Four Signs That Our Knowledge Begins With Our Senses

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Four Signs That Our Knowledge Begins With Our Senses

Wisdom about Beginnings · Roads in Our Knowledge

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FOUR SIGNS THAT OUR KNOWLEDGE BEGINS WITH OUR SENSES

1. We place a name first upon what can be sensed and then carry that word over and place it upon a like thing that does not come under the senses. (Hence, we call the meanings of a word its senses)

2. We know things in an outward way before inwardly. Hence, we must think about a thing before we can think it out and have insight.

3. The effect is usually more known to us than the cause.

4. We give examples of a thing before we define it.

5. We induce before syllogizing.

6. We judge usually and ultimately by our senses (Hence, we express our judgment by words like “it makes sense or doesn’t make sense” “nonsense”)

The need to use examples in every art or science is in accord with the road from the senses into reason and is a sign of it being the road. It is necessary to give examples when teaching others if you want to be understood, and the man investigating by himself will use examples in which he considers what he is looking for. The geometer draws a triangle on the board or in the sand, or forms a triangle in his imagination. The reason is impeded when it cannot form or recall the sensible image. The saying "out of sight, out of mind" is true universally if by sight, we understand not only the exterior senses, but every sensible image.

A second consequence and sign of the road from the senses into reason is the need for induction in the sciences and arts. Induction proceeds from many singulars sensed or imagined and remembered which are brought together so reason can separates out what they have in common.

A number of consequences and signs of the truth of the road from the senses into reason can be found in our use of words. The use of words which are sensible in teaching and learning, in discussing and even in thinking by oneself (these may be imagined words) is a sign of some kind of dependence of our thinking upon words. One does not seem to know what one thinks before one has expressed it in words to oneself or others. And words are in some way tied to the sensible images which they provoke. People find difficulty in thinking about something again when they cannot remember the words in which they thought about it. The most common mistakes in thinking are from speech (See the book of Aristotle On Sophistical Refutations) and, among these, the mistake from equivocation of a word holds the most prominent place. To think there is one thought or one thing where there is one word is a mistake that only a reason that depends upon the sensible could make. And we make this mistake mainly where the meanings of the word are not sensible; for example, people are deceived more by the word infinite than by the word bat.

Moreover, we cannot learn the meaning of every word by other words. The first words must be learned by their application to things sensed which is the way a child learns his first words. Hence, we commonly call the meanings of a word, its senses. The meaning of a word rest upon the senses.

Again, we carry over words or names of sensible things to things that cannot be sensed (or are sensed less) when the latter are like, or signified by , or causes of, the former. The word road is carried over by a likeness from the sensible road we walk or drive upon to the road in our knowledge. The word spirit is carried over from the bodily air that is invisible and has little matter to the immaterial and invisible substances. The word seeing is carried over from the act of the eye to the act of the memory or imagination and then carried even further to understanding by likeness. The Greek word lógoß is carried over from the sensible word to the thought signified by it. (The written word is also a sign of the spoken word.) The word genus is carried over from a sensible name to the general kind of thing signified by such a name. The word nature is carried over from birth to the cause of this within. Since we name things as we know them, the order in our naming is a sign of the order in our knowing. Men are much impeded when they use words of Greek or Latin oriign and are ignorant of their first meanings.

Another consequence and sign of the road from the senses into reason can be found in our way of judging. Judgment is the separation of the true from the false by some beginning in our knowledge. Hence, that by which we last judge is the beginning of our knowledge. There are many signs that our judgment ends in the senses.

Men are deceived when they are cut off from their senses. We discover the deception in our dreams when we awake, when we comes back to our senses. The judge will not accept what is merely imagined by the witness; he wants evidence (a word meaning from seeing), the witness should be an eye-witness. No one should judge by custom against the evidence of his senses. The man who is out of touch with things cannot judge them well.

Our way of speaking in making judgments shows a common awareness of judging depending upon the senses: "nonsense", "that doesn't make sense", "that's senseless", it's just common sense", "that makes sense", "now you're talking sense", "now you're making sense", "a sensible man", "a sensible plan". What we say and think should make sense. A man should not talk nonsense. "We should not act and speak like those asleep.", Heraclitus tells us. A man who is out of his senses is out of his mind. He should come to his senses. The reader will agree when he comes to his senses.

There is thus a circle in human knowledge. It begins in the senses and must return there to judge. Hence, Einstein said that experience is the alpha and the omega of science.

More consequences and signs of the road from the senses into reason can be found in the order in which we know things.

The effect is known before its cause because effects lie closer to the senses than causes. The underlying cause of something sensed is an object of the understanding rather than the senses. That the effect is more known than the cause is shown by the frequency of the question "Why?". The man who asks "Why?" knows an effect of which he is seeking the cause by his question. It is also clear by induction in natural things and in human action and history that the effect is more known than the cause; e.g., day and night, eclipses of the sun, change of seasons, stones failing to the ground, chemical reactions, animals and trees growing etc. are more known than their causes; and people's outward actions are more known than their intentions, and revolutions than their causes. A further sign is that men who agree about effects often disagree as to their causes, as is clear from the history of human thought. Art or science comes after experience. But one difference between experience and art or science, is that the former knows only that it is so why the latter know why.

Later on in natural philosophy, we can see that the cause of causes is even less known, both when we consider the historical order in which the Greek philosophers talked about the four kinds of cause (matter, form, mover and end) and when we consider the order of causes within one of these kinds of cause (e.g., water was known before hydrogen and oxygen, and these were known before electron and proton). We begin to see then that the order in our knowledge is the reverse of the order in things. What we know first comes last in things and what we know last comes first in things. This is why the last knowledge on the road from the senses into reason is wisdom, the knowledge of the first cause.

Another order in which we know things is also a result and a sign of the natural road: we know material things before immaterial things. Sensible things are material things. Human reason easily adopts a materialist position in the beginning of its thinking. "Whatever exists must be somewhere" and "what is not in some place does not exist" are common opinions in all ages. But to be somewhere or in a place is a property of bodies. Moreover the human reason either does not know immaterial things or it comes to know them with much difficulty after and through knowing material things. We know immaterial things from material things as a cause is known through its effect, by a distant likeness, and be negating aspects of material things. This negative way of knowing is also found in our knowledge of the simple which is known by the negation ofthe composed. Thus Euclid defines the point as that which has no parts. It is the composed rather than the simple which falls under the senses. And when one thing is known by the negation of another, the negated is more known. Hence, we speak of immaterial and unchanging things and the immaterial substances are called the separated substances by the philosophers.

The history of our knowledge also points to this order from material things to immaterial things. Knowledge of immaterial things, such as logic and metaphysics or wisdom, was the last to be found as is clear in the history of Greek philosophy. The word metaphysics means after nature or natural things.

The mathematical sciences also point a bit to this order from the material to the immaterial. Geometry studies things close to matter. We sometimes even use the word body in mathematics while numbers are more immaterial. We find that geometry is studied before numbers in Euclid's Elements. And numbers are named from likeness to geometrical things. We speak of square and cube numbers, the sides of a number and so on. Although geometry considers things in separation from matter, the priority of the material in our knowledge is seen in the roots of the word geometry (to measure the earth) and the use of blackboard, paper or sand in geometry (and likewise of little sticks or other bodies in learning how to count.

Another sign and result of the natural road is that natural philosophy is the knowledge most conformed to man's way of knowing; for natural knowledge begins and ends in sense experience and we especially judge by the senses therein.

The road from the senses into reason also explains why things known by external experience come before things known by internal experience in our knowledge. Since our knowledge begins with our senses, we are at first turned outward. The child pays attention to the things around him. We only gradually turn inwards. To lose interest in the things around you is an ailment of age, not of childhood or youth. Some people carry this to excess and want to do away with any knowledge by internal experience; but such excess gives testimony to the priority of knowledge by external experience. The sciences concerned with the external have developed before and are more established than psychology.

The road from the senses into reason is also seen in men being more moved by poetic and rhetorical persuasion than by logical arguments. The former are closer to the senses. We also understand or use more arguments that are closer to the senses such as example, induction enthymeme than the syllogism. We more easily arrive at a definition starting from sensible examples than by descending from the universal.

Men also love the sensible good before the understandable good even thought the latter is better. The reason for this is that they are more known.