Form

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Form

Natural Philosophy · Physics Book 1

From his file: FORM & MATTER.doc.

Word doc

FORM

Perhaps the first meaning of form is the shape of a body and then the shape of a surface.

Another meaning is that which is defined or can be defined. It is always a particular kind of thing that is defined. In this sense, we can say that democracy is a form of government. Or as Churchill said, it is the worst form of government except for all the rest. Likwise, we say that tragedy and comedy are the main forms of drama. And square, oblong, rhombus, rhomboid and trapezium are different forms of quadrilateral.

And since the definition is in a way the thing defined (for a square is an equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral), the definition and even the parts of the definition are said to be a form. And this is used to distinguish the kind of cause called form from the other kinds of cause. Hence, in making known this kind of cause, Aristotle says in the second book of Natural Hearing (194b 27-29) that it is = λόγος ὁ τοῦ τί |ν εἶναι καὶ τὰ τούτου γένη (οἷον τοῦ διὰ πασῶν τὰ δύο πρὸς ἕν, καὶ ὅλως ὁ ἀριθμός) καὶ τὰ μέρη τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ.

Is the word form said equivocally by chance or by reason of the shape of a body and that which is defined (or the definition itself)?

It seems to be by reason of a likeness of ratios. Hence, Porphyry sees that the difference (which the species or form has in addition to the general kind of thing it is) is to the genus as the shape is to the matter. A sign of this is the likeness of the fourth and fifth senses of being in (the fourth sense is that in which the species is said to be in the genus and the fifth, form in matter). Hence, the similar difficulty of Locke and Anaxagoras And both are a limit or defined by limit. And limit is a name equivocal by reason when said of the limit of the continuous and the definition.

MATTER

What we first call matter is an actual substance with length, width and depth. If this were the only kind of matter, there would be no change of substance, but only of accidents. And all forms would be accidents. An actual substance (or substances) would underlie all change and every change would be accidental.

But if man and dog are substances and not eternal, but they come into existence and go out of existence, there is substantial change or change of substance. But in all change, there is something underlying what the change is between. In the change between hard and soft, there is the underlying butter or some other actual substance. And in the change between wet and dry, there is the underlying cloth or sponge or some other actual substance. In the change called growth, there is an animal or plant that was small and is now large.

But what underlies change of substance cannot be an actual substance for then the change would have been only accidental. It is difficult to see what underlies change of substance - so difficult that the first philosophers, unable to see it, denied in words their own experience of men dying or coming into existence.

Aristotle, seeing the fact of substantial change, knew there must be something underlying this change. But this could not be an actual substance for the reason already given and even more clearly it could not be an actual accident (for an actual substance underlies all accidents). But since what underlies the change between substances must be to these substances something like butter is to hard and soft or cloth to wet and dry or clay to sphere and cube, what underlies change beween substances must be able to be these substances just as the butter is able to be hard or soft and the cloth is able to be wet or dry and the clay is able to be a sphere or a cube. Hence, what underlies the change between substances must be substance in ability. But substance in ability, considered by itself, cannot be anything in act - neither an actual substance nor an accident. Considered by itself, then, it is pure ability, ability without any act. And this is why it is so difficult to know. Ability is not knowable by itself. We can know what underlies change of substance only by a proportion as when we say that it is to man and dog (and other actual substances) something like butter is to hard and soft, or cloth to wet and dry, or clay to sphere and cube; or by negation as when we say that it is pure ability or ability without any act.

We call what underlies change of substance the first matter. We call it matter equivocally by reason of the likeness of ratios. And we call it first since it underlies actual substances which are the matter of accidents.