Heisenberg-on Contradiction

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Heisenberg-on Contradiction

Natural Philosophy · Physics Book 3

Not Berquist’s writing; a text he kept. By Werner Heisenberg. From his file: HEISENBERG-ON CONTRADICTION.doc.

Word doc

Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, Harper Torchbooks, pp. 180-182:

The concept of "temperature" in classical thermodynamics seems to describe an objective feature of reality, an objective property of matter. In daily life it is quite easy to define with the help of a thermometer what we mean by stating that a piece of matter has a certain temperature. But when we try to define what the temperature of an atom would mean we are, even in classical physics, in a much more difficult position. Actually we cannot correlate this concept "temperature of the atom" with a well-defined property of the atom but have to connect it at least partly with our insufficient knowledge of it. We can correlate the value of the temperature with certain statistical expectations about the properties of the atom, but it seems rather doubtful whether an expectation should be called objective...

In a similar way in quantum theory all the classical concepts are, when applied to he atom, just as well and just as little defined as the "temperature of the atom"; they are correlated with statistical expectations; only in rare cases may the expectation become the equivalent of certainty. Again, as in classical thermodynamics, it is difficult to call the expectation objective. One might perhaps call it an objective tendency or possibility, a "potentia" in the sense of Aristotelian philosophy. In fact, I believe that the language actually used by physicists when they speak about atomic events produces in their minds similar notions as the concept "potentia." So the physicists have gradually become accustomed to considering the electronic orbits, etc., not as reality but rather as a kind of "potentia." The language has already adjusted itself, at least to some extent, to this true situation. but it is not a precise language in which one could use the normal logical pattern; it is a language that produces pictures in our mind, but together with them the notion that the pictures have only a vague connection with reality, that they represent only a tendency toward reality.

The vagueness of this language in use among the physicists has therefore led to attempts to define a different precise language which follows definite language patterns in complete conformity with the mathematical scheme of quantum theory. The result of these attempts by Birkhoff and Neumann and more recently by Weizsacker can be stated by saying that the mathematical scheme of quantum theory can be interpreted as an extension or a modification of classical logic. It is especially one fundamental principle of classical logic which seems to require a modification. In classical logic it is assumed that, if a statement has any meaning at all, either the statement or the negation of the statement must be correct. Of "here is a table" or "here is not a table," either the first or the second statement must be correct. "Tertium non datur," a third possibility does not exist. It may be that we do not know whether the statement or its negation is correct; but in "reality" one of the two is correct.

In quantum theory this law "tertium non datur" is to be modified. Against any modification of this fundamental principle one can of course at once argue that the principle is assumed in common language and that we have to speak at least about our eventual modification of logic in the natural language. Therefore, it would be a self-contradiction to describe in natural language a logical scheme that does not apply to natural language. There, however, Weizsacker points out that one may distinguish various levels of language...It is true that finally we have to go back to the natural language and thereby to the classical language patterns. But Weizsacker suggests that classical logic may be in a similar manner a priori to quantum logic, as classical physics is to quantum theory. Classical logic would then be contained as a kind of limiting case in quantum logic but the latter would constitute the more general logical pattern.