ut ens intellectui correspondeat: quae quidem correspondentia adaequatio rei et intellectus dicitur; et in hoc formaliter ratio veri perficitur.

Hoc est ergo quod addit verum supra ens, scilicet conformitatem sive adaequationem rei et intellectus; ad quam conformitatem, ut dictum est, sequitur cognitio rei.

Sic ergo entitas rei praecedat rationem veritatis, sed cognitio est quidem veritatis effectus.

[This is an extremely interesting before and after. Truth is after the entity of things but before knowledge.]

De Veritate, Q. I, Art. 9, corpus:

...veritas est in intellectu...sicut consequens actum intellectus, et sicut cognita per intellectum.

Consequitur namque intellectus operationem, secundum quod iudicium intellectus est de re secundum quod est.

Cognoscitur autem ab intellectu secundum quod intellectus reflectitur supra actum suum, non solum secundum quod cognoscit actum suum, sed secundum quod cognoscit proportionem eius ad rem: quod quidem cognosci non potest nisi cognita natura ipsius actus; quae cognosci non potest nisi cognoscatur natura principii activi, quod est ipse intellectus, in cuius natura est ut rebus conformetur; unde secundum hoc cognoscat veritatem intellectus quod supra seipsum reflectitur.

[A knowledge of truth is after truth following an act of the understanding. This helps us to understand why it is possible not to know that you know.]

Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Q. 16, Art. 2, corpus:

...verum...secundum sui primam rationem est in intellectu. Cum autem omnis res sit vera secundum quod habet propriam formam naturae suae, necesse est quod intellectus, inquantum est cognoscens, sit verus inquantum habet similitudinem rei cognitae, quae est forma eius inquantum est cognoscens.

Et propter hoc per conformitatem intellectus et rei veritas definitur.

Unde conformitatem istam cognoscere, est cognoscere veritatem.

Hanc autem nullo modo sensus cognoscit...

Intellectus autem conformitatem suam ad rem intelligibilem cognoscere potest: sed tamen non apprehendit eam secundum quod cognoscit de aliquo quid est; sed quando iudicat rem ita se habere sicut est forma quam de re apprehendit, tunc primo cognoscit et dicit verum. Et hoc facit componendo et dividendo...

Veritas quidem igitur potest esse in sensu, vel in intellectu cognoscente quod quid est, ut in quadam re vera: non autem ut cognitum in cognoscente, quod importat nomen veri; perfectio enim intellectus est verum ut cognitum.

Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 90, Art. 2, Corpus and Ad 3:

Primum autem principium in operativis, quorum est ratio practica, est finis ultimus. Est autem ultimus finis humanae vitae felicitas vel beatitudo...Unde oportet quod lex maxime respiciat ordinem qui est in beatitudinem.

Rursus, cum omnis pars ordinatur ad totum sicut imperfectum ad perfectum; unus autem homo est pars communitatis perfectae: necesse est quod lex proprie respiciat ordinem ad felicitatem communem....

In quolibet autem genere id quod maxime dicitur, est principium aliorum, et alia dicuntur secundum ordinem ad ipsum...

Unde oportet quod, cum lex maxime dicatur secundum ordinem ad bonum commune, quodcumque aliud praeceptum de particulari opere non habeat rationem legis nisi secundum ordinem ad bonum commune...

sicut nihil constat firmiter secundum rationem speculativam nisi per resolutionem ad prima principia indemonstrabilia, ita firmiter nihil constat per rationem practicam nisi per ordinationem ad ultimum finem, qui est bonum commune.

But is there also a common good of looking reason? If truth is the common good of the universe, and not just any truth, but the first and eternal truth about God (or that is God), would not the truth of which wisdom is the knowledge (the truth about the first cause) be the common good of the looking reason? This should be considered again in the light of the Summa Contra Gentiles, Liber I, Caput I. And did not Socrates say that it is not lawful to be angry with the truth? But law is always said by order to a common good. And since the natural road is the road to wisdom, it most of all should be followed just as in the practical order we must follow the law that leads to the common good of the city or nation.