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Humility Texts

Wisdom about Beginnings · Beginning of Philosophy in the Will

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στεινωποὶ μὲν γὰρ παλάμαι κατὰ γυῖα κέχυνται· πολλὰ δὲ δείλ’ ἔμπαια, τά τ’ ἀμβλύνουσι μέριμνας.παῦρον δ’ ἐν ζωῆισι βίου μέρος ἀθρήσαντες ὠκύμοροι καπνοῖο δίκην ἀρθέντες ἀπέπταν αὐτὸ μόνον πεισθέντες, ὅτωι προσέκυρσεν ἕκαστος πάντοσ’ ἐλαυνόμενοι, τὸ δ’ ὅλον <πᾶς> εὔχεται εὑρεῖν· οὕτως οὔτ’ ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ’ ἀνδράσιν οὔτ’ ἐπακουστά οὔτε νόωι περιληπτά. σὺ d' o”n, ἐπεὶ <δ’ ἐλιάσθης, πεύσεαι οὐ πλέον ἠὲ βροτείη μῆτις ὄρωρεν.(Empedocles, DK 2)

For narrow are the means spread throughout the limbs and many are the miseries that burst in and blunt the thoughts. And having seen only a small part of life during their lives, and doomed to early death, they are lifted up and carried off like smoke, and believing only that which each one meets with as he is driven every way, they boast of having found the whole. But things are not thus seen or heard by men or grasped by their minds. You, however, since you have withdrawn to here, shall not learn more than mortal wisdom can attain. (Empedocles, DK 2)

εἰ γάρ κέν σφ’ ἀδινῆισιν ὑπὸ πραπίδεσσιν ἐρείσας εὐμενέως καθαρῆισιν ἐποπτεύσηις μελέτηισιν, ταῦτά τέ σοι μάλα πάντα δι’ αἰῶνος παρέσονται, ἄλλα τε πόλλ’ ἀπὸ τῶνδ’ ἐκτήσεαι· αὐτὰ γὰρ αὔξει ταῦτ’ εἰς |qoß ἕκαστον, ὅπη φύσις ἐστὶν ἑκάστωι. εἰ δὲ σύ γ’ ἀλλοίων ἐπορέξεαι, οἷα κατ’ ἄνδρας μυρία δειλὰ πέλονται ἅ τ’ ἀμβλύνουσι μερίμνας, ἧ σ’ ἄφαρ ἐκλείψουσι περιπλομένοιο χρόνοιο σφῶν αὐτῶν ποθέοντα φίλην ἐπὶ γένναν ἱκέσθαι πάντα γὰρ ἴσθι φρόνησιν ἔχειν καὶ νώματος αἶσαν.(Empedocles, DK 110)

If you press these things deep into your firm mind with a friendly disposition and a watchful attention that is pure, certainly all these things will remain with you throughout your life; and you will gain many other things from them; for the former things cause these things to grow into their own character according to the nature of each. But if you reach out for other things, such as the countless miserable things that usually occupy men and blunt their thoughts, surely these things will quickly forsake you as time rolls on for they desire to return to their own kind; for know that all things have wisdom and a share of thought. (Empedocles, DK 110)

οὐκ ἔστιν πελάσσασθαι ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἐφικτόν ἡμετέροις ἢ χερσὶ λαβεῖν, ἧιπέρ τε μεγίστη πειθοῦς ἀνθρώποισιν ἁμαξιτὸς εἰς φρένα πίπτει.(Empedocles, DK 133)

It is not possible to draw [God] near within easy reach of our eyes or to take hold of him with our hands which is the broadest road of persuasion that leads into the mind of man. (Empedocles, DK 133)

οὔτοι ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς πάντα θεοὶ θνητοῖσ’ ὑπέδειξαν, ἀλλὰ χρόνωι ζητοῦντες ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄμεινον.(Xenophanes, DK 18)

The gods have not shown all things to mortals from the beginning; but seeking in time, they have found the better. (Xenophanes, DK 18)

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book One, 1098a 21-26:

Περιγεγράφθω μὲν οὖν τἀγαθὸν ταύτῃ· δεῖ γὰρ ἴσως ὑποτυπῶσαι πρῶτον, εἶθ’ ὕστερον ἀναγράψαι.δόξειε δ’ ἂν παντὸς εἶναι προαγαγεῖν καὶ διαρθρῶσαι τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα τῇ περιγραφῇ, καὶ ὁ χρόνος τῶν τοιούτων εὑρετὴς ἢ συνεργὸς εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν γεγόνασιν αἱ ἐπιδόσεις· παντὸς γὰρ προσθεῖναι τὸ ἐλλεῖπον.

A line has been drawn around the good in this way. It is perhaps necessary to sketch first and then afterwards to fill it out. It would seem to belong to everyone to bring forward and to distinguish what is well done in outline. And time is a finder and co-worker of such things. Whence also came about the advances of the arts, everyone adding what was lacking.

μὴ πάντα ἐπίστασθαι προθυμέο, μὴ πάντων ἀμαθὴς γένηι.(Democritus, DK 169)

Do not try to understand everything, lest you become ignorant of everything. (Democritus, DK 169)

ἀλλὰ θεοὶ τῶν μὲν μανίην ἀποτρέψατε γλώσσης, ἐκ δ’ ὁσίων στομάτων καθαρὴν ὀχετεύσατε πηγήν καὶ σέ, πολυμνήστη λευκώλενε παρθένε Μοῦσα, ἄντομαι, ὧν θέμις ἐστὶν ἐφημερίοισιν ἀκούειν, πέμπε παρ’ Εύσεβίης ἐλάουσ’ εὐήνιον ἅρμα.μηδέ σέ γ’ εὐδόξοιο βιήσεται ἄνθεα τιμῆς πρὸς θνητῶν ἀνελέσθαι, ἐφ’ <ι θ’ ὁσίης πλέον εἰπεῖν qárse0 - καὶ τότε δὴ σοφίης ἐπ’ ἄκροισι θοάζειν.

ἀλλ’ ἄγ’ ἄθρει πάσηι παλάμηι, πῆι δῆλον ἕκαστον, μήτε τιν’ ὄψιν ἔχων πίστει πλέον ἢ κατ’ ἀκουήν ἢ ἀκοὴν ἐρίδουπον ὑπὲρ τρανώματα γλώσσης, μήτε τι τῶν ἄλλων, ὁπόσηι πόρος ἐστὶ νοῆσαι, γυίων πίστιν ἔρυκε, νόει δ’ ἧι δῆλον ἕκαστον (Empedocles, DK 3)

But gods, turn away from my tongue the madness of those men, and from pious lips guide forth a pure stream. And you, much wooed, white-armed, virgin Muse, I pray to hear such things as are lawful for creatures of a day to hear; send me from piety driving the obedient chariot. Nor shall the flowers of honor from mortals force you to say boldly more than is pious and to move quickly to the heights of wisdom.

But come, observe with every means in which way each thing is clear, neither hold any sight in trust more than hearing, nor loud-sounding hearing above what is made clear by the tongue, nor hold back belief from any of the other limbs where there is any way to perceive, but observe in the way in which each thing is clear. (Empedocles, DK 3)

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book One, 1096a 14-18 :

δόξειη δ’ ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι, καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους ὄντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν φίλοιν ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

It would seem perhaps to be better and necessary in defending the truth even to overthrow one's own, especially being philosophers. For both being friends, it is pious to honor the truth before.

Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, Caput IV:

'´Allwß te: τί τὸ ἐν δαίμοσι κακόν; θυμὸς ἄλογος, ἄνους ἐπιθυμία, φαντασία προπετής.

Thomas Aquinas, Expositio in Librum Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus, Caput IV, Lectio XIX, n. 539:

In nobis autem malum est per hoc quod pars sensitiva non regulatur ratione; et hoc quantum ad tria, scilicet: quantum ad irascibilem...et quantum ad concupiscentiam...et quantum ad phantasiam sive imaginativam quae, dum non regulatur ratione, contra veritatem protervit.

Thomas Aquinas, Quaestio Disputata De Anima (Art. 19, Ad 8):

malum hominis est secundum tria (scilicet phantasiam protervam, quae scilicet est principium errandi.........

ὕβριν χρὴ σβεννύναι μᾶλλον « purka0Én.(Heraclitus, DK 43)

One should quench arrogance more than a conflagration. (Heraclitus, DK 43)

κορυφὰς ἑτέρας ἑτέρηισι προσάπτων μύθων μὴ τελέειν ἀτραπὸν μίαν (Empedocles, DK 24)

Fastening one summit to another, never to complete one path of words [thoughts]. (Empedocles, DK 24)

≤ φίλοι, οἶδα μὲν οὕνεκ’ ἀληθείη πάρα μύθοις, o¨ß ἐγὼ ἐξερέω· μάλα δ’ ἀργαλέη γε τέτυκται ἀνδράσι καὶ δύσζηλος ἐπὶ φρένα πίστιος ὁρμή.(Empedocles, DK 114)

O friends, I know that truth is in the words which I shall speak; but it is very hard [painful, burdensome, troublesome] for men and they are exceedingly jealous of the force of belief on their minds. (Empedocles, DK 114)

St. Augustine, Confessions, Bk.. XII, nn. 33-34 (xxiv, xxv), Great Books, Vol. 18, Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., p. 107:

O my God...can I, with the same confidence wherewith I affirm that...Thou createdst all things visible and invisible, affirm also that Moses meant no other than this when he wrote, ‘In the beginning God made heaven and earth’? No. because I see not in his mind that he thought of this when he wrote these things, as I do see it in Thy truth to be certain. For he might have his thoughts upon God’s commencement of creating, when he said ‘In the beginning’, and by ‘heaven and earth’, in this place he might intend no formed and perfected nature whether spiritual or corporeal, but both of them inchoate and as yet formless. For I perceive that whichsoever of the two has been said, it might have been truly said; but which of the two he thought of in these words. I do not so perceive. Although, whether it were either of these, or any sense beside (that I have not mentioned) which this so great man saw in his mind when he uttered these words, I doubt not but that he saw it truly, and expressed it aptly.

Let no man harass me then, by saying, “Moses thought not as you say, but as I say’; for if he should ask me, ‘How know you that Moses thought that which you infer out of his words?’, I ought to take it in good part, and would answer perchance as I have above, or something more at large, if he were unyielding. But when he saith, ‘Moses meant not what you say, but what I say,’ yet denieth not that what each of us say may both be true, O my God, life of the poor, in whose bosom is no contradiction, pour down a softening dew into my heart, that I may patiently bear with such as say this to me, not because they have a divine Spirit, and have seen in the heart of Thy servant what they speak, but because they be proud, not knowing Moses’ opinion, but loving their own, not because it is truth, but because it is theirs. Otherwise they would equally love another true opinion, as I love what they say when they say true: not because it is theirs, but because it is true. But if they therefore love it because it is true, then is it both theirs and mine; as being in common to all lovers of truth.

But whereas they contend that Moses did not mean what I say, but what they say, this I like not, love not; for though it were so, yet that their rashness belongs not to knowledge, but to overboldness, and not insight but vanity was its parent. And therefore, O Lord, are Thy judgments terrible; seeing Thy truth is neither mine nor his, nor another’s; but belonging to us all, whom Thou callest publicly to partake of it, warning us terribly not to account it private to ourselves, lest we be deprived of it. For whosoever challenges that as proper to himself, which Thou propoundest to all to enjoy, and would have that his own which belongs to all, is driven from what is in common to his own; that is, from truth, to a lie. For he that ‘speaketh a lie, speaketh it of his own.’ (John, 8, v. 44)

ἀλλὰ κακοῖς μὲν κάρτα μέλει κρατέουσιν ἀπιστεῖν· ὡς δὲ Παρ’ ἡμετέρης κέλεται πιστώματα Μούσης, γνῶθι διασσηθέντος ἐνὶ σπλάγχνοισι λόγοιο.(Empedocles, DK 4)

But there is much care in the bad to disbelieve the better; however, know these as most believable things commanded by my Muse, when sifted through by reason in your inward heart. (Empedocles, DK 4)

Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo, Q. VIII, Art. 3, Ad 8:

...humilitas et sapientia inveniuntur in eodem homine, in quantum humilitas ad sapientiam disponit: quia qui humilis est subiicit se sapientibus ad discendum, et non innititur sensui proprio.

Non tamen oportet quod sapientia et humilitas sint in eadem parte animae, quia quod est in inferiori potest disponere ad quod est superioris; sicut bonitas imaginationis disponit ad scientiam.